Ukraine’s acquisition of the EU candidate status started a large-scale reform process in many spheres of Ukrainian life, and the parliament was no exception. The legislative process is characterised by chronic problems that impair the law-making process at all stages of work. The chaos of the legislative cycle results in low-quality legislative initiatives, which then affect changes in all spheres of life. However, the progress of the reform can be described similarly: changes are implemented unevenly and abruptly. Last year, we returned to the parliamentary reform again, so we offer to review key changes that took place in the work of the Ukrainian Parliament during 2023.

The current stage of parliamentary reform started in 2016 when the European Parliament’s mission presented the Roadmap for internal reform to increase the institutional capacity of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a relevant resolution where the recommendations of the European Parliament’s mission were recognised as the basis for subsequent changes. However, the process slowed down over time. According to the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, progress was only 4% from 2019 to 2021 compared to a total of 45%. The main part of the work was performed only after the resolution was adopted, and no large-scale changes happened until recently.

They returned to the reform again after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. In particular, in 2022, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, a plan for Ukraine’s recovery was presented, with an analysis of the necessary reforms in different spheres. These reforms included the public administration sector, where the parliamentary reform stood out.

Perhaps the most important problem that was attempted to be resolved during 2023 within the framework of the parliamentary reform was the low quality of the large number of registered draft laws. As stated in the Recovery Plan for Ukraine in the field of public administration, “submitting countless conceptually ill-considered, poorly executed and unsubstantiated draft laws, forces the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, its bodies and services of the Office of the Verkhovna Rada to spend considerable time, effort and money to properly process the initiatives, which, taking into account their content, have no prospects of becoming laws.” The main changes in this field were related to accompanying documents and the adoption of by-laws.

Among other things, the law “On Law-Making Activity” adopted this year changes the requirements for accompanying documents. The green book, the impact assessment, and other documents are among the compulsory accompanying analytical documents stipulated by the legislative initiative entities. Thanks to this, the problems that need to be addressed will be identified more accurately, and the dialogue will move from the issue of “how to change” to “what to change.” This should fundamentally change the entire legislative process. The law will become effective after the end of martial law, but preparations for implementation of changes are already in progress.

Collaboration between the Cabinet of Ministers and the Verkhovna Rada is going on to improve the process of adoption of the by-laws. In fact, bylaws are currently being developed by the government after the adoption of the law. Therefore, their preparation for draft law adoption is not rational enough — the law may change significantly during adoption, so the work should be started all over again. After all, the situation in which the current law has had no by-laws regulating its implementation for a long time has become normal, and this does little good. That is why the possibility of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers providing a list of laws that need to be amended in advance is being considered. At the same time, this practice has already been implemented for some draft laws, which now have relative lists.

Digitalisation was not the most important guarantee of stability of the Verkhovna Rada at the start of the full-scale invasion. Online meetings and electronic access to documentation enabled Parliamentary entities to function without considerable interruptions during difficult times. The development continues: in 2023, the Docflow in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (DC) was continuously optimised, particularly under increased workload and permanent monitoring. The hybrid data processing centre was created, which stipulates expansion and combination of ground infrastructure at the expense of cloud resources. All these decisions contributed to creating a secure environment, with the Employees of the Verkhovna Rada Office and MPs constantly having access to work processes.

The parliamentary reform does not end here; processes that were started in 2023 can yield positive results in 2024. Amendments to accompanying documents were developed. This way, a comparative note is currently performing its function just formally: in fact, there is no unified system of requirements as to its content. For this reason, processing draft laws requires considerable resources from both the Office of the Verkhovna Rada and MPs. Thus, requirements for explanatory notes were updated in 2023.

In addition, the Interdepartmental Group on Improving Law Drafting Work, Assessing Legislative Impact and Improving the Results of Law Implementation started functioning. Its members include officials from the Cabinet of Ministers and the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada, as well as representatives from public organisations, including the Agency for Legislative Initiatives. High-quality collaboration between branches of the government and engagement of independent experts ensures relevant progress in the parliamentary reform.

In 2023, the parliamentary reform returned, and the progress can be called quite tangible. However, it was not without a couple of flies in the ointment: much less productive years hid behind the fruitful 2023, during which the parliamentary reform almost stopped. The only thing is obvious: the reform process lacks systematisation. Without it, we are going to observe jumps followed by increasingly longer pauses. The effectiveness of the previous year in implementing the reform can easily be erased by the subsequent years of stagnation. That is why it is critical to implement changes in 2024. Successful parliamentary reform depends on improving reforms and other areas of life, as high-quality legislation is the key to development, sustainable democracy, and European integration.

Over this year, the Rada worked fruitfully, having adopted [at the time of this text publication] 231 laws). Some of them caused a whole range of emotions – from screams of “Betrayal!” (Zrada in Ukrainian) on social networks to a more positive reaction to innovations. Other laws seem to have been disregarded by the public, although they will have a significant impact on society. Here are 5 laws adopted this year which will influence Ukraine, the war, and society.

Disclaimer: The mentioned laws are not necessarily “good” or “bad.” Their quality is to be determined by the Cabinet of Ministers and specialised experts following their implementation. We have highlighted the most important ones, those where their considerable influence is hard to deny.

Why is it important? This law was recognised by the relevant committee as one of the priority laws in the field of decentralisation. They worked on its development for two years, having involved numerous public organisations and associations, and the adoption of this law received positive feedback from the public. The draft law on service in the local government is an integral part of decentralisation reform, as well as the state service reform. The law will take effect after the war. However, the preparations for new regulations are underway.

What does it change? Optimising remuneration processes and their transparency, respective payments will be published in the public domain. Approving a new position – manager of the local government service, who will ensure appropriate employment conditions and fair competition for managerial positions. The competitions will also become more transparent: interviews with the winners will be published for the public. Generally, employees will receive additional legal protection, and their status will finally be properly stipulated by law.

