In Ukraine, the interaction between citizens and public institutions is governed simultaneously by the current Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ (No. 393/96-VR of 2 October 1996) and by the recently adopted Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’ (No. 2073-IX of 15 December 2023). However, these two acts rest on different governance logics. The Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ introduces a more modern model of public administration, aligned with European standards and oriented towards taking an individual decision on the merits of a case. The Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’, by contrast, retains a more traditional, post-communist approach centred on the obligation to provide a reply within a set deadline. As a result, situations that are identical in substance — complaints, requests, reports of violations, or requests to resolve an individual matter — may fall under two different procedures (stipulated by two different laws). This is inconvenient for the individual, as it obscures which mechanism should actually be used to resolve a problem. At the administrative level, this duality effectively leaves the choice of procedure to the authorities’ discretion, encourages formal responses rather than genuine resolution, and reduces both the predictability and the effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights.

The specific problem has been described in:

1. the European Commission’s enlargement reports on Ukraine for 2024 and 2025: the sections devoted to public administration reform (2025) state explicitly that Ukraine has still not met the requirement to adopt a Law ‘On Appeals’ that would clearly distinguish administrative procedures from other forms of public petition;
2. the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, which requires the current Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ to be aligned with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and with European legislation, and a new law to be adopted by the end of the fourth quarter of 2025.

The continued parallel existence of two different approaches to handling appeals (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’) creates a number of systemic risks for both the state and citizens, namely:

• it reduces the predictability of interaction with the state: citizens find it difficult to understand the rules under which an authority will consider a particular appeal and whether this will lead to a genuine resolution or merely to a formal reply;
• this uncertainty reinforces a formalistic style of response: rather than resolving the underlying problem, authorities often confine themselves to issuing a reply within the prescribed deadline, which diminishes the practical effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights; 
• it generates duplication of procedures and additional administrative burden, since similar matters may follow different legal routes and give rise to repeated appeals and challenges;
• it creates risks for the European integration process. In the approach taken by the EU and the OECD, a clear distinction between the two functions of the state is essential: administrative procedure means taking binding individual decisions with procedural safeguards for the individual, whereas the appeals mechanism is a feedback channel between society and the state. This distinction is crucial, as it ensures a balance between individual rights and administrative effectiveness.

The problem of duplication and inconsistency in the regulation of appeals is currently being addressed through the government’s draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024), which is intended to define how the right of persons to apply to public authorities is exercised and to separate the two channels of interaction between citizens and the public authorities:

• administrative procedure (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’): used where a person applies to obtain an individual administrative decision (a permit, registration, licence, or other decision on the merits of a case);
• the appeals mechanism (the new Law ‘On Appeals’): covering proposals, reports of problems, comments, and other forms of communication that do not entail an individual authoritative decision concerning a person’s rights.

To give effect to this approach, draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ proposes the following innovations:

1. a clear definition of the purpose and a classification of proposal-type appeals (proposals, recommendations, comments, and reports of problems);
2. the introduction of a single procedure for considering all appeals;
3. clarification of the range of entities obliged to consider appeals, with a focus on public administration bodies;
4. extension of the right to submit appeals beyond Ukrainian citizens to other natural and legal persons;
5. stronger legal certainty for applicants as to ‘whom to approach’ and ‘under which procedure’;
6. removal of complaints from the appeals mechanism and the transfer of their full regulation to the sphere of administrative procedure, in line with EU standards;
7. institutionalisation of in-person reception of citizens as a component of the work of public authorities, while allowing it to be delegated to authorised officials.

Draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted in the first reading as a basis on 24 April 2024 and is currently being prepared for the second reading.

Although draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024) is intended to separate administrative procedure from the appeals mechanism, its revised version does not fully resolve the key systemic problems that give rise to certain risks, namely:

• Risk of institutional uncertainty in the appeals-handling system. The reference to ‘other entities designated by the head of a state authority, an authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, or a local self-government body, within whose powers the matters raised fall’ creates legal uncertainty as to whether the law applies to housing maintenance offices, hospitals, schools, social protection bodies, and other providers of public services.

This will lead to:

1. a regulatory ‘grey zone’: some citizens’ appeals remain outside the legal framework (covered neither by the new law nor by the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’);
2. inequality among citizens: depending on whether a reviewing body recognises itself as such, a person may or may not receive a reply to their appeal;
3. an erosion of the authorities’ legitimacy: citizens will not know whom to approach, or whether their appeal will be considered at all.

The core problem: in the absence of clear criteria, the law will be interpreted by the very bodies that consider appeals, at their own discretion, creating a risk of manipulation and of blocking unwelcome communications.

• Risk of formalistic responses to appeals owing to insufficient time to prepare them. Short deadlines for preparing a reply create an unrealistic pace of administration, particularly under martial law.

This leads to:

1. the formalisation of appeal handling: rather than substantive consideration, authorities will be compelled to issue template replies to ‘meet’ the deadline;
2. inevitable breaches of reply deadlines: staff shortages and heavy workloads make compliance with such deadlines practically impossible;
3. the provocation of additional appeals: any formal failure to meet the deadlines becomes grounds for a new appeal, creating a vicious circle.

The core problem: excessively short deadlines encourage ‘brush-off’ replies instead of substantive communication between the state’s representative and the author of the appeal.

• Risk to European integration and to EU support. Retaining in the draft law both the appellant’s ability to challenge the reply of the body considering the appeal and the excessively short deadlines for preparing a reply — which encourage formalistic handling — runs counter to Ukraine’s commitments under Cluster 1 of the EU negotiating framework (the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, and the rule of law).

Retaining these shortcomings weakens Ukraine’s position in the EU accession negotiations.

The core problem: the draft law meant to eliminate competition with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and to bring Ukrainian appeals practice into line with European practice instead retains provisions that reproduce that very competition.

Conclusion

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Clarify the range of ‘other entities considering appeals’ in draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ by adding to it institutions that perform public administration functions, provide public services, or carry out public tasks.
• Remove from draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ the right to challenge a reply to an appeal, retaining only the right to challenge a failure to reply or a refusal to consider an appeal.
• Reconsider the excessively short deadlines for handling appeals. It would be advisable to extend the 15-day deadline for providing a reply to the EU standard of 30 days, and to reconsider the obligation to forward an appeal to the competent body within five days.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• The appeals system should become an instrument of feedback between the state and society and a source of governance analytics for identifying systemic problems and improving the quality of public services. Accordingly, implementation of the Law ‘On Appeals’ should provide for (1) its transformation into a tool of evidence-based policy-making, (2) the creation of a national system for analysing appeals, (3) the integration of this analysis into assessments of the performance of public authorities, and (4) a shift towards using feedback to adjust public policy and improve services.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives attended a meeting about the regulation of parliamentary majority and opposition powers in Ukraine. Organised by the National Democratic Institute, the event was also attended by Members of Parliament, representatives of political parties, civil society organisations, academics and experts. An Analytical Note on the regulation of the powers of the parliamentary majority and opposition was also shared at the event.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, the ALI’s Deputy Executive Director for Analytics, outlined the concept of legislative enshrinement of the opposition’s status. This concept was originally designed in 2022 by the Sub-group on Regulating the Status of the Opposition, which was part of the Working Group on Parliamentary Reform. The ALI was a member of this Sub-group.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi highlighted that the Sub-group’s key insight was the rejection of the perception that the opposition is a unified entity, given that Ukrainian parliamentary practice is far more intricate. In fact, it is more accurate to refer to a pluralistic opposition, or even to opposition factions that may collaborate ad hoc, rather than to the opposition as a unified whole.

