What is the President proposing to restore the independence of NABU and SAPO? An analysis of Draft Law of Ukraine No. 13533 ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”’
General Context
1. On 23 July, Law No. 4555-ІX entered into force — ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Specifics of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offences Related to the Disappearance of Persons Under Special Circumstances During Martial Law’. It is better known as the ‘law abolishing the independence of NABU and SAPO’ or the ‘law enhancing the role of the Prosecutor General in anti-corruption proceedings’.
Law No. 4555-ІX was initially registered as Draft Law No. 12414 on 16 January 2025 but was significantly expanded and passed in its entirety within a single day — 22 July 2025. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has already provided an analysis of the adopted amendments. In its final version, it introduced changes to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’.
3. In substance, Law No. 4555-ІX addresses four main areas:
1) Procedural powers of the Prosecutor General over SAPO and all prosecutors (the special procedures for exercising procedural oversight over SAPO prosecutors and NABU detectives have been abolished. This undermines the procedural independence of prosecutors and opens the door to abuse of power);
2) Clarification of the grounds for conducting an urgent search (without a ruling from the investigating judge) — amendments to Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine have, on the one hand, narrowed the list of offences for which an urgent search may be conducted and redefined ‘saving property’ as ‘preserving evidence’. On the other hand, they have removed the possibility of conducting urgent searches in corruption and corruption-related cases, which weakens the effectiveness of such investigations;
3) Possibility to change the location of investigating criminal proceedings involving missing persons to the place of residence (or stay) of the victim — amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine, which implement the original intent of Draft Law No. 12414 dated 16 January 2025;
4) Personnel-related amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ — the law enables the recruitment of individuals to the prosecution service without prior work experience and without a competitive selection process, as well as the dismissal of prosecutors who are classified as ‘out of staff’ (dismissed due to the liquidation or reorganisation of departments). This contradicts the conclusions expressed by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024 and effectively bypasses guarantees of independence through so-called ‘personnel purges’.
4. On 23 July, the President of Ukraine stated that he would ‘propose to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine a draft law that will be the answer — that will strengthen the law enforcement system’, and on 24 July that ‘the text of the draft law, which guarantees the real reinforcement of Ukraine’s law enforcement system, the independence of anti-corruption bodies, and the reliable protection of the law enforcement system from any russian influence or interference’, had been agreed. The draft law was registered under No. 13533. What follows is an analysis of this draft law.
Analysis of the Draft Law
5. The Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”’ concerns two components of Law No. 4555-ІX (excluding the personnel-related provisions on the prosecution service and the provisions on missing persons) outlined above. Additionally, it introduces a mechanism for polygraph testing of NABU and SAPO staff who have access to state secrets — to be conducted by the internal control units of NABU and SAPO following the methodology of the SSU. It also provides for a six-month screening of NABU detectives and SAPO prosecutors with access to state secrets, which will be carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, this applies to all law enforcement and prosecution bodies.
6. Regarding the procedural component. The draft law repeals all procedural restrictions on SAPO introduced by Law No. 4555-ІX (amendments to Articles 3, 36, 37, 39, 40, 40-1, 41, 216, 218, 284, 294, 470, 480, 481, and amendments to Section XI ‘Transitional Provisions’). Moreover, these procedural restrictions applied not only to SAPO but to all prosecutors. However, the mechanism for ‘requisitioning’ case materials for review by the Prosecutor General or third parties (prosecutors) remains — except for NABU proceedings. In other words, these amendments continue to undermine the procedural independence of all prosecutors (apart from SAPO). Yet the entire rationale behind implementing EU standards was the opposite — to expand prosecutors’ procedural independence, not to return to the old supervisory practices of the prosecution service (in the context of the function of ‘oversight of legality’).
It likewise repeals the restrictions on the Head of SAPO regarding the management of SAPO prosecutors, which had been introduced into the relevant law (amendments to Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’).
7. Regarding the grounds for conducting urgent searches. The grounds for conducting urgent searches (without a ruling from an investigating judge) are returned to their original version (amendments to Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine).
Overall, Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC already contains an appropriate mechanism for conducting a search without a judge’s ruling, namely: (1) conducting the urgent search; (2) applying to the investigating judge for judicial oversight; (3) legalisation of the search results by the investigating judge — resolving whether there were valid grounds, which subsequently affects the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence obtained. In this regard, the issue lies more in weak judicial oversight than in the regulatory framework itself. The European Court of Human Rights, in its recent judgment in Korniyets and Others v. Ukraine (10 July 2025), rightly noted that the key matter is one of discretion — and judicial control should serve to neutralise any abuse. Therefore, urgent searches may exist as a tool, but must comply with the principle of the rule of law.
