Draft Law No. 12439 emerged as a response to the decision of the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) on the need to protect economic security during wartime. In February 2025, Parliament supported it at the first reading. This looked like a triumph of common sense: business was to receive the long-awaited protection from state pressure, while the state gained a chance to restore entrepreneurs’ trust. As a result, everyone would benefit: business would operate effectively, taxes would flow into the budget, and Ukraine’s investment appeal would grow, enabling the attraction of larger foreign capital. After all, the economy in wartime is crucial for defence capability, making this a matter of national security rather than merely business.

However, between the first and second readings, the draft law turned into something of a monstrosity. Provisions appeared that created new corruption risks and weakened the anti-corruption authorities and the Bureau of Economic Security (ESBU). This compels us to ask: is it truly about the consistent protection of entrepreneurs, or another attempt to covertly destabilise criminal justice in a direction convenient for certain actors? According to sources of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, the updated text of Draft Law No. 12439 was carefully concealed and is expected to be put to a vote in the near future.

New provisions have provoked sharp criticism from civil society organisations, academics and state bodies, including the ESBU, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Let us examine the main advantages and disadvantages of this new pig in a poke from the Ukrainian authorities, and what businesses can expect. A detailed analysis of the draft law is available on the ALI website.

Given the events of July 2025, when attempts were made to restrict the independence of the NABU and SAPO, and the appointment of the winner of the competition for Director of the ESBU was delayed, further introduction of provisions into the Criminal Code is a matter of concern. They may help the guilty evade responsibility, provided they have the ‘right’ connections.

The most problematic is the provision of exemption from criminal liability for tax evasion, smuggling, abuse of office, and so forth on the basis of ‘clarifications’ by the state financial control authority or other central and local executive bodies. In essence, the state is creating a mechanism of official indulgences: the necessary clarification could be obtained even through corrupt means. This would make it possible to circumvent the law and would serve as automatic protection from prosecution, undermining the role of the courts and opening space for abuse in the tax, customs and procurement spheres. 

The ESBU also emphasises the danger: ‘Clarifications by authorised bodies become not merely evidence of good faith in court, but an automatic “alibi” that blocks the very initiation of criminal proceedings’.

Executive bodies cannot interpret the substance of a legal norm enacted by the legislator. Only the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine may claim this role — and even then, only in defined cases. Such ‘indulgences’ grant executive authorities excessively broad discretion, which they may exercise solely within the boundaries of the law. A rhetorical question arises: what kind of ‘school of law’ could have written such a provision?

No less controversial is the attempt to limit the independence of the ESBU. Draft Law No. 12439 proposes new mechanisms. The first — a suspect or their defence lawyer would be able to request a higher-level prosecutor to change the jurisdiction of their case if they believe it is being investigated by ‘the wrong authority’. At first glance, this seems a safeguard for a business or citizen to avoid situations where a case is handled by a body they deem incompetent or conflicted. Yet the defence would need information they usually do not possess to prove a breach of jurisdiction. Thus, one could quite reasonably insist that the ESBU (or any other law enforcement agency) cannot investigate a case. After all, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC) does not define what constitutes a ‘breach of the jurisdiction of a criminal offence’. Prosecutors could approach this matter creatively, including by citing ineffectiveness.

The second mechanism — only the Prosecutor General would be able to register criminal proceedings in cases under Article 191 of the Criminal Code (embezzlement in the economic sphere by officials). Yet these cases fall within the jurisdiction of the ESBU. Formally, this is an ‘additional filter against abuse’, with the prosecution checking whether an investigation should begin. What is striking, however, is the selectivity: why does this apply only to the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine and specifically to Article 191? It looks more like an additional layer of administrative control over the ESBU, which already has limited resources and an unstable state of reform, rather than a systemic solution to the problem of jurisdiction.

This is ostensibly meant to protect businesses from abuse by the ESBU. However, if case materials are first reviewed by a prosecutor, then in situations where there is mistrust of the prosecutor, and the ESBU must act swiftly, this could damage the proceedings. Such violations can be prevented through disciplinary liability, anti-corruption restrictions and internal control mechanisms, rather than by filters of this kind.

The draft law also proposes an unbalanced approach to protecting business by reintroducing the ‘filtering’ practices of the 1960 CPC at the stage of registering criminal proceedings. Under the proposed amendments, a crime report would need to contain sufficient data to be registered. For entrepreneurs, this creates a barrier against unfounded proceedings, but other categories of the criminal process would suffer — victims of ordinary crimes. For them, there is a risk that their reports will not move forward. Even now, it is often necessary to apply to an investigating judge to have a crime report entered when investigators ignore it. What then to say of situations where one must provide ‘sufficient data’ that is often not visible even during the investigation itself, as in cases of sexual violence?

Equally controversial is the expansion of the role of investigating judges, who would be empowered to summon and interrogate witnesses and collect evidence independently. This moves us away from the European model of adversarial proceedings, where the judge’s role is to act as an impartial arbiter. Instead, the judge would be given the right to summon witnesses and experts or examine documents and objects, even if neither party initiated it. In effect, the judge would be ‘supplementing’ the evidence rather than merely assessing what was provided. A biased investigating judge could create conditions for the prosecution to ‘supply’ the missing evidence.

An even greater threat arises in ordinary criminal cases, for instance, when a preventive measure in the form of detention is being considered. The prosecutor submits a motion supported by evidence. The defence objects, arguing that there are no risks and that the evidentiary base is weak. Draft Law No. 12439 would allow the judge to demand additional materials, interrogate witnesses and so on — effectively correcting the shortcomings of the investigation. In such logic, the court ceases to be the guarantor of balance and instead becomes another player on the prosecution’s or the defence’s team.

This resembles the inquisitorial system characteristic of the Soviet CPC. It also goes beyond the impartiality of the court, creating a risk of biased decisions. A judge who independently initiates ‘additional’ testimony or evidence inevitably becomes a party to the process. Instead of remaining neutral, the judge turns into an active player who undermines the principle of adversarial proceedings and may erode trust in criminal court judgments.

At the same time, the draft law contains several positive innovations for business that remain overshadowed by its negative provisions. These would make the criminal process less punitive and more procedurally fair. Business gains real safeguards against procedural pressure, victims receive effective mechanisms to defend their rights, and judicial oversight is provided with clearer standards of reasoning and time limits.

Although Draft Law No. 12439 does include many positive changes for business, in its current form, under the guise of ‘protection’, it weakens the anti-corruption infrastructure and the ESBU.

There is one Criminal Procedure Code in Ukraine. It does not contain adaptations ‘for business’, ‘for officials’ or ‘for ordinary citizens’. All provisions apply equally to different types of criminal offences. If Draft Law No. 12439 now seems like salvation for business, tomorrow these same provisions may work against, say, a victim of a violent crime.

The criminal process should not serve the interests of only one group. Its logic must work for everyone. Otherwise, any amendment intended to ‘protect business’ will in practice undermine victims’ rights, create new loopholes for evading liability or deprive the court of impartiality. We have already experienced this with the ‘Lozovyi amendments’, which we have been unable to repeal fully since 2018. Now we are falling into the same trap again.

If Parliament genuinely wishes to support business rather than provide new tools for abuse, the draft law must be substantially revised, with harmful provisions removed. Otherwise, the so-called ‘protection of business’ will turn into a new spiral of impunity.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada of the 9th convocation has begun. The start of each parliamentary season always renews expectations of MPs — both regarding new draft laws and legislative initiatives whose consideration has been suspended or has stalled altogether for various reasons and factors.

However, the postponement of strategically important draft laws cannot be blurred into an abstract ‘not the right time’. So which initiatives should MPs consider first?

The Government’s Programme of Activities is the main document for planning state policy. It forms the basis for the Government’s medium-term action plans (for a three-year period) and its priority action plans (for a period of up to one year). The adoption of such a Programme should not be perceived as a mere formality: this document occupies a central place in the entire structure of Ukraine’s state policy and is an important component of parliamentary oversight. In its absence, it is in fact impossible to assess the Government’s performance, since there are no goals or objectives against which this can be done. Indeed, we already have such a precedent: in 2020, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal presented his Programme of Activities, which the Verkhovna Rada sent for revision, but which was never approved. Thus, the previous Government operated without an adopted Programme for more than five years.

On 18 August 2025, Prime Minister of Ukraine Yuliia Svyrydenko, together with members of the Cabinet of Ministers, presented the Draft Programme of Action of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for 2025–2026. But the presentation itself is not enough. The Draft must now be submitted to Parliament for consideration — that is, either to be approved or rejected.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives was involved in the development of this draft law — it is currently under review by the Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights. At this stage, however, it is important to continue working on improving its provisions, discussing and refining them. First, because there are indeed many problems accumulated in the sphere of veteran policy, and they are often systemic in nature, which means that solutions should not be piecemeal but comprehensive.

