During the 14th session, a total of 48 hours was spent on the consideration of draft laws in the session hall, which is the lowest figure for the 9th–14th sessions of the IX convocation.

7.4% of plenary time during the 14th session was spent on the consideration of draft laws initiated by actors outside the governing majority.

Draft laws for which both readings took place during the 14th session demonstrate the highest average and median consideration time indicators for the entire period of the IX convocation.

Overall, draft laws were discussed significantly longer than during other sessions; however, the record-low amount of plenary time is explained by the relatively small number of adopted draft laws.

For the calculation of plenary time indicators, only the time spent on the consideration of draft laws was used. Time for registration, announcements of inquiries, the ‘Government Question Hour’, resolutions and other matters was not considered.

During the 14th session, Members of Parliament spent almost 48 hours of plenary time on the consideration of draft laws. This constitutes a new negative record for the Verkhovna Rada, as it is the lowest amount of time spent on the discussion of draft laws for the period of the 9th–14th sessions. It may also indicate a possible end to the trend of increasing plenary time expenditure, which began during the 9th session.

During the 14th session, 92.6% of plenary time was devoted to the consideration of draft laws initiated by the governing actors — the Servant of the People faction, the Government and the President. This is a fairly typical situation for recent sessions, as this figure usually exceeds 90%.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada demonstrates a further increase in both the average and median time spent on the discussion of draft laws compared to previous sessions. The average and median consideration time represent the second-highest indicators for the IX convocation and the highest for the period of the full-scale invasion. This indicates a continuation of the trend towards longer consideration of draft laws. For 70% of draft laws adopted at the first reading and in their entirety, the amount of plenary time spent increased, although the average time remains slightly lower than the peak value of the 6th session (701 seconds). These data demonstrate a return to the pre-war format of draft law consideration. 

Draft laws considered only in the second reading during the 14th session were discussed in the session hall twice as long as during the previous three sessions and even exceeded the indicators of some pre-war sessions. For 80% of draft laws adopted at the second reading and in their entirety (where the first reading took place before the 14th session), plenary time increased. 

Draft laws for which both readings took place during the 14th session were considered, on average, for the longest time across the entire IX convocation. The average consideration time amounted to approximately 123 minutes, while the median was 40 minutes. This indicates a significant increase in time, partly driven by the lengthy consideration of the State Budget for 2026, which in total amounted to almost 12 hours. Thus, in terms of the format of draft law consideration in the session hall, the 14th session significantly exceeded the indicators of pre-war sessions. For 100% of draft laws, plenary time for both readings increased compared to the 13th session.

The five draft laws with the longest consideration time in the plenary hall are presented in Annex 6. 

47.6% of draft laws were adopted after the first reading, while 52.4% were adopted after the second reading; the third reading was not applied.

Only 3 out of the 63 laws adopted during the 14th session were registered before 24 February 2022, indicating the dominance of the martial law agenda. 

Main timeframes for the passage of draft laws (average values):

• from registration to adoption in the first reading and in entirety — 63 days;
• between the first reading and adoption in the second reading and in entirety — 264 days;
• from registration to adoption in the second reading and in entirety — 382 days.

The timeframes for the passage of draft laws set three record-high slowest values.

The average time from registration to adoption of draft laws at the second reading is 382 days — the highest for the period from the 4th to the 14th sessions. In other words, on average, the Verkhovna Rada requires more than one year to adopt a draft law in the second reading. Given that two-thirds of the adopted draft laws were registered during the 13th and 14th sessions, this indicates a slowdown in the Parliament’s legislative activity.

The other two records are also related to the adoption of draft laws at the second reading and concern MPs’ initiatives. Draft laws initiated by MPs have the highest average number of days from registration to adoption at the second reading and in its entirety (433 days), as well as from adoption at the first reading to adoption at the second reading and in its entirety (308 days), for the period from the 4th to the 14th sessions of the IX convocation.

1. 30 — adopted in their entirety after the first reading (47.6%);
2. 33 — adopted in their entirety after the second reading (52.4%);
3. 0 — adopted in their entirety after the third reading (0%).

The 14th session disrupted the previous trend in the distribution of adopted laws by stage of reading. While in previous sessions almost two-thirds of laws were adopted at the second reading and in their entirety, during the 14th session the distribution of laws adopted in their entirety at the first and second readings became nearly equal: 47.6% and 52.4%, respectively. A similar situation was observed during the 3rd, 4th and 7th sessions (the first six months of the war). The trend of not applying the third reading remained unchanged — no draft law passed through three readingsAccording to Article 1(102) of the Rules of Procedure, ‘draft laws shall be considered by the Verkhovna
Rada, as a rule, according to the procedure of three readings’.. It should be recalled that two readings allow for better preparation of a draft law and for correcting shortcomings and errors identified during the first reading. However, two readings also require more time.

When reviewing the information on committees, it should be borne in mind that this monitoring report is based on the number of opinions of the main committees. These methods are used due to the availability of data. Specifically, information on the opinions of the main committees is constantly available on the website of the Verkhovna Rada, is regularly updated and covers all opinions of the main committees. However, committees, of course, perform many other functions and tasks in addition to providing opinions of the main committees. Three committeesThe Budget Committee, the Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy and the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union. are required to provide mandatory opinions on all draft laws; committees may also be tasked with preparing opinions as auxiliary committees; committees consider and make decisions within the framework of the oversight function; they review letters and appeals and hold conferences and round tables. However, all this information is published only in fragments and therefore cannot be used for the purposes of regular monitoring. If such information is available in a form acceptable for systemic monitoring, it is used. These limitations should be considered when reviewing the information below, which is based on the opinions of the main committees. 

The timing of the main committees’ opinions on draft lawsThe data presented relate only to cases where opinions were provided. The time between the date of draft law registration and the date of submission of the first opinion by the main committee was calculated, including opinions on inclusion in the agenda. This type of opinion was taken into account, as the committee often considers draft laws on their merits during preliminary processing. allows for the assessment of several important indicators. In terms of committees, the time from registration to the submission of the first opinion by the committee characterises the workload of the committees and enables a general forecast of the speed of preliminary processing of a given draft law, depending on its main committee. In terms of initiators, the time of submitting opinions characterises the commitment of committee members to a particular initiator and enhances the predictive capacity of the speed of preliminary processing. Finally, the time required to receive the main committee’s first opinion, together with the data on the overall passage of draft laws, makes it possible to better understand the overall dynamics of the passage of draft laws.

On average, the committees provided their opinions for the first reading in 101 days, and half of all opinions were provided within 43 days.

The speed of providing opinions varies significantly depending on the committee, in some cases reaching almost a fiftyfold difference. When comparing the indicators of the 14th session with those of the previous 13th session, the average timeIf during the 13th session the average number of days from registration to the provision of the first opinion for the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure was 755 days, during the 14th session this indicator decreased to 207 days. for providing the first opinion decreased for almost half of the committees (for one committee, by nearly one and a half years). For most other committees, the increase was moderate, within one to two months, while only one committee recorded an increase in the average time of more than six months.

Overall, the workload and the speed of issuing opinions are mostly correlated. For example, the Committee on Economic Development provided the highest number of opinions (22) and at the same time had the highest average duration for providing an opinion — 399 days. By contrast, the Budget Committee provided only 4 opinions but did so the fastest — on average within 8 days. However, in some cases, workload and the speed of providing opinions do not correlate. For instance, the Committee on Youth and Sports, despite providing a small number of opinions (only 3), delivered them on average within 157 days.

*The median is the value that divides all the data in half, meaning that half of all observations will be less than the median and half will be more than the median.

Compared to the 13th session, the average number of days required to provide the first committee opinion before the first reading almost doubled for presidential draft laws, although it has not yet reached the level of the 12th session. For the Cabinet of Ministers, the average timeframe for providing an opinion decreased by more than half (by 56 days), while for MPs it increased by 19 days. For the sixth consecutive session, the average timeframe for providing first opinions on government draft laws remains shorter than that for MPs’ draft laws.

The median time for providing the first opinion on government draft laws is significantly shorter than the average timeframe for providing opinions on MPs’ draft laws. Compared to the 13th session, the median time for government draft laws decreased, while for MPs’ draft laws it increased significantly (by 15 days). At the same time, the median time for providing the first committee opinion on presidential draft laws is considerably shorter than that for both government and MPs’ draft laws. As is typically the case, presidential draft laws receive committee opinions the fastest, with half of such draft laws receiving the first committee opinion within two weeks.

Draft laws submitted by most factions and groups during the 14th session received opinions faster than during the 13th session, and for some factions, the average speed increased almost fourfold. However, for draft laws initiated by MPs from the Servant of the People and Fatherland factions and the Restoration of Ukraine group, the speed of providing first opinions decreased. For draft laws initiated by MPs from the European Solidarity faction, no committee opinions were provided before the first reading.

The five draft laws with the longest timeframes from registration to the first opinion of the main committee are presented in Annex 1.

The speed of providing committee opinions before the second readingThe number of days was calculated between the date the draft law was adopted in the first reading and the date the committee submitted its first opinion for the second reading (although there may be several opinions). is less indicative due to the small number of such opinions per committee. These dataDue to the small number of opinions for the second reading, only the average value is used here. Only eight committees submitted five or more opinions for the second reading during the 14th session. should therefore be treated with caution; however, they still merit attention. Six out of elevenAnother 13 committees did not provide any opinion for the second reading. committees (i.e. more than half) increased the average time taken to provide opinions before the second reading compared to the previous 13th session, while three committees increased this timeframe by one year or more. 

The average time from the adoption of a draft law at the first reading to the provision of an opinion before the second reading amounted to 259 days, which is twice as long as during the 13th session, while half of all opinions were provided by committees in less than 114 days.

*Committees did not provide opinions on presidential draft laws for the second reading during the 14th session. Therefore, this initiator is highlighted in grey in the table.

The speed of providing the first committee opinion before the second reading shows that, compared to the 13th session, the average time for providing opinions on government draft laws increased almost two and a half times, while for MPs’ draft laws it nearly doubled. During the 14th session, committees did not provide any opinions before the second reading for presidential draft laws. For draft laws initiated by MPs from the Servant of the People faction, the time required to provide the first committee opinion before the second reading also increased (by 36 days).

*It should also be taken into account that a significant number of opinions (more than five) were provided only for draft laws initiated by the Government and MPs from the Servant of the People faction. For other factions and groups, the number of draft laws for which opinions were provided is fewer than five; these are also highlighted in grey in the table. For these categories, the indicated values may be explained by coincidence rather than a systemic pattern. 

The five draft laws with the longest timeframes from the first reading to submission of the first opinion of the main committee for the second reading, as well as the five fastest draft laws, are presented in Annex 2.

