ALI material for Ukrainska Pravda
The Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation is unique in numerous aspects. It is the first time in the history of the Ukrainian parliamentary system that the majority is in the composition of one ruling party, i.e., a mono-majority.
Approximately 80% of newly elected members of parliament are people without any prior experience in politics. For more than two years, they have been working under martial law without any break, although, at the moment, it is unknown how long this office will last. This last fact is highly ironic if we recall some narratives in the media and in the public space after the changes in the newly elected president’s team were made: the people around, in particular, MPs, were perceived as “one-time.”
Life definitely was not preparing the newbies for the problems and shocks they finally faced. The first was the COVID-19 pandemic, and since 24 February 2022 – the biggest ordeal for the Ukrainian statehood since its independence – the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.
Although under ordinary circumstances, the term of the ninth convocation should have already expired, it is currently extended for an indefinite term. But there is still a question of how long it will be able to work. The parliament has been incomplete from the very beginning (424 MPs took the oath instead of 450), and in connection with the full-scale war, it continues to lose its MPs. Previously, the ALI analysed who of the members of parliament could be the following candidates to leave. Now, we will consider how the Verkhovna Rada has changed in quantity within five years, what this means, and how unique this situation is for the Ukrainian parliament.
So, 51 members of parliament have already resigned prematurely. This is about 12% of the primary composition of the Verkhovna Rada in August 2019. Instead, 30 new members of parliament have come to the Verkhovna Rada. That is, vacancies were filled by 2/3.
Today, there are 401 members of parliament in the Verkhovna Rada. And this is the historical minimum over the total history of Ukraine’s independence. MPs see problems in the strengthening of this trend, as it is unknown how long the term of this convocation is going to last under the conditions of war. In addition, according to Davyd Arakhamia, leader of the Servant of the People faction, at least 17 representatives of his faction have applied to resign.
This trend bears certain threats. One of the biggest ones, which MPs constantly emphasise, is changes in the factional affiliation of MPs.
How has the faction composition changed over the five years?
Although most factions manage to replace the party-list MPs even in wartime quickly, they still lose their MPs due to internal conflicts or corruption scandals. Although the Servant of the People has replaced almost all of the resigned MPs, its number has decreased by 14 over the five years. The number of the MP group, which during the convocation traditionally supported the mono-majority – “For the Future” – decreased too, and the number of non-factional members of parliament almost halved.
Besides, MPs, whose usefulness equals zero, still “work” in the Verkhovna Rada (or are rather included in the list). For example, although he is a member of parliament, Oleksandr Dubinskyi last participated in the voting in October 2023. Other well-known absentees who do not burden themselves with professional duties are Stepan Ivakhiv (absent during voting since August 2022), Anzhelika Labunska (absent almost for the entire period of the ninth convocation), and Fedir Khrystenko (absent almost during the entire period of the ninth convocation and last registered for voting in February 2022). But these are just a few names. There are many more absentees in the Verkhovna Rada.
Numerous conflicts in the largest faction led to the destruction of the mono-majority: the Servant of the People has been experiencing difficulties with collecting votes to adopt certain draft laws, and the adoption of draft laws using the votes of party members only is not even discussed. As a result, they had to set up coalitions with previously “non-handshake” MPs of the former Opposition Platform – For Life, who, however, later started supporting the mono-majority in many cases the ban of this faction. One of the telling examples is voting for the law on fair lobbying. It would not have been adopted in the second reading without the votes of the Platform for Life and Peace (PLP) and the Restoration of Ukraine MP group because, except for them, only 210 MPs voted for it. Or voting for the draft law on medical cannabis, where MPs of these two groups could be used just for support: without which exactly 226 members of parliament voted for this document in the second reading (and PLP and the Restoration of Ukraine accumulatively gave another 22 votes).
So why did MPs resign prematurely?
A member of parliament can resign prematurely at their request if they file a respective application. This usually happens because they were appointed to a position in the government, central or local governments, etc., or due to personal circumstances. Other grounds for prematurely losing a mandate may be a guilty verdict, the member’s incapacity status, loss of citizenship, disappearance, death, or departure for permanent residence abroad.
Although the legislation offers an extensive list of reasons for the premature termination of MP powers, in 40 out of 51 (i.e., 78%) cases, the formal reason is the filing of a personal written statement: hence, some MPs of the banned Opposition Platform – for Life resigned “at their request,” and so did the controversial “servant of the people” Oleksandr Trukhin. At the same time, the most prominent officials of the Opposition Platform – for Life lost their mandates, namely after Volodymyr Zelenskyy had deprived them of their citizenship. These are Viktor Medvedchuk, Taras Kozak, Ihor Vasylkovskyi, Renat Kuzmin, Andriy Derkach, and Vadym Rabinovych. Besides, in 2020, Sviatoslav Vakarchuk filed an application for a premature termination of his mandate, but it did not receive the required number of votes. For this reason, he had to apply the provision of law on the loss of mandate due to leaving the Holos party faction from the list to which he had been elected.