In terms of the definition of the word ‘opposition’, the Sub-group had set out several potential criteria:

• Factions in which the majority of registered members did not vote in favour of the Government’s appointment (or of the majority of Government members) — a mandatory criterion;
• Factions in which the majority of registered members did not vote in favour of the Government’s programme — an optional criterion;
• Factions that have declared themselves to be in opposition or have signed an opposition list — an optional criterion.

The concept also acknowledges the separation of responsibilities between the majority and the opposition. The majority is responsible for policymaking, while the opposition focuses on parliamentary oversight. The opposition must have access to the necessary tools and levers, including the appointment of committee chairs with clear oversight responsibilities.

Members of Parliament of the 9th convocation must address the issue of regulating the status of the parliamentary opposition alongside other long-awaited decisions. Among these tasks are adopting the Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament, passing the Parliamentary Service Law, and establishing a framework for a special oversight committee on intelligence matters for the next parliamentary convocation.

The Concept of Reforming Local Self-Government and Territorial Organisation of Power in Ukraine set out, as early as 2014, the objective of achieving an optimal distribution of powers between local self-government bodies (LSGBs) and state authorities. Despite this, the proper delineation of powers between the various levels of public administration remains an open question and has yet to be conclusively resolved. The absence of such delineation sustains the excessive (post-communist) centralisation of public administration, entrenches an ineffective model of power-sharing between central state authorities and LSGBs, undermines the achievements of Ukraine’s decentralisation reform, and does not conform to the European principles governing the distribution of powers across levels of public governance. In practical terms, the lack of delineation gives rise to conflicts of competence, the inefficient use of resources, and the dependence of local self-government on ‘manual’ control from the centre.

The specific problem has been set out in the following documents:

• the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027,which sets the task of bringing into force, by 31 March 2026, legislation delineating powers between LSGBs and state authorities, and between the various levels of public administration, in line with the principles of decentralisation and subsidiarity;
• the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, which establishes commitments: (1) to define the principles for delineating the spheres of competence of the state and of local self-government and (2) to distribute LSGB powers into own and delegated powers by June 2025, and (3) to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine a draft law on delineating the powers of LSGBs of different levels and of LSGBs and executive authorities in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity by August 2025;
• the Public Administration Reform Roadmap (2025), which provides for completing the reform of local self-government and the territorial organisation of power in Ukraine by 31 December 2027 and adopting the corresponding legislation by 31 March 2026.

Entrenching the current model of power-sharing between LSGBs and state authorities, together with the imbalances between the various levels of public administration, creates a set of systemic risks. Specifically, it:

1. makes effective vertical coordination impossible owing to chronic conflicts of competence between levels of authority: the quality of public service delivery becomes secondary, while authorities focus on disputes over the limits of their responsibilities;
2. undermines the very idea of decentralisation: the administrative, financial and resource dependence of LSGBs — driven by the persistence of extensive ‘manual’ control over them by state administrations — devalues the accountability of LSGBs to voters;
3. contributes to a negative assessment of Ukraine’s progress in the EU negotiation process, owing to the late fulfilment of commitments under the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027, the Action Plan for Implementing the Recommendations of the European Commission Set Out in the Report on Ukraine’s Progress Under the 2024 EU Enlargement Package, the European Commission’s recommendations set out in its report on Ukraine (November 2025), and the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, [АБ1] with regard to regulating the area of multi-level governance.

The problems described above are to be resolved by the government’s draft law ‘On the Principles of Delineation and Distribution of Powers Between Levels of Public Governance’ (No. 14412 of 30 January 2026).

The draft law sets out the framework, principles, conditions and criteria for the delineation and distribution of powers between executive bodies and local self-government bodies. If it is adopted, amendments will be required for a further 158 laws and other legal acts, ultimately establishing the powers of public governance bodies.

Draft Law No. 14412 defines:

• the legal basis and principles for delineating and distributing powers of public governance bodies;
• the levels and bodies of public governance;
• the classification of the powers of public governance bodies;
• the criteria for distinguishing the own and delegated powers of local self-government, as well as the criteria for delineating powers between levels of local self-government;
• the conditions under which the state may delegate powers to LSGBs;
• the specific arrangements for the exercise of powers by executive authorities and LSGBs under martial law or a state of emergency;
• the resourcing of the exercise of powers by public governance bodies;
• the limits of LSGB autonomy in decision-making;
• the accountability of LSGBs for the exercise of their powers.

Draft Law No. 14412 was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted at first reading on 7 April 2026. While it regulates the same matters of local self-government reform and the territorial organisation of power as the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1748 of 12 December 2025, the two documents propose different approaches to classifying the powers of public governance bodies. The government Resolution No. 1748 differentiates between (1) powers of state authorities that cannot be transferred to LSGBs; (2) powers of executive authorities that may be transferred under certain conditions; (3) delegated powers of LSGBs; and (4) own powers of LSGBs. The classification proposed by Draft Law No. 14412 includes (1) functional powers (own, delegated, optional, and those falling within the exclusive competence of the state) and (2) institutional and organisational powers (powers aimed at establishing and providing organisational support for the activities of public governance bodies).

Inconsistency in the legal basis for the activities of the various levels of public governance. Draft Law No. 14412 contains provisions that conflict with the Constitution of Ukraine and with European law, namely: (1) defining by law the manner in which LSGBs perform their own functions; (2) specifying the list of LSGB functions through a legal act of the government or the President rather than through a law; (3) restricting the right of LSGBs to challenge in court the decisions concerning their own powers; and (4) establishing contractual grounds for the joint exercise or delegation of powers. Together with the discrepancies between Draft Law No. 14412 and Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 1748 regarding the classification of the powers of public governance bodies, these features create the following risks:

1. a high likelihood that the law will be found unconstitutional, in whole or in part;
2. the emergence of an internally contradictory model of public governance;
3. a slowing of European integration.

Institutional bias in favour of the executive vertical. Draft Law No. 14412 effectively allows the functions of LSGBs to be defined at the level of subordinate legislation (acts of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers), which creates a threat:

• to the balance between the branches of government, in particular by limiting the competence of Parliament and of local councils;
• to the long-term planning of LSGB activities, since subordinate legislation is less stable and predictable than primary law.

Adopting Draft Law No. 14412 without addressing its conceptual inconsistencies would create risks of legal uncertainty and institutional conflict, lay the groundwork for greater centralisation of administration by the executive and the erosion of the positive results of the decentralisation reform, and slow Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Synchronise government decisions with legislative changes in the area of the optimal distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration; align the terminology and the classification of powers used in Draft Law No. 14412 and in government Resolution No. 1748.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on defining the functions of LSGBs through subordinate legislation, and provide that LSGB functions be defined exclusively by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the norms allowing executive authorities to determine the means and procedures by which LSGBs exercise their own powers, leaving communities free to choose their own working methods within the powers conferred on them by law.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the concept of ‘optional powers’, as it has no equivalent in European law and creates legal uncertainty.
• Remove from Draft Law No. 14412 the provisions on the contractual redistribution of powers between public authorities, and provide that powers be defined exclusively by law rather than transferred locally through informal arrangements.
• Provide for the resolution of any disputes regarding the exercise of all powers (not only those delegated) through the courts.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• Conduct a functional audit of the system of public powers.
• Develop and enshrine in law a single model for classifying powers.
• Regulate the resourcing for LSGBs’ exercise of delegated powers.
• Institutionalise a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the distribution of powers between LSGBs and state authorities and between the various levels of public administration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives systematically supports and actively contributes to Ukraine’s European integration. As part of this effort, together with the International Renaissance Foundation, we are launching the IntehRada project. Building on sectoral analysis, the project aims to enhance awareness among international partners and Ukrainian MPs of the legislative changes and reforms that Ukraine needs to implement on its path to EU membership. Without a clear understanding of the specific political and procedural challenges faced by draft laws as they move through Parliament, it is extremely difficult to reinvigorate this process. The same applies to securing support — both externally, from EU Member States, and internally, within Parliament.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine plays a crucial role in the European integration process by considering and adopting the necessary legislation. However, since obtaining EU candidate status, Ukraine has gradually experienced a slowdown in the development, consideration and adoption of EU-related draft laws: 2025 showed a decline in the pace of legislative European integration compared to previous years.