The average timeframe for the adoption of laws, regardless of the reading at which they were adopted, is 230 days, with a median of 106 days (i.e. half of the draft laws were adopted in more than 106 days and half in a shorter period). 

For 90% of draft laws, the time required for adoption at the first reading and in their entirety increased. As a result, the median time rose compared to the 13th session. All draft laws adopted at the first reading and in their entirety were registered after 2025. This trend generally corresponds to the standard logic of using the first reading as a fast-track mechanism for adopting the most urgent draft laws.

The experimental indicator ‘growth rate’ increased by approximately 7 days, indicating an acceleration in the growth of the time required to adopt draft laws at the first reading and in their entirety. It should be recalled that the growth rate is calculated as the average difference between the decile differences in the number of days from registration to adoption for the 13th and 12th sessions and the decile differences for the 14th and 13th sessions. 

In the first reading and in entirety, 10 government draft laws, 8 MPs’ draft laws and 12 presidential draft laws were adopted. Half of the government draft laws consisted of ratifications. At the same time, all (except one) presidential draft laws adopted at the first reading and in entirety were approvals of decrees and ratifications.

The timeframe for the passage of government draft laws from registration to adoption at the first reading and in entirety increased by 21 days. The average timeframe for MPs’ draft laws is 91 days, which is the third highest figure for the period from the 4th to the 13th sessions of the IX convocation. It is noteworthy that for MPs’ draft laws, both the average and the median timeframe increased. This indicates that some MPs’ draft laws have taken significantly longer to pass from registration to adoption at the first reading and in their entirety, including due to the consideration of a number of older draft laws.

For presidential draft laws, the average timeframe increased and returned to the level of the 9th session. The median timeframe also increased, indicating that presidential draft laws have begun to take longer to pass from registration to adoption at the first reading and in their entirety.

The five draft laws with the longest timeframes from registration to adoption at the first reading and in their entirety, as well as the five fastest draft laws, are presented in Annex 3.

During the 14th session, the Parliament increased the time required for the passage of draft laws from registration to adoption at the second reading and in their entirety. On average, this timeframe increased by 73 days compared to the 13th session and by 47 days compared to the 12th session. The average time from registration to adoption at the second reading and in its entirety is the highest for the entire period of the IX convocation. The median value increased by 65 days and returned to the level observed during the 12th session. For 70% of draft laws, the time required for adoption at the second reading and in their entirety increased. Only 3 out of 33 (9%) draft laws adopted at the second reading and in their entirety were registered before 24 February 2022. This indicates that during the 14th session, Parliament adopted almost exclusively laws corresponding to the martial law agenda. These indicators demonstrate that over three years and eight sessions under martial law, the Verkhovna Rada has effectively developed a new legislative agenda with a new volume of draft laws.

The growth rate of the time from registration to adoption at the second reading and in its entirety increased, interrupting the trend of the previous two sessions. While the timeframes for adopting draft laws increased during the 14th session, the pace of this increase declined significantly compared to previous periods.

*The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted only two presidential draft laws in the second reading and in entirety during the 14th session. Therefore, this initiator is highlighted in grey in the table.

Government draft laws reduced (compared to the 13th session) the average time required for their passage from registration to adoption at the second reading and in their entirety and, for the first time since the 10th session, continue to pass this stage faster than MPs’ draft laws. At the same time, MPs’ draft laws set a new record during the 14th session — their average time from registration to adoption reached 433 days, the slowest figure for the period from the 4th to the 14th sessions.

During the 14th session, 2 presidential draft laws were adopted, which on average passed from registration to adoption within 127 days. However, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the influence of the President as a legislative initiator on the legislative process due to the small number of adopted laws.

The five draft laws with the longest timeframes from registration to adoption at the second reading and in their entirety, as well as the five fastest draft laws, are presented in Annex 4.

*The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted only two presidential draft law in the second reading and in entirety during the 14th session. Therefore, this initiator is highlighted in grey in the table.

The passage of draft laws from adoption in the first reading to adoption at the second reading and in their entirety during the 14th session returned to the trends observed during the 8th, 9th and 12th sessions, when MPs’ draft laws took longer to pass from the first reading to adoption at the second reading and in their entirety than government initiatives. However, compared to the 13th session, the timeframe for the passage of MPs’ draft laws increased more than twofold and set a new record. The timeframe for government draft laws slightly decreased compared to the 13th session, although it has not yet reached the level of the 12th session. A similar situation is observed with presidential legislative initiatives.

The timeframe between the first reading and adoption at the second reading increased for 100% of draft laws.

The five draft laws with the longest timeframes from adoption in the first reading to adoption in the second reading and in their entirety, as well as the five fastest draft laws, are presented in Annex 5.

389 draft laws were registered, of which:

1. 7 (1.8%) European integration draft laws;
2. 17 (4.4%) draft laws on the consent to or denunciation of international treaties;
3. 1 (0.3%) urgent draft law.

63 were adopted, of which:

1. 2 (3.2%) European integration draft laws;
2. 10 (16%) laws on ratification of international treaties;
3. 5 (8%) laws were identified by the President as urgent.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is characterised by a further decline in legislative activity: 389 draft laws were registered, which is one of the lowest figures for the entire IX convocation and continues the downward trend that emerged after the 9th session. A similar dynamic is observed in terms of effectiveness — only 63 laws were adopted, which is the lowest figure for this convocation.

The indicators of the 14th session point to a partial decrease in legislative spam, primarily due to the reduction in the overall number of registered draft laws and the declining share of initiatives with one signatory. At the same time, the share of draft laws with 8–22 signatories has increased, which may indicate a higher level of cross-factional cooperation and better prior preparation of documents. However, the problem of legislative spam has not been fully resolved. The Restoration of Ukraine group continues to demonstrate an abnormally high number of draft laws per MP, despite a significant decrease in this indicator, which remains a structural risk to the quality of the legislative process.

During the 14th session, a total of 389 draft laws were registered — 47 fewer than during the previous autumn (12th) session. Overall, the 14th session is one of the lowest in terms of the number of registered draft laws for the entire IX convocation; fewer draft laws (by four) were registered only during the 8th session. This result returns to the trend of a gradual decrease in the number of registered draft laws observed from the 9th to the 13th session. Such a volume of registered draft laws indicates a potential reduction in legislative spam or, at least, a decrease in legislative activity. 

During the 14th session, 7 European integrationEuro-integration draft laws are those that have been granted this status by decision of the Committee on European Integration. Consequently, the number of Euro-integration draft laws for the 14th session may vary and may not correspond to the figures given in the Monitoring Report. This may occur if the Committee on European Integration recognises draft laws registered during the 14th session as European integration-related after the publication of the Monitoring for that session. The data presented here regarding the number of registered European integration-related draft laws is current as of 03.02.2026. draft laws were registered, accounting for 1.8% of all registered legislative initiatives.

During the 14th session, 17 draft laws on granting consent to or denunciation of international treaties were registered, accounting for 4.4% of all registered legislative initiatives.

During the 14th session, 1 urgent draft law was registered, accounting for 0.3% of all registered legislative initiatives.

*For simplicity, the term ‘initiator’ is used here and in similar tables below. This is accurate in the case of the Government and the President. Factions of the Verkhovna Rada do not have the right of legislative initiative; therefore, when referring to factions, this should be understood as indicating the faction or group affiliation of the first signatory (initiator) among Members of Parliament.

For most factions and groups of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the indicators of the 14th session remain relatively stable, demonstrating trends similar to those of the previous sessions (10th–13th). Fatherland (4.4%) and European Solidarity (3.3%) registered between 13 and 17 draft laws, which corresponds to their previous activity. The share of draft laws submitted by the Servant of the People faction (39.3%) has remained almost unchanged and continues to be relatively low for this faction. However, several notable changes and specific features should be highlighted:

1. The share of draft laws initiated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine decreased to 20.3%, compared to 22.7% during the 13th session. At the same time, this share remains higher than the Cabinet’s typical level. While during the previous session such high figures were largely the result of re-registration of draft laws, in the current session this may indicate an increase in the Government’s actual legislative activity.
2. The share of draft laws submitted by the President reached a record low for the IX convocation. This could suggest at least a formal distancing of the President from domestic policymaking; however, the relatively high share of adopted presidential laws indicates the opposite.
3. The Holos faction continues to increase its activity (4% compared to 3% during the 13th session and 1.6% during the 12th), although it remains at a relatively low level compared to the sessions prior to the full-scale invasion.
4. The share of draft laws submitted by the Restoration of Ukraine group increased after a significant decline during the 13th session. The group remains one of the most active, surpassing most factions and groups, which confirms the tendency towards possible legislative spam. However, this increase in share is rather a result of the overall decline in indicators: in absolute terms, the group has in fact almost halved its activity (during the previous five sessions, the number of draft laws remained at around 90 per session).
5. Non-factional MPs have increased their share of registered draft laws: while during the 13th session it amounted to 6%, it now exceeds 8.7%. This increase is primarily explained by the decrease in the number of draft laws registered by other factions and groups.

The authorship of the draft law was determined by the initiator’s factional affiliation. For MPs, the first signatory of the draft law is considered the initiator. This method has certain limitations; however, it is also used by the VRU Secretariat. In addition, Article 90(3) of the Rules of Procedure explicitly defines the MP whose signature appears first as the initiator of a draft law.

The number of registered draft laws per MPNotably, the number of draft laws per MP cannot be considered an indicator of the effectiveness of factions or groups. Rather, it is a metric that helps to better understand general trends in the work of the Verkhovna Rada. The number of draft laws introduced by individual MPs is deliberately not presented here, as it is often perceived by them as a measure of their personal performance, which incentivises the registration of a greater number of draft laws at the expense of quality — one of the drivers of legislative spam. for the majority of factions and groups in the 14th session demonstrates a significant decrease compared to the 13th session. The main reason for this is that the 14th session is the least active, whereas the 13th session was one of the most active (during the period of the full-scale invasion) in terms of the number of draft laws.

As during the 12th session, most factions and groups account for fewer than one draft law per MP, with two exceptions — non-factional MPs and the Restoration of Ukraine group. Compared to the 12th session, the Fatherland and Holos factions, the Party For the Future group and non-factional MPs have increased the number of registered draft laws per MP. This is particularly evident in the case of the Holos faction, which has doubled the number of draft laws per MP (0.79 during the 14th session compared to 0.35 during the 12th session). Overall, all four of these factions and groups have higher indicators during the 13th and 14th sessions than during the 12th session. The average numberIt is reasonable to assume that legislative drafting work within political parties forming factions is better organised than in groups formed by MPs elected in single-member constituencies, given the existence of a stable organisational structure and the capacity to organise the work of a parliamentary association as a subject of the right of legislative initiative. This evidently affects their ability to develop group draft laws. of draft laws per MP stands at 0.9.