Initiator(s): The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Why is it important? With the beginning of the full-scale invasion, cash payments to military servicepersons increased significantly. However, over time, mass mobilisation and the simultaneous economic decline caused discussions about the reduction of payments: the burden on the budget turned out to be excessive. As the Minister of Finance later said, “It is impossible to calculate and impossible to fund.” Although with different arguments, the Ministry of Defence agreed: the department emphasised “the adherence to the principles of justice in terms of motivating soldiers of the security and defence forces of Ukraine.” Hence, starting February 2023, the amount of additional monetary compensation for some categories of military servicepersons was reduced. This decision caused a harsh response from the society. After six months of discussions and struggle, a decision was adopted to increase payments to some categories of military servicepersons, and the Cabinet of Ministers specified categories and the amount of payments by its resolution.

What does it change? Different categories of military servicepersons received different increases in additional monetary remuneration. This way, UAH 100,000 is now paid to military personnel of missile and artillery forces, as well as to those who are engaged in demining in the area of combat operations. UAH 50,000 is paid to military personnel from command and headquarters. Those who perform demining outside the combat area will be paid an additional remuneration of UAH 30,000. Remuneration to wounded military servicepersons was increased to UAH 20,100, as well as to training centre instructors – from UAH 15,000 to UAH 30,000. Furthermore, this law increased the vacation period to 30 days per year.

Initiator(s): Davyd Arakhamia, Head of the parliamentary faction “Servant of the People,” and 125 more MPs.

Why is it important? For more than 30 years after Ukraine’s independence, there was no “law on laws” in place to regulate law-making activity. The definition of the “law,” “regulatory act,” and other important instruments were present only in theory. In the history of Ukrainian law-making, other problems related to the lack of high-quality regulation of the process became apparent. Lack of long-term planning of law-making activity, the absence of established rules for registration, as well as ineffective control over the implementation of laws by the executive power – all had a negative influence on the development of Ukrainian legislation. Therefore, a new law, “On Law-Making Activity,” is supposed to rectify this.

What does it change? The Law “On Law-Making Activity” is aimed at establishing the rules for the effective development of legislation and high-quality control over its implementation. The law establishes definitions of such notions as the “law,” “code,” “legislation of Ukraine,” and others. Legal monitoring is also introduced for more specific parliamentary control over the effectiveness of legislation application. Law-making will also be subject to regulation: the creation of a number of analytical, forecasting and programme documents for public policy will be introduced. Each stage of regulatory act drafting is elaborated in detail.

Initiator(s): Ruslan Stefanchuk, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and 190 other MPs.

Why is it important? At the beginning of the invasion, the Verkhovna Rada suspended the obligation to submit declarations for officials until peacetime. The reason for such a decision was the reaction to a full-scale war – a significant part of public officials and their families were located in the occupied territories, and accessibility of public information could expose them to direct danger. However, over time, the fight against corruption came back into the focus of civil society and international partners. The return of declarations and opening of the registry was one of the requirements: of the IMF – in order to receive funding, the EU – had to start negotiations regarding membership in the EU. The law on resuming compulsory submission of declarations was adopted, although with one exception: the opening of the registry was scheduled for the time after the end of martial law. This little detail caused a harsh reaction from the public, which is why the President vetoed the law, demanding that declarations be made accessible immediately and that the necessary number of votes be gathered.

What does it change? No later than 90 days after the enactment of the law, authorised persons shall be obliged to submit declarations for 2022–2023 (unless submitted before). If declarants are serving in the military or stay in the temporarily occupied territories, the deadlines for submitting declarations for them shall be different: declarations shall be submitted within 90 days after de-occupation of the person’s place of residence; return from the place of permanent deployment; from the date of the termination of powers; from the day when martial law is lifted. In addition, the Unified State Register of Declarations shall become accessible within 30 days from the date of enactment of the law.

Initiator(s): Davyd Arakhamia, Head of the parliamentary faction “Servant of the People,” and 40 more MPs.

Why is it important? The full-scale invasion and significantly greater mobilisation level caused a considerable increase in state expenses for payments to military servicepersons. This resulted in the increased amount of personal income tax to be paid to local budgets where military units are deployed. Hence, while the state budget suffered a significant deficit of 50%, a considerable share of local budgets increased their revenues through the personal income tax of military personnel. Expenses of communities attracted the attention of citizens, in particular, mass media. Questions appeared: is it worth spending money on parks and paving in the midst of a full-scale war? Central authorities also had similar questions concerning the efficiency of spending, given the significant deficit of funds in the state budget. So, the idea was born to reallocate personal income tax from military personnel’s salaries to the state budget, though such a step raised even more questions. On the one hand, the state needs more money in the armed fight against the invader. At the same time, during recent years, Ukraine has made moderate progress towards decentralisation, providing communities with more power. This law means a drastic U-turn from declared values. Finally, the decision to transfer the “military” personal income tax to the central budget was adopted. But what will it mean in practice: regular centralisation of the state in conditions of war or an attack on communities and moving back to authoritarianism? Only time will tell.

What does it change? In 2024, around UAH 96 billion are expected to be received from the “military” personal income tax. Of them, 45% will be allocated to the Administration of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine for manufacturing and procuring UIVs; 45% – to the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine for developing the defence and industrial complex, and 10% – to military units relative to the paid personal income tax. Expenditures on donations to local budgets were also increased to prevent their deficit and compensate for the loss of the “military” personal income tax.

Initiator(s): The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

During the second year of full-scale war, the most important laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada are distinguished by the continued armed resistance against the occupying state. In spite of the war, Ukraine keeps undertaking reforms in other spheres, in particular, in the anti-corruption sector. Some laws were adopted under public pressure and based on assumed commitments, and others were the result of many years of hard work. Some laws became objects of long and fierce discussions, while others received unconditional support. 2024 will present new challenges to Ukrainian parliamentarians. We hope that the Parliament will be able to address them with dignity.

Currently, most of the committees are controlled by a single-party majority in the form of the Servant of the People faction. Committees on national security and defence, budget, information and humanitarian policy issues – all these and other committees are chaired by government coalition representatives. At the same time, the opposition members cannot boast of anything like this – only a few committees are in their hands. But what was the distribution like before? What committees were controlled by the coalition even then?

Our data covers the last 17 years, starting with the fifth convocation. This period was chosen given the constitutional changes of 2004 when the concept of coalition was added to the Constitution. So, we can find out exactly which committees were usually controlled by the coalition and which by the oppositionWe consider the opposition to be those MPs who are not part of the government coalition..