To accelerate progress in this area and ensure sustainable results, the ALI will produce three types of regular information briefs under the project:

1. briefs on specific EU integration laws;
2. briefs on broader challenges of the European integration track, focusing on procedural and institutional dimensions;
3. briefs for Members of Parliament of Ukraine on priority EU integration draft laws (based on strategic planning documents, such as the Ukraine Facility Plan or the legislative work plan) for the upcoming month.

Ukraine’s accession to the EU also depends on the positions of EU Member States, which are not always unanimous in their support for Ukraine. However, the Verkhovna Rada can influence these positions — in particular, through interparliamentary friendship groups. Accordingly, another strand of the project will focus on analysing the work of these groups. Strengthening the effectiveness of parliamentary diplomacy tools (including friendship groups) will enable Ukraine to better substantiate its positions, explain the current context and shape realistic expectations.

We are confident that this approach will help draw the attention of international partners to challenges within the legislative European integration track and serve as an impetus for addressing them. In the longer term, it will contribute to steady progress in European integration through the consistent functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The IntehRada project is implemented with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The project reflects the position of the ALI and does not necessarily represent the position of the Foundation.

Democratic governance and the rule of law are essential components of European integration and of our long-term security and defence capabilities. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives consistently upholds these values and works to implement them within Ukrainian state institutions. Therefore, as part of a delegation of Ukrainian non-governmental organisations, the ALI participated in the First Supplementary Meeting on the Human Dimension organised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Ukraine was represented by Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director for Analytics at the ALI, Ihor Kohut, Director at the Ukrainian Parliamentary Institute, Anastasiia Datsiv, European Integration Advocacy Manager at the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, and Halyna Petrenko, Director of Detector Media.

EU accession requires the implementation of institutional reforms and transparent legislative changes, with the participation of civil society. Responsibility for this lies with the Ukrainian Parliament, whose work is undoubtedly influenced by a number of wartime circumstances. During the panel discussion ‘Parliament’s Lawmaking: Ukraine between the War and European Integration’, ALI and other participants discussed how parliamentary procedures are being adapted during wartime while preserving transparency and accountability. They also exchanged views on the role of civil society in supporting legislative quality, EU acquis alignment, and independent monitoring.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi emphasised that the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation has been working under the conditions of a full-scale war for longer than in peacetime and has gone through several stages of transformation. The first months were characterised by extraordinary speed of decision-making and an exceptionally high level of legislative activity and political unity.

A special focus should be on strengthening Parliament’s ability to operate amid new and existing security challenges and to progress toward the EU, noted Ihor Kohut. Important areas include developing the parliamentary administration and implementing the Roadmap for democratic institutions along with the European Commission’s recommendations on enlargement.

In other words, despite procedural obstacles, the Verkhovna Rada has largely adapted to the conditions of a protracted war and continues to function despite obvious difficulties. What, then, can help the Parliament achieve stability in the current Ukrainian context:

1. Full implementation of a methodology for assessing the legislative impact of draft laws, in conjunction with post-legislative oversight tools, as well as a methodology for gender-sensitive legal expertise of legislative initiatives.
2. Adoption of a law strengthening ethical standards for Members of Parliament.
3. Updating priorities regarding next steps, in particular, the adoption of a new Resolution on parliamentary reform.
4. Inclusion in the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of special procedures and mechanisms in case of the need to operate under extreme (including wartime) conditions.

These recommendations from the ALI will contribute to the consistent improvement of legislative work and to effective legislative support for European integration. In this process, it is important for Parliament to be open to cooperation and dialogue with civil society.

Despite the security risks associated with martial law, the Verkhovna Rada is gradually becoming more open, though it has not yet returned to pre-war levels.

Supplementary Human Dimension Meetings provide a platform for exchange of views between OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions, international organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders to discuss implementation of specific OSCE commitments in the human dimension. In 2026, the OSCE will hold three supplementary human dimension meetings. The first focused on threats to democratic lawmaking and the role of preventive safeguards, the contribution of civil society and independent oversight, and the importance of judicial review and accountability throughout the legislative process.

The series of meetings was organised by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The discussion titled ‘Parliament’s Lawmaking: Ukraine between the War and European Integration’ was held with the support of the Netherlands Helsinki Committee.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine began 2026 not very actively, yet ‘vividly’ — the greatest interest in the work of Members of Parliament is currently demonstrated by the anti-corruption bodies. This cannot but affect the capacity of Parliament and its ability to adopt draft laws, including those related to European integration. It also once again raises the question of whether the Verkhovna Rada is capable not only of adopting decisions but also of exercising effective oversight over the executive branch.

‘The attention of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office to the activities of Members of Parliament is directly linked to MPs’ performance of their direct duties — bribes for “necessary votes”, false asset declarations, accusations of land misappropriation and so on. This time, officers of NABU and SAPO did not overlook the Head of the “Batkivshchyna” faction, Yuliia Tymoshenko.’

This entire anti-corruption track — including the corruption scandal in the energy sector — could not but affect the ‘New Year agenda of the parliamentarians. Most importantly, it has evidently also affected the effectiveness of the first plenary meetings.

At first, Parliament dismissed two ministers and, only on the second attempt, adopted a decision to appoint Denys Shmyhal and Mykhailo Fedorov to other positions — First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine — Minister of Energy of Ukraine and Minister of Defence of Ukraine respectively. However, MPs have still not voted for a new Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, nor for changes in the Ministry of Justice.

As for legislative activity, from 1 January to 2 February 2026, Members of Parliament considered only 12 draft laws, six of which were adopted. The total plenary time during this period amounted to 11 hours. During the same period in 2025, the Verkhovna Rada considered 46 draft laws and plenary time in the chamber totalled almost 18 hours.

It should be noted that the President has also not demonstrated productivity in the legislative sphere from early January to 2 February — he was expected to sign or submit proposals regarding 13 laws. However, four laws did not receive any response from the President despite the expiry of the 15-day deadline (as of 17 February 2026, two of them have already been signed). Among them is draft law No. 3195 on introducing mandatory reporting by members of the Government prior to their dismissal.

In the context of this draft law, the article analyses whether there is a chance for effective parliamentary oversight during the 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada. It also examines why parliamentary oversight does not function effectively and how this can be remedied.