For the seventh consecutive session, the Restoration of Ukraine group stands out the most. Despite a significant decrease in this indicator during the 14th session (3.24 compared to 5.71 during the 13th session and 4.94 during the 12th session), the group remains the leader. This number of draft laws per MP still exceeds the indicators of all other factions and groups in any other session and is indicative of legislative spam.

In the context of this indicator, it is worth noting the gradual decrease in the number of Members of Parliament in the Verkhovna Rada. Thus, from the 11th to the 14th session, their number decreased from 401 to 393.

In terms of the number of signatories to draft laws, the 14th session returns to the trend observed during the 12th session — namely, a decrease in the number of draft laws with one initiator, a large number of which indirectly indicates the presence of legislative spam. The share of draft laws with one signatory decreased compared to the 13th session, although it still remains higher than during the 11th and 12th sessions. At the same time, the share of draft laws with 4–7 and 8–22 signatories increased. This may indicate a higher level of cooperation among MPs and potentially a somewhat higher quality of draft laws. At the same time, the share of draft laws with more than 23 signatories decreased.

In this section of parliamentary monitoring, the authors proceed from the assumption that a larger number of signatories positively correlates with better elaboration of draft laws, a higher level of consensus and serves as an indicator of a reduction in legislative spam.

The draft law with the largest number of signatories — 183 — is the draft law on amendments to the Civil Code of Ukraine No. 14057 of 21 September 2025.

During the 14th session, a total of 63 laws were adopted in their entirety. This is the lowest figure for the IX convocation. At the same time, it is slightly lower than the result of the 10th session, which until now had been the minimum in terms of the number of adopted laws. Given the record-low number of registered draft laws, it can be concluded that there has been a significant decrease in legislative activity.

During the 14th session, 2 European integration laws were adopted, accounting for 3.2% of all adopted laws.

During the 14th session, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 10 laws on granting consent to international treaties, accounting for 16% of all adopted laws. Of the 10 treaties ratified by the Verkhovna Rada during the 14th session, 1 was a multilateral agreement and 9 were bilateral agreements. Among these, two agreements each were ratified with the European Investment Bank and Italy.

Five draft laws (8%) adopted during the 14th session were identified by the President of Ukraine as urgent.

The President vetoed (and submitted his proposals to) one draft law. At present, this draft law is being prepared for consideration.

First, MPs of the Servant of the People faction demonstrated the lowest share of all adopted draft laws for the entire IX convocation (39.7%). For comparison, the average share for this faction across all sessions under martial law is 48%. The share of adopted draft laws submitted by Servant of the People had been increasing since the 10th session.

Second, the share of adopted laws initiated by the President of Ukraine increased significantly (22.2%) compared to the results of the 13th (12%) and 12th (15%) sessions. This is the highest share of adopted presidential laws for the IX convocation. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, for the first time in the last four consecutive sessions, demonstrated a slight increase in its share of adopted laws; however, this increase is indeed minimal — less than 1%.

Third, the share of laws initiated by MPs from minority factions and non-affiliated MPs amounts to 12% in total, which is lower than during the 13th session (16%). This level is more typical for the IX convocation. In particular, the decrease in this indicator may be explained by the fact that (1) the share of draft laws initiated by the President has significantly increased and (2) the number of factions and groups with adopted draft laws has decreased overall.

The 14th session reinforced the positive trends observed in previous sessions. Compared to the 13th session, the share of adopted laws with more than 8 signatories increased significantly. Overall, draft laws with 8–22 signatories account for nearly one third, while those with more than 23 signatories constitute more than half of all adopted laws.

For the second consecutive session, the share of draft laws with 23+ signatories is not only record-high but also the highest among all groups. At the same time, the share of draft laws with fewer than 8 signatories continues to decline. Thus, 84% of adopted laws have more than 8 signatories, compared to 64% during the 13th session.

The draft law with the highest number of signatories — 65 — is the draft law on academic integrity No. 10392 of 08 January 2024, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 18 December 2025.

Main indicators of the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the 14th session of the IX convocation:

389 draft laws were registered, of which: 

1. 7 (1.8%) European integration draft laws;
2. 17 (4.4%) draft laws on the consent to or denunciation of international treaties;
3. 1 (0.3%) urgent draft law.

63 draft laws were adopted, of which:

1. 2 (3.2%) European integration draft laws;
2. 10 (16%) laws on ratification of international treaties;
3. 5 (8%) laws were identified by the President as urgent.

30 draft laws were adopted at the first reading (47.6%), while 33 draft laws were adopted at the second reading (52.4%).

Monitoring of the activity of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the 14th session of the IX convocation identified five key trends: 

Legislative activity of the Verkhovna Rada during the 14th session significantly declined both in terms of the number of registered draft laws and the number of adopted laws. A total of 389 draft laws were registered — one of the lowest figures for the entire IX convocation — while only 63 laws were adopted, which is an absolute minimum for this convocation. This dynamic continues the downward trend that emerged after the 9th session and indicates not only a reduction in the legislative workload but also a general slowdown of the parliamentary legislative process. In addition, this session recorded an anti-record in terms of plenary time spent on the consideration of laws — 48 hours. This is the lowest figure in the past three years.

The decrease in the number of adopted laws occurs against the background of record-long timeframes for their passage, which further reinforces the decline in the effectiveness of legislative activity. The average time from registration to adoption of draft laws at the second reading reached 382 days — the highest figure for the period from the 4th to the 14th session. In other words, on average, the Verkhovna Rada requires more than one year to adopt a draft law at the second reading. The timeframes between the adoption of draft laws at the first reading and their adoption at the second reading have also increased. In practice, this demonstrates that draft laws are processed very slowly or that there are difficulties in securing the necessary votes for their adoption.

The reasons for such a decline in activity may include both general fatigue within the Parliament and the consequences of scandals related to the activities of anti-corruption bodies. It is also important to consider the exceptionally challenging circumstances of autumn and winter 2025–2026. A large number of air raid alerts and attacks on critical infrastructure facilities may have affected the functioning of state institutions, including the Parliament. This decline is particularly notable considering the change of Government at the end of the previous session: the 14th session was expected to be more active, driven by the legislative initiatives of the new Cabinet of Ministers during its ‘first 100 days’, yet this did not materialise.

Particular attention should be paid to the European integration track. During the 14th session, only two European integration laws were adopted. This is the lowest share and number of adopted European integration laws since the 7th session (the first session in which draft laws were labelled as European integration). Such a pace poses risks to Ukraine’s European integration prospects.

Another negative record is the decrease in the number of Members of Parliament, as only 393 MPs remained at the beginning of the 15th session. This, of course, also had an impact on legislative activity and the Parliament’s capacity to adopt laws.

During the 14th session, a decrease in the number of violations of procedural rules was recorded both at the stage of consideration of draft laws at the first and second readings. Compared to the 13th session, the share of procedural violations in the process of draft laws’ passage decreased by 30%, indicating a more restrained and formalised approach to the consideration of legislative initiatives. This makes it possible to observe a certain pattern in the work of the Verkhovna Rada: the share of violations decreased precisely when overall legislative activity declined. Conversely, the higher the number of laws, the greater the number of violations of the Rules of Procedure recorded. At the same time, only a slight decrease in violations of the constitutional procedure for the signing of laws by the President was observed. Despite a modest positive dynamic of this indicator, the scale of violations remains significant, which does not allow for unequivocal conclusions about a sustainable improvement in compliance with constitutional requirements and rather points to a temporary fluctuation than to a systemic change in practice.

It is also worth noting signs of a decrease in legislative spam. The reduction in the overall number of registered draft laws is accompanied by a decline in the share of initiatives with a single signatory and an increase in the share of draft laws submitted by groups of 8–22 signatories. Such a structure of draft law submission may indicate a somewhat higher level of prior coordination among Members of Parliament. At the same time, the problem of legislative spam has not been fully eliminated: certain parliamentary groups, particularly the Restoration of Ukraine group, continue to demonstrate abnormally high levels of draft law activity per MP, which maintains structural risks for the quality of legislation.

The decrease in the activity of Members of Parliament is also reflected in data on the exercise of the oversight function. During the 14th session, MPs submitted only 218 parliamentary questions, which is almost half as many as during the 13th session. They also held fewer ‘Government Question Hour’ sessions and asked fewer questions (interventions) compared to previous sessions after their resumption (apart from the 10th session).

This monitoring report of the activity of the 14th session of the 9th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine consists of a summary, six units and annexes. *To find out more about each unit, follow the links below:

1. legislative activity: the total number of registered draft laws and laws, their breakdown by initiators and groups of signatories;
2. passage of draft laws: breakdown of laws by readings of adoption, deadlines for submitting opinions of the main committees, timeframe from registration to adoption of the law, including by readings and initiators;
3. plenary time: total time spent on consideration of draft laws in the VRU, distribution of time for consideration of draft laws according to the initiator and the time required for consideration of the draft law in the session hall;
4. committees: total number and breakdown by initiators of opinions on dismissal, number of committee meetings and their workload in accordance with the number of registered draft laws and submitted opinions on draft laws, including the workload per committee member;
5. violations of the Rules of Procedure: the number of violations of the Rules of Procedure in relation to draft laws and proposals of the President of Ukraine;
6. the oversight function of the Verkhovna Rada: indicators of the ‘Government Question Hour’, the number of temporary commissions and the number of MPs’ inquiries.

Annexes contain lists of draft laws included in the ranking, which is based on various quantitative indicators (e.g., number of days from registration to adoption).

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine began 2026 not very actively, yet ‘vividly’ — the greatest interest in the work of Members of Parliament is currently demonstrated by the anti-corruption bodies. This cannot but affect the capacity of Parliament and its ability to adopt draft laws, including those related to European integration. It also once again raises the question of whether the Verkhovna Rada is capable not only of adopting decisions but also of exercising effective oversight over the executive branch.

‘The attention of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office to the activities of Members of Parliament is directly linked to MPs’ performance of their direct duties — bribes for “necessary votes”, false asset declarations, accusations of land misappropriation and so on. This time, officers of NABU and SAPO did not overlook the Head of the “Batkivshchyna” faction, Yuliia Tymoshenko.’

This entire anti-corruption track — including the corruption scandal in the energy sector — could not but affect the ‘New Year agenda of the parliamentarians. Most importantly, it has evidently also affected the effectiveness of the first plenary meetings.