An interesting situation has developed in the current convocation of the Verkhovna Rada: for instance, at first the ruling single-party majority took control of 19 out of 23 committees. As a result of subsequent personnel changes (in particular, the appointment of Dmytro Lubinets as the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Commissioner for Human Rights), the Servant of the People currently controls 20 committees (87 percent). Compared to the number of MPs who are part of the single-party majority – slightly more than half – this distribution is disproportionate: according to our calculations, even at the beginning of the convocation, the coalition held too many committees in its hands, and over time, this trend only intensified.

But such a bias did not always exist in Ukrainian politics. To understand which committees have historically played the greatest role for the Ukrainian government, we analysed the distribution of positions of committee chairs in previous convocations of the Verkhovna Rada.

In total, we were able to identify 4 “coalition-held” committeesIf the threshold of 4 convocations of control is used, then there will be almost twice as many “coalition-held” committees, namely 9., which were controlled by the coalition in all 5 convocations, as well as 6 committees which were not controlled by the representatives of the coalition for the greater number of convocations (3 out of 5 convocations). We will consider such committees as “opposition-held”.

If during the 5th to 7th convocations, the opposition and the coalition controlled approximately the same number of committees, then already in the 8th convocation, elected in 2014, the coalition controlled all committees except for one – on the Rules of Procedure and Organisation of the Work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. But even there, the reason is prosaic: they simply failed to elect the chair of that committee for all five years. The situation of the current convocation is quite similar: at the beginning of the convocation, only four committees were not controlled by the Servant of the People faction.

A more balanced distribution of committees in the past may also have resulted from less consolidation of power. In the 5th and 6th convocations, for example, Viktor Yushchenko was the president, while the pro-presidential faction was in the opposition. So, using his position as a lever of influence, the opposition forces could achieve more favourable positions for themselves – which meant better representation among the committee chairs.

The most “coalition-held” committees: (modern committee names are used)

There may be several reasons for this distribution of coalition-held committees.

First, the committees that the coalition usually received have an executive role – the Budget Committee is necessary for the Government to successfully perform its main functions. Also, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure allows the parliamentary majority to control the main processes of the Rada’s work. Thanks to the coalition control over these committees, the system is less prone to conflicts regarding the most basic areas of work, which, in particular, affects the speed of making important decisions.

Secondly, a large portion of resources is redistributed in these fields. Thus, according to the budget for 2021 (that is before the greater part of the expenditures was transferred to the Ministry of Defence), expenditures on social protection and health care alone accounted for a third of the total. Therefore, these committees are of particular interest to the coalition: they literally provide more opportunities for amendments.

At the same time, since these committees affect everyone’s life, the coalition and the Cabinet get the opportunity to implement their ideas as efficiently as possible. As we have already emphasised, politicians in democracies work primarily for their re-election, so they need results. In turn, the success of reforms that will improve the lives of as broad section of the population as possible is a very good example of high-quality work. In this case, control over the committees that allow redistribution of such extensive resources becomes even more important. After all, it is the committees that decide the fate of draft laws – which will go to the vote, and which will forever remain marked “being deliberated on in the committee” on the website of the Verkhovna Rada.

The most “opposition-held” committees: (modern committee names are used)

The Committee on National Security and Defence can boast of probably the most interesting history. Until 2014, it belonged exclusively to the forces of the opposition, but with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the Committee became much more important – so for the second convocation in a row, it is controlled by coalition political forces.

But in addition to importance, another factor plays a role: committees historically controlled by the opposition have less influence. Such committees have much less ability to redistribute resources – so they act more as a bargaining chip in the distribution of committee positions. Also, as we wrote earlier, among other things, committees monitor the compliance with legislation by other authorities. Therefore, it is logical to transfer the committees with a more prominent government control function to the opposition. In particular, the Committee on Freedom of Speech has a special role (or at least had one before having been weakened). It is they that monitor the (absence of) restrictions on journalists’ work and possible censorship by the authorities – such excesses have a negative impact on Ukrainian democracy.

The state of affairs in which most (if not all) committees go to the coalition developed in 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity. The formation of a coalition consisting of 5 out of 6 factions allowed the coalition to appoint its representatives as chairs of all committees, strengthening its influence on the entire process of the Rada’s work. In the 9th convocation, with the existence of a single-party majority, the situation was repeated, and most committees again went to the coalition, with minimal representation of the opposition among their chairs.

The situation where one political force can control almost all processes of Parliament’s work due to a minimal advantage in the number of seats has two significant drawbacks. First, the opposition has limited opportunities to exercise control functions, which creates risks of monopolisation of power and inefficient exercise of executive power. Secondly, one of the main functions of the parliament – representation of public interests – is being distorted because parliamentary minority factions and groups have fewer opportunities to influence public administration. At the same time, the situation where representatives of the parliamentary majority want to take for themselves as many committees as possible is partly due to the design of the Ukrainian parliamentary system, in which committees combine both law-making and control functions. By contrast, in some nations adhering to the Westminster system, there are separate specialised committees to control the executive and separate committees to create legislation, so this problem does not arise.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the control of committees by the opposition can prevent the coalition from pushing through the draft laws it needs. That is why there is a desire for maximum control of committees by representatives of the parliamentary majority. Our analysis has demonstrated this. The most important committees for the exercise of executive power were taken by representatives of the parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, this situation, just as any other distribution of leadership positions in committees, is the result of political agreements between factions and groups that belong to both the opposition and the coalition. Therefore, apparently, the key factor that determines the allocation of committees is the intra-parliamentary inter-factional dialogue.

Finding answers through detailed analysis: what data helped us.

In order to answer these questions, we looked at the committees of past convocations and determined which political forces had their representatives appointed to leading positions on them. It is the position of the chair of the committee that is the most important indicator – historically, committee chairs have had the greatest influence on the evaluation of draft laws and the formation of the agenda. We agree that the statutory powers of committee chairs are mostly organisational. But during the existence of the Verkhovna Rada, this position has acquired an informal influence, which makes the opinion of the chair of the committee the most important. Also, we are most interested in the early stages of convocations because this is the best indicator of the logic of redistribution of such an important resource.