8. Regarding amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine. The draft law retains the amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine, which allow for the change of location of a pre-trial investigation of criminal offences during martial law upon the request of a victim who is a close relative or family member of a person who has gone missing under special circumstances. At the request of such a person, the location is changed to the place of residence (or stay) of the victim, who is a close relative or family member of the person who has gone missing under such circumstances. These amendments reflect the original intent of Draft Law No. 12414 dated 16 January 2025 and can generally be assessed positively, as they address a practical issue in the operations of law enforcement agencies — primarily the National Police of Ukraine. It is worth noting that the ‘opposition’ Draft Law No. 13531 dated 24 July 2025 (MP I. Sovsun and others) also retains this provision.
9. Regarding personnel matters in the prosecution service. The possibility of appointing prosecutors to the prosecution service without a competitive selection process, as well as dismissals resulting from being declared ‘out of staff’ due to the reorganisation or liquidation of a prosecutorial body, remains in place. The draft law does not repeal the amendments to Articles 41, 51, 60 and Section XIII ‘Transitional Provisions’ of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’. These amendments do not comply with EU standards regarding merit-based recruitment to the prosecution service through open competition and run counter to Ukraine’s broader commitments to European integration. The provision on dismissing individuals classified as ‘out of staff’ in effect constitutes non-compliance with Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024 of the CCU dated 18 December 2024 — and is thus unconstitutional. The mechanism introduced, under which a prosecutor is offered a position and dismissed in case of repeated refusal, can easily be manipulated — for instance, by offering positions in lower-level prosecutor’s offices or in offices facing severe staffing shortages due to proximity to active combat zones (e.g. district prosecutor’s offices in areas of Sumy region near the border with the russian federation).
10. Regarding screenings by the SSU. The Final and Transitional Provisions of the draft law introduce the following mechanism for the ‘purging of anti-corruption bodies from the influence of russian intelligence services’:
10.1 The internal control unit of NABU and other law enforcement bodies, the PGO, and SAPO shall, using a methodology agreed with the SSU, conduct polygraph examinations of law enforcement personnel and prosecutors of the PGO and SAPO who have access to state secrets, at least once every two years, in order to detect actions taken in favour of the aggressor state.
10.2 Within six months from the date this law enters into force, the SSU shall conduct screenings of employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and other law enforcement bodies, as well as prosecutors of the PGO and SAPO who have access to state secrets, to identify any actions taken in favour of the aggressor state.
Thus, the core idea behind the President of Ukraine’s ‘compromise’ amendments is the ‘purging’ of NABU from the influence of russian intelligence services. The information campaign that damaged NABU’s reputation following the searches and arrests on 21 July created the impression that this is a widespread issue within NABU. However, no adequate evidence or sufficiently transparent communication from the SSU has been provided.
Such screenings may serve as a means of exerting pressure on NABU and SAPO, as well as grounds for granting the SSU access to covert investigative materials in NABU and SAPO proceedings. Furthermore, this could be viewed as a form of subordinating NABU to the SSU by introducing a mechanism of continuous polygraph checks. This undermines the institutional independence of NABU and SAPO, which has been built over the past ten years in the course of implementing the state’s anti-corruption policy.
11. Regarding asset tracing. The Final and Transitional Provisions of the draft law envisage the development of a range of legislative initiatives.
11.1 The Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice are tasked with intensifying efforts to trace and secure the extradition of individuals from foreign states who are evading pre-trial investigation, judicial proceedings, or the execution of sentences. If necessary, within three months from the date this law enters into force, they shall — jointly with the Cabinet of Ministers — develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law with the relevant legislative amendments.
11.2 The Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Asset Recovery and Management Agency of Ukraine (ARMA), NABU, the ESBU, SBI, SSU, NPU, and the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine are also instructed to strengthen efforts to identify, trace, and recover from foreign jurisdictions assets obtained through criminal means. If necessary, within three months of the law’s entry into force, they shall — jointly with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine — develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law with the relevant legislative amendments.
11.3 The CMU and NABU shall, within one month from the date this law enters into force, amend the relevant regulatory acts to prohibit, for the duration of martial law, the travel abroad of employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, except in cases of official business trips.
In other words, during martial law, NABU employees will be entirely prohibited from travelling abroad (except for official duty trips), including for purposes such as leave. Furthermore, the procedure for approving official trips may involve a number of bureaucratic constraints, which could become grounds for abuse.
General Conclusion of the ALI
The draft law proposed by the President of Ukraine represents a compromise on the issue of safeguarding the procedural independence of SAPO, as well as of all prosecutors (with the exception of certain problematic instruments). It repeals all limitations on the procedural independence of SAPO introduced by Law No. 4555-ІX. However, it encroaches on the institutional independence (autonomy) of NABU and SAPO through the introduction of ongoing polygraph screenings conducted by the SSU or in accordance with SSU methodology. In general, these screenings apply to all law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies.
The grounds for conducting urgent searches (without an investigating judge’s ruling) are returned to the original version of the provision in the CPC of Ukraine.
At the same time, the negative provisions concerning personnel matters in the prosecution service have not been repealed. For example, it will remain possible to appoint individuals to the prosecution service without a competitive selection process (in violation of EU standards), and to dismiss them in cases of liquidation or reorganisation of a prosecutorial body (in violation of CCU Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024).