On 17 December 2025, an overwhelming majority of Members of Parliament adopted in the second reading and in its entirety draft law No. 3195, which obliges ministers to report before parliamentary committees and, ultimately, before Parliament when their resignation is being considered. With 285 votes in favour, the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation attempted to assert — strengthen — restore its own institutional agency through reinforcing parliamentary oversight. The fact that draft law No. 3195 was supported by virtually all factions and groups may be regarded as an institutional demand for stronger oversight.

The dismissal of Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko and Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk, which took place without their presence in the Rada, once again demonstrated the gap in interaction between the Government and Parliament. The entire arsenal of available instruments has proven insufficient to ensure ministerial accountability and responsibility before Parliament.

After the energy sector, the security and defence sector is the next sphere where new scandals with even more far-reaching consequences can be expected — both for the country’s defence capability and for its socio-political resilience. In this area, parliamentary oversight of the Government traditionally does not differ from that in other sectors.

Although recent monitoring of the Verkhovna Rada’s work records a significant increase in quantitative indicators — in particular, a rise in the number of requests and appeals submitted by MPs — this does not always indicate genuine parliamentary oversight. In many cases, it reflects pressure or personal gain. Recordings from Operation ‘Midas’ revealed that a criminal group had asked Members of Parliament to submit certain requests.

In terms of dialogue, government officials and parliamentarians held nine ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, which was also noted in the report of the European Commission.

However, even though energy infrastructure was the most frequently discussed topic during these ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, the Verkhovna Rada failed to identify in advance the problems that ultimately resulted in the largest corruption scandal — at least since the beginning of the full-scale war.

This once again highlighted the weakness and ineffectiveness of this mechanism. Ukraine has many established rules and practices intended to maintain balance within the triangle of power that correspond to general European and Euro-Atlantic counterparts. In practice, however, the application of these instruments does not produce results. Attempts to introduce fines for ignoring an invitation to attend a parliamentary session in draft law No. 11387 were vetoed by the President.

When discussing the provision of parliamentary oversight and the accountability of the executive branch, structural constraints are becoming increasingly visible. Performing these functions is difficult in a system where the key centre of decision-making is the President — both in the perception of government officials and often of MPs themselves. In such a configuration, the question of accountability remains open: why report to Parliament if it is not, in fact, Parliament that determines your ministerial fate? As a result, the instruments of parliamentary oversight continue to exist on paper but in reality remain largely a formality.

When discussing the strengthening of parliamentary oversight in Ukraine, international experience is often invoked in the search for quick and effective solutions. Although foreign practices and regulations in the field of parliamentary oversight may differ significantly and the respective countries are not currently in a state of war, examining how these mechanisms operate elsewhere allows for a better understanding of why the approach proposed by Ukrainian legislators is unlikely to work as expected.

As a rule, the Prime Minister and other ministers have the right to resign on their own initiative. In developed democracies, government reporting to Parliament — as one component of a broader architecture of oversight — is largely voluntary. In some countries, the resignation of a minister does not require mandatory discussion at all — as, for example, in North Macedonia or Serbia.

The Government of Finland annually submits a report to Parliament on its activities and, separately, reports on the state of the economy and the implementation of the budget. Parliamentarians may also request thematic reports. Their consideration may result either in approval or in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in an individual minister.

In the United Kingdom, ministers are required to report on their work as well as on the activities of their departments and agencies. Moreover, they may bear responsibility for the actions of the latter. The instruments of oversight include parliamentary questions and committee hearings. If the results of a report are deemed unsatisfactory, a minister may be dismissed by the Prime Minister or submit a resignation.

In Sweden, the Government annually presents to Parliament a programme defining its main priorities and objectives and submits a report on the implementation of the budget. In addition, it reports on the work of commissions established to develop proposals for addressing pressing issues. The Government may also submit to Parliament a statement or report on matters related to the governance of the country or international relations. The consideration of such a statement may result in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in a minister.

The Polish Government also reports annually on the implementation of the budget. Following its consideration, a resolution is adopted either granting or refusing consent for the Government to continue its activities. There are also thematic reports (for example on the state of the healthcare system or environmental policy) which Parliament may approve or reject. The rejection of a report does not automatically result in the resignation of the member of the Government responsible for the relevant public policy.

The rules of procedure in some countries also provide for interpellations. An interpellation is a procedure whereby Parliament summons representatives of the Government and government officials must explain their policy, specific documents or actions. Following an interpellation, a member of the Government may receive immunity for a short period or a procedure for their dismissal may be initiated. For example, in the Czech Republic there are both oral and written interpellations.

Effective parliamentary oversight abroad is based not on isolated procedures but on a coherent system of instruments that ensure regular access of Parliament to information and the accountability of the Government. It is precisely from this perspective that draft law No. 3195 should be considered — whether it complements the existing arsenal of parliamentary oversight instruments in Ukraine and whether it is capable of strengthening it in practice.

Draft law No. 3195 provides that a minister who submits a resignation must personally be present and report on their work during the consideration of the issue of their dismissal — both at a meeting of the relevant committee and in the plenary chamber. The authors also propose aligning certain provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada with the Constitution in the part concerning the appointment of members of the Cabinet of Ministers.

However, in its current version, draft law No. 3195 is unlikely to strengthen the oversight function of Parliament, as it contains several shortcomings.

For example, the requirement to report does not apply to dismissals initiated upon the submission of the Prime Minister, the President or on the initiative of the Verkhovna Rada itself.

Draft law No. 3195 also does not establish any requirements regarding the structure, content or standards of such a report. In other words, the minister will be able to determine independently what exactly and in what form should be communicated to Parliament. This effectively turns both oral and written reporting into a formality.

Parliamentary oversight must operate in conjunction with all available instruments, since only then can it be effective. This arsenal could be expanded through the introduction of interpellation. However, draft laws No. 3499 and No. 13596 registered in the Verkhovna Rada on this issue have still not been brought to the Parliament’s agenda. The Main Scientific and Expert Department and the committees of the Verkhovna Rada have expressed substantial comments on them, yet it remains important to assess interpellation as a potential instrument of parliamentary oversight.

Merely reporting on one’s activities prior to a minister’s resignation is insufficient. It is more of a symbolic gesture than an effective instrument of oversight. It cannot replace systemic mechanisms — interpellations, regular and extraordinary reports, well-developed committee work and others.

Draft law No. 3195 positions ministerial reporting as a sanction that is triggered at the very end, when a minister resigns, rather than as an instrument of regular accountability. In other words, the minister is effectively punished by having to report — a public ‘examination’ is imposed at the moment of dismissal. Such an approach transforms the position of minister from the apex of a political career into compulsory ‘community service’, from which one cannot even depart without first submitting a report.

If the intention to strengthen parliamentary oversight is a genuine objective rather than merely an imitation, action must be systematic rather than selective. Extracting only one instrument from the entire set — reporting — and applying it situationally will not solve the problem. This is particularly true in the context of scandals in the security and defence sector — where parliamentary oversight and accountability must be strengthened as a matter of urgency. Draft law No. 3195 does not address this issue. Instead, Parliament is once again attempting to adopt a narrow measure that does not correspond to the scale of the problem.

Limited parliamentary oversight fits poorly within the framework of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. It is precisely through the oversight function that Parliament can guarantee a balance between security and freedom, the observance of democratic principles and the protection of human rights — all of which are fundamental to accession to the European Union.