At first, Parliament dismissed two ministers and, only on the second attempt, adopted a decision to appoint Denys Shmyhal and Mykhailo Fedorov to other positions — First Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine — Minister of Energy of Ukraine and Minister of Defence of Ukraine respectively. However, MPs have still not voted for a new Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, nor for changes in the Ministry of Justice.

As for legislative activity, from 1 January to 2 February 2026, Members of Parliament considered only 12 draft laws, six of which were adopted. The total plenary time during this period amounted to 11 hours. During the same period in 2025, the Verkhovna Rada considered 46 draft laws and plenary time in the chamber totalled almost 18 hours.

It should be noted that the President has also not demonstrated productivity in the legislative sphere from early January to 2 February — he was expected to sign or submit proposals regarding 13 laws. However, four laws did not receive any response from the President despite the expiry of the 15-day deadline (as of 17 February 2026, two of them have already been signed). Among them is draft law No. 3195 on introducing mandatory reporting by members of the Government prior to their dismissal.

In the context of this draft law, the article analyses whether there is a chance for effective parliamentary oversight during the 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada. It also examines why parliamentary oversight does not function effectively and how this can be remedied.

On 17 December 2025, an overwhelming majority of Members of Parliament adopted in the second reading and in its entirety draft law No. 3195, which obliges ministers to report before parliamentary committees and, ultimately, before Parliament when their resignation is being considered. With 285 votes in favour, the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation attempted to assert — strengthen — restore its own institutional agency through reinforcing parliamentary oversight. The fact that draft law No. 3195 was supported by virtually all factions and groups may be regarded as an institutional demand for stronger oversight.

The dismissal of Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko and Minister of Energy Svitlana Hrynchuk, which took place without their presence in the Rada, once again demonstrated the gap in interaction between the Government and Parliament. The entire arsenal of available instruments has proven insufficient to ensure ministerial accountability and responsibility before Parliament.

After the energy sector, the security and defence sector is the next sphere where new scandals with even more far-reaching consequences can be expected — both for the country’s defence capability and for its socio-political resilience. In this area, parliamentary oversight of the Government traditionally does not differ from that in other sectors.

Although recent monitoring of the Verkhovna Rada’s work records a significant increase in quantitative indicators — in particular, a rise in the number of requests and appeals submitted by MPs — this does not always indicate genuine parliamentary oversight. In many cases, it reflects pressure or personal gain. Recordings from Operation ‘Midas’ revealed that a criminal group had asked Members of Parliament to submit certain requests.

In terms of dialogue, government officials and parliamentarians held nine ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, which was also noted in the report of the European Commission.

However, even though energy infrastructure was the most frequently discussed topic during these ‘Question Time with the Government’ sessions, the Verkhovna Rada failed to identify in advance the problems that ultimately resulted in the largest corruption scandal — at least since the beginning of the full-scale war.

This once again highlighted the weakness and ineffectiveness of this mechanism. Ukraine has many established rules and practices intended to maintain balance within the triangle of power that correspond to general European and Euro-Atlantic counterparts. In practice, however, the application of these instruments does not produce results. Attempts to introduce fines for ignoring an invitation to attend a parliamentary session in draft law No. 11387 were vetoed by the President.

When discussing the provision of parliamentary oversight and the accountability of the executive branch, structural constraints are becoming increasingly visible. Performing these functions is difficult in a system where the key centre of decision-making is the President — both in the perception of government officials and often of MPs themselves. In such a configuration, the question of accountability remains open: why report to Parliament if it is not, in fact, Parliament that determines your ministerial fate? As a result, the instruments of parliamentary oversight continue to exist on paper but in reality remain largely a formality.

When discussing the strengthening of parliamentary oversight in Ukraine, international experience is often invoked in the search for quick and effective solutions. Although foreign practices and regulations in the field of parliamentary oversight may differ significantly and the respective countries are not currently in a state of war, examining how these mechanisms operate elsewhere allows for a better understanding of why the approach proposed by Ukrainian legislators is unlikely to work as expected.

As a rule, the Prime Minister and other ministers have the right to resign on their own initiative. In developed democracies, government reporting to Parliament — as one component of a broader architecture of oversight — is largely voluntary. In some countries, the resignation of a minister does not require mandatory discussion at all — as, for example, in North Macedonia or Serbia.

The Government of Finland annually submits a report to Parliament on its activities and, separately, reports on the state of the economy and the implementation of the budget. Parliamentarians may also request thematic reports. Their consideration may result either in approval or in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in an individual minister.

In the United Kingdom, ministers are required to report on their work as well as on the activities of their departments and agencies. Moreover, they may bear responsibility for the actions of the latter. The instruments of oversight include parliamentary questions and committee hearings. If the results of a report are deemed unsatisfactory, a minister may be dismissed by the Prime Minister or submit a resignation.

In Sweden, the Government annually presents to Parliament a programme defining its main priorities and objectives and submits a report on the implementation of the budget. In addition, it reports on the work of commissions established to develop proposals for addressing pressing issues. The Government may also submit to Parliament a statement or report on matters related to the governance of the country or international relations. The consideration of such a statement may result in a vote of no confidence in the Government or in a minister.

The Polish Government also reports annually on the implementation of the budget. Following its consideration, a resolution is adopted either granting or refusing consent for the Government to continue its activities. There are also thematic reports (for example on the state of the healthcare system or environmental policy) which Parliament may approve or reject. The rejection of a report does not automatically result in the resignation of the member of the Government responsible for the relevant public policy.

The rules of procedure in some countries also provide for interpellations. An interpellation is a procedure whereby Parliament summons representatives of the Government and government officials must explain their policy, specific documents or actions. Following an interpellation, a member of the Government may receive immunity for a short period or a procedure for their dismissal may be initiated. For example, in the Czech Republic there are both oral and written interpellations.

Effective parliamentary oversight abroad is based not on isolated procedures but on a coherent system of instruments that ensure regular access of Parliament to information and the accountability of the Government. It is precisely from this perspective that draft law No. 3195 should be considered — whether it complements the existing arsenal of parliamentary oversight instruments in Ukraine and whether it is capable of strengthening it in practice.

Draft law No. 3195 provides that a minister who submits a resignation must personally be present and report on their work during the consideration of the issue of their dismissal — both at a meeting of the relevant committee and in the plenary chamber. The authors also propose aligning certain provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada with the Constitution in the part concerning the appointment of members of the Cabinet of Ministers.

However, in its current version, draft law No. 3195 is unlikely to strengthen the oversight function of Parliament, as it contains several shortcomings.

For example, the requirement to report does not apply to dismissals initiated upon the submission of the Prime Minister, the President or on the initiative of the Verkhovna Rada itself.

Draft law No. 3195 also does not establish any requirements regarding the structure, content or standards of such a report. In other words, the minister will be able to determine independently what exactly and in what form should be communicated to Parliament. This effectively turns both oral and written reporting into a formality.

Parliamentary oversight must operate in conjunction with all available instruments, since only then can it be effective. This arsenal could be expanded through the introduction of interpellation. However, draft laws No. 3499 and No. 13596 registered in the Verkhovna Rada on this issue have still not been brought to the Parliament’s agenda. The Main Scientific and Expert Department and the committees of the Verkhovna Rada have expressed substantial comments on them, yet it remains important to assess interpellation as a potential instrument of parliamentary oversight.

Merely reporting on one’s activities prior to a minister’s resignation is insufficient. It is more of a symbolic gesture than an effective instrument of oversight. It cannot replace systemic mechanisms — interpellations, regular and extraordinary reports, well-developed committee work and others.

Draft law No. 3195 positions ministerial reporting as a sanction that is triggered at the very end, when a minister resigns, rather than as an instrument of regular accountability. In other words, the minister is effectively punished by having to report — a public ‘examination’ is imposed at the moment of dismissal. Such an approach transforms the position of minister from the apex of a political career into compulsory ‘community service’, from which one cannot even depart without first submitting a report.

If the intention to strengthen parliamentary oversight is a genuine objective rather than merely an imitation, action must be systematic rather than selective. Extracting only one instrument from the entire set — reporting — and applying it situationally will not solve the problem. This is particularly true in the context of scandals in the security and defence sector — where parliamentary oversight and accountability must be strengthened as a matter of urgency. Draft law No. 3195 does not address this issue. Instead, Parliament is once again attempting to adopt a narrow measure that does not correspond to the scale of the problem.

Limited parliamentary oversight fits poorly within the framework of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. It is precisely through the oversight function that Parliament can guarantee a balance between security and freedom, the observance of democratic principles and the protection of human rights — all of which are fundamental to accession to the European Union.

For a country in a state of war, this is of particular importance when it comes to the security and defence sector. This is traditionally a closed sphere that requires oversight, alignment of security and political objectives and the establishment of safeguards against abuses by the executive branch. By exercising oversight over the security sector, Parliament ensures its effectiveness, transparency and accountability, as well as supervision over the proper use of funds. However, as long as the Verkhovna Rada is unable to transform the existing set of instruments into an institutionally developed system of oversight, the security sector itself is unlikely to submit to such oversight. Is it possible to change this? In the Green Paper, experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analyse whether, under martial law, the Verkhovna Rada uses the available instruments of parliamentary oversight to their full extent, to what degree this function of Parliament is limited under wartime conditions, and which practices of NATO member states should be adopted in the future.

European partners emphasise the need for reform of the Security Service of Ukraine, stressing that oversight of this key national security body must be strengthened, alongside the relaunch of the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) and the central and regional units of the National Police. They also point to political risks associated with the work of the recently merged Defence Procurement Agency and the State Rear Operator.

In the Verkhovna Rada, the response has unfortunately been slow. MPs’ draft laws No. 13602 on the relaunch of the SBI (registered in August 2025) and No. 4210 on democratic civilian oversight have been left idle. The creation of a committee for oversight of special-purpose bodies, which would have expanded powers of parliamentary oversight, was initiated as far back as the IV convocation and is provided for under current legislation. However, this decision has also not been adopted for several years, although it depends exclusively on the Verkhovna Rada.

Without a comprehensive approach, the Verkhovna Rada will continue to have formal powers but remain limited in its capacity to use them effectively. Yet it is precisely this capacity — particularly with regard to oversight of the security and defence sector — that serves as a marker of a mature democracy and a key condition for Ukraine’s European future.

A significant share of the problems currently observed by Ukrainian society and international partners is the result of decisions that postponed issues of accountability and oversight (as well as many others) ‘until after the war’ and/or left their resolution to successors. However, it appears that remaining suspended in such hypothetical anticipation can continue for a very long time. Will the President and Parliament change in the near future? Evidently not. Yet the resolution of the problems described depends precisely on this Parliament and this President — and it is they who will determine when and how the long-awaited post bellum moment arrives.