Work on the draft law needs to be resumed, since oversight of the security and defence sector makes it possible to ensure the rule of law, legality, accountability and transparency of the institutions of the security and defence sector.

The need to adopt an ethical code is highlighted by each successive scandal involving Members of Parliament. Moreover, holding individual MPs to account, whose behaviour discredits the only legislative body of Ukraine, is critically important for restoring its credibility. One need only recall July of this year, when certain MPs outraged the public with their undisguised joy after the vote on Draft Law No. 12414.

Such a code should define the rules of conduct for Members of Parliament in the plenary chamber, in other working bodies of Parliament and, importantly, outside it. The need to adopt an ethical code has been raised since 2016 — in particular, it is one of the recommendations of the Roadmap on Parliamentary Reform. A draft resolution is already before the Verkhovna Rada: at the end of 2022, Draft Law No. 8327 was registered, which is intended to modernise the current rules of parliamentary ethics and create an effective system for their implementation. This will not only separate out unworthy manifestations of behaviour by individual MPs but will also be one of the steps towards increasing trust in Parliament.

Improving the procedures for adapting Ukraine’s legislation to the European Union acquis is one of the key directions of Ukraine’s European integration course. This is important above all for monitoring and screening the reforms being implemented by Ukraine, as mentioned in the recommendations and Roadmaps from the European Union.

Continuing work on the draft law that brings legislation closer in the context of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU must remain in the focus of the Verkhovna Rada and be supported at the level of all parliamentary Committees without exception.

The draft law is intended to reinstate the mandatory competition for appointment to the position of prosecutor in prosecution offices of all levels, conducted by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). It also proposes to repeal other negative changes introduced by Law No. 4555-IX: granting the Prosecutor General oversight powers, bypassing the independent prosecutor-procedural supervisor in criminal proceedings, and providing additional grounds for dismissing ‘disloyal’ prosecutors through structural changes.

Among other things, the draft law provides for measures to improve the operation of criminal justice bodies, primarily of anti-corruption specialisation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives consistently supports the introduction of the Legislative Impact Assessment tool in the law-making activity of the Ukrainian Parliament, in particular, helping to integrate it into the work of parliamentary Committees and the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. This is a structured tool through which the future consequences and likely impacts of proposed decisions can be identified and assessed.

Impact Assessment is mentioned in the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform and the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, which was created in preparation for negotiations with the European Union on concluding the Agreement on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Conducting an Impact Assessment is also required by the Law of Ukraine ‘On Lawmaking’, adopted in 2023. But since the Law will take effect one year after martial law is lifted, Parliament has so far been in no hurry to apply the tool of Legislative Impact Assessment systematically, and it still remains ad hoc. Nevertheless, understanding the principles and practice of applying Impact Assessment is important for everyone involved in developing legislation, especially in the context of continuing parliamentary reform.    

The organisation of recruitment for civil service positions remains one of the most problematic areas in public administration. At the same time, the draft law provides for the phased resumption of competitions for civil service positions, which is critically important for relaunching the process of renewing staff in the public sector.

It was developed as an alternative to the government draft, which was withdrawn due to the change in the composition of the Government.

More on what this draft law seeks to address is noted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in its infobrief on the issue of a politically neutral civil service.

The draft law concerns problems that require urgent resolution at the legislative level, and delaying its consideration is truly unacceptable. At present, the draft law is under review in the relevant Committee and requires further refinement, but its adoption is very important for adapting the state secrets protection system to wartime conditions.

In particular, the draft law regulates such issues as:

• speeding up, during martial law, the classification of information as state secrets;
• revising approaches to the functioning of the clearance system (risk-based approach);
• updating the mechanisms of information exchange between bodies during security checks related to clearance for state secrets and the granting of special permits for activities connected with state secrets.

This draft law grants the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) the authority to develop and submit to the President of Ukraine and the Government draft regulatory acts on matters within the competence of the SSU.

It was adopted as a basis at first reading in April 2025, and there are no critical comments on the content of the draft law. Therefore, its final adoption must also be a priority since it will contribute to the preparation of timely decisions, particularly in ensuring the protection of state secrets.

During the war, Ukraine faces systemic threats and heightened enemy interest in information constituting state secrets — and therefore delaying the adoption of these draft laws, which is certainly not in the interests of the state.

The advancement of the initiatives listed above in Parliament is important for timely responses to all the challenges Ukraine faces under martial law. An updated agenda makes it possible to focus on priority tasks and not postpone important decisions ‘for later’, when the issue will become acute and inevitably require an immediate response.

‘The stick and carrot’ have long been known, since school days, as methods of influence. The state also uses them to govern society. The ‘stick’ — that is, sanctions and punishments — is applied when the state wants to discourage society from certain behaviour. When it seeks to encourage more people to behave in a particular way, it applies the ‘carrot’ — motivation and reward. Both tools must be applied to achieve results, as the proverb teaches us. The Ukrainian Parliament, in striking a balance between the ‘stick’ and the ‘carrot’, is severe — it gives preference to punishment over reward. 

Parliament’s standard reaction to any social problem is the ‘stick’: to increase liability for citizens, to add new articles to the codes, and to introduce harsher sanctions.

Let us take, for example, Draft Law No. 13452 — yet another ‘stick’. It proposes to strengthen punishment for military personnel for disobeying an order with imprisonment for a term of 5 to 10 years. Moreover, the court would have no right to take circumstances into account or impose a lighter sentence. MPs may vote on this draft law as early as today, 3 September.

The declared aim is to increase discipline in the army, allegedly in response to a demand from the military itself. Yet as soon as information about the draft law appeared, the most critical voices came precisely from the soldiers. Lawyers also question the effectiveness of this approach. For example, Judge of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, Doctor of Laws Oleh Tkachuk, emphasises: ‘Increasing punishment in itself will not ensure law and order in the Armed Forces’. And not only in the Armed Forces, in fact; this example is by no means an isolated one.

Let us move to 3 March 2022. Exactly one week had passed since the start of russia’s full-scale invasion, and Parliament convened for a session at which it would for the first time adopt laws under martial law. One of the first problems it sought to address was ‘looting’, or what MPs understood by this term. And what they understood by it were theft, robbery, brigandage and extortion committed under martial law or a state of emergency. At that time, the imagination could draw a picture of gangs of criminals carrying away property from houses whose owners were fleeing the fighting. What had to be done to prevent such a situation? MPs used their time-tested trump card — in their imagination — to increase liability. Thus, on 3 March, they registered, reviewed and adopted Law No. 2117-IX, equating any theft ‘under martial law’ to a serious crime.

Did such a decision stop thefts under martial law? No. But it created an exceptional legal problem that even the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court could not resolve, and complicated the interpretation of the new provisions in courts. The very fact that many cases of theft under martial law were heard shows that such offences were nevertheless committed, even though Parliament had increased liability for them.

Moreover, the very definition of ‘looting’ was incorrect. In international law, it means theft of property on the battlefield, in particular from the wounded or the dead. In fact, it has the same meaning in the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Nevertheless, this did not prevent lawmakers from calling ordinary offences committed anywhere in Ukraine looting.

‘More punishments — fewer offences’ sounds simple and appealing, but it does not work in practice. Of course, the state cannot hand out only ‘carrots’; there must be punishment for undesirable behaviour. But problems cannot be solved in this way alone. On the contrary, the opposite effect may be achieved — worsening the situation or increasing the burden on law enforcement and the courts. Yet this does not seem to trouble lawmakers. The Committee on Law Enforcement regularly ranks among the top three busiest committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. From session to session, MPs methodically and relentlessly compete over who can devise new punishments. Do these punishments solve social problems? The question is rhetorical. 

The military doubts this — instead of solving the problem, soldiers are likely ‘simply to leave their units (AWOL) more often’. Liability is provided for absence without leave (AWOL), yet more than 200,000 cases show that punishment alone cannot effectively prevent it.

The proverb about the ‘stick and carrot’ is not unique. For example, in the United Kingdom, the more common idiom is about the ‘stick and carrot’. Likewise, Ukraine is not unique in its attempts to influence society. Other states also seek to influence society by different methods. In doing so, they have left the ‘always the stick’ formula far behind. Where Ukraine seizes every opportunity to amend laws, the European Commission proposes a broad set of tools to influence social behaviour, grouped into four categories (each of which includes a list of specific instruments):

1. ‘hard’ binding rules;
2. ‘soft’ regulation;
3. education and information;
4. economic instruments.