At the beginning of each convocation, the list of committees is formed anew. However, by analysing the responsibilities of committees through the decades, we can see how the committees of the past correspond to the committees of today. Thus, we have identified 19 committees that remained relatively stable over the years.

On November 9, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the state budget for 2024. The decision was approved long before the beginning of the next year. This year’s budget vote is quite a significant event — in the ranking of the most timely adopted budgets, it ranks second in the entire independence era. What does this discipline in the budget process indicate because higher speed does not always mean improvement?

To answer this question, we analysed the dates of adoption of all state budgets from 1992 to 2024. Also taken into account were the dates of passage of draft laws at a number of stages: submission to the Verkhovna Rada, first and second readings, as well as the president’s signature. A large amount of data has been publicly available only since 1998, so for the previous budgets, we only considered the date of adoption as a whole. Thanks to such a database, we can observe how the drafting of such an important national document took place, as well as how the work of the parliament and trends in the budget process changed.

The 2010 Verkhovna Rada Rules of Procedure set specific dates by which each stage of budget adoption must be completed. The Cabinet of Ministers must submit the draft budget to the Rada by October 1. The Rada must adopt it in the first reading by October 20 and in the second reading by November 20. And while this year, the parliament fully complied with the established timeframes, earlier, the situation could be radically different.

For instance, it happened more than once that the draft law was accepted as a whole only in the last days of the year, sometimes receiving the president’s signature only on December 31, which is already a holiday. For the first time in a long time, the law was adopted as early as November 2018 — before that, the last time this happened was as far back as 2003. In general, since 2010, it has only been possible to adopt the draft budget within the statutory timeframe on three occasions. And two of them occurred after the start of a full-scale invasion.

This year, the draft budget was adopted on time both according to the Rules of Procedure and taking into account the fiscal year – there are still 53 days until the start of the new one. This may seem like something completely normal, but if we recall the history of the issue, it definitely was not the norm in all periods. In the 1990s, for example, out of eight budgets (from 1992 to 1999), only two were adopted before the beginning of the fiscal year. Afterwards, the situation gradually improved, and such severe delays became less and less frequent. Still, delays happened. In this millennium, the latest budget to be adopted was that of 2010, passed on the 116th day of the fiscal year (April 29). The budget adopted this year ranks as the second timeliest in the entire history of Ukraine’s independence era, second only to last year’s budget.

In 2023, 55 days passed between the submission of the draft to the Rada and its adoption, while on average the budget adoption process over the past 26 years takes about three months, or 84 days. However, this measure is extremely unstable. Usually, the later the draft is submitted, the faster they try to adopt it, trying to make it by the beginning of the year. Thus, the 2008 budget was submitted to the parliament on December 26, and just four days later, it was signed into law by the president. However, a very long adoption period (for example, more than 100 days) is not necessarily a good sign: in such cases, it is possible, for example, to call off the draft and subsequently replace it. And this is definitely not a sign of quality work.

If one takes a step back and looks at the situation from the perspective of convocations, one can see a rather interesting picture. During the 9th convocation, the budget has adopted an average of 42 days before the beginning of the year. In the 8th convocation, the statistical average was different, standing at 17 days. If we consider another five years before that, the figure was even worse: minus 17 days, that is, budgets were adopted on average as late as January. It is the 2010 budget, which was adopted on April 29 (116 days after the New Year), that makes the data so bad. In general, it can be seen how, over time, the work on the budget becomes more and more systematic and responsible, at least in terms of meeting deadlines.

It is also worth considering that compliance with the norms prescribed in the Rules of Procedure and the speed of the process are not identical to the quality of the document itself, which is not the subject of this analysis. But the time and timeliness of the adoption of the state budget are also important: a too long or too fast budget process, as well as a delay in the adoption in the debating chamber — all this can serve as an indicator of haphazard work on the document or different views of power-holders on certain components. Compliance with prescribed norms, in particular with regard to deadlines, shows the quality of the process, as well as the coherence of the actions of all its participants. Still, the reasons for coherence may be different, not all participants in the process may be equally autonomous.

In general, two clear trends can be observed.

First, they are usually late with the budget in years of crisis. For example, in the 1990s, when a deep economic decline spread across Ukraine, there were cases when budgets were adopted 3–6 months after the beginning of the respective year. The 1997 budget, which was adopted as late as June, stands out among them. It should also be taken into account, though, that the first decade of independence was a unique period, during which the framework and norms within which the parliament of a democratic Ukraine should work were still being established. However, such delays were repeated later on, as well in the years of the most acute crises. For example, in 2009, when the power-holders had to prepare the budget for 2010, a crisis hit — Ukraine’s GDP fell by 15 percent, so the question of the future took a back seat. In 2014, during the Revolution of Dignity, the budget was adopted on the infamous day of January 16, and for the next several years, the president signed the budget on December 31, the day before the start of the fiscal year. However, this regularity has disappeared – the budget was last adopted after January 1 2014. Currently, one can observe a completely different attitude towards the adoption of the state budget.

Secondly, there is a significant visible improvement in the interaction between the Cabinet of Ministers and the parliament, as well as in their discipline. Considering only the previous behaviour, it could be assumed that this year’s budget should be adopted with a great delay. However, this is not the case. Currently, the situation is almost the opposite: Ukraine is experiencing the deepest crisis in the entire independence era, but at the same time, the government’s compliance with its own rules has improved. One of the reasons is that the issue of economic survival has been probably the most important for the past two years: half of the budget for the next year will go to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and only thanks to international aid will it be possible to cover the budget deficit, which will amount to almost 50 percent. Actually, the timeliness of the budget adoption can be explained by the need to fulfil obligations to international partners, for whom budget discipline is an important indicator of capacity.

Another reason is the centralisation of power: the president, the government and the single-party majority belong to the same team, and it has one decision-making centre in Bankova Street. There is a lot of micromanagement in important decisions, the adoption of this year’s budget is just one example. This fact gave a good figure for quantitative statistics, which, however, does not turn into a qualitative improvement. The system of public administration is unbalanced, and the cabinet has accepted the role of an extra. But this is a topic for another analytical article.