For a country in a state of war, this is of particular importance when it comes to the security and defence sector. This is traditionally a closed sphere that requires oversight, alignment of security and political objectives and the establishment of safeguards against abuses by the executive branch. By exercising oversight over the security sector, Parliament ensures its effectiveness, transparency and accountability, as well as supervision over the proper use of funds. However, as long as the Verkhovna Rada is unable to transform the existing set of instruments into an institutionally developed system of oversight, the security sector itself is unlikely to submit to such oversight. Is it possible to change this? In the Green Paper, experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analyse whether, under martial law, the Verkhovna Rada uses the available instruments of parliamentary oversight to their full extent, to what degree this function of Parliament is limited under wartime conditions, and which practices of NATO member states should be adopted in the future.

European partners emphasise the need for reform of the Security Service of Ukraine, stressing that oversight of this key national security body must be strengthened, alongside the relaunch of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) and the central and regional units of the National Police. They also point to political risks associated with the work of the recently merged Defence Procurement Agency and the State Rear Operator.

In the Verkhovna Rada, the response has unfortunately been slow. MPs’ draft laws No. 13602 on the relaunch of the SBI (registered in August 2025) and No. 4210 on democratic civilian oversight have been left idle. The creation of a committee for oversight of special-purpose bodies, which would have expanded powers of parliamentary oversight, was initiated as far back as the IV convocation and is provided for under current legislation. However, this decision has also not been adopted for several years, although it depends exclusively on the Verkhovna Rada.

Without a comprehensive approach, the Verkhovna Rada will continue to have formal powers but remain limited in its capacity to use them effectively. Yet it is precisely this capacity — particularly with regard to oversight of the security and defence sector — that serves as a marker of a mature democracy and a key condition for Ukraine’s European future.

A significant share of the problems currently observed by Ukrainian society and international partners is the result of decisions that postponed issues of accountability and oversight (as well as many others) ‘until after the war’ and/or left their resolution to successors. However, it appears that remaining suspended in such hypothetical anticipation can continue for a very long time. Will the President and Parliament change in the near future? Evidently not. Yet the resolution of the problems described depends precisely on this Parliament and this President — and it is they who will determine when and how the long-awaited post bellum moment arrives.

The evaluation of legislation is an important component of the law-making process, as it makes it possible to identify shortcomings and gaps in legislative acts and to assess their impact on various aspects of public life. In addition, analysing the practical implementation of laws contributes to building an open dialogue between the legislator and stakeholders.

In European countries, legislative evaluation is applied to assess the achievement of stated objectives, identify shortcomings and unintended consequences, and amend legislation to enhance its effectiveness.

In Ukrainian practice, the attention of Members of Parliament is primarily focused on the mere adoption of legislative decisions, whereas the ability of legislation to achieve its declared objectives and the effectiveness of its implementation remain without proper evaluation. At the same time, the absence of a systematic approach to legislative evaluation makes it more difficult to identify problems in a timely manner and reduces the overall effectiveness of law-making activity.

From August 2019 to June 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted several laws in the field of local self-government and regional development aimed at continuing the decentralisation process. Not all of them have been analysed in terms of their practical application. Meanwhile, under wartime conditions, communities face new challenges, which in turn necessitate a prompt and high-quality review of legislation.

Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to analyse selected laws in the field of local self-government and regional development adopted between August 2019 and June 2025 inclusive and to assess the practice of their implementation.

1. what factors influence the quality and effectiveness of legislative provisions;
2. to what extent the adopted legislation corresponds to the needs of territorial communities;
3. how improved communication between the legislator and local self-government bodies (LSG bodies) can contribute to enhancing the legislative process and increasing the effectiveness of law implementation.

The study also contains a number of recommendations for legislators, local self-government bodies and central executive authorities aimed at developing a systematic approach to the application and evaluation of legislation.

Although in Ukraine the requirement to conduct legislative evaluation will enter into force only after the termination of martial law, the study provides recommendations that can be applied in practice now.

More on the evaluation of legislation in the field of local self-government and regional development can be found in the new issue of the journal Parliament, published by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

This study has been prepared with the support of Sweden. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of the NGO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and does not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) has launched a new project supported by the MATRA programme of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. The project aims to consistently advance the reform of the judiciary and the prosecution, which are crucial for Ukraine’s further progress on its path toward European integration.

The project focuses on two strategic priorities.

The first area is the optimisation of the national network of general local first instance courts.

The current court system does not align with Ukraine’s new administrative and territorial structure or with the realities of wartime, thereby complicating access to justice for citizens and posing additional risks to the effective functioning of the judicial system.

To address these challenges, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives will:

1. Develop a new court mapping methodology that takes into account Ukraine’s updated administrative-territorial division, internal and external migration processes caused by the ongoing war, judges’ workload, and the geographical features of regions, including those located close to the combat zone. At all stages, the recommendations of the Council of Europe European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) will be taken into account.
2. Prepare model court maps for each government-controlled region of Ukraine. Based on the results, universal regional maps will be developed, defining the number of courts and judges, as well as hub territorial communities for the location of new courts of first instance.
3. Develop a detailed step-by-step plan for a pilot project on optimising the network of general local courts in one of Ukraine’s regions, which can later be replicated in all other regions.
4. Assist in developing the legislative framework necessary for this transformation.

This project will help rethink court mapping projects developed before the full-scale invasion and, taking into account significant population migration, propose the most optimal models for the future functioning of the system of general local courts. The goal is to ensure the best possible access to justice for Ukrainian citizens residing in government-controlled territories or using judicial services from abroad.

The second area focuses on strengthening guarantees of prosecutorial independence by enhancing the institutional capacity and autonomy of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (CPU), as a body of prosecutorial self-governance, and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP), as a body ensuring the functioning of the prosecution.

The current legal design of these bodies prevents them from effectively fulfilling their mandate to protect prosecutorial independence. At the same time, their financial dependence on the Prosecutor’s General Office undermines their institutional autonomy in this process.

The project envisages the preparation of analytical concepts based on EU standards to substantiate proposed solutions, ALI’s expert participation in drafting legislative amendments together with key stakeholders (the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors), as well as further advocacy for the proposed reforms.

The implementation of the project is expected to create practical preconditions for:

• improving citizens’ access to justice through an updated and rationally structured network of local general courts of first instance;
• ensuring that prosecutors adopt lawful and fair decisions in criminal proceedings by reducing the risks of pressure and interference, including from political actors or senior management, made possible through strengthening the institutional capacity of prosecutorial self-governance to safeguard prosecutorial independence;
• implementing the recommendations of the European Commission and the objectives of the Rule of Law Roadmap, which are necessary for advancing Ukraine’s path toward EU membership.

The project will last for two years.

The MATRA programme of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands supports reforms in the field of democracy and the rule of law in the countries joining the EU. Support for this project is further evidence of the Netherlands’ consistent support, which, even in conditions of full-scale war, remains a loyal partner of Ukraine: strict but fair, and involved at every stage of Ukraine’s integration into the EU.

Responsibility for the content of the project lies with the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Netherlands.

The issue of appointing a new Head of the Office of the President (OP) has receded to the margins of the political agenda while President Zelenskyy is fully immersed in the negotiation process. This, however, has not stopped political commentators, journalists and others from speculating about who will ultimately take the helm of the OP. In parallel, Ukrainska Pravda reports that the President has resumed communication with Andrii Yermak.

Despite this, the moment of ‘office interregnum’ should be used for a kind of after-action review. In other words, we propose to look at the institution of the Administration/Secretariat/Office of the President in a broader perspective and through the prism of international experience, and to examine what, in fact, could function differently with a change in the Head of the OP. And, ultimately, whether there is an institutional problem within the power triangle or a traditional ‘excess of executive discretion’.