Where Ukraine conducts a super-quick analysis in a single day, the European Commission may spend several months studying a problem, choosing the most balanced, rational and effective option for resolving it.

Where Ukraine uses ‘always the stick’, the European Commission may think about changing the environment, the organisational model, the management structure and culture, combining sanctions with incentives, and so on.

This does not mean that the EU never applies ‘sticks’, sanctions and punishments. It does. But only after determining (as a result of thorough analysis and broad consultations) that all other ways of solving the problem will not work, and only legislative changes establishing sanctions for undesirable behaviour can correct the situation.

Ukraine is moving towards the EU. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine plays one of the key roles on this path. And the new, fourteenth session of the Ukrainian Parliament’s work can bring us even closer to the European Union. However, the ratification of a few more technical regulations or uniform product labelling will not make Ukraine a full member of the EU. An important aspect of our development must be a change in the logic of addressing social problems. The European Union was not built with ‘sticks’ alone.

Perhaps Ukrainian lawmakers want to create the impression of a ‘strong hand’ which, holding the ‘stick’, keeps everything under control. Or perhaps MPs continue to do this unconsciously and by inertia, applying only sanctions and punishments, since it is difficult for them to imagine other ways of solving problems. However, the new session of the Verkhovna Rada offers a new chance to change the ways in which society is influenced. Or else — remain hostage to their own ‘stick’.

Public trust in Parliament in Ukraine is consistently low. This is not a new trend or an ‘achievement’ of the ninth convocation — the low level of trust in the Verkhovna Rada has persisted for years and, according to research by the Razumkov Centre, is now the lowest among state institutions.

There are many reasons for this, not least the conflation of the individual MPs’ reputations with that of the institution. This is hardly surprising, as even this year there has been no shortage of scandals involving MPs. One need only recall recent weeks, when the Verkhovna Rada once again demonstrated its lack of agency, while certain MPs outraged society with their unrestrained delight after voting for draft law No. 12414. 

On 31 July, Parliament attempted to roll back its decision and voted for the President’s Draft Law No. 13533. For the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion, it even broadcast a sitting online. Yet in the very first minutes of the broadcast, we saw MPs fighting. Then came Serhii Vlasenko’s middle finger, in response to a speech by a fellow MP. Mariana Bezuhla and MPs from the Holos faction walked around with cardboard signs — an action that may be regarded as the use of posters and slogans, prohibited under the current Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada (Article 53). The first live broadcast of a sitting in three years revealed utter chaos in the conduct of business and MPs’ lack of respect for procedure and for each other. But what can be done about this?

Are there mechanisms to hold to account individual MPs whose behaviour discredits Ukraine’s sole legislative body?

At present, the Verkhovna Rada is unable to distance itself from the unethical — and at times harmful — behaviour of MPs. The absence of parliamentary culture as such, even as evidenced by the most recent broadcast of a sitting, creates numerous situations in which MPs appear in the public space, including on social media, as violators of ethical norms. This negatively affects not only their personal image but also that of their party or faction, and of Parliament as a whole.

One instrument actively used in the parliaments of 85 countries worldwide is a code of conduct for parliamentarians, or a code of parliamentary ethics. This is a normative act that establishes rules of behaviour for MPs in the chamber, and — crucially — beyond it. The list of possible violations in codes across different countries may vary, but the most common include: inappropriate behaviour, personal insults or defamation, prolonged absence from work, and other actions incompatible with the notion of parliamentary dignity. In addition, it is important to have a dedicated internal parliamentary body responsible for ensuring compliance with ethical standards.

The application of ethical norms to members of parliament outside the chamber is not a unique practice. For example, the Code of Ethics of the Saeima of Latvia requires MPs to abide by the principles, rules and recommendations set out in the code in their approach to work, in relations with other MPs, with other institutions, and with society. The  Code of Conduct for Members of the Althingi — the Parliament of Iceland — stipulates that its provisions apply to their duties in public service as elected representatives of the people.

In Ukraine, no such code exists; the full spectrum of possible violations is not clearly set out, and the current Rules of Procedure provide only three types of sanctions for breaches of ethics: 

• interruption of a speech;
• deprivation of the right to speak until the end of the plenary sitting;
• deprivation of the right to participate in plenary sittings.

These apply only to violations of rules of behaviour in the session hall, solely during a plenary sitting, and only in cases of insulting another MP or a parliamentary faction or group. Yet even when the existing mechanisms are used, the outcome may be no result at all. For example, the relevant committee recommended that the Verkhovna Rada adopt a decision depriving Petro Poroshenko of the right to participate in one plenary sitting because of his use of obscene language towards another MP (leaving aside the atmosphere of political pressure in the context of sanctions imposed against him). However, because of a lack of political will, this matter has not even been put to a vote since January. 

The recommendation to adopt a code of ethics was set out in the European Parliament’s Needs Assessment Mission in the 2016 Parliamentary Reform Roadmap — a document soon to mark its tenth anniversary. In the years since, the Verkhovna Rada has failed not only to adopt a code of ethics but even to consider any initiatives in this area at first reading. Notably, at the end of 2022, draft law No. 8327 was registered, aimed at updating the existing norms of parliamentary ethics and establishing an effective system for their implementation. This legislative initiative is important for strengthening public trust in Parliament and consolidating democratic governance. Yet it remains under consideration in the Committee on Rules of Procedure.

Draft law No. 8327 proposes a mechanism of self-regulation. It provides for the establishment in the Verkhovna Rada of a separate committee, to be formed on a parity basis (that is, with an equal number of MPs from the coalition and the opposition), which would oversee compliance with discipline and parliamentary ethics. The committee would examine complaints against MPs who violated parliamentary ethics in the course of exercising their powers (including in the public sphere outside the Parliament building) and decide on their responsibility.

The Main Scientific and Expert Department made several pertinent comments on this draft law, which can be addressed before second reading, and the draft law can be further revised in line with the recommendations of the Rules of Procedure Committee, while also taking into account international practice and standards.

Draft Law No. 8327 is an opportunity to address the problem of unethical behaviour by individual MPs, which could improve the reputation of the institution and increase trust in the Verkhovna Rada. Yet Parliament continues to delay consideration of this draft law.

It is important to recall that a new committee is unlikely to be established during this convocation: given the specifics of forming its membership, this responsibility would fall to the next, tenth, convocation. If the law is not adopted now, the next convocation will also be left without a specialised committee, since the size and remit of committees are determined at the beginning of each new convocation.

It is logical that individuals who make, and will in the future make, the most important decisions in the state should be subject to ethical requirements. Yet Draft Law No. 8327 has been ‘lying’ in the Rules of Procedure Committee for a third year already, and without its conclusion, it cannot be considered at first reading. Ignoring this draft law is a deliberate position of the committee since any other decision would place the issue of ethical conduct back onto the agenda — something clearly not a priority for MPs.

Scuffles in the Verkhovna Rada, threats against activists, abuses of status, and, at the very least, some highly insensitive posts by MPs on social media only intensify public dissatisfaction with the authorities. What outrages people is not so much MPs’ breaches of ethical norms, but the absence of any response from their colleagues. The fact that parliamentarians do not even attempt to condemn unethical behaviour, and that some MPs are capable only of hypocritical statements, is yet further evidence of the loss of agency of Parliament as an institution.

In the present circumstances, the Verkhovna Rada urgently needs to find instruments capable of restoring people’s trust. During wartime, the problems with Parliament’s agency are becoming ever more visible and threatening — threatening to the democratic state order of Ukraine. As an institution, the Verkhovna Rada is obliged to ensure citizens’ trust to avoid these threats. While a code of ethics for MPs is no panacea for all the problems in Parliament, without it, in the view of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, restoring trust will be impossible.

The adoption of the controversial Law No. 4555 concerning the NABU and the SAPO became a turning point, when, for the first time since the start of the full-scale war, society so openly and decisively opposed the actions of the authorities. The speed of the draft law’s passage — from the moment the comparative table was provided to its signing and publication — was staggering: everything took place within a single day.

Excuses for Members of Parliament to breach the Rules of Procedure abound: from ‘the requirements of wartime’ to ‘threats to national security’. Moreover, this is not aligned with the Constitution of Ukraine, which automatically makes it problematic.

Already in the first months of the full-scale invasion, it became evident that the Rules of Procedure were not suited for application under martial law — the relevant procedures for such circumstances were simply not prescribed. At the same time, for over three years, Parliament has failed to amend them to ensure the legitimacy of procedural decisions — instead, it resorted to half-measures in the form of resolutions that only slightly simplified organisational procedures.