And one final remark: The number of amendments to the state budget and, accordingly, the duration of their consideration and the pains of adoption strongly depend on the amount of free money in the budget for distribution. In the last two years, there have been fewer discussions around the budget process because there is not enough our own money in the budget — and all of it is spent on protected items.

High-quality control of the work of the Verkhovna Rada by civil society requires transparent work of the Parliament. More than once, it was the work of journalists under the dome of the Rada that sparked discussions which led to large-scale changes. But should all aspects of the Rada’s work be public? We agree that the Verkhovna Rada previously adhered to this principle.

But everything changed a year and a half ago. With the beginning of the invasion, certain restrictions were introduced in the Rada, in particular regarding the dissemination of information. The calendar of plenary sessions, the broadcast of plenary sessions and meetings of the Conciliation Board were removed from public access, and access to MP profiles through the website was turned off. All these restrictions were accepted by the society as reasonable – the security aspect was then perceived as the most important.

Recently, we can observe the opposite trend: on the website of the Rada, data about MPs have been made public again, a public hour of questions to the Government was held. Restrictions on the Parliament’s work are gradually being lifted, and the Rada is returning to its previous work regime.

But is it necessary to restore the transparency of the Parliament as it existed until February 24, 2022? Should the inner workings of the Parliament be opened to the public? This was the role previously performed by the Conciliation Board.

The powers of this body include, according to the Rules of Procedure, “preliminary preparation and consideration of organisational issues of the Verkhovna Rada.” Its members include heads of factions and MP groups, chairs of committees, and the Speaker of the Rada together with his/her deputies. So, in theory, the subject of discussions is coordinating the work of the Parliament, agreeing on agendas and ensuring the effective work of the Rada.

However, in practice, everything unfolded quite differently. The Conciliation Board was primarily not a space for solving organisational issues but an arena for delivering political speeches and provoking scandals.

For example, the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 8th convocation, Andrii Parubii, was very forthright in his attitude towards the behaviour of MPs at the Conciliation Board: “Unfortunately, they use the Conciliation Board simply as a PR platform to produce a message for the TV, record it, get up and leave.”

Similar opinions were expressed by the MPs themselves: they compared the Conciliation Board to a “circus” and a “talk show” for years. There were scandals there as well. You can easily find on the Internet, for example, a video showing Yurii Boiko hitting Oleh Liashko in the face right during the meeting or the news that members of the Conciliation Board brought handcuffs to the speaker. The Conciliation Board played the role of a large platform for exchanging speeches, not a place for organising the work of the Parliament.

In 2016, the mission of the European Parliament presented the Report and Roadmap on Internal Reform and Capacity-building for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It contained a number of proposals for changes that ought to be implemented to increase the efficiency of the work of the Ukrainian Parliament. Among the listed recommendations was the closure of the Conciliation Board to the public. The reason is clear: “ In practice, the CB is a highly politicised event in which the leading political figures of different factions make speeches about topical issues.  Discussion of the parliamentary agenda tends to be secondary.”

However, it was not about the absolute closure of the Conciliation Board to citizens: it was also proposed to organise a group of special parliamentary reporters who could convey the most up-to-date information about the meetings to the public.

With the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the recommendation of the European Parliament’s mission regarding the Conciliation Board was unexpectedly fulfilled – the Conciliation Board began to be held without the presence of journalists, as well as without audio and video recording. 

During expert interviews for the Agency of Legislative Initiatives, MPs noted that the changes turned out to be striking: meetings of the Conciliation Board began to last for hours (sometimes reaching as long as 5 hours), and the discussions themselves became much more constructive – the agenda and support for certain draft laws became the main questions This had a direct impact on other aspects of the work of the Verkhovna Rada: primarily those draft laws that already had the prior support of the MPs now came to the vote. This was one of the indicators of the unity of the Parliament in the first months of the full-scale invasion because almost every vote saw more than 300 votes in favour of the draft law.

This also affected the quantitative indicators: if in the spring of 2021, MPs considered an average of 6.7 draft laws per meeting, then in the same period of 2023, this indicator was equal to 22.6, marking a manifold increase. The closure of the Conciliation Board played its role here as well: long, substantive discussions help to build the most effective agenda possible.

One year and a half have passed since MPs lost a large part of their power to control the government and communicate with society. The scandal with Turkish jackets and the ex-Minister of Defence was telling. Such news shook society and, most likely, led to Mr. Reznikov losing his post. Against the background of scandals, dissatisfaction also built up in the session hall, where MPs increasingly demanded to return the so-called “hour of questions.” Finally, on 6 October, the first session of questions in a long time was held in the Rada. Why do members of parliament need this tool, and is it effective for influencing the government?

Before the full-scale invasion, the “hour of questions” to the government was held on Friday, each plenary week. The topic was chosen in advance, so the Prime Minister and the relevant minister answered the questions. The significance of such meetings between MPs and government officials consists in several components. First, the “hour of questions to the government” is an important tool of parliamentary oversight. MPs can use it to find out the state of affairs within the government and its performance. This is especially sensitive for MPs who do not belong to the ruling coalition: they have fewer opportunities to communicate with the executive branch of the government. Certainly, the “hour of questions to the government” mostly comes down to information sharing – answers of government officials to questions asked by MPs. But after all, this is the possibility of communication between the two most important state institutions, and this means a lot.

Second, this is an important media tool that has been used by the opposition members to the fullest extent. It was due to the procedure’s publicity as before the full-scale invasion, the “hour of questions to the government” was broadcast online, and MPs were able to exert pressure on the government officials, contributing to the desired changes.

There is another crucial aspect: the government is usually formed by the coalition, so the “hour of questions” for the opposition means the continuation of the “coalition-opposition” dialogue. They say that the truth is born in debates… Well, the “hour of questions to the government” is a platform for public discussions, the opportunity for parliamentarians to give publicity to problems they consider important. An aptly asked question on a relevant topic may involve civil society in the discussion, and this tandem has a chance to achieve changes.

After 24 February 2022, the “hour of questions to the government” is being held in a completely different form. Ministers still meet with MPs: meetings with the coalition take place, as well as with faction leaders in the form of the Conciliation Board. However, it is hard to speak about the recurrence of this activity. Having reviewed the transcripts of plenary sessions for August, it may be assumed that MPs are not happy. At each session during this period, representatives of the opposition factions demanded to return the “hour of questions to the government” at least once, and sometimes, it was quite emotional.