However, let’s have a more profound look at what was behind the “filing of written applications for terminating the powers” by MPs. We identified six main reasons (most of them coincide with those prescribed by the law) for the premature dismissal of members of parliament.
The most frequent is obtaining a position in the government, central governments, law enforcement agencies, or local governments. Due to this career advancement, 20 members of parliament of the current convocation resigned. Ten more members of parliament resigned for personal reasons. The next nine members of parliament were representatives of the pro-Russian Opposition Platform – for Life faction which is banned. Their long-term systemic anti-Ukrainian activity provoked a radical public demand to deprive them of their mandates, but the Verkhovna Rada was limited in its ability to do so because the Constitution does not stipulate any grounds for such cases. So, although they left the Verkhovna Rada formally of their own free will, in fact, they did so under compulsion: the ostracism of other members of parliament and the possibility of getting real criminal sentences while remaining in Ukraine.
Six members of parliament lost their mandates automatically due to the loss of citizenship. The powers of the other three members of parliament were terminated because of tragic circumstances – death.
The only member of parliament, Mykhailo Zabrodskyi, resigned as he decided to focus on helping the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
Who was replaced?
According to peacetime regulations, if a member of parliament resigns prematurely, another MP shall take their place. The method of electing a member of parliament matters: if they came as part of the party list, they will be replaced by the next candidate from the same list; if the candidate represents the majority district, then in the event of their dismissal, the district must hold elections of the next representative. However, as the Constitution of Ukraine does not stipulate elections during martial law, all seats of candidates from majority districts who left the Verkhovna Rada after the beginning of a full-scale war shall remain vacant until it ends.
So, as of the end of July 2024, 30 new members of parliament had joined the Verkhovna Rada since the beginning of the tenure. Almost all of them were party-list members, namely 23 MPs. In addition, before the beginning of a full-scale war, they managed to elect seven majority district candidates: most (four persons) were from the Servant of the People faction, two persons were from the then-existing Opposition Platform – for Life, and another MP, Yulia Svitlychna, won the elections as a self-nominated candidate and remained non-factional.
So, although the Verkhovna Rada managed to fill about 2/3 of the vacant seats as of the end of April this year, the total number of members of parliament, nevertheless, decreased by 23 persons (that is, by about 5%) compared to the beginning of the convocation.
Premature termination of mandates: is the ninth convocation unique?
Although the circumstances under which the ninth convocation is forced to work are unique, the problem with the premature dismissal of many MPs is not new. In reality, the Verkhovna Rada has been in an even worse situation (and this happened even during relatively peaceful times).
The situation was still worse in the first convocation when it was possible to replace only about half of the members of parliament who resigned. It is also worth taking into account the peculiarities of data: in some convocations, the number of MPs who took the oath later than others is greater than the number of those who resigned prematurely. That is, newbie MPs did not necessarily replace those who resigned but could come later due to, for example, additional elections in some districts, the availability of technical obstacles, or court proceedings (in the ninth convocation, Serhii Rudyk took the oath later than others due to the latter reason). In general, the resigned members of parliament could be fully replaced only in the sixth convocation (with the 100% Proportional Representation Voting System).
Instead, the most critical moment occurred in the fifth convocation. This situation is known as the 2007 parliamentary crisis. It had been developing gradually since 2006, when the parliament of the fifth convocation started working, but was still unable to form a capable and effective coalition. For this reason, President Viktor Yushchenko issued a decree on the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada but got protests due to the unconstitutionality of such a decision. After that, members of parliament who failed to create a new coalition started leaving the factions en masse to lose their mandates. The situation peaked in the summer of 2007: as of 15 June, there were 151 MPs, while, according to the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada shall lose its legitimacy if at least 150 members of parliament are deprived of their mandates prematurely.
Although the ninth convocation is still far from a disaster (it is at least 69 possible dismissals away from the complete loss of the capacity to make decisions), the tendency to the reduction in the number of MPs, against the background of a lack of a distinct prospect that martial law will end, bears its threats: from loss of efficiency to loss of legitimacy.
Currently, it is unknown how many members of parliament are very close to leaving the Verkhovna Rada. Still, potentially, those who have already expressed their desire to resign or are thinking about it will have less motivation to work effectively because they are kept only by the unwillingness of others to vote for such applications.
However, we must credit the ninth convocation: it is still holding on and retaining its decision-making power. In addition, the President’s Office factor shall be taken into account: in recent years, on the one hand, it has been increasing its pressure on the Verkhovna Rada, and on the other, there is control (starting with the agenda up to the provisions of individual draft laws). This undermines the already shaky credibility of the most important democratic institution, which is happening at the height of a great war. Although the President’s Office may be impressed by the idea of a controlled parliament that will support any decision “from above,” such a situation would not benefit anyone. An incapable, and what is still worse, an illegitimate parliament is a verdict for the total system of making and legalising decisions still existing and functioning. By the way, external critics of the parliament and its political management should remember this: it is impossible to tolerate the purely harmful activities of individual members of parliament and individual representatives of the political leadership team because the price for this may be the institution that embodies Ukrainian independence and Ukrainian democracy.