Using Law No. 4555 as an example, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives recalls the most common violations of the Rules of Procedure.

As an exception, the lead committee may decide to consider proposals and amendments introduced into the provisions of a draft law that were not the subject of consideration at first reading. This is possible if the lead committee and/or the expert unit of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada indicated the necessity of their inclusion in their conclusions, and the chair announced this at the plenary session during the consideration of the draft law at first reading.

In other words, between the first and second reading, the text of a draft law must not change so radically (through the appearance of entirely new provisions that were neither discussed nor elaborated at the stage of first reading) that it would in fact need to be reconsidered afresh. The Rules of Procedure contain a direct prohibition on such procedural acrobatics.

There was no mention of the need to introduce proposals unrelated to the subject of Law No. 4555 either in the conclusion of the lead committee at first reading or in the conclusion of the Main Scientific and Expert Department. This is reflected in the draft law’s profile. The inclusion of proposals limiting the independence of the NABU and SAPO even forced one of the initiators to abstain from voting for his own legislative initiative.

Nothing fundamentally new occurred. The long-standing practice of ‘nested doll laws’, which became particularly popular in the first months of martial law, has evidently once again been applied. This was how the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada was established and how the regulatory impact analysis was dispensed with. This scheme makes it possible to avoid registering a new draft law that would otherwise have to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Procedure, include justification, and undergo mandatory reviews in the structural units of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada and in committees. Such proposals would hardly have secured the support of the parliamentary committees on Anti-Corruption Policy or European Integration, whose review is mandatory for all registered draft laws.

MPs are supposed to receive the draft law prepared for second or repeated reading, together with the lead committee’s conclusion and other supporting documents, at least ten days before the date of its consideration at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Rules of Procedure prescribe precisely such a period to ensure that MPs have at least the opportunity to familiarise themselves with what they will have to vote for or against.

In the case of Law No. 4555, however, the committee meeting took place on the same day, 22 July, just a few hours before the start of the plenary sitting, while MPs received what was in effect a new text only a few minutes before the sitting began. They simply had no physical time to familiarise themselves with the committee’s version of the draft law. This does not, however, absolve MPs of responsibility, since voting for an unknown text is still a choice — and one that they make at almost every plenary sitting. For instance, with regard to 45 (60%) of the draft laws adopted at second reading during the 12th session of the Verkhovna Rada, the deadlines for familiarisation with the committee conclusions and the comparative table before consideration in the plenary hall were violated. Overall, since the start of the full-scale invasion, in each session, more than half of the draft laws have been adopted in breach of MPs’ lawful right to familiarise themselves with the texts.

In Parliament, this practice has long been perceived as a standard ‘working process’. It emerged and became entrenched well before the start of the ninth convocation of Parliament. The situation in which most MPs do not, in fact, know what they are voting for is more the rule than the exception. Given the existing practice of registering, processing and considering hundreds of legislative initiatives during a session, such a situation is hardly surprising. Yet when a whole series of procedural norms are ignored, failure to observe the time limits for familiarisation can play a decisive role in the adoption of initiatives such as Law No. 4555 or the so-called ‘dictatorial laws’ of 16 January 2014.

The Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada signs a law within two to five days of its submission (after preparation in the lead committee and the legal unit), except in cases provided for by the Rules of Procedure. This period is justified by the fact that MPs have two days in which to challenge the results of a vote if it was conducted in violation of the rules. In the case of Law No. 4555, immediately after the vote, at the proposal of MP Maksym Buzhanskyi, the Verkhovna Rada instructed the Speaker to sign the draft law without delay and send it to the President for signature. While carrying out instructions of Parliament is one of the Speaker’s powers, the procedure of immediate signing is not provided for by the Rules of Procedure. Nevertheless, this has become a fairly common practice during martial law, often justified by the need to accelerate certain stages of the legislative process.

The regular breach of the Rules of Procedure by MPs has already become part of parliamentary culture (and MPs of the ninth convocation — also known as the ‘new faces’ — very quickly adapted to this process).

If anyone wishes to challenge a law on the grounds of violations of the procedure for its adoption, the Constitutional Court consistently adheres to its own legal position. It holds that a normative act may be declared unconstitutional only if the procedural requirements established directly by the Constitution of Ukraine, and not by other legal acts (the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada), have been violated.

Previously, for these reasons, laws were declared unconstitutional only in cases where MPs had not voted in person or if a law had not received a committee conclusion. The first reason is no longer relevant due to the introduction of the touch-sensitive voting button in March 2021, and as to the second — in the case of Law No. 4555, a committee meeting, albeit only formally, did take place. Breaches of the Rules of Procedure have not yet constituted grounds for declaring a law unconstitutional. It is unlikely that anyone in their right mind would wish to open this ‘Pandora’s box’ by declaring an act unconstitutional on the basis of violations of the Rules of Procedure, given the number of acts adopted in this way.

Only under pressure from engaged public and international partners did the President register, and the Verkhovna Rada adopt in full, a new draft law that effectively restored the procedural independence of the NABU and SAPO, rescinded by Law No. 4555. In other words, it was only public oversight of Parliament and other institutions that compelled the authorities to correct what had been done. Yet this, unfortunately, was also achieved in breach of the Rules of Procedure. However, in this case, the public importance of adopting the President’s draft law as swiftly as possible was indisputable.

Clearly, persuading MPs of the need to comply with the Rules of Procedure — or comprehensively reviewing it so as to bring it into line with the Constitution (!) and ensure the basic principles of transparency and public participation in the legislative process — is a task marked with several stars. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives is convinced, however, that there are several critically important steps that can be taken here and now to at least minimise the risk of a repeat of the lightning-fast adoption of Law No. 4555.

First and foremost, the problem of the closed nature of the decision-making process must be addressed. This is manifested in several ways — most notably the absence of live broadcasting of plenary sittings of the Verkhovna Rada.

Nor can the absence of broadcasting be justified by the content of the issues discussed at a plenary sitting — the Verkhovna Rada itself uploads recordings to its YouTube channel, and transcripts are published on the official website. The ban on live broadcasting means that the public learns of the most important decisions only after the fact. More than 90 civil society organisations and media outlets have called for the restoration of online broadcasting of plenary sittings. A group of MPs registered the relevant resolution, yet neither it nor any other similar proposal received the support of the Verkhovna Rada.

Another manifestation of closedness is the fact that for six months, the President has not signed Draft Law No. 11321. This legislative initiative obliges open sittings of committees to be broadcast and the recordings permanently posted on their webpages, as well as requiring the agenda of sittings and the draft acts scheduled for consideration to be published no later than 24 hours before the start of a committee sitting. Even some members of the committee were unaware of the sitting at which Law No. 4555 was prepared for second reading — let alone journalists having open access.

The sabotage of parliamentary transparency has also affected the Law of Ukraine ‘On Public Consultations’. As a result of proposals by MPs, this law: 

• will enter into force only one year after the lifting or termination of martial law, instead of six months as envisaged in the draft law at first reading;
• has established an exception allowing MPs and parliamentary committees not to conduct public consultations at all.

All this creates the impression that MPs are doing everything possible to avoid dealing with policy and instead concern themselves solely with politics. Ultimately, unsubstantiated and hasty political decisions lead to mistakes, with the authorities once again stepping on the same rake they themselves had laid in their path.

The habitual condescending attitude of MPs towards violations of the Rules of Procedure — which manifests itself at critical moments (as in the case of Law No. 4555) — threatens the democratic foundations of parliamentarism and sends a signal to this and future convocations of the Verkhovna Rada that the Rules of Procedure can be violated — and that such violations will go unpunished.

Democratic civilian control encompasses a suite of measures designed to ensure the rule of law, legality, accountability and transparency of security and defence sector actors, as well as other entities whose activities involve the restriction of human rights and freedoms. These measures are intended to promote the effective operation of these entities and the fulfilment of their functions, thereby strengthening Ukraine’s national security.

Experience from around the world, namely that of NATO member states, proves that democratic civilian control is essential for state stability and democratic order.

Parliamentary oversight is one of the pillars of democratic civilian control. It places a framework of restrictions that prevents the army from being misused for unconstitutional purposes. In other words, Parliament limits the President’s or Government’s ability to exploit the security and defence sectors for illegal purposes or the usurpation of power, while also minimising the likelihood of a military coup.