“Perhaps it is just the time for us to return the “hour of questions to the government” if everything that is adopted in this session hall is so brazenly and stupidly regulated,” judging by these words of Solomiia Bobrovska, MP from the “Holos” opposition faction, the lack of this parliamentary oversight tool has long been the burning problem for MPs.

Thus, the full-scale invasion forced MPs to change their working mode. The “hour of questions to the government” has just disappeared from it. At that moment, it seemed quite reasonable – MPs gathered under the dome for the minimum possible period of time only to address the most pressing problems. The safety aspect of the work seemed the most important at that time – nobody wanted to be exposed to excessive danger by spending too much time discussing policy implementation. The recurrence, with which the “hour of questions to the government” was supposed to take place, stood in stark contrast with the level of looming danger.

Is this working mode still reasonable now? Opposition representatives disagree. A year ago, opposition forces were against the continuation of some restrictions related to safety. Thus, in September of last year, there were heated debates in the session hall concerning the restriction on the functioning of the Rada TV channel and live broadcasts of sessions. Even then, restrictions seemed inadequate, taking into account the existing level of threat. The same thing is happening with the “hour of questions”: scandals with jackets and then with eggs around the Ministry of Defence demonstrate how detached MPs are from what is happening in the government.

Calls for returning the “hour of questions” may be a symptom of another parliamentary sickness – decreased subjectivity of the Verkhovna Rada in general and of the opposition in particular. The existential threat to Ukrainian statehood objectively needs consolidation and, solidarity, closer coordination between the legislative and executive branches of the government. And since the majority and opposition factions and groups consolidated in the parliament, criticism of the government’s actions from different parliamentary forces became less evident. Such a state of affairs is normal for a country at war. But, at the same time, the role of such democratic structures as the parliament is reduced. Taking into account the long history of the Ukrainian struggle for democracy and freedom, this situation creates a piercing dissonance – legally elected MPs have limited influence on the development of state policies and the composition of the government.

The ice broke on 6 October: the Verkhovna Rada held the first “hour of questions to the government” over a long period. In spite of the quite specific topic during the question session – energy security and readiness for the heating season – MPs did not hesitate to ask questions on a wide range of topics, including payments to military servicepersons and restrictions on foreign travel for MPs.

Unfortunately, the success did not repeat: on the following plenary week, the “hour of questions to the government” did not take place. However, isolated meetings will not resolve the problem – only systematic events will help build high-quality communication between branches of the government and enhance the role of the parliament, which is critical now.

Even before the full-scale invasion, Rada had 27 vacant seats due to the occupied status of communities with the majority constituencies, where 26 MPs should have been elected. A full-scale invasion prevented the planned by-elections from being held in another constituency. After 24 February 2022, the number of MPs started declining rapidly. There were many reasons this time: some went to serve in the army, others lost their Ukrainian citizenship, and numerous members from the already-banned OPZZh party left Rada, supposedly out of their own free will. At present, the parliament comprises 403 MPs, a record that is unprecedented in the history of Ukraine’s independence. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives is trying to predict how many more MPs might leave the Verkhovna Rada and what consequences this may have.

If MPs are stripped of their mandates, why aren’t new ones appointed in their place? The question is what method was used to elect the MP: if they were elected through the party list, then their mandate should be given to the next person on the list. Practice shows that adding MPs from party lists is not a problem. This is what happened in the Voice party. Maksym Khlapuk replaced Rustem Umierov, who was appointed as the Chair of the State Property Fund in 2022. Rustem Umierov now holds the position of the Minister of Defence of Ukraine. (Author) The situation with “majoritarians” is much more complicated. If such MPs lose their mandate, elections must be held in the constituency that lost its representative. The Constitution does not foresee elections during martial law, which is one of the two main technical reasons for the drastic decline in the number of parliamentarians. So, MPs elected by majority vote drag along with them their spot in the Parliament into their political coffin.

Another reason is that sometimes, the party list no longer exists, just as the very party. This is what happened with the OPZZh party. Since its activities are banned in Ukraine, replacing MPs elected by its list is impossible. That is why these two categories of MPs — MPs elected by majority vote and ex-members of the OPZZh party — are in the focus.

How can MPs lose their mandate early? Article 81 of the Constitution of Ukraine outlines several reasons. In practice, most mandate losses over the past year and a half have been formally caused by two things: deprivation of Ukrainian citizenship and personal application. The reasons for mandate loss by MPs from the risk group since the onset of a full-scale invasion are the following: 11 MPs resigned, 6 MPs lost their citizenship, 1 occupied a government post, and two passed away.

MPs left their seats in the Rada earlier because of several main reasons. ALI calculated how many deputies could find themselves in the same conditions at this moment.

Risk No. 1 – affiliation with pro-Russian political forces (-33).

The banned OPZZh party cannot be ignored. Members of this party are under special scrutiny. There was more than one draft law initiated during martial law, which aimed to terminate the powers of MPs from this faction. However, all of them were dismissed as “unconstitutional”. In the interim, the ranks of the former OPZZh party are dwindling despite the absence of specific decisions from above. For instance, Tetiana Plachkova gave up her mandate allegedly due to health issues, and in some cases, MPs are losing their mandates due to the procedure of deprivation of citizenship. Consequently, these MPs are at particular risk, and the potential Rada of the Future may be smaller by 33 parliamentarians if all former members of the OPZZh party lose their mandates.

Risk No. 2 – transition to management positions in the AFU (-1).

Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces Mykhailo Zabrodskyi decided to concentrate on working with the General Staff more than six months ago and resigned. There is one MP among the majoritarians who is fighting, Lieutenant Colonel Serhii Rudyk from the For the Future group. He may concentrate more on military affairs as a result of further promotion. Therefore, the number of MPs can decrease by one more MP.

Risk No. 3 – guilty verdict taking effect (-15).

The entry into force of a guilty verdict may be one of the reasons for the mandate loss. Based on the information available in the public domain, we calculated MPs against whom criminal cases had been initiated in recent years, as well as MPs against whom a pre-trial investigation had been initiated. We have identified a total of 15 parliamentarians among majoritarians, excluding MPs from the OPZZh party.