The Office of the President of Ukraine is a permanent auxiliary body of the Head of State; it is an institution that replaced the Presidential Administration in this capacity in 2019. Officially, the Office of the President is positioned as an advisory and analytical, communications and organisational centre that ensures the functioning of the Head of State. Formally, the Office of the President does not adopt political decisions, is not a body of executive power and may not assume the functions of the Government or Parliament.

Its main tasks include analytical work, coordination of communications, oversight of compliance with diplomatic protocol, interaction with public authorities, preparation of the President’s documents and administration of working processes. Given the constitutionally defined duties and powers of the President of Ukraine, the Office must possess strategic-level expertise in the fields of national security, international relations, interaction with public authorities and related areas.

What, then, constitutes the basis and legal framework for the establishment and functioning of this auxiliary body? Obviously, it will come as no surprise that the Constitution of Ukraine provides the basic answer to this question, in the part that defines the powers of the President and the apparatus that ensures their exercise. Article 106 of the Constitution sets out the exclusive powers of the Head of State: defence, national security, international policy, appointment and dismissal of a number of officials, submission of draft laws to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), signing adopted laws and exercising the right of veto. Although the Constitution does not contain a separate article on the Office of the President, it is precisely the scope of the President’s powers that necessitates the establishment of an apparatus to ensure the performance of these functions, and paragraph 28 of Article 106 explicitly states that the President ‘establishes, reorganises and dissolves consultative, advisory and other auxiliary bodies and services’.

If the Office of the President operated strictly within the limits of its formal tasks, the figure of its Head would hardly be an object of such a level of public attention. However, Ukrainian politics and the architecture of power systematically demonstrate weak institutional development. As a result, situations repeatedly arise in which the actual influence of a specific official often exceeds their formal mandate. The Head of the Office/Administration/Secretariat of the President is a classic example of this phenomenon.

At the same time, the same statement is fully applicable to the position of the President of Ukraine itself: everyone who has held it, perhaps with the exception of Leonid Kravchuk, has in one way or another sought to increase their level of influence, expanding their constitutional powers in a non-constitutional manner. The Administration/Secretariat/Office has precisely been the auxiliary instrument that enabled this ‘expansion of influence’.

We will not delve too deeply into history. Primarily due to an entirely obvious fact: the Constitution in the 1996 version granted the President of Ukraine powers close to those of the head of the executive branch. As a result, during the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych, the Head of the Presidential Administration was the ‘right hand’ of the Head of State and a key management hub through which personnel decisions, political arrangements and a significant part of state strategies passed.

However, the more recent framework of the constitutional reforms of 2004/2014 also provides examples of the President’s influence and that of their auxiliary body beyond constitutional powers.

During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, the Administration was renamed the Secretariat, ostensibly to emphasise the renewal of both the auxiliary body’s functionality, with an apparent focus on ‘clerical functions’, and the Head of State himself. In practice, however, the Secretariat became a centre for the formulation of presidential decisions that went beyond the framework defined by the Constitution: from the appointment and dismissal of heads of regional and district state administrations without government submissions to overwhelming the Government with hundreds of decrees on virtually any matter.

Under Petro Poroshenko, the Presidential Administration effectively performed the functions of a political headquarters, a decision-making centre and a coordinator of key policy areas. For example, in 2016, it was the President and his Administration who became the key architects of the judicial reform.

With the launch of the OP in 2019, the ‘unloading’ of the institution and its depoliticisation were declared, but in practice, it became an even stronger centre of decision-making concentration, albeit within a new, more informal architecture. At the same time, several groups of claims can be identified that have regularly appeared in the media space regarding the OP and its leadership.

• Excessive lack of transparency and concentration of power. According to journalists, key decisions were made within a narrow circle without the necessary communication with the Government, Parliament and/or the expert community. This gave rise to conclusions about ‘manual governance’, politicisation and the personalisation of processes that should have been institutional in nature. This category also includes a subcategory relating to personnel decisions. Appointments of ministers, heads of law enforcement bodies and top officials often appeared to be personal arrangements and the construction of a vertical of loyalty rather than a systemic approach based on professionalism and achievements.
• Conflicts of interest and issues of trust. Certain publications highlighted corrupt links, informal or improper influence, which cast doubt on the impartiality and professionalism of the decisions taken.
• Parallel ‘centres of power’ and a struggle between towers. Publications often described internal conflicts between different groups of influence within the OP, which led to blocked decisions, ineffective coordination and information contradictions. This category also includes materials related to communication crises surrounding sensitive issues.

How can such a media discourse around the Office of the President and its leadership be explained? The Regulation on the OP contains a rather broad range of functions of a strategic nature, from analysing the situation in the world to providing expertise on adopted laws and developing its own legislative initiatives. The structure of the body, in fact, reproduces the architecture of the executive branch: so-called ‘sectoral’ units are responsible for the development of specific authorities. As a result, despite the declared ‘minimalist’ concept of the Secretariat/Office/Administration of the President, which would be limited solely to organisational matters, it has in practice turned into a ‘fourth’ branch of power alongside the legislative, executive and judicial branches.

The Office of the President became not merely an analytical or advisory body. It turned into a bridge between the President and the entire system of government and often into a de facto filter for access to decision-making. In the presence of a presidential ‘mono-majority’ in Parliament, this created such an imbalance in the system of checks and balances, such an over-centralisation and personalisation of power, that the Head of the Office of the President began to be informally referred to as a ‘Vice President’.

If the OP is viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that the history of scandals, accusations of ‘grey cardinal schemes’, conflicts of interest and information wars between different ‘towers’ within the presidential circle is the result of a convergence of historical preconditions, a structural flaw in the architecture of power and specific political realities, rather than of individual personalities. In this sense, it can be argued that the role and place of the auxiliary body and the extent of influence of its Head are determined by the governing style of the President himself, within the limits permitted by the legislative framework.

In Ukraine, in the search for a ‘proper recipe’ for any reform, reference is traditionally made to ‘best international practices and standards’. We, however, propose to look at international experience in regulating and operating auxiliary bodies attached to the president, bearing in mind the identified problem and its genesis in Ukraine.

Globally, there is a wide range of models for organising presidential offices, apparatuses, administrations and secretariats, ranging from purely administrative and support structures to powerful political decision-making centres.

In parliamentary republics (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and others), the president does not possess executive powers and his role in the legislative process is largely limited to symbolic or procedural functions. Accordingly, the activity of the president’s office is predominantly administrative and protocol-oriented.

Its main functions include the preparation of documents for promulgation, technical support for decrees and the organisation of protocol events. Presidential advisers perform the functions of secretaries and rapporteurs and do not exert substantive influence on policy. In complex or controversial legislative situations, the president relies not on his own analytical apparatus but on the expertise of government structures or the decisions of the Constitutional Court.

In semi-presidential systems (France, Poland, Lithuania, Romania and others), where the president has real levers of influence over the executive branch, the president’s office acquires significant political weight. Such a body is effectively integrated into the system of public administration: it analyses draft laws, elaborates options for the use of veto powers and participates in consultations with the government and parliament. In this case, the president’s office acts as an extension of the powers of the Head of State.

The degree of legislative regulation of the status and powers of such offices varies across countries. For example, in Romania and Lithuania, the functions of the presidential administration are defined by law. In Poland and Lithuania, there are direct constitutional and legislative provisions that delineate the auxiliary role and structure of the office. In contrast, in France, a significant part of the activities of the President’s Chancellery is based on constitutional custom and internal orders of the president.