The instruments of parliamentary oversight in Ukraine are broadly similar to those utilised by NATO member states, albeit with variations stemming from the distinct legal systems and cycles of interaction within the power triangle (Parliament — Government — President). Despite these similarities, parliamentary oversight in Ukraine has not yet become a reliable foundation for achieving the desired effectiveness of the country’s security and defence infrastructure.

The root of the problem lies in Parliament’s limited oversight of the Government’s actions. This control is even weaker in the security and defence sector due to its sensitive nature and the specific features of its ‘constitutional architecture’.

Therefore, existing shortcomings in legislative regulation remain unaddressed, and the weak political and institutional interaction between stakeholders in the security and defence sector is not improving. Instead, it is being exacerbated by the full-scale invasion.

Recognising the subject’s undeniable relevance and weight, ALI’s Green Paper addresses issues surrounding the use of parliamentary oversight tools under martial law and suggests solutions.

The Study addresses the following questions:

1. To what extent are the declared parliamentary oversight instruments over the security and defence sector used by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and how effective are they?
2. To what extent is parliamentary oversight over the security and defence sector in Ukraine limited during wartime?
3. What practices of NATO member states regarding parliamentary oversight over the security and defence sector should Ukraine adopt in the future?

Further information on parliamentary oversight is available in the ALI Green Paper.

The study was conducted within the framework of the project “Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine” (PASS Ukraine), which the Agency implements together with the Parliamentary Centre, in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with the support of Canada’s Foreign Policy — Global Affairs Canada as part of the Peacebuilding Program and stability (PSOPs).

1. On 23 July, Law No. 4555-ІX entered into force — ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Specifics of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offences Related to the Disappearance of Persons Under Special Circumstances During Martial Law’. It is better known as the ‘law abolishing the independence of NABU and SAPO’ or the ‘law enhancing the role of the Prosecutor General in anti-corruption proceedings’.

Law No. 4555-ІX was initially registered as Draft Law No. 12414 on 16 January 2025 but was significantly expanded and passed in its entirety within a single day — 22 July 2025. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has already provided an analysis of the adopted amendments. In its final version, it introduced changes to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’.

3. In substance, Law No. 4555-ІX addresses four main areas:

1) Procedural powers of the Prosecutor General over SAPO and all prosecutors (the special procedures for exercising procedural oversight over SAPO prosecutors and NABU detectives have been abolished. This undermines the procedural independence of prosecutors and opens the door to abuse of power);

2) Clarification of the grounds for conducting an urgent search (without a ruling from the investigating judge) — amendments to Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine have, on the one hand, narrowed the list of offences for which an urgent search may be conducted and redefined ‘saving property’ as ‘preserving evidence’. On the other hand, they have removed the possibility of conducting urgent searches in corruption and corruption-related cases, which weakens the effectiveness of such investigations;

3) Possibility to change the location of investigating criminal proceedings involving missing persons to the place of residence (or stay) of the victim — amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine, which implement the original intent of Draft Law No. 12414 dated 16 January 2025;

4) Personnel-related amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ — the law enables the recruitment of individuals to the prosecution service without prior work experience and without a competitive selection process, as well as the dismissal of prosecutors who are classified as ‘out of staff’ (dismissed due to the liquidation or reorganisation of departments). This contradicts the conclusions expressed by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024 and effectively bypasses guarantees of independence through so-called ‘personnel purges’.

4. On 23 July, the President of Ukraine stated that he would ‘propose to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine a draft law that will be the answer — that will strengthen the law enforcement system’, and on 24 July that ‘the text of the draft law, which guarantees the real reinforcement of Ukraine’s law enforcement system, the independence of anti-corruption bodies, and the reliable protection of the law enforcement system from any russian influence or interference’, had been agreed. The draft law was registered under No. 13533. What follows is an analysis of this draft law.

5. The Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine “On the Public Prosecutor’s Office”’ concerns two components of Law No. 4555-ІX (excluding the personnel-related provisions on the prosecution service and the provisions on missing persons) outlined above. Additionally, it introduces a mechanism for polygraph testing of NABU and SAPO staff who have access to state secrets — to be conducted by the internal control units of NABU and SAPO following the methodology of the SSU. It also provides for a six-month screening of NABU detectives and SAPO prosecutors with access to state secrets, which will be carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine. Broadly speaking, this applies to all law enforcement and prosecution bodies.

6. Regarding the procedural component. The draft law repeals all procedural restrictions on SAPO introduced by Law No. 4555-ІX (amendments to Articles 3, 36, 37, 39, 40, 40-1, 41, 216, 218, 284, 294, 470, 480, 481, and amendments to Section XI ‘Transitional Provisions’). Moreover, these procedural restrictions applied not only to SAPO but to all prosecutors. However, the mechanism for ‘requisitioning’ case materials for review by the Prosecutor General or third parties (prosecutors) remains — except for NABU proceedings. In other words, these amendments continue to undermine the procedural independence of all prosecutors (apart from SAPO). Yet the entire rationale behind implementing EU standards was the opposite — to expand prosecutors’ procedural independence, not to return to the old supervisory practices of the prosecution service (in the context of the function of ‘oversight of legality’).

It likewise repeals the restrictions on the Head of SAPO regarding the management of SAPO prosecutors, which had been introduced into the relevant law (amendments to Article 8-1 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’).

7. Regarding the grounds for conducting urgent searches. The grounds for conducting urgent searches (without a ruling from an investigating judge) are returned to their original version (amendments to Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine).

Overall, Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC already contains an appropriate mechanism for conducting a search without a judge’s ruling, namely: (1) conducting the urgent search; (2) applying to the investigating judge for judicial oversight; (3) legalisation of the search results by the investigating judge — resolving whether there were valid grounds, which subsequently affects the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence obtained. In this regard, the issue lies more in weak judicial oversight than in the regulatory framework itself. The European Court of Human Rights, in its recent judgment in Korniyets and Others v. Ukraine (10 July 2025), rightly noted that the key matter is one of discretion — and judicial control should serve to neutralise any abuse. Therefore, urgent searches may exist as a tool, but must comply with the principle of the rule of law.

8. Regarding amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine. The draft law retains the amendments to Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine, which allow for the change of location of a pre-trial investigation of criminal offences during martial law upon the request of a victim who is a close relative or family member of a person who has gone missing under special circumstances. At the request of such a person, the location is changed to the place of residence (or stay) of the victim, who is a close relative or family member of the person who has gone missing under such circumstances. These amendments reflect the original intent of Draft Law No. 12414 dated 16 January 2025 and can generally be assessed positively, as they address a practical issue in the operations of law enforcement agencies — primarily the National Police of Ukraine. It is worth noting that the ‘opposition’ Draft Law No. 13531 dated 24 July 2025 (MP I. Sovsun and others) also retains this provision.

9. Regarding personnel matters in the prosecution service. The possibility of appointing prosecutors to the prosecution service without a competitive selection process, as well as dismissals resulting from being declared ‘out of staff’ due to the reorganisation or liquidation of a prosecutorial body, remains in place. The draft law does not repeal the amendments to Articles 41, 51, 60 and Section XIII ‘Transitional Provisions’ of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’. These amendments do not comply with EU standards regarding merit-based recruitment to the prosecution service through open competition and run counter to Ukraine’s broader commitments to European integration. The provision on dismissing individuals classified as ‘out of staff’ in effect constitutes non-compliance with Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024 of the CCU dated 18 December 2024 — and is thus unconstitutional. The mechanism introduced, under which a prosecutor is offered a position and dismissed in case of repeated refusal, can easily be manipulated — for instance, by offering positions in lower-level prosecutor’s offices or in offices facing severe staffing shortages due to proximity to active combat zones (e.g. district prosecutor’s offices in areas of Sumy region near the border with the russian federation).

10. Regarding screenings by the SSU. The Final and Transitional Provisions of the draft law introduce the following mechanism for the ‘purging of anti-corruption bodies from the influence of russian intelligence services’:

10.1 The internal control unit of NABU and other law enforcement bodies, the PGO, and SAPO shall, using a methodology agreed with the SSU, conduct polygraph examinations of law enforcement personnel and prosecutors of the PGO and SAPO who have access to state secrets, at least once every two years, in order to detect actions taken in favour of the aggressor state.

10.2 Within six months from the date this law enters into force, the SSU shall conduct screenings of employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and other law enforcement bodies, as well as prosecutors of the PGO and SAPO who have access to state secrets, to identify any actions taken in favour of the aggressor state.

Thus, the core idea behind the President of Ukraine’s ‘compromise’ amendments is the ‘purging’ of NABU from the influence of russian intelligence services. The information campaign that damaged NABU’s reputation following the searches and arrests on 21 July created the impression that this is a widespread issue within NABU. However, no adequate evidence or sufficiently transparent communication from the SSU has been provided.