The evaluation of legislation is an important component of the law-making process, as it makes it possible to identify shortcomings and gaps in legislative acts and to assess their impact on various aspects of public life. In addition, analysing the practical implementation of laws contributes to building an open dialogue between the legislator and stakeholders.

In European countries, legislative evaluation is applied to assess the achievement of stated objectives, identify shortcomings and unintended consequences, and amend legislation to enhance its effectiveness.

In Ukrainian practice, the attention of Members of Parliament is primarily focused on the mere adoption of legislative decisions, whereas the ability of legislation to achieve its declared objectives and the effectiveness of its implementation remain without proper evaluation. At the same time, the absence of a systematic approach to legislative evaluation makes it more difficult to identify problems in a timely manner and reduces the overall effectiveness of law-making activity.

From August 2019 to June 2025, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted several laws in the field of local self-government and regional development aimed at continuing the decentralisation process. Not all of them have been analysed in terms of their practical application. Meanwhile, under wartime conditions, communities face new challenges, which in turn necessitate a prompt and high-quality review of legislation.

Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to analyse selected laws in the field of local self-government and regional development adopted between August 2019 and June 2025 inclusive and to assess the practice of their implementation.

1. what factors influence the quality and effectiveness of legislative provisions;
2. to what extent the adopted legislation corresponds to the needs of territorial communities;
3. how improved communication between the legislator and local self-government bodies (LSG bodies) can contribute to enhancing the legislative process and increasing the effectiveness of law implementation.

The study also contains a number of recommendations for legislators, local self-government bodies and central executive authorities aimed at developing a systematic approach to the application and evaluation of legislation.

Although in Ukraine the requirement to conduct legislative evaluation will enter into force only after the termination of martial law, the study provides recommendations that can be applied in practice now.

More on the evaluation of legislation in the field of local self-government and regional development can be found in the new issue of the journal Parliament, published by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

This study has been prepared with the support of Sweden. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of the NGO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and does not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

The Verkhovna Rada adopted the first Legislative Agenda (LA) in 2020. This instrument was designed to facilitate the planning of legislative work, enhance the quality of draft laws, and reduce the number of draft laws submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. However, Parliament has not introduced effective tools for coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of these Agendas. Although committees submit reports to the Verkhovna Rada, these reports are not publicised, and no analysis of the reasons for the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these tasks is undertaken.

The Legislative Agenda for 2024 lists 481 tasks, 95 of which are focused on European integration. The vast number of tasks in the Agenda, especially given the true capacity of the Verkhovna Rada to pass laws, does not contribute to its implementation. According to estimates by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), only 60 tasks from the Agenda, or 12%, have been completed. Only one in four laws was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada as part of the Legislative Agenda. Taking into account all performance indicators of the Legislative Agenda, such as the timeliness of new draft laws, compliance with deadlines for consideration, etc., only 11 tasks can be classified as fully compliant with the Agenda. 

293 tasks remain unfulfilled, which accounts for 61% of the total. There are two reasons why certain tasks were not completed: 1) the responsible initiator did not submit a new draft law to fulfil the task; 2) the Verkhovna Rada did not consider the registered draft law during the reporting period. 

The Legislative Agenda for 2024 is government-centric, which means that the government must register or has already registered most of the draft laws that need to be adopted to fulfil the tasks. The non-submission of new draft laws by the Cabinet of Ministers is one of the reasons for a low level of implementation of the Agenda.

ALI’s monitoring also examines how committees implement the Agenda, as they submit proposals for its formulation, and how the main committees review draft laws registered for implementation under the Agenda. On average, each committee is responsible for implementing 22 tasks, with a median of 16 tasks. 

The five committees with the largest number of tasks are responsible for implementing half of the Agenda. The Committee on Law Enforcement has the most tasks in the Legislative Agenda (64 tasks). The Committee on Finance has completed the most tasks (18 tasks).

Currently, the Legislative Agenda, as a document designed to ensure a planned legislative process, plays only a nominal role, not least because of insufficient coordination between legislative initiators and weak parliamentary control. 

There are some shortcomings in the preparation of the Agenda, such as setting a deadlineThe Verkhovna Rada approves the Legislative Agenda at the beginning of each regular session, which takes place on the first Tuesday of February. for submitting new draft laws in January 2024, even before its adoption. This means that the legislative initiator must register the draft law ‘in advance’ within the framework of the Agenda. Another example is setting the deadline for submitting new draft laws in December 2024, which is rather short-sighted, as the Verkhovna Rada is unlikely to have enough time to review and vote on the relevant draft law. 

The approach to preparing the Legislative Agenda and the role of committees in its implementation needs to be revised. Legislative Agendas containing hundreds of tasks and draft laws do not reflect the performance indicators of the Verkhovna Rada: the number of laws adopted, the average time taken to consider draft laws, the activity of committees in preparing opinions on them, etc.

This monitoring of the implementation of the Legislative Agenda for 2024 aims to assess the effectiveness of this planning instrument for the legislative activity of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as well as to examine the activities of parliamentary committees in the context of implementing the Legislative Agenda for 2024. 

The monitoring consists of two parts:

1. Information on the state of implementation of the Legislative Agenda for 2024: timeliness of adoption; structure and number of tasks; registration of draft laws, and their consideration.
2. Activities of parliamentary committees in the context of implementing the Legislative Agenda for 2024.

The status of implementation of the tasks set out in the Legislative Agenda for 2024 was determined based on reports submitted by the committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in response to public information requests.

Although the LA is approved for a calendar year, due to the specific features of the Verkhovna Rada’s working schedule, it should be analysed in the context of the parliamentary session cycle. This is evidenced, first, by the timing of the adoption of the Legislative Agenda (at the beginning of a regular session, which starts on the first Tuesday of February) and, second, by the deadline for committees to report on its implementation (January of the current year, at the end of a regular session). Accordingly, the planning period of the LA covers two regular sessions of the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, the Agenda includes tasks with deadlines in January 2024. For this reason, the monitoring of the implementation of the Legislative Agenda covers a 13-month period, from January 2024 to January 2025 inclusive.

The monitoring is conducted using the following indicators:

1. Completed: a law was adopted to implement the task.
2. Partially completed: a draft law was registered to implement the task; the draft law was considered by the relevant committee, and a conclusion was prepared during the reporting period; or the draft law was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the reporting period.
3. Not completed: no draft law was registered to implement the task; the draft law was not considered by the committee during the reporting period (no committee conclusion); or, where a committee conclusion had been adopted earlier (prior to the inclusion of the draft law in the Agenda), the draft law was not considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the reporting period.
4. Removed from consideration: the draft law was rejected during the reporting period or was not included in the Agenda.

The Legislative Agenda for 2024 was adopted on time, on 6 February 2024, following the opening of the regular 11th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the IX convocation.

The 2024 LA consists of two sections. The first contains a list of issues aimed at fulfilling Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration, while the second covers all other issues requiring legislative regulation. Each section is divided into subsections, the titles of which correspond to the names of parliamentary committees. The Legislative Agendas for 2023 and 2024 share a similar structure, which allows for speaking of a certain standardisation in the presentation of the Agenda.

The 2024 LA includes 481 tasks, of which 95 tasks fall under the first section and are aimed at European integration. Although the number of tasks in the Agendas has been gradually decreasing since 2020 (with the exception of 2021, which contained the lowest number of tasks over the past five years — 376 tasks), implementation of the Agenda remains unrealistic, particularly when compared with the number of laws adopted over the same period.

Implementation of a task under the LA does not always mean the adoption of an already registered draft law. Some tasks envisage the drafting and registration of a new draft law. The Agenda provides for the submission of draft laws to implement 279 tasks (58% of the total), while another 202 tasks (42%) already include the numbers of draft laws that are to be adopted. The LA is government-centred, as it assigns to the Government the obligation to register new draft laws to implement 213 tasks.

The Parliament fully implemented 60 tasks, which accounts for only 12% of the total number of tasks, while a further 128 tasks were implemented only partially (27%). Accordingly, the 2024 LA was implemented at only 39%. If all indicators of the Agenda are taken into account — such as the timeliness of submitting new draft laws and compliance with deadlines for their consideration — only 11 tasks can be classified as having been fully implemented in strict accordance with the Agenda. In the first, European-integration-focused section, only 19 tasks were implemented (20% of the tasks in that section).

In order to implement 60 tasks, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 60 laws between January 2024 and January 2025, whereas a total of 236 laws were adopted during this period overall. Thus, only one in four adopted laws was aimed at implementing the tasks set out in the 2024 LA. Of the 60 adopted laws, 17 were European integration-related. In most cases, including with regard to European integration legislation, the initiators of the laws were Members of Parliament.

A total of 293 tasks remained unimplemented, accounting for 61% of the overall number of tasks.

The largest number of tasks in the 2024 LA was assigned to the Committee on Law Enforcement (64 tasks). Five committees with the highest number of tasks are responsible for the implementation of half of all tasks set out in the Agenda. The Committee on Finance recorded 18 implemented tasks, the highest number among all committees. The Committee on Environmental Policy has the largest number of unimplemented tasks — 40 in total. The Committee on Rules of Procedure is the only committee that has no fully or partially implemented tasks.

The process of drafting the Legislative Agenda, its content, and the approach taken by committees to formulating proposals for inclusion in the Agenda require substantial revision to genuinely ensure that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its committees are capable of implementing it. An optimal solution would be to reduce the number of tasks to a level that corresponds to the actual capacity of the Verkhovna Rada to adopt laws and of committees to prepare draft laws for consideration. Improved communication with the Government is also required to address the problem of the non-submission of new draft laws, which has been one of the factors contributing to the high rate of non-implementation of the Agenda.

The Rules of Procedure of the VRU provide that the Parliament approves the Legislative Agenda annually at the beginning of the regular session, which starts on the first Tuesday of February. In 2024, the Legislative Agenda was adopted on time — on 6 February — following the opening of the 11th regular session of the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation. The decision was supported by 262 Members of Parliament from six parliamentary factions and groups, as well as non-affiliated MPs.

The parliamentary factions Fatherland and European SolidarityMembers of the European Solidarity parliamentary faction also did not vote in favour of the LA in any of the previous years. Prior to its dissolution, the parliamentary faction OPFL likewise did not support the 2020–2022 LA. did not cast a single vote in support of the 2024 LA. 

The 2024 LA consists of two sections. The first contains a list of issues requiring legislative regulation aimed at adapting Ukraine’s legislation to European Union law (the EU acquis) to fulfil Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration. The second section covers other issues requiring legislative regulation. Each section is divided into subsections whose topics correspond to the names of parliamentary committees (for example, anti-corruption policy; finance, tax and customs policy, etc.).