ALI repeatedly filed inquiries to the Prosecutor General’s Office to seek official data on the number of MPs who had been charged in criminal proceedings. Regrettably, the provision of information was denied. Therefore, this data is collected from public sources.

Risk No. 4 – termination of Ukrainian citizenship.

In the ideal scenario, obtaining a second citizenship should also serve as a sufficient prerequisite for the mandate’s revocation. However, as demonstrated by experience, this particular card is only played when it is convenient. The stories of Vadym Rabinovych and Ihor Vasylkovskyi serve as noteworthy illustrations. Nonetheless, we did not include this particular category in our analysis as it is exceedingly challenging to obtain such information from open sources, and the Rada does not accord it much attention.

* MP Anton Yatsenko’s press office told us and gave us relevant paperwork proving that three criminal cases against him had been closed as of 23 October 2023. This information is available in open sources. This is why his name was removed from the infographics.

Considering all these risks, it may be assumed who is the next MP to leave. Vadym Stolar gathered full house. He was part of the called Monaco Battalion and has had several criminal proceedings on record. The SSU visited his residence with searches; he was part of the OPZZh party. Furthermore, there were rumours earlier that he would give up his mandate.

After the introduction of martial law, the demand for purging the Parliament of traitors and corrupt officials increased. However, their replacement is sometimes impossible. Considering all the risks mentioned, the current minimum permissible number of MPs is 354. However, there may be unexpected criminal proceedings and changes in the Government at any time. Why is this dangerous?

The threshold number of votes that the Rada needs for adequate performance of its duties is dependent on several criteria. These are 1) 226 votes to adopt laws, 2) 300 votes to make amendments to the Constitution, and 3) 338 votes for impeachment of the President. It is likely that the IX convocation will not drop to these figures, and the parliament will still be able to continue its work.

Even though problems cannot be avoided, as Oleksandr Kornienko, the First Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, said, “This is the first Rada where 10% of MP are missing, and it is also important to understand that this affects committees comprised of not so many people. The situation with the quorum there is worse now.” Hence, it is certain that the capacity of the parliament to make decisions will diminish, and with the reduction in the number of MPs, this issue will become more evident.

This story also has another dimension. The fate of not only individual MPs holds significant importance but also that of the political forces to which they belong. A faction or group in the parliament requires at least 17 MPs. The composition of the three groups of MPs is equal to this minimum, namely “Ukraine’s Restoration,” “For the Future,” and “Trust.” But if you break down “risky” MPs by factions, you may see that all four MP groups in the Rada may cease to exist.

In such a scenario, the arrangement of MP groups may undergo modifications. If the “risky MP” are eliminated, a total of 33 MPs will remain from former members of these political forces, which is nearly sufficient to establish two additional groups. The parliament will still have 20 non-factional MPs who can be used as additional persons to cover a possible shortage.

Another risk that the Parliament is exposed to is the loss of the mono-majority. In response to loud scandals surrounding coalition members, the Servant of the People party simply excludes them from the ranks of the faction. This is what happened to Anatolii Hunko and Bohdan Torokhtii in August. Notably, Davyd Arahamiia, in his comment on Torokhtii’s exclusion, stated that “there have been attempts to manipulate the situation to further diminish our faction.” Hence, the risk of critical reduction of the mono-majority, if not complete disintegration, is already anticipated by the head of the faction. At present, the ruling faction consists of a total of 235 MPs; however, if we were to subtract six representatives, which we have mentioned, the total number would be reduced to only 229. Specifically, four additional scandals will separate the Servant of the People from the need to form a coalition by consolidating with another faction or exploring alternative methods to expand the faction, such as recruiting non-partisan MPs or returning the former ones.

The constant decrease in the number of MPs most resembles the zugzwang, which is a situation on a chessboard where each subsequent move only makes the situation worse. Society expects a swift response to any scandal involving elected officials. If no response is forthcoming, the perpetrator will continue to enjoy privileges that may not be due to them. But if they lose the mandate, the problem of (not) recruiting votes will become increasingly obvious. Perhaps the delay with the deprivation of the mandates of MPs from the long-banned OPZZh party is related to the reluctance to lose the capacity of the Rada. After all, they subsequently became a convenient lever in the hands of the authorities, sincerely fulfilling their role as pawns.

When Nestor Shufrych, (still) MP, was accused of treason and subsequently lost the position as Chair of the Committee on Freedom of Speech, the matter arose within the parliament once again: what should be done with the committee, which was hardly distinguished by law-making activities throughout the entire IX convocation, and where only three deputies remained? Should it be liquidated? Or, reorganised and merged with another committee? Or, perhaps, it should stay as is?

Let’s review different political outcomes for the committee.

During this time, only three draft laws were elaborated by the Committee on Freedom of Speech. Of them, all were assigned after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. That is, it has the lowest workload of all the committees of the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation. Its quantitative composition also appears reasonable – only three MPs, the smallest number among the other committees.

According to the transcripts, during the first four meetings of the committee in 2022 (i.e., all of the meetings before the full-scale invasion), each time one of the issues raised was the “illegal” restrictions on the media of pro-Russian politicians, “NASH” and “Ukraine Public News,” (owned by Muraiev and Medvedchuk, respectively) In fact, primarily due to Shufrych being the chair of this committee, it morphed into a mouthpiece for pro-Russian forces, which were able to express once again their remorse for the “persecutions” that had been afflicted upon them.

Looking back, the situation during the eighth convocation is completely different. At that time, the committee was known as the Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy and worked much more actively. The number of elaborated laws was much higher – 109. The committee’s composition was also distinct; at the commencement of the eighth convocation, it consisted of a total of 10 MPs.

Why was there such a drastic weakening of the committee? The issue is associated with modifications made at the start of the ninth convocation. The Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy (a similar committee was called the Committee on Culture and Spirituality in the eighth convocation) was given a broader scope of competence. This happened because of two other committees: the Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy and the Committee on Family, Youth, Sports, and Tourism.

The Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy has the most members, just as the highest number of elaborated laws – 186.

The reason for the redistribution of the committee’s scope of competence could be a purely political decision. Chairing committees has always been a subject of political agreements.

