Carthage Has Fallen: How Ruslan Kravchenko Tightened His Grip on the Prosecution Service — and What Comes Next

Rumours that Ruslan Kravchenko might resign as Prosecutor General first surfaced on 12 December 2025. But he quickly denied them on his personal Facebook page and threatened: ‘I’ll come after each and every one of you myself.’ 

Less than a year later, Kravchenko submitted his resignation amid corruption scandals at the Prosecutor General’s Office. The Verkhovna Rada must now approve his dismissal. That is a remarkably swift end to his tenure, but it does not solve the core problems of the prosecution service — one side of the justice triangle.

This is not only about one criminal proceeding or the people involved in it. Operation ‘Carthage’ by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) exposed a much deeper institutional problem: over the past year, the prosecution service has become even more dependent on whoever happens to occupy the Prosecutor General’s office.

Ruslan Kravchenko’s work came under regular criticism from the outset. His priorities did not match the challenges of wartime, European integration reforms stalled and, in some areas, went into reverse, while ‘manual control’ and the appointment of unqualified people to managerial positions took hold across the prosecution service.

In that sense, ‘Carthage’ is only the tip of the iceberg. It showed how costly a system becomes when staffing decisions increasingly depend on the will of one leader rather than on professional competence, while internal safeguards weaken or disappear altogether.

After Kravchenko’s departure, Ukraine will therefore have to answer two questions at once. Who will be the next Prosecutor General? And what should be done with the system his successor will inherit — a system damaged under Kravchenko? As for what comes next for Ruslan Kravchenko himself, further SAPO materials may provide the answer.

The direction of the prosecution service under Kravchenko became clear almost immediately after his appointment. On 24 June 2025, with a single signature, he undid a year’s work by the prosecution service and international experts on a pilot project for selecting heads of prosecution offices, which envisaged a gradual shift towards competitive appointments. Kravchenko abolished the rules governing the personnel reserve for managerial positions in the prosecution service, just as the reserve was nearing completion. The reserve was no cure-all for staffing problems, of course. But it was meant to help move the system gradually from backroom recruitment towards transparent selection based on clear criteria of professional competence and integrity.

The scandal over prosecutors’ ‘fake’ disabilities was equally revealing. After taking office, Ruslan Kravchenko promised to get to the bottom of the scandal that had cost his predecessor, Andrii Kostin, his job in 2024. Rather than pursue criminal proceedings, the Prosecutor General simply sent complaints to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) and waited for the outcome. Unsurprisingly, that did not answer the central question — whether the disability statuses had been obtained unlawfully. To this day, the prosecutors have not been held criminally liable and have faced barely any disciplinary consequences: 80% of the disciplinary cases were simply closed, while the prosecutors continue to receive payments. Some lost managerial positions but stayed on as rank-and-file prosecutors. What is more, some have even had their disability status restored by courts after the notorious scandal. Kravchenko effectively stepped away from the problem, tried to shift responsibility onto an independent body and made their impunity all the more obvious.

The prosecution service under Kravchenko then moved towards an even more ‘manual’ model of management. Early in his tenure, he tried to justify simplified appointment procedures by citing a ‘staffing shortage’ in the prosecution service that he had simply invented. During the July 2025 attack on the anti-corruption bodies, Parliament adopted Law No. 4555-IX, which stripped the NABU and SAPO of their procedural independence. Investigative reporting points to Kravchenko’s active role in that move — and to the benefit he secured in return: the abolition of competitive selection for managerial positions in the prosecution service. After the protests, some provisions affecting the NABU and SAPO were amended. But the damaging changes to the prosecution service remained.

Competitive selection was suspended for the duration of martial law — since August 2025, anyone with a law degree can be appointed to a position in the Prosecutor General’s Office or a regional prosecutor’s office. The Prosecutor General’s procedural powers were expanded, further strengthening his influence over all prosecutors. He can now issue instructions directly to an investigator, bypassing the prosecutor handling the case, and call in particular criminal proceedings for review, effectively freezing them.