The structure of the LA in previous years was different. In 2020, the first adopted LA consisted of two sections (a main and an additional part) and did not include a thematic or committee-based breakdown. The 2021 LA was divided into 20 thematic sections, each further subdivided, with several different committees responsible for tasks within a single section or subsection.

The 2022 LA contained 12 thematic sections; however, as in 2021, several main committees were designated within a single section. Unlike the 2024 Agenda, the 2023 LA did not include a separate European integration section, but it was also divided into thematic subsections. This allows us to speak of the achievement of a certain standardised approach to the presentation of tasks and the structure of the Agenda.

The 2024 LA includes 481 tasks, of which 95 are contained in the European integration section.

In previous years, the number of tasks was significantly higher. For example, the 2020 LA — approved for the first time after the relevant amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine — contained a record 878 tasks, while the smallest number was recorded in the 2021 Agenda, which included 376 tasks.

In 2022, the number of tasks in the Agenda reached 662. Although a downward trend in the number of tasks has been observed in subsequent years, their total still amounts to several hundred. When comparing the Verkhovna Rada’s capacity to adopt laws with the number of tasks set out in the LA, the unrealistic nature of such Plans becomes evident.

For example, in 2020, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted 221 laws, which is almost four times fewer than the number of tasks set out in the Plan. In 2023, the number of laws adopted was twice as low as the number of tasks envisagedAs a general rule, the adoption of one draft law is deemed to constitute the fulfilment of one task. However, even taking into account the possibility that a single adopted law may fulfil several tasks, the total number of tasks remains excessively high for the Legislative Agenda to correspond to the Verkhovna Rada’s actual legislative capacity.. Between January 2024 and January 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 236 laws, while the Legislative Agenda contained 481 tasks. Thus, even if every adopted law had been aimed at implementing the Agenda (which was not the case), the level of implementation would still not have reached even half of the planned targets.

Implementation of a task under the LA does not always imply the adoption of an already registered draft law. Some tasks provide for the drafting and registration of a new draft law, for instance, where a parliamentary committee considers that a specific issue requires legislative regulation. By way of example, the Committee on National Security considers it necessaryItem 193, Section II of the 2024 LA. to develop a draft law on the development of the defence-industrial complex. In such cases, instead of indicating a draft law number and registration date, the Agenda specifies the deadline for submitting a new draft law to the Verkhovna Rada (e.g. December or June) and identifies the subject of legislative initiative responsible for registering the draft law.

The Agenda envisages the submission of new draft laws to implement 279 tasks (58% of the total), while 202 tasks (42%) already refer to draft laws that are to be adopted.

Under the Constitution, the right of legislative initiative is vested in only three subjects: Members of Parliament, the Government, and the President. Accordingly, the share of newly submitted draft laws will be calculatedTwo tasks (items 372 and 375 of Section II) did not identify a subject of legislative initiative as required by the Constitution. with respect to these three subjects.

The Agenda can unequivocally be described as government-centred, as it places responsibility on the Government to submit draft laws for the implementation of 213 tasks (almost 45% of the total number of tasks). The CMU registered draft laws for only one-third of these tasks. It is precisely the Government’s failure to submit new draft laws that contributed to the high rate of non-implementation of the LA.

Members of Parliament were required to submitTwo tasks designated both Members of Parliament and the Government as responsible for submission and were therefore counted for both subjects. legislative initiatives for 56 tasks, yet they registered new draft laws for only 22 of their own tasks. At the same time, cases are common where MPs register draft laws in relation to tasks for which the Agenda designates a different subject of legislative initiative, or where they register alternative or revised draft laws. Overall, within the framework of the LA, MPs submitted 73 draft laws.

As regards the President, he is responsible for submitting draft laws for the implementation of only 10 tasks; of these, he submitted five draft laws, which mainly concern external relations, such as the ratification of international agreements.

There are cases where, as of the date of adoption of the LA, a draft law aimed at implementing a given task had already been registered, yet the LA contains information on the need to submit a new draft law. Of the 28 such cases identified, 22 can be explained by the timing of the preparation and adoption of the Agenda, where draft laws were registered in December 2023 or January 2024. Committees submit proposals to the LA in December; therefore, for example, proposals submitted in the first half of December will no longer take into account draft laws registered in the second half of December or in January, even though they may be aimed at implementing tasks set out in the Agenda.

For 25 tasks, the Legislative Agenda sets the deadline for submitting a new draft law in January, which is peculiar given that the Agenda itself is adopted by the Verkhovna Rada only in February. In other words, the subject of legislative initiative is expected, within the framework of the LA, to register a draft law ‘in advance’, in January 2024.

The opposite extreme is the setting of deadlines for the submission of new draft laws in December 2024 — this applies to 27 tasks. Given that the average time required for the adoption of a draft law from registration to adoption amounts to 211 days during the 11th session and 254 days during the 12th session, the decision to register draft laws in December with a view to their subsequent consideration is, at the very least, short-sighted. Within the framework of implementing the LA, the Verkhovna Rada did not adopt a single draft law registered in December 2024.

Such provisions in the LA give grounds to conclude that the committees submitting proposals to it, as well as Members of Parliament, tend to perceive the Agenda more as a formality than as a genuine instrument for planning legislative activity.

Parliament fully completed 60 tasks, which accounts for only 12% of the total number of tasks, while a further 128 tasks were partially completed (27%). As a result, the 2024 LA was implemented at just over one-third — 39%.

In the first, EU integration–related section, 19 tasks were completed (20% of the total number of tasks in that section), while a further 20 tasks (21%) were partially completed. In the second section, 41 tasks were completed (11% of the total number of tasks in the section), and an additional 108 tasks were partially completed (22%).

In implementing the 60 completed tasks, the Verkhovna Rada adopted 60 laws between January 2024 and January 2025The fulfilment of a single task does not always entail the adoption of one law. In some cases, the fulfilment of one task may require the adoption of several laws, while in others the adoption of one law may result in the fulfilment of several tasks., while a total of 236 laws were adopted during the same period. This means that only one in four adopted laws was aimed at implementing the tasks of the Legislative Agenda for 2024

Most of the adopted draft laws were initiated by Members of Parliament (53%), while slightly fewer were registered by the Government (45%). The only law initiated by the President (2%) concernedDraft Law on the Ratification of the Agreement between Ukraine, of the one part, and the European Union, of the other part, on Ukraine’s participation in the Union Anti-Fraud Programme, No. 0281 of 21.06.2024. the ratification of the Agreement on Ukraine’s participation in the European Union Anti-Fraud Programme.

Of the 60 adopted laws, 17 were EU integration–relatedThat is, they were marked accordingly on the official website. (28% of the total number of adopted laws). Eleven EU integration laws were initiated by Members of Parliament, while six were registered by the Government. In total, during the monitoring period of the implementation of the 2024 LA, the VRU adopted 28 EU integration laws, meaning that almost two-thirds (61%) of EU integration legislation was included in the Agenda.

The draft law that took the longestDraft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Mandatory Use of Liquid Biofuels (Biocomponents) in the Transport Sector, No. 3356-d of 05.11.2020. to be adopted was Draft Law No. 3356-d, registered in November 2020: 1,307 days elapsed between its registration and final adoption. The fastest legislative process applied to Draft Law No. 12232Draft Law on Amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine Concerning Transactions Involving Contingent Liabilities, No.12232 of 22.11.2024., which was adopted just 11 days after registration.

A list of the five draft laws with the shortest and longest periods between registration and adoption is provided in Annexe 1.

A total of 293 tasks were not completed, representing 61% of all tasks.

Two main reasons can be identified as to why certain tasks were not completed: 

• The responsible legislative initiative holder failed to register a draft law to implement the task.

The 2024 LA provides for the registration of new draft laws to implement 279 tasks, of which 213 tasks assign responsibility for registering a new draft law to the Government. However, the CMU registered draft laws for the implementation of only 68 tasks, which constitutes one-third of the planned number (32%). It was precisely the Government’s failure to register new draft laws that contributed to the high rate of non-completion of the LA.

Members of Parliament were required to register draft laws to implement 56 tasks, but submitted draft laws for only 22 tasks (39%). At the same time, there are numerous cases where Members of Parliament register draft laws for tasks for which the Agenda designates a different legislative initiative holder, or where they register alternative or revised draft laws. The President was responsible for registering 10 draft laws, of which only five were submitted (50%). 

Overall, due to the failure of the responsible legislative initiative holder to register a draft law, 162 tasks were not completed, accounting for more than one-third of all tasks (34%).

• The Verkhovna Rada did not consider a registered draft law during the reporting period.

This reason accounts for the non-completion of 117 tasks (24% of the total number), where a draft law had already been registered but, for various reasons, was not considered by the relevant committee or by Parliament during the reporting period. 

The oldest not completed task for this reason concerns draft law No. 1193-1Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to Align Them with European Union Legislation in the Field of the Transport of Dangerous Goods, No. 1193-1 of 20.09.2019., registered by Members of Parliament as early as September 2019. A list of the five draft laws that have been registered and remain pending consideration for the longest period is provided in Annexe 2.

In addition, draft laws relating to 14 tasks (3%) were rejected or removed from consideration. One case is particularly noteworthy, as the rejection of a draft law did not result in the task being not completed. Draft law No. 6004-d, which was intended to initiate reform of industrial pollution and constituted one of the conditions for receiving financing under the Ukraine Facility, failed to secure the required number of votes at second reading (by a margin of one vote). As a result, on the same day, Members of Parliament registered a new draft law No. 11355, which was almost identical to the rejected draft law No. 6004-d. Subsequently, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the newly registered draft law and, accordingly, the task was completedItem 20, Section I of the Legislative Agenda for 2024..

The Agenda specifies when each task is to be completed. In the first quarter (January–March), the LA envisaged the completion of 83 tasks (17% of the total), and in the second quarter, 140 tasks (26%). In the third quarter, the Verkhovna Rada was expected to complete 86 tasks (18%), while the largest number of tasks — 172 (36%) — was scheduled for the fourth quarter. To some extent, these timeframes reflect the specific features of the VRU’s work schedule, as a lighter workload is allocated toRegular sessions of the Verkhovna Rada commence on the first Tuesday of February and the first Tuesday of September each year and conclude, respectively, no later than 45 days and 10 days before the opening of the next session. quarters that include parliamentary recesses.