The Statute of the Romanian Presidential Administration provides that presidential advisers (consilieri) hold the rank of minister, while the staffing and structure of the administration are approved by presidential decree. As a result, presidential advisers are formally endowed with a high status and access to state authority resources. In practice, strategic policy in areas where the Head of State plays a leading role is often shaped through the presidential apparatus. For example, in foreign policy and security, presidential advisers participate in the development of defence doctrine (as provided for by legislation); in domestic policy, they are involved in shaping international policy on anti-corruption matters, among others. Thus, the Romanian Presidential Administration has formally established an influence and scope that corresponds to the constitutional functions of the Head of State.

The Chancellery of the President of Lithuania in practice constitutes an important centre for diplomacy, defence and appointments. Under the Constitution of Lithuania, the President defines the main directions of foreign policy and, together with the Government, implements it, appoints diplomatic representatives, and plays a key role in the field of national security and defence. The only impeachment in Lithuania’s history was linked to the fact that President Rolandas Paksas, in 2003–2004, allowed business partners and donors connected to Russian business and special services into his close circle, which posed a threat to Lithuania’s national security.

The Offices of the Presidents of France and Poland, alongside their formally defined functions, also perform informal ones: they prepare analytical materials, oversee personnel policy, coordinate legislative initiatives and shape the President’s position. However, a substantial share of this influence occurs outside the boundaries of normative regulation and proper public oversight.

What these countries have in common is the presence of a broad staff of expert advisers who wield significant informal influence. On the one hand, this provides the President with access to high-quality analysis and comprehensive information, which is critically important when decisions must be taken on the promulgation of laws, the exercise of veto powers or appeals to the Constitutional Court under tight time constraints. On the other hand, such a model creates risks: advisers who do not bear political responsibility may exert non-public influence over the fate of laws, shaping a behind-the-scenes agenda. In the absence of clear mechanisms of democratic oversight, this increases the risks of backroom decision-making and potential abuses.

Both a brief historical excursus and a review of international experience suggest that, at this stage, Ukraine is not unique in its ‘office–presidential discourse’:

• the formal status and informal influence of auxiliary bodies may differ;
• their functions may be regulated or may instead be based on political and organisational traditions;
• depending on the specific individuals holding office, new practices may emerge, as well as various difficulties and crisis episodes.

International experience underscores the absence of a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing these issues and demonstrates the need to build functioning institutions as an alternative to a personalised style of governance.

Is it possible to change anything in the specific socio-political and wartime circumstances? Unlike politicians, we have no need to promise ‘golden mountains’ or lure anyone with ‘castles in the air’. Therefore, to be completely frank, we are rather sceptical about the prospects of changing an already entrenched approach that has proven its propensity to generate problems. At the same time, the illusory nature of these prospects is no reason to give up or to refrain from demanding more.

We nevertheless propose to view the change of the Head of the Office of the President not merely as a political or personnel gesture. It is an opportunity to reconsider the very architecture of the institution which, in Ukraine’s political system, has traditionally acquired excessive, often informal, influence.

What needs to change is the model of operation in favour of a more transparent one, with clearly defined procedures for interaction within the triangle of power, analytically capable and less personalised, rather than simply selecting a ‘better person’. This would help avoid the hyperconcentration of power in the hands of the head of the President’s auxiliary body, who exercises his powers in the context of a full-scale war and the presence of a pro-presidential ‘mono-majority’. Of course, this is provided that Yermak’s resignation and his rapid transition to the status of a service member are not part of a cunning plan for a triumphant return and the preservation of influence, in light of his own statement about reforming the OP by involving service members and veterans across all departments.

In the sphere of the state’s internal (civil) security, there exists a range of threats that negatively affect human security, primarily physical security. Among these threats, as in any society, there is crime, which cannot be eradicated or overcome, given that this negative social phenomenon is a direct consequence of human nature (behaviour). However, crime as a phenomenon can be controlled and minimised in certain areas.

The level of crime and its perception (people’s sense of security) fall within the direct influence of law-enforcement bodies, and both human security and the perception of security depend on the effectiveness of their work. Under these conditions, effectiveness may be undermined by corrupt practices within these bodies. And while a system affected by corruption may remain effective in certain aspects of crime control, public perceptions of crime will inevitably suffer because of the negative image of law-enforcement agencies. Conversely, attempts to improve their image through active communication of performance results will not necessarily have positive consequences, particularly in terms of real crime control.

At the same time, people’s attitudes towards the system of combating crime depend directly on two circumstances. On the one hand, law-enforcement bodies must have the proper capacity to help a person with their problem — that is, the criminal-law conflict (the criminal offence) that has occurred. Namely, they must provide support to the victim, investigate the criminal offence and restore justice by bringing the perpetrators to justice and ensuring compensation for the harm. On the other hand, it is the law-enforcement system that is endowed with the most invasive instruments regarding human rights and freedoms, as it has lawful powers to restrict liberty, conduct searches or seize property and so on. It is precisely here that cases of unlawful detention, torture, falsification of evidence, corruption and similar abuses occur.

Today in Ukraine, complaints about both the first and the second components are quite widespread. Depending on the type of offence (it is obvious that in cases of violent crime, a person is more likely to seek protection from law-enforcement bodies, whereas in property-related or, all the more so, in office-related offences, much less so), people assess differently the ability of law-enforcement bodies to protect their rights, that is, to guarantee their safety.

For example, in 2024, 48% of companies experienced pressure from law-enforcement or regulatory bodiesThe state and needs of business in Ukraine: results of the survey in August 2024. The survey was conducted by the Innovation Development Centre, the Entrepreneurship and Export Development Office, the national project Diia.Business and AdvanterGroup in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Coalition of Business Communities for the Modernisation of Ukraine. Survey period: 20.08.2024 — 31.08.2024.. This is because within law-enforcement agencies, there are abuses of criminal law instruments for the purpose of exerting pressure and obtaining undue benefit. This occurs within the framework of artificially initiated criminal proceedings (conducting searches, seizure and arrest of property). As a consequence, this blocks the operation of the enterprise, harming businesses and their investors. Such actions have long-term negative impacts on the Ukrainian economy and limit its development. Foreign investors often name problems with the rule of law among the reasons why they are not ready to operate in the Ukrainian market.

Thus, citizens seek support from the law-enforcement system in order to protect themselves from unlawful encroachments that negatively affect their safety, while at the same time expecting that the law-enforcement system will fulfil the duties directly assigned to it — namely, ensuring proper respect for human rights and freedoms — and not create new unlawful acts in the sphere of offences committed by officials. For this, the law-enforcement system must be effective, oriented towards the needs of people, primarily victims and use scientifically grounded approaches to forecasting and countering crime at a systemic level.

That is why law-enforcement reform consists of these structures fulfilling their core task — countering crime that negatively affects the internal security of people in society. It concerns the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodiesThe Constitution of Ukraine uses both the term ‘law-enforcement bodies’ (Article 131-1) and ‘law-enforcement agencies’ (Article 17). Sectoral legislation uses varying terminology that requires unification. The first step towards this may be the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law-Enforcement Bodies’, the adoption of which is envisaged in para. 1.1 of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies for 2023–2027. In our view, law- enforcement bodies should be understood as bodies endowed with powers: 1) to conduct pre-trial investigations of criminal offences; 2) To exercise operational-search activity (in future — criminal intelligence). At the same time, the term ‘law-enforcement bodies’ is a specific (narrower) category, whereas ‘law-enforcement agencies’ is a generic (broader) category. The latter encompasses the former and includes bodies with attested staff, uniforms, the right to carry weapons, and those that perform oversight functions of a security nature, or which are expressly designated by law as law-enforcement agencies. to carry out the prevention of and fight against crime, primarily organised crime, which causes the greatest harm to the interests of society.