Such screenings may serve as a means of exerting pressure on NABU and SAPO, as well as grounds for granting the SSU access to covert investigative materials in NABU and SAPO proceedings. Furthermore, this could be viewed as a form of subordinating NABU to the SSU by introducing a mechanism of continuous polygraph checks. This undermines the institutional independence of NABU and SAPO, which has been built over the past ten years in the course of implementing the state’s anti-corruption policy.

11. Regarding asset tracing. The Final and Transitional Provisions of the draft law envisage the development of a range of legislative initiatives.

11.1 The Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice are tasked with intensifying efforts to trace and secure the extradition of individuals from foreign states who are evading pre-trial investigation, judicial proceedings, or the execution of sentences. If necessary, within three months from the date this law enters into force, they shall — jointly with the Cabinet of Ministers — develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law with the relevant legislative amendments.

11.2 The Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Asset Recovery and Management Agency of Ukraine (ARMA), NABU, the ESBU, SBI, SSU, NPU, and the State Financial Monitoring Service of Ukraine are also instructed to strengthen efforts to identify, trace, and recover from foreign jurisdictions assets obtained through criminal means. If necessary, within three months of the law’s entry into force, they shall — jointly with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine — develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada a draft law with the relevant legislative amendments.

11.3 The CMU and NABU shall, within one month from the date this law enters into force, amend the relevant regulatory acts to prohibit, for the duration of martial law, the travel abroad of employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, except in cases of official business trips.

In other words, during martial law, NABU employees will be entirely prohibited from travelling abroad (except for official duty trips), including for purposes such as leave. Furthermore, the procedure for approving official trips may involve a number of bureaucratic constraints, which could become grounds for abuse.

The draft law proposed by the President of Ukraine represents a compromise on the issue of safeguarding the procedural independence of SAPO, as well as of all prosecutors (with the exception of certain problematic instruments). It repeals all limitations on the procedural independence of SAPO introduced by Law No. 4555-ІX. However, it encroaches on the institutional independence (autonomy) of NABU and SAPO through the introduction of ongoing polygraph screenings conducted by the SSU or in accordance with SSU methodology. In general, these screenings apply to all law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies.

The grounds for conducting urgent searches (without an investigating judge’s ruling) are returned to the original version of the provision in the CPC of Ukraine.

At the same time, the negative provisions concerning personnel matters in the prosecution service have not been repealed. For example, it will remain possible to appoint individuals to the prosecution service without a competitive selection process (in violation of EU standards), and to dismiss them in cases of liquidation or reorganisation of a prosecutorial body (in violation of CCU Decision No. 11-r(ІІ)/2024).

The Committee on Law Enforcement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has received proposals for a substantial expansion of the content of Draft Law No. 12414, dated 16 January 2025. The primary objective of the proposed law is to establish special conditions for conducting pre-trial investigations that would allow for a prompt and effective response to reports of missing persons and ensure that applicants (victims) — close relatives and family members of the missing person — have access to legal mechanisms during wartime. The draft law merely seeks to simplify the procedure for determining the venue of pre-trial investigation to enhance the effectiveness of organising such investigations under martial law.

The proposals to amend the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine submitted to the Committee include:

1. A significant strengthening of the role of the Prosecutor General (primarily through amendments to paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the CPC of Ukraine) — the Prosecutor General would be granted the authority to request any criminal proceeding for the purpose of verifying compliance with the law, including the ability to transfer such proceedings to other prosecutors for review. This step threatens the procedural independence of prosecutors who exercise procedural control in these cases, blocks further investigation, and enables manual control over all high-profile proceedings. In practice, this would implement the doctrinal notion that ‘the Prosecutor General is superior to any prosecutor’, which contradicts the will of the legislator, who for the past ten years has consistently granted the Head of the SAPO a high level of procedural independence and the SAPO itself — as a specialised prosecution office — institutional autonomy.
2. Abolition of the so-called ‘exclusive investigative jurisdiction’ in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of NABU and SAPO. Currently, a prosecutor of the relevant level has the right to transfer a case from one pre-trial investigation body to another in cases of investigative ineffectiveness (paragraph 5, Article 36 of the CPC of Ukraine). However, an exception exists for NABU — such proceedings cannot be reassigned to, for example, the National Police of Ukraine or the State Bureau of Investigation. This is one of the key guarantees of the agency’s independence. The proposed amendments would eliminate this safeguard entirely — the Prosecutor General would be authorised to reassign any proceedings in any direction. Moreover, the Prosecutor General would gain the power to issue binding written instructions in NABU-led criminal proceedings. Such instructions could either harm the overall logic of criminal prosecution or simply ‘block’ proceedings by issuing meaningless directives that would require considerable time and resources to implement.
3. Elimination of most provisions granting SAPO procedural independence in high-level corruption cases to ensure impartial and effective investigations. For example, the proposed amendments would revoke any exclusive procedural powers, such as approving notices of suspicion for special subjects, resolving disputes over investigative jurisdiction, and making changes to appellate and cassation appeals. In addition, the powers of the Deputy Prosecutor General — Head of SAPO could be delegated to other prosecutors (as proposed in the amendment to Article 37 of the CPC of Ukraine). In effect, the role of the Head of SAPO would become ‘transitional’ and would be determined within the general framework of duty allocation among the Deputy Prosecutors General.
4. ⁠The closure of criminal proceedings against a suspect (for example, following an announced audit of proceedings) may become a matter of ‘negotiation’ in relation to other individuals involved. Currently, a prosecutor’s decision to close a criminal proceeding against a suspect does not preclude the continuation of the pre-trial investigation into the respective criminal offence (Part 5 of Article 284 of the CPC of Ukraine). The proposed amendments would allow a suspect who is a special subject — such as an official in Category ‘A’, an MP, a judge, or the head of a major enterprise with a significant share of state or municipal ownership — to file a motion for the closure of proceedings in relation to themselves. However, such a motion would go directly to the Prosecutor General. In practice, this would mean the suspect would simply need to ‘come to an agreement’ with the Prosecutor General, as it is the latter who would now decide the fate of top-level corruption cases — and all others — from initiation to completion.
5. Extension of all additional instruments provided for in Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine (special procedures for investigation under martial law) for a period of three years after the termination or repeal of martial law. In light of the evolving practice of pre-trial investigation, there is a possibility that currently ‘dormant’ provisions allowing prosecutors to conduct searches or extend preventive measures without applying to an investigating judge, who, in certain territories, is objectively unable to exercise their powers, may be applied in practice.

The draft also proposes amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ to simplify the procedure for transferring prosecutors from lower-level prosecutors’ offices to the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) without a competitive selection process during the period of martial law. It would also allow for the appointment of individuals from outside the prosecution system. In addition, it proposes resolving the issue of prosecutors placed ‘out of staff’ due to decisions by the leadership concerning liquidation, reorganisation, restructuring, or changes in staffing levels within the prosecution service.

The likely aim of these provisions is to enable the transfer of prosecutors from district and regional offices, as significant resources are needed to conduct audits of NABU proceedings. However, this approach runs counter to the merit-based principles of appointment and transfer within the prosecution service and continues the flawed policy of addressing staffing issues outside the framework developed by the previous PGO leadership along the European integration track.

General Conclusion. The expansion of the Prosecutor General’s powers through the repeal of most provisions ensuring the procedural independence and autonomy of NABU and SAPO is inconsistent with the state’s anti-corruption policy pursued since the Revolution of Dignity. The prohibition against transferring NABU and SAPO proceedings to other investigative bodies, along with the special procedure for approving procedural decisions by the Head of SAPO, was introduced to minimise pressure on high-level corruption cases involving senior public officials, ministers, presidents, judges, and others. The effectiveness of this approach has been repeatedly emphasised by Ukraine’s international partners, particularly within the framework of European integration and the anti-corruption component of Chapter 23 of EU acquis.

Unlike prosecutors of the Prosecutor General’s Office, SAPO prosecutors underwent rigorous selection procedures involving international partners, and the Head of SAPO was appointed through an open competition. Public scandals in recent years, linked to the ‘blocking’ of proceedings by investigative bodies and the PGO, have demonstrated the intent to exercise ‘manual control’ over criminal cases, which undermines the principle of accountability in high-level corruption investigations. Recent efforts to discredit NABU and SAPO in the media space only reinforce this concern.