The restrictions lawmakers had sought to impose on the NABU and SAPO were instead left in place for other law enforcement bodies and the prosecution service. In practice, the Prosecutor General can therefore interfere in cases handled, for example, by the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine and the National Police of Ukraine, whether to pursue his own ideas or to defend other political interests.

Institutional reforms of the prosecution service — competitive selection for managerial positions, rather than only rank-and-file posts, stronger prosecutorial self-governance, random allocation of criminal proceedings, a new evaluation system and improvements to disciplinary procedures — were effectively put on hold under Kravchenko.

By contrast, the Prosecutor General made the protection of children’s rights his priority. The Prosecutor General’s Office began assigning heads of regional and district prosecution offices to personally prosecute high-profile cases involving murders and rapes of children, even though they were less familiar with the cases than the prosecutors who had handled them from the outset. The prosecution service also sought broader powers to coordinate other state bodies in the field of child protection. Experts saw two risks in this practice: a gradual return to the Soviet-totalitarian concept of ‘general supervision’, which Ukraine had moved away from through earlier reforms, and the replacement of specialised juvenile prosecutors by administrative managers.

Ukraine, meanwhile, lost an entire year of prosecution reform and, worse, has left the next Prosecutor General with an even weaker starting position. Kravchenko bears direct responsibility for this backsliding — something that has surprised even European bureaucrats. In meetings with international partners, he said one thing and did the opposite.

Until August 2025, the only way to become a prosecutor was through a competition administered by the QDCP. Only then could prosecutors ‘move up’ through the system. Those already in the system had undergone that kind of vetting. That meant it was impossible simply to bring ‘your own’ person straight into the Prosecutor General’s Office, and putting them through a competition was cumbersome. Law No. 4555-IX removed precisely this demanding entry route into the profession. Kravchenko made active use of the opportunities it created.

Under the new rules, for example, Serhii Kropyva joined the Prosecutor General’s Office in August 2025. A former cyber police official and deputy head of the Odesa Regional Military Administration, he was appointed to a managerial position in the Department of International Cooperation without an open competition. What is more, he had never previously served as a prosecutor.

According to experts at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, under the new rules more than a thousand people entered the system without competitive selection or a prior competitive assessment of their professional competence and integrity. Kravchenko personally ‘reshuffled’ the prosecution service’s leadership, undermining the quality of management.

That is why simply restoring the old rules is no longer enough. Ukraine will also have to change management practices and scrutinise the staffing decisions made over the past year.

Kravchenko is leaving, but his appointees remain — and they are the ones running the prosecution service. They have largely shaped the institution’s public image over the past year. But the prosecution service is part of the justice system, and Kravchenko does not represent all prosecutors.

A crisis or political turbulence at the very top should not cast a shadow over the institution as a whole, or over the thousands of prosecutors who continue to do their jobs conscientiously.

Many competent, high-integrity professionals remain in the system. Under Kravchenko, however, some were pushed to the margins of management decision-making, while others left the prosecution service altogether. These are the people who should be leading the prosecution service, including by serving on prosecutorial self-governance bodies that should develop in line with European standards. In a democratic state, the prosecution service is not a ‘law enforcement body’ built around a rigid executive chain of command. It is an important part of the justice system, which guarantees a degree of independence for both judges and prosecutors. Their decisions are dictated by law, not by superiors. At the same time, self-governance decentralises the system, limits the powers of heads of prosecution offices, including the Prosecutor General, and protects prosecutors from unlawful pressure, above all political pressure.

Judging the entire institution solely through the actions or inaction of its head means ignoring the reality on the ground and devaluing the work of those who continue to ensure the fair administration of justice.

For the system to work effectively and remain resilient regardless of who holds the office of Prosecutor General, it is critical to focus on far-reaching institutional reforms.