In the context of European integration, Ukraine continues the process of aligning its legislation with the EU acquis communautaire, as well as implementing the enlargement-policy recommendations contained in the European Commission’s Enlargement Reports (2023, 2024, 2025) under Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’. It is in this chapter that the focus is placed on organised crime, cybercrime, drug-related crime, the fight against terrorism and international cooperation in this field (Europol, Eurojust), as well as other aspects of combating serious crime.

In addition, the issue concerns not only the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies to counter crime, but also the instruments for the strategic prevention of crime and for the prioritisation of law-enforcement resources through the introduction of planned and consistent criminal policyFor details, see: Krapyvin Y. Criminal policy and strategic planning in combating crime: prospects and what European integration has to do with it. JustTalk, 12.11.2025.. Thus, the introduction of European mechanisms for assessing threats posed by such crime (SOCTASerious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment., IOCTAInternet Organised Crime Threat Assessment.), information exchange with European law-enforcement bodies (SIENA, SIENA-CT, cooperation with Europol and Eurojust) and the implementation of intelligence-led policing concepts is envisaged. In other words, the issue concerns strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime.

In addition to institutional capacity and the strengthening of the analytical component (strategic planning), the discussion also concerns a review of criminal procedural powers and of the infrastructure of criminal justice. The former includes improving the system of investigative jurisdiction over criminal offences, improving alternative measures for resolving criminal-law conflicts (for example, international practice with transactions), transforming the institution of operational search activity into criminal intelligence, introducing safeguards against the abuse of procedural rights and so forth. The latter includes implementing a system for compensation of victims of violent crimes, improving the system for ensuring the safety of participants in criminal proceedings and expanding the whistleblowing framework to a broader range of offences committed by officials, as provided by the relevant EU Directive 2019/1937 and so on.

Thus, Ukraine’s European integration commitments are directed towards building a more effective law-enforcement system that will be oriented towards consistent and effective criminal policy, the prioritisation of criminal proceedings and the allocation of resources to counter serious crime.

At the centre of such a system will be the victim and their need for compensation for harm, rather than solely the criminal prosecution of the offender at any cost.

Law-enforcement reform consists of three key areas:

1. strengthening the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies in countering serious crime;
2. improving the system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — the introduction of a system of criminal policy;
3. reviewing the criminal procedural powers of the prosecution service and of law-enforcement bodies and, more generally, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system.

The main document in the sphere of reforming law-enforcement bodies is the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027: Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 273/2023 of 11.05.2023. (the OAS) and the Government’s Action PlanAction Plan aimed at implementing the Overarching Strategic Plan for Reforming Law-Enforcement Agencies as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027: Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 792 of 23.08.2024. aimed at its implementation (the OAS Action Plan). Certain provisions of the OAS are reflected in the Rule of Law Roadmap, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in May 2025Certain issues of ensuring the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union under Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals of the EU Accession Process’: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 475 of 14.05.2025.. At the same time, implementation of the OAS is one of the measures under Chapter 24 of the EU acquis.

Certain measures are also included in the Plan for the Ukraine FacilityPlan for the Ukraine Facility. 2024–2027., in the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025On the Approval of the State Anti-Corruption Programme for 2023–2025: Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 220 of 04.03.2023. (a new programme is currently being prepared by the NACP) and in sectoral documents (the Strategy for Combating Organised Crime, the Prosecution Service Development Strategy for 2025–2028, the National Strategy for the Protection of Children’s Rights in the Sphere of Justice until 2028 and others). Achieving comprehensive reform of law-enforcement bodies on the path towards European integration is possible only on the condition that all measures provided for in these documents in the sphere of state policy are implemented, as they concern, at the same time, amendments to legislation, the resolution of institutional problems, the introduction of strategic planning practices and so forth.

By contrast, addressing individual components — whether personnel matters (the introduction of competitive selection procedures and so on), or the expansion of powers, or institutional practices — will not have the proper effect given the unsystematic and fragmented nature of such reforms.

Key measures for strengthening the institutional capacity of law-enforcement bodies in countering serious crime:

• adoption of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law-Enforcement Bodies’, which will define the legal framework for the functioning of law-enforcement bodies and will unify their status and powers;
• introduction of merit-based principles for the selection of candidates to managerial positions in law-enforcement bodies, including the heads of these bodies (the National Police, the SBI, NABU);
• reform of the Security Service of Ukraine through the gradual removal of pre-trial investigation functions, which will transform it into a classical counterintelligence body;
• strengthening the institutional capacity of analytical units of law-enforcement bodies;
• strengthening the internal security system of law-enforcement bodies and the procedures for conducting internal investigations and disciplinary proceedings; strengthening the institutional capacity of authorised units within the criminal justice system responsible for preventing and detecting corruption and granting them the powers necessary for effective monitoring and for supporting the implementation of anti-corruption programmes;
• improving the system of accountability and transparency of law-enforcement bodies.

Key measures for improving the system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — the introduction of a criminal policy system:

• introduction of a system of strategic planning in the sphere of combating crime — criminal policy — which will encompass both prevention and the fight against crime;
• introduction of European strategic planning instruments: the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) and the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA);
• introduction of a system for collecting alternative data forming the knowledge base on crime: crime surveys, victimology surveys and so forth;
• improvement of the criminal statistics system;
• introduction of criminal policy documents: 1) national priorities for combating crime (long-term, high-level criminal policy for a period of 5–10 years); 2) strategic priorities of law-enforcement bodies (medium-term criminal policy — annual plans); 3) priorities in individual criminal proceedings (short-term criminal policy), which constitute part of the management system in this field.

Key measures for reviewing the criminal procedural powers of the prosecution service and law-enforcement bodies and, more generally, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system:

• improving the system of investigative jurisdiction as a means of determining the specialisation of law-enforcement bodies;
• introducing detectives into all law-enforcement bodies;
• introduction a common performance evaluation system for detectives and others, who are involved into the crime investigation, which is oriented to the quality of data, not only quantity;
• expanding the discretionary powers of the prosecutor for the purpose of implementing the measures provided for by criminal policy;
• improving alternative measures for resolving criminal-law conflicts (for example, international practice of transactions);
• introducing into the CPC of Ukraine the principle concerning the abuse of procedural rights;
• improving the system for guaranteeing the safety of participants in criminal proceedings;
• establishing a compensation fund for victims of violent crimes;
• reforming the system of forensic expert activity in criminal proceedings;
• adopting the Law of Ukraine ‘On Criminal Intelligence’, which will transform the institution of operational-search activity by delimiting it from criminal procedural, intelligence and counterintelligence activity;
• full implementation of the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime and its Second Additional Protocol, including the introduction into the CPC of Ukraine of the concept of electronic (digital) evidence (by analogy with the Commercial and Procedural Code of Ukraine, the Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine and the Code of Administrative Proceedings of Ukraine), criminalisation of cyberviolence and so forth.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is an independent Ukrainian think tank that for 25 years has been helping the state build sustainable institutions and develop evidence-based public policy across various sectors.