Such an Assessment is one of the key instruments for ensuring the development and subsequent evaluation of the effectiveness of quality legislation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has been consistently working on the integration of impact assessments into the practice of the Ukrainian parliament. In particular, the Agency facilitated the preparation of a range of legislative impact assessments in cooperation with the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union, the Committee on Law Enforcement, the Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence, and the Committee on State Building, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning.

In this Handbook, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives publishes new groundwork and an expanded methodology for performing gender-sensitive impact assessments based on the experience of piloting the methodology in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

The legislative practices of developed democracies, including the EU countries, are based on the model of the policy cycle. That is, a decisionFor example, draft laws or other non-normative measures. goes through a chain of mandatory stages — from planning and analysis of the problem to monitoring and evaluation of the implementation effectiveness. Impact assessment is performed at the initial stage of the policy design process, which makes it possible to adjust its instruments in accordance with the data obtained.

The logic of the Ukrainian legislative process, with the exception of a few cases, is reversed: first, the initiatorMost commonly a member of Parliament. registers a ready-made draft law and only then does the justification of the proposed approach to address the problem take place. In fact, our European partners have repeatedly drawn attention to this issue. For example, back in 2016, the European Parliament’s Needs Assessment Mission to the Verkhovna Rada on Parliamentary Reform recommended introducing the Impact Assessment tool in the work of the Ukrainian Parliament.

At the same time, the incorporation of the Assessment into the Verkhovna Rada’s practice is driven not only by the requirements of European integration, but also — and most fundamentally — by the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Parliament and enhance the effectiveness of public policies. Therefore, by adopting the Law of Ukraine “On Lawmaking” in 2023, the Verkhovna Rada committed itself to integrating Impact assessments into its lawmaking.

1. provides an opportunity to clarify the implications of the draft law and its impact on various social groups and areas;
2. serves as a mechanism for effective communication with stakeholders and the civil society in the course of drafting a law;
3. serves as a tool to promote transparency in the decision-making process, as the policy designer conducts consultations with stakeholders along the way;
4. allows lawmakers to assess whether a proposed measure is reasonable and capable of achieving its intended purpose;
5. becomes particularly valuable in cases of insufficient background information or justification for a draft law. It provides the full picture needed to ensure evidence-based decision-making.

People may experience legislative impacts very differently depending on their gender identity, age, ethnicity or other characteristics. However, gender-sensitive impact assessments help to determine to what extent and how draft laws or other measures affect various groups of people. It also allows for policy adjustments and ensures that any discriminatory effects are eliminated or mitigated.

The purpose of this Handbook is to outline a methodological approach to conducting a gender-sensitive legislative impact assessment and to systematise the process of its implementation in order to help lawmakers analyse and assess the potential effects of legislative initiatives and to enable them to justify the chosen method of regulation.

Read more about the Legislative Impact Assessment — in the new ALI’s Handbook.

The Handbook was developed within the framework of the project “Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine” (PASS Ukraine), which the Agency implements together with the Parliamentary Centre, in cooperation with The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with the support of Canada’s Foreign Policy—Global Affairs Canada as part of the Peacebuilding Program and stability (PSOPs).

The Public Administration Reform Strategy for 2022–2025, although aimed at reforming the entire system of professional and politically neutral public service focused on protecting citizens’ interests, excludes from its scope the reform of the civil service within the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. This is explained, in part, by the fact that parliamentary service reform is most often explicitly viewed as part of parliamentary reform rather than as a component of public administration or civil service reform. However, such an assumption is unlikely to be justified. The implementation of public administration reform should be carried out in accordance with the European Principles of Public Administration, developed by the OECD/SIGMA, which state that these principles also apply to parliaments and other independent constitutional bodies, with due respect for their constitutional independence and specific functional characteristics.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is the sole legislative body, which, in turn, determines the specific features of the functioning of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. This body performs a wide range of tasks — from financial and logistical support to scientific, expert, and analytical assistance to the work of Parliament. The Secretariat operates in an environment characterised by a plurality of political positions and a high level of politicisation in the decision-making process. For an institution that provides support, consultation, and daily services to the Parliament and its members, it is essential to have mechanisms in place that ensure Members of Parliament receive impartial assistance in exercising their powers, while staff are protected from potential abuses of status by MPs.

Among such abuses are the registration of many low-quality draft laws and the formal compliance with explanatory note requirements, or the practice of adopting draft laws ‘on the same day’This refers to draft laws that are registered and passed on the same day or the next day.. In the first case, the responsible structural units do not have the authority to refuse registration of draft laws and supporting documents that do not meet the requirements of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, which in turn contributes to the phenomenon of ‘legislative spam’. In the second case, units responsible for conducting legal and analytical assessments of draft laws and other acts are only able to provide a superficial evaluation of the consequences of their adoption and their consistency with existing legislation. For example, during the 12^th session, in the case of 45 draft laws (60% of the draft laws adopted in the second reading), the deadline for Members of Parliament to review the relevant conclusions before their consideration in the plenary session was violated.

Particularly vulnerable in this context are, for example, the committee secretariats, as they are subject to dual subordination: to the Head of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada and to the respective parliamentary committee. While this situation is not unique to committee secretariats in UkraineFor example, in the Estonian parliament, the head of the committee’s secretariat reports to the head of the Parliamentary Office and the committee chair on matters directly related to advising and servicing the committee’s work., parliamentary civil servants are constantly forced to balance the need to comply with the Rules of Procedure against political pressure from interest groups that use administrative leverage to ‘bypass’ certain parliamentary procedures.

In addition to the protection of the Secretariat staff from political pressure exerted by parliamentarians (or groups of parliamentarians, such as party factions or committees), another important dimension of the Secretariat’s ‘independence’ is its independence from the executive branch of power — i.e., administrative autonomy. This may include such components as: the existence of a separate legal framework with clearly defined powers; freedom in organising its internal structure; an independent mechanism for hiring parliamentary civil servants, including the appointment of the head of the parliamentary service; autonomy in budget formation; and transparency and accountability to Parliament rather than to the executive branch, among others.

Staff of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada represent a relatively small portion of all civil servants in Ukraine, especially when compared to those employed in ministries and other central executive bodies. Nevertheless, their work in supporting the functioning of the sole legislative body is regulated only in a fragmented manner. The Law of Ukraine ‘On Civil Service’  stipulates that the procedures for entry into, progression through, and termination of civil service within the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada are governed by this law, taking into account the specifics defined by special legislation. For instance, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine set out specific provisions only for the appointment and dismissal of a single individual — the Head of the  Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. Similarly, the Law of Ukraine ‘On Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’ establishes procedures for appointing and dismissing the heads of committee secretariats by order of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, based on a proposal by the relevant committee and in agreement with the Head of the  Secretariat.

The Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada has approved the Regulation on the  Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. However, this regulation does not outline the specifics of parliamentary service either. It merely stipulates that the procedure for recruitment, hiring, transfer, application of disciplinary measures, and dismissal within the Secretariat is determined by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada.

Both the Rules of Procedure and the Regulation on the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada primarily define the operational areas of the Secretariat across various domains, rather than setting out the actual conditions for civil service within it.

To ensure the independence and administrative autonomy of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, it is essential to establish a legal framework that does not necessarily require a separate regulatory regime for parliamentary civil servants, but which nonetheless protects staff of the Secretariat from potential external influence.

In December 2020, the Draft Law No. 4530 ‘On Parliamentary Service’ was registered in Parliament. The authors of the draft law noted that the existing Law of Ukraine ‘On Civil Service’, which is primarily aimed at regulating the work of civil servants within executive bodies, is insufficient for addressing the specific conditions and nature of civil service in Parliament. In January 2021, Draft Law No. 4530 was adopted at first reading, and the lead committeeThe lead committee is the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning. was instructed to prepare it for a second reading.

The draft law outlines three categories of parliamentary staff:

1. parliamentary civil servants;
2. employees of the parliamentary patronage service;
3. parliamentary staff performing service-related functions.

The draft law clarifies the principle of political impartiality, stating that parliamentary civil servants must ensure equal treatment of every Member of Parliament of Ukraine, their assistant-consultants, staff of parliamentary faction (group) secretariats, and other employees of the parliamentary patronage service.

The draft law provides for:

• setting requirements for candidates seeking parliamentary civil service positions;
• conducting competitions for Category ‘A’ positions (first deputies and deputies of the Head of the Secretariat) not by the High Civil Service Commission established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, but by a Commission for the Selection of Parliamentary Civil Servants of Category ‘A’ directly formed by the Head of the Secretariat;
• streamlining the regulation of parliamentary civil servants’ career progression: the Head of the Secretariat is tasked with approving the Procedure for the Advancement of Parliamentary Civil Servants, the Procedure for Evaluating Performance Results, and the Procedure for Internships for young professionals;
• establishing a Disciplinary Commission by the Head of the Verkhovna Rada to conduct disciplinary proceedings aimed at determining the presence and degree of guilt, nature, and severity of disciplinary offences committed by parliamentary civil servants holding Category ‘A’ positions, among other responsibilities.