First, Ukraine needs to repeal the damaging provisions of Law No. 4555-IX and restore transparent competitive selection at every level of the prosecution service. The prosecutorial corps should be formed on the basis of professional competence, integrity and meritocracy, not loyalty to the leadership. In addition, effective prosecutorial self-governance should become the foundation of an independent prosecution service. Its bodies must become genuine collective bodies rather than nominal appendages to the chain of command, capable of protecting prosecutors’ procedural independence from administrative pressure and ensuring fair disciplinary procedures. Ukraine must also deliver on its EU commitments  a new evaluation system, random allocation of criminal proceedings, improved disciplinary procedures and other reforms.

The staffing decisions of the past year also require separate attention. There is no lawful way simply to dismiss prosecutors appointed during this period. Heads appointed without competitive procedures should face heightened scrutiny both from internal control units within the prosecution service and from law enforcement bodies more broadly.

There is another problem with appointing a new Prosecutor General: time. After Andrii Kostin resigned in autumn 2024, the president spent another eight months looking for a successor. As we can now see, that lengthy search can hardly be called a success.

The same transitional period could recur. By law, in the Prosecutor General’s absence, their powers are exercised by the First Deputy Prosecutor General or, if there is no first deputy, by one of the deputies.

At present, First Deputy Prosecutor General Mariia Vdovychenko features in covert recordings from Operation ‘Carthage’ and, according to journalists, was preparing a fresh attack on the anti-corruption bodies. On 8 September, Vdovychenko submitted her resignation, so under the allocation of duties, the role passes to Deputy Prosecutor General Maksym Krym.

At the same time, appointing the next Prosecutor General under the current closed procedure would effectively take Ukraine straight back to the point where the Kravchenko story began.

Ukraine therefore needs a transitional solution. Its task is much simpler: to prevent another candidate who lacks competence and integrity from being appointed Prosecutor General while a new permanent model is not yet in place.

But can the president do this alone? Probably not. The voice of the professional community matters too, as do the support and trust of those in the profession who will ultimately have to work with this person. An assessment by that community would allow the public to see who the candidate is, what experience they have and whether they meet integrity standards. That would make the process clearer and more transparent and help build trust. The president should therefore submit prospective nominees for an assessment of competence and integrity before formally nominating one to Parliament.

One possible mechanism would be preliminary screening of candidates by the existing Ethics Council. It assesses candidates for the High Council of Justice (HCJ) against the criteria of professional ethics and integrity. The Ethics Council has six members: three judges or retired judges nominated by the Council of Judges of Ukraine and three international experts. It is an existing institutional framework with experience in reviewing asset declarations and information from state registers and open sources, as well as assessing reputational risks and professional ethics. It has been operating since 2022.

In the future, this function should be performed by a reformed Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine or through a new competitive procedure, depending on the model Ukraine chooses after consultations with the Venice Commission.

Involving the Ethics Council at this stage would therefore be a bridge towards depoliticising the procedure for appointing the Prosecutor General. It would buy Ukraine more time to carry out the longer-term reform properly.

For several years, the European Union has been urging Ukraine to reduce political influence over the appointment of the Prosecutor General. The European Commission explicitly requires Ukraine to depoliticise the procedure for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General and make it transparent and merit-based, with the involvement of the prosecutorial corps.

Ukraine currently has several ways to meet these EU requirements. One is an open competition involving international experts. MPs registered the relevant Draft Law No. 15343 in Parliament in June 2026.

Another model envisages a greater role for the professional community and a reformed Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine in the preliminary assessment of candidates. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has already analysed both approaches and their constitutional risks in detail, because the Constitution of Ukraine cannot be amended under martial law.

The problem now is not that Ukraine has to choose between these models within a few days. It is that neither of them can start working immediately. Each option requires legislative amendments, their implementation, the establishment of the necessary bodies, the launch of the relevant procedures and, ultimately, the selection itself.

Permanent rules and procedures are needed for years to come. A Prosecutor General is needed now.