The largest number of tasks — approximately one-third — were completed during the fourth quarter. The ratio between completed and planned tasks once again demonstrates the real capacity of the Verkhovna Rada to implement the Agenda. A further four tasks, that is, the adoption of the relevant draft laws, were completed in January 2025, while one task was completedItem 72, Section I provides for the adoption of draft law No. 3716, registered in June 2020 and adopted at first reading as early as February 2021 (main committee: the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure). However, in July 2023, draft law No. 8185 (main committee: the Committee on Law Enforcement) was adopted, which in substance duplicates the provisions of draft law No. 3716. much earlier — in July 2023, prior to the adoption of the Agenda.

Following an analysis of implementation, the deadlines established by the Agenda appear largely conditional: of the 60 completed tasks, only 17 were completed within the timeframes set by the Agenda, while 34 laws were adopted later than planned.

The greatest delay occurred with draft law No. 10017Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Mandatory State Social Insurance, No. 10017 of 06.09.2023.: although it was scheduled for adoption in the first quarter, it became law only 262 days later, in December. The shortest delay concerned draft law No. 11159Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Promotion of Volunteering among Education Seekers, No. 11159 of 9 April 2024., which became law only eight days after the planned fourth-quarter deadline, although it was adopted in January 2025. On average, draft laws were adopted with a delay of 103 days.

A list of the five draft laws with the longest period between the planned consideration deadline and adoption is provided in Annexe 3.

Nine laws demonstrate the opposite situation — they were adopted earlier than planned. The earliest was draft law No. 10337Draft Law on Ethical Lobbying, No. 10337 of 13 December 2023.: although the Agenda envisaged regulation of lobbying only in the fourth quarter, the law was adopted in February 2024, 221 days earlier than scheduled.

The monitoring includes an analysis of how the Agenda is implemented by parliamentary committees, as it is the committees that submit proposals for the formation of the Legislative Agenda and, as main committees, consider draft laws registered for the implementation of the LAThe number of tasks attributed to a committee is calculated based on the results of the implementation of the LA, rather than at the time of its adoption. This is because, following registration, some draft laws considered by the Verkhovna Rada in the context of fulfilling Agenda tasks may be assigned a different main committee than originally indicated in the Legislative Agenda. For example, item 317 of Section II of the 2024 Legislative Agenda designated the Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights as the main committee. However, following the registration of the draft law (No. 11159 of 09.04.2024), the Committee on Education, Science and Innovation was designated as the lead committee. Accordingly, the fulfilment of this item of the LA is attributed to the Committee on Education, Science and Innovation..

On average, a single committee is responsible for 22 tasks, while the median number is 16 tasks. This means that half of the committees are responsible for fewer than 16 tasks, and the other half for more than 16 tasks.

The largest number of tasks under the 2024 LA is assigned to the Committee on Law Enforcement (64 tasks). More than 40 tasks are assigned to three other committees: the Committee on Economic Development (53 tasks), the Committee on Environmental Policy (48 tasks) and the Committee on Finance (44 tasks). These four committees, together with the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure, are responsible for the implementation of half of all tasks under the 2024 LA.

Five committees act as main committees for fewer than 10 tasks each. These are the Committee on Digital Transformation (eight tasks), the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Human Rights and the Committee on the Budget (six tasks each), as well as the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (two tasks).

The Committee on Finance has 18 completed tasks, the highest number among all committees. All other committees have fewer than 10 completed tasks. Five committees have no completed tasks at all: the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Committee on Youth and Sports, the Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, the Committee on Humanitarian Policy and the Committee on Foreign Policy.

However, when looking at the percentage of completed tasks relative to the total number of tasks, other committees emerge as leaders in implementation. With 18 completed tasks (41%), the Committee on Finance ranks only as the third most effective committee. The Committee on Budget has completed 83% of its tasks, while the Committee on EU Integration has achieved a 50% completion rate. At the same time, these high percentages are largely explained by the small number of tasks assigned to these committees. For example, the Committee on Budget has only six tasks, and the Committee on EU Integration has just two tasks.

Conversely, a small number of tasks does not automatically ensure better implementation. The Committee on the Rules of Procedure and the Committee on Digital Transformation also have a limited number of tasks — six and eight, respectively — but this has not translated into higher completion rates. The Committee on the Rules of Procedure has no completed tasks at all, while the Committee on Digital Transformation has a completion rate of only 13% (with just one task completed).

The highest number of incomplete tasks is observed in the Committee on Environmental Policy, with 40 incomplete tasks. Slightly fewer not-completed tasks are recorded for the Committee on Law Enforcement (38 tasks) and the Committee on Economic Development (37 tasks). Half of the committees have 10 or fewer tasks that have not been completed. This is partly explained by the overall number of tasks assigned to each committee: committees with the largest total number of tasks also tend to have the highest number of not completed ones.

The Committee on the Rules of Procedure also has no partially completed tasks, making it the only committee with 100% non-completion of all assigned tasks. By contrast, the Committee on Budget is the only committee with no not completed tasks at all. A further five committees have less than half of their tasks not completed in percentage terms: the Committee on Human Rights (33%, or two not completed tasks), the Committee on Digital Transformation (38%, or three not completed tasks), the Committee on Finance (41%, or 18 not completed tasks), the Committee on Education (44%, or seven not completed tasks), and the Committee on Youth and Sports (45%, or five not completed tasks). All other 16 committees failed to complete more than half of the tasks assigned to them under the LA.

Calculating the number of tasks and completed tasks per committee makes it possible to assess the workload per individual Member of Parliament serving on a committee. 

The highest workload in the context of the LA falls on Members of Parliament serving on the Committee on Economic Development, with 3.31 tasks per committee member. A similarly high workload (more than two tasks per member) is observed for members of three other committees: the Committee on Environmental Policy (3.00 tasks), the Committee on Law Enforcement (2.91 tasks) and the Committee on Social Policy (2.50 tasks). By contrast, a low workload (fewer than 0.5 tasks per member) is observed among members of the Committee on Budget (0.16 tasks) and the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (0.25 tasks). Such a low workload can be explained by the small number of tasks assigned to these committees, combined with a relatively large number of committee members.

All committees have a completed-task workload per MP below one. The highest figure — 0.58 completed tasks per MP — is recorded for the Committee on Finance, which is attributable to the relatively high number of tasks completed by that committee.

The highest number of not completed tasks per MP is observed in the Committee on Economic Development (2.31 tasks), followed closely by the Committee on Environmental Policy (2.19 tasks). More than one not completed task per committee member is also recorded for four additional committees: the Committee on Law Enforcement (1.59), the Committee on Social Policy (1.40), the Committee on Transport and Infrastructure (1.09) and the Committee on Foreign Policy (1.00).

The analysis of monitoring the implementation of the 2024 LA provides grounds to conclude that the Verkhovna Rada does not use it as a guiding instrument in its work. If all indicators of the LA are taken into account — such as the timeliness of submitting new draft laws, compliance with consideration deadlines and related factors — only 11 tasks can be regarded as fully compliant with the Agenda. In addition, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada do not require committees to publish reports on the implementation of the AgendaA report on the implementation of the 2024 LA was published, for example, by the Committee on Legal Policy; however, the Rules of Procedure do not oblige parliamentary committees to publish such reports., let alone to analyse its implementation. The promised tool for tracking draft laws included in the LAImproving legislative planning in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine // RADA. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ONLINE: Official web portal of the Parliament of Ukraine. 28.05.2020. has also never been developed.

The process of preparing the Legislative Agenda, its substantive content, and the approach taken by committees when submitting proposals require a substantial revision in order to ensure that the Verkhovna Rada and its committees are realistically capable of implementing it.

First and foremost, the number of tasks included in the Legislative Agenda should be reviewed so that it corresponds to the actual capacity of the Verkhovna Rada to adopt draft laws. Agendas containing several hundred tasks and draft laws clearly fail to reflect objective reality and the Parliament’s actual performance indicators, including the number of laws adopted, the average time required to consider draft laws and the level of committee activity in preparing opinions on draft laws.

Committees should also reconsider their approaches to submitting proposals to the Legislative Agenda. The largest number of incomplete tasks is recorded for committees that are assigned the largest overall number of tasks. Moreover, committee reports reveal cases where different committees assess the implementation status of the same task differently, which once again indicates inconsistent practices across parliamentary committees.

Improved communication with the Government is also required, particularly with regard to the submission of new draft laws.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada stipulate that committees are to submit proposals to the Legislative Agenda, taking into account the Programme of Activities and the indicative legislative planning documents of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. However, the provisions on the indicative plan were removed from the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers only a few days after the adoption of the law that introduced the Legislative Agenda, while the Programmes of Activities of the last two Governments have not been approved at all.

In practice, the preparation of proposals for the LA involves consultations between ministers and committees of the VRU, during which issues requiring legislative regulation in the coming year are identified, and tasks for preparing draft laws are allocated between ministries and parliamentary committees. All proposals submitted by ministries and Verkhovna Rada committees are coordinatedThe legislative process in the defence sector: ALI prepared an analytical study // ALI. 13.08.2025. at meetings of the relevant main committees. Accordingly, the need to register new draft laws cannot be regarded as unexpected for the Government.

At present, however, the Legislative Agenda, as a document intended to ensure a planned and predictable legislative process, plays only a nominal role. This is due, not least, to an insufficient level of coordination among subjects of legislative initiative and weak parliamentary oversight.

This document was prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

The Ukrainian Parliament entered its 14th session carrying a burden of challenges pressing in from all sides. On the one hand, there are the deadlines of European integration commitments and constant pressure from external partners expecting decisions from the Verkhovna Rada. On the other hand, there are internal crises — public distrust and a series of political scandals.

Quantitative indicators of parliamentary work only reinforce this state of tension. In particular, the number of procedural violations and draft laws registered with a single signatory has increased. At first glance, this may appear to be a surge in activity; however, behind the figures, it is increasingly not effectiveness but system overload that is revealed. Parliament finds itself in a situation where it must maintain the pace of reforms against the backdrop of a low capacity to renew its own working mechanisms.

Experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analysed these processes in the Verkhovna Rada during the 13th session using quantitative data. We examine how the figures reflect the real state of the legislative machine, how the dynamics of its work are changing under the pressure of war, European integration and public distrust, and whether Parliament is managing to remain an effective centre of decision-making under such conditions. More details on the key features of the Verkhovna Rada’s work during the 13th  session can be found in the parliamentary Monitoring by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

Parliamentary dynamics in 2025 appear restrained — and this restraint is not accidental; it is confirmed by quantitative indicators. Following the crisis triggered by the attempt to undermine the independence of anti-corruption bodies in July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada entered a phase of decline: August is traditionally a low-productivity month. More troubling signals, however, did not disappear in the autumn.