The mentioned provisions only partially address the issue of dependence on the executive branch by granting the Head of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat significant powers regarding the organisation of service within the Secretariat. At the same time, the problem of dual influence on committee secretariats is not only unresolved but even exacerbated: the draft law proposes that the results of performance evaluations of committee secretariat staff should be approved by the committee chair. This may seem logical, as the Secretariat’s work is meant to satisfy the committee itself. However, it creates conditions for undue influence over employees, mainly since the evaluation results determine the payment of an annual bonus. The opinions of committee members and chairs should be advisory and used to improve interaction between the Secretariat and the committee, but should not directly affect the evaluation of individual employees.

Among other things, to harmonise with the relevant law, the Personnel Management Department is replaced by a Personnel Management Service, which, in addition to the tasks and functions stipulated by the Law of Ukraine ‘On Civil Service’, will undertake:

1. the development of standard professional competency requirements for parliamentary civil servants holding Category ‘A’ parliamentary civil service positions;
2. the development of a list of test questions for conducting competitions for parliamentary civil service positions;
3. personnel support for Members of Parliament of Ukraine;
4. preparation of legally mandated materials concerning individuals elected or appointed to positions, and the granting of consent for appointments within the jurisdiction of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

However, this draft law does not create a new type of public service — the ‘parliamentary’ service — but merely establishes certain specific features of the work of civil servants within the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The law is aimed more at regulating the parliamentary civil service rather than the parliamentary service as a whole.

After its adoption at first reading, Draft Law No. 4530 has not been brought toAccording to First Deputy Chairperson of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine O. Kornienko, the draft law on parliamentary service was ready for consideration in the second reading already in October 2021. a vote at the second reading for four years. This delay indicates that for the majority of Members of Parliament, the draft law is not among the priority issues requiring consideration in the plenary session. Furthermore, should it be brought back to the Verkhovna Rada’s agenda, it will be necessary to assess the draft law’s compliance with the EU acquis (the parliamentary committee on European integration had raised concerns about its content already at the first reading), as well as to determine its place within the ongoing public administration reform.

The legislative establishment of a separate parliamentary civil service is one of many recommendations aimed at internal reform and strengthening the institutional capacity of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Some of these recommendations focus on enhancing the administrative capacity of the Verkhovna Rada and thereby reforming public administration within Parliament.

One recommendation (Recommendation No. 36) suggests consolidating the entire regulatory framework governing the work of the Verkhovna Rada’s Secretariat into a single internal regulation on staffing. This has not been achieved at the institutional level — apart from the aforementioned Regulations on the  Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, other regulations govern the work of individual structural units, such as the Regulations on the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada Committee, and the Regulations on the Secretariat of a Parliamentary Faction (or Group) within the Verkhovna Rada. Additionally, recommendations relating to the regulation of the work of parliamentary assistants-consultants have not been implemented at all. This issue is also not addressed by Draft Law No. 4530.

At the same time, the Secretariat has implemented another recommendation (Recommendation No. 39) concerning the elaboration of a comprehensive human resources development strategy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Adopted in 2019, the Strategy for Building the Personnel Potential of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat until 2022 is aimed at optimising, preserving, strengthening, and developing the personnel capacity of the  Secretariat. This capacity should be competent and responsible in fulfilling its tasks and functions, and timely and effectively support innovative processes aimed at the efficient execution of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. One of the primary objectives set by this Strategy was to align the main directions of personnel work within the Secretariat with the goals of the public administration reform, particularly in terms of the ability to analyse, develop, implement, timely adopt, and adjust management decisions. Another objective was to define, in legislation regulating the activities of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its Secretariat, the status of the Secretariat’s employees, as well as the specifics of entry, tenure (including professional training), and termination of civil service, patronage services, and other staff. Measures implemented within the Strategy included conducting a functional review of the Verkhovna Rada’s  Secretariat, carrying out a gender audit, developing an online training platform for the Verkhovna Rada’s  Secretariat, adopting methodological recommendations on the development of corporate culture within the  Secretariat, and adopting other documents related to the system for improving professional competence and performance evaluation.

For a long time, parliamentary civil servants remained excluded from the reform of the civil service remuneration system based on job classification. The main measure of the remuneration reform was the establishment of the fixed and variable components of salaries according to a ’70/30′ formula. The reform commenced in January 2024 pursuant to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2024’. However, Clause 22 of the Final Provisions of this Law introduced an exception for civil servants in the  Secretariat of the legislative body. Thus, without a conducted job classification, they retained the possibility to receive incentive payments based on decisions by the head of the civil service. At the same time, the size of the wage fund was to be no less than that provided for in 2023.

The Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Budget for 2025’ established that until the first job classification is carried out for civil servants in state bodies that did not conduct a job classification in 2024, the remuneration conditions set for 2024 will remain in effect, but no later than 1 April 2025. Such bodies include the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. Job classification in this office is to be conducted in accordance with the catalogue of civil service positions in the Secretariat of the legislative body, approved by the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine upon submission by the Head of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. On 11 April 2025, the Government adopted a resolution establishing the scheme of official salaries for civil service positions, taking into account job families and levels of positions in the  Secretariat of the legislative body, effective from 1 April 2025. This resolution also determined that the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada approves the catalogue of typical civil service positions in the Secretariat of the legislative body.

On 11 March 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Implementation of Unified Approaches to the Remuneration of Civil Servants Based on Job Classification’, which aims to introduce unified approaches to civil servants’ remuneration based on job classification. The law establishesThe Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued Resolution No. 369 dated 1 April 2025 “Certain Issues of Classification of Civil Service Positions”, which comes into force simultaneously with the Law of Ukraine No. 4282-IX dated 11 March 2025 ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Implementation of Unified Approaches to Remuneration of Civil Servants Based on Position Classification’ (Draft Law No. 8222). that in 2025, the classification of civil service positions shall be carried out in accordance with the Algorithm for Conducting Job Classification of Civil Service Positions under Martial Law, which is to be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Another adopted draft law, No. 9478, stipulates that the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service does not approve job classifications conducted by certain bodies, including the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. This draft law is currently awaiting the President’s signature.

The Draft Law No. 4530 ‘On Parliamentary Service’, regarding remuneration, refers to the Law of Ukraine ‘On Civil Service’, although it establishes certain particularities. For example, the salary for civil servants of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada cannot be lower than the salary of civil servants in the permanent auxiliary body that supports the exercise of the powers of the President of Ukraine (considering the notes to the salary scale determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine). However, unlike other civil servants, the draft law allows parliamentary civil servants to receive an additional payment for an academic degree.

In its latest report on Ukraine’s progress within the 2024 Enlargement Package, the European Commission noted that the public administration reform strategy requires more effective implementation, particularly regarding the broader application of the remuneration system across the entire civil service.

The reform of the parliamentary civil service is proceeding in an unsystematic and inconsistent manner, disconnected from the overall civil service reform. For instance, the Strategy for Building the Personnel Potential of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat was designed only for the period up to 2022, and the lack of reporting on the measures implemented prevents a comprehensive assessment of its outcomes. Nevertheless, it provided impetus for planning human resources policies and actively undertaking initiatives to develop the human resources capacity of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada. Adoption of a new Strategy for Building the Personnel Potential as a programme document aimed at strengthening the human resources of the Secretariat would be appropriate.

It is also worth continuing the discussion on the distinction between the parliamentary civil service and the civil service in general, particularly through the renewed consideration of Draft Law No. 4530. This discussion is especially important in the context of the adoption of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Lawmaking’, which defines the actors responsible for supporting the lawmaking process (which undoubtedly includes the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada) as participants in lawmaking activities and assigns them certain powers, such as conducting mandatory expert reviews of draft legal acts. Ensuring the lawmaking process will require strengthening the analytical human resources capacity and enhancing the administrative capability of the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, starting with the regulation of the status of parliamentary civil servants by developing robust mechanisms aimed at ensuring their independence and impartiality.

This publication has been prepared within the framework of the ‘Improvement of Governance in Ukraine: Enhancing Policy Making for Social Progress’ Project with the support of Switzerland. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the NGO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’. The opinion of the authors does not necessarily reflect the views of the donor.