Between September and November 2025, Parliament adopted only 38 laws — significantly fewer than during the same period in 2024 (58 laws). By comparison, during the same period in 2023 (the 10th session), 46 laws were adopted — a session that recorded a historically low number of adopted acts. Thus, even by wartime standards, the current result points to a downturn, signalling either the gradual exhaustion of the Verkhovna Rada or the continuation of the crisis following the July events.

At the same time, the figures show that this decline did not emerge in a vacuum. During the 13th session, the Verkhovna Rada demonstrated the lowest productivity of all ‘spring’ sessions. If these trends persist, the 14th session will consolidate a new level of ‘normality’ — one in which a smaller number of adopted decisions no longer appear exceptional but become the rule. Even under such conditions, however, Parliament remains capable of adopting strategically important decisions. Among the laws adopted are No. 14048 (on ensuring the legality and transparency of the activities of local self-government bodies), which is required to secure financial support from the EU under the Ukraine Facility, as well as another European integration draft law — No. 13202-1.

Overall, these indicators point to the functional capacity of Parliament to perform its legislative functions. The Verkhovna Rada remains capable of acting, but under conditions of constant strain and political fatigue — each time with a smaller reserve of energy and a growing need for time.

When Ukraine obtained EU candidate status in June 2022, Parliament found itself on the threshold of a major transformation. The Verkhovna Rada was expected not merely to provide political support for the EU course, but to engage in daily, systematic work — adopting dozens of laws intended to bring Ukrainian legislation closer to the acquis of the European Union. More than two years after the start of accession negotiations, it is necessary to face reality: a fast start does not guarantee the same pace across the entire distance.

To accelerate the European integration process, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483 in July 2022, introducing a separate procedure for the consideration of relevant draft laws. Each committee was expected to establish subcommittees on the adaptation of legislation to EU law. This was an important, but interim step — a kind of ‘add-on’ to the Rules of Procedure that has never undergone formal amendment.

In parallel, Parliament sought to accelerate the consideration of European integration initiatives through other means: the requirement to conduct a regulatory impact assessment was removed; the legislative work plans for 2024 and 2025 introduced dedicated sections on adaptation to EU law; and following the update of the Verkhovna Rada website in 2025, it became possible to track the progress of draft laws marked as European integration-related. These decisions did indeed help to partially speed up the process at the initial stages. However, it became clear quickly that without legislative amendments to the Rules of Procedure, such an ‘accelerator’ would not function indefinitely.

For example, in 2022–2023 Parliament adopted dozens of European integration laws (26 during the eighth session and 22 during the ninth). With each subsequent session, however, their number declined: only four during the 10th session, 16 during the 11th, 12 during the 12th, nine during the 13th and just one during the first half of the 14th session. At the same time, the average time required to consider such draft laws has been steadily increasing. This may indicate fatigue (a point also raised by Members of Parliament), a loss of consensus and a continuously rising level of decision-making complexity.

The ‘obvious’ European integration decisions have already been adopted. What remains are more complex, technically demanding draft laws that require longer coordination both within Parliament and beyond it. The duration of their passage has also increased. Whereas during the eighth session draft laws took an average of 403 days from registration to adoption, by the 13th session this figure had risen to 573 days. During the 14th session so far, only one law has been adopted, and it underwent the procedure for more than 150 days.

The dynamics have changed. A fast pace is undoubtedly a positive sign. Although European integration must be operational, the quality and thoroughness of decisions should remain a priority. The Ukrainian Parliament should take its own experience into account and acknowledge that every decision in this process requires inter-institutional coordination and political will. New steps will require more time. Therefore, it is worth engaging in dialogue with society and international partners on realistic timeframes for fulfilling commitments. The European integration process will continue to unfold under ‘burning’ deadlines if expectations of swift decision-making remain detached from practice ‘on the ground’.

Another problematic aspect of the legislative process is the President of Ukraine’s failure to comply with the constitutional requirement to sign laws adopted by Parliament within the prescribed timeframe. Clearly, this issue lies beyond Parliament itself; nevertheless, such striking figures cannot be ignored. In addition to the obvious lever — the ‘silent’ veto as a means of controlling parliamentary decisions — such violations risk laws being declared unconstitutional if signed in this manner.

At least every second law adopted during the 13th session was either signed in breach of the constitutional deadlines or has still not been signed at all (54%). This is the highest figure throughout the entire ninth convocation and possibly in the entire history. For instance, Law No. 3291-IX on measures aimed at settling arrears on the wholesale electricity market was adopted by Parliament in July 2023, yet the President signed it only in January 2025 — after 518 days of waiting.

As of today, 43 laws remain neither signed nor vetoed at all. All these laws are in a state of ‘legislative limbo’, and there is still no real understanding of what should be done with such acts. The authors of the Constitution clearly could not have envisaged such a situation. This practice creates a dangerous precedent. The signing of a law is not a symbolic act, but a constitutionally defined stage of the legislative process. When the President simply ‘keeps’ a draft law in a drawer, he effectively acquires an additional instrument of influence over Parliament that is not envisaged by the Constitution and is more ‘silent’ than a veto.

Among the reasons for breaching the deadlines for signing laws may be both political motives and the limited capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus. Indeed, in the turbulent conditions of martial law, a law may have lost its relevance by the time it reaches the signing stage; however, such a volume of laws signed late requires not explanation, but a response.

During the 13th session, ‘Question Time to the Government’, when ministers report to the Verkhovna Rada, lasted a total of more than 11 hours — the highest figure since the start of the full-scale invasion. The use of another oversight instrument of the Verkhovna Rada — MPs’ inquiries — also increased: during the 13th session, MPs submitted a record number for the period of martial law — 303.

As is well known, quantity does not always translate into quality. When it comes to the oversight function, Parliament finds it difficult to maintain a balance. On the positive side, MPs are making more active use of the available oversight instruments. The claim that they are entirely incapable of overseeing the Government’s actions would be unfair. However, the scale of unused potential is striking. Plans to strengthen parliamentary oversight of the Government, approved by a Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada as far back as 2016, have remained just that — plans. New instruments that were intended to be introduced during the ninth convocation, such as interpellation, have also remained at the draft law stage. Oversight instruments — whether old or new — are expected to deliver results. Yet this has not materialised either: neither the relevant committees nor the Accounting Chamber (which is an instrument of parliamentary oversight) identified problems in the work of the executive authorities that ultimately led to the resignations of Ministers Halushchenko and Hrynchuk.

Legislative spam is a systemic problem of the Verkhovna Rada. It refers to the mass submission of a large number of draft laws without proper preparation, support or realistic prospects of adoption, which overloads the parliamentary system and imitates legislative activity. At present, the situation may appear ambiguous at first glance. The large number of registered draft laws can be partially explained by their re-registration following a change of Government. However, when looking specifically at MPs’ initiatives, the picture is somewhat different. The key indicator of legislative spam is the record share of draft laws with only a single signatory — 45% of all draft laws registered by MPs. This is the highest figure across all sessions of the ninth convocation. In practice, almost every second document was submitted without the support of colleagues, indicating an almost zero chance of being backed in the chamber.

Parliament may give the impression of a hyperactive institution generating a large number of new initiatives, but around half of them have almost no chance of becoming law.

The Verkhovna Rada has remained functional and has continued to fulfil its duties despite all challenges, at least until the most recent events related to the corruption scandal highlighted by Operation ‘Midas’. How Parliament will emerge from the current crisis remains an open question. Nevertheless, signs of systemic institutional exhaustion have been evident for some time. An analysis of quantitative data makes it possible to highlight specific problems, the resolution of which is critically important for the further work of the longest convocation in the history of independent Ukraine.

Much will depend on how institutions — and the Verkhovna Rada in particular — emerge from this crisis, notably on the effectiveness of parliamentary bodies such as the Temporary Investigative Commission (TIC) on economic security, as well as on decisions taken by the Office of the President. The pace of the TIC’s work is already notable: within a week of the searches, it held an open meeting with NABU, SAPO and key officials from the Anti-Corruption Committee, which addressed the scandal at its own meeting a week later. Parliament has already dismissed the ministers involved in the scandal. Yermak was dismissed by the President. How new ministers will be appointed will become a new test for the Verkhovna Rada. If the situation is repeated, and these ministers do not feel accountable to Parliament as the body that appointed them, then the issue of their accountability will remain unchanged.

It will be possible to speak of a demonstration of extraordinary resilience and institutional capacity for decision-making if the legislative process does not come to a halt and a functioning majority continues to operate in the Verkhovna Rada. Transforming the current effort to keep the system ‘afloat’ into gradual forward movement will require realistic expectations regarding European integration, a reduction in ‘legislative spam’, strengthened parliamentary oversight and, above all, the successful navigation of a new ‘storm’.

The discussion focused on the state of implementation of the criteria under Cluster 1 ‘Fundamentals’, with participation of the First Vice-Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Oleksandr Korniyenko; the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Taras Kachka; the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, Katarína Mathernová; Members of Parliament; and civil society representatives from Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe Without Barriers and the Ukrainian Bar Association.

According to Karyna Aslanian, Head of the Rule of Law area at ALI, several priority tasks in judicial reform require Parliament’s involvement:

Participation of international experts in selection processes.

In June 2025, the Verkhovna Rada registered Draft Law No. 13382, which would reinstate international experts in the selection of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). However, no progress in considering the draft law has been made to date.

Filling vacancies in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ).

In addition, the expert drew attention to the need to revise the approach to financing the judiciary: ‘Each year the judiciary is funded at roughly 60%, which makes it impossible to ensure adequate remuneration in local courts. As a result, court secretaries and judges’ assistants earn less than cleaning staff in a supermarket’.

Karyna Aslanian also touched on the latest scandals surrounding the work of the parliamentary Temporary Investigative Commission (TIC):

A significant part of renewing the justice system is the reform of law-enforcement agencies, which requires more systematic and consistent work.

Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area, noted that establishing a practice of dialogue between Parliament and the Government on Ukraine’s implementation of its European integration commitments is essential and should become regular. This reflects the political agency of both Parliament and the Government in this process. The expert also stressed that Parliament and the Government’s decision to involve civil society in such meetings is crucial, as it enables all sides to assess Ukraine’s progress on the path to EU integration objectively.

The Head of ALI’s Law and Order area stressed the need to reinstate mandatory competitive procedures for appointments to prosecution offices at all levels, and that the selection of the Prosecutor General must take place through a transparent and merit-based procedure that eliminates any risk of politicisation.

He noted that draft laws No. 13601 and No. 13699 are already before the Verkhovna Rada, giving Parliament the opportunity to swiftly meet the EU’s recommendations.

The Shadow Report was prepared by a coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, under a grant provided by the EU Project Pravo-Justice, implemented by Expertise France. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.