Consequently, during the ninth convocation, OPZZh, an apparently pro-Russian party, received the second-largest faction in the Rada. This faction also possesses a means of exerting influence, as they have also submitted applications for positions in committees. The reluctance to give such an important political resource as the chairmanship of committees to the most toxic faction makes it seem logical to redistribute the scope of competence and give the weaker committee to the OPZZh as part of the general desire of the Servant of the People party to concentrate as much influence as possible in its hands.

The current Committee on Youth and Sports suffered the same fate. No wonder that it is chaired by the MP from the minority faction – “Batkivshchyna.” The complete picture becomes apparent when one considers who was appointed as the Chair of the Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy in 2019. And this is Oleksandr Tkachenko, a man from the ranks of the Servant of the People party who will later become the Minister of Culture and Information Policy.

It is important to improve the balance between committees and ministries. Such reorganisation of the scope of expertise resulted in the emergence of a further issue pertaining to the control mechanism. As previously stated by the Agency, the distribution in the form of “one ministry – one committee” is the best approach for ensuring the highest level of quality performance of the oversight function. In this particular instance, it is evident to each ministry which committee to communicate with and to which to report. The decision to divide the committee duties, however, has led to a dispersion of its oversight function – the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy now has to be accountable to a certain extent to four committees. This has a detrimental impact on both the Ministry’s performance (as the burden increases and coordination deteriorates) and the efficacy of committee oversight.

We now find ourselves at the cross roads: what should we do with such a committee? There are several options. There were suggestions to liquidate the committee altogether or to merge it with another committee. Despite the assertions of opposition figures that this would be a “victory of censorship,” such “censorship” may not extend beyond mere assertions. The Committee on Freedom of Speech now has such a limited scope of powers that its nullification will have little impact on the actual situation. But this does not mean that the Committee on Freedom of Speech should be put out of commission.

Another option is to give the chairmanship to one of the other opposition factions. Each faction deserves to chair at least one of the committees, as we already estimated at the beginning of the ninth convocation using the D’Hondt method. There is only one faction that does not have this privilege, and that is the Voice faction. Nonetheless, such a modification will not address the primary issue, as the Committee on Freedom of Speech will continue to be constrained in its workload. Three laws were elaborated during the entire ninth convocation, which is a telling indicator.

Another way to address the problem is to go back to the scope of competence that was distributed during the eighth convocation. However, there is one caveat: Servant of the People party currently does not preside over three of the 23 committees. Two of them got fewer powers than in the previous convocation. So, will there be a political will to balance the capacity of various committees? This could have a negative impact on the coalition in power.

The first month of the full-scale invasion is a unique period in the history of the Ukrainian parliamentary system. At that particular moment, representatives of the ruling elite were in immediate danger, and the Verkhovna Rada, as a place housing MPs, was one of the primary targets for destruction.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian parliament kept working despite all odds. MPs needed to amend the legislation immediately to fit the conditions of a full-scale invasion, and they did so in a very short time and under the threat of shelling and operations of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. However, given the rapid alterations in circumstances, what was the degree of stability of laws enacted during this period?

We have analysed all laws adopted in March 2022. The absolute majority of them were amending other laws. So, we reviewed all laws and codes that had been amended.

According to our estimates, after 18 months following March 2022, most amendments were modified again. This means that MPs once again tried to re-write what had been changed just before that. Such laws can be called unstable.

One of the reasons includes continuously changing circumstances. When enemy tanks are within a few kilometres from the capital, changes are needed here and now. This is what the Rada was doing: settling the situation in a very stressful environment. Subsequent developments at the frontline and in the international arena forced parliamentarians to amend newly adopted laws again and again. The general instability also affected the instability of legislation.

In peacetime, however, a slightly different paradigm exists: constant amendments to the legislation, especially during a relatively short time since its adoption, mean that the quality of the law is not very high. Amendments to it may be compared to patching old clothing that no longer fits by any parameters.

In March 2022, laws were developed and enacted with utmost speed, and hence, errors were unavoidable. The frequency of amendments to the regulations may be related to the low quality.

It is hard to tell what was the actual reason in each specific case. Since there are sufficient resources and information available, the Cabinet of Ministers is the only body that may speak with certainty of the quality and clarity of any draft law. Although sometimes, everything is obvious.

For instance, the Main Scientific and Expert Administration saw a violation of laws in draft law No. 7118 already after its registration due to the introduced possibility of forwarding cases investigated by NABU to another pre-trial investigation body. After all, it is for a reason that NABU has a special status. But the draft law was adopted without recommendations being taken into account. Therefore, a month later they were to be introduced by means of a separate law.

And it is sometimes apparent that laws were adopted with great speed during this period. It is especially noticeable in the laws elaborated with obviously superficial mistakes. For instance, draft law No. 7185 was adopted on 24 March 2022. This law was supposed to amend the law “On Baby Food,” which had been invalid for almost six months at the time.

Draft law 7151 is similar. It was intended to change the words that do not exist in the law! It seems like this paragraph will stay in the law forever as a recollection of March 2022, when two days passed between the law’s registration and adoption.

“{Amendments to part one of Article 18 adopted by Law of Ukraine No. 2121-IX of 15 March 2022 are infeasible (the words that need replacement are missing)}”

Of the 51 laws that were adopted in March 2022, only 17 remained unchanged. It is noteworthy that we do not consider ratifications and resolutions, which are regarded as crucial pillars of stability in the unstable framework of Ukrainian legislation (as they are hardly ever amended). One ratification was found among March laws. Two additional laws remain unsigned and are still sitting on the shelves of the President’s Office.

The norms of 68% of the laws have undergone changes, while a third of them remain in the version of March 2022. A comparison will help us figure out whether it is many or not.

Let’s review similar periods – March 2021 and March 2023. In March 2021, 27 laws were adopted (and another 15 ratifications and resolutions). Of them, only five were subsequently amended. More than 80% of unchanged laws is a striking difference compared to the results shown by MPs a year later.

The situation in March 2023 is interesting. During this time, MPs adopted 17 laws and another 13 resolutions. Out of these 17 laws, 24% – almost a quarter – were later amended. This figure is higher than two years before. However, considering that less than six months have elapsed, the current situation is beginning to resemble the one in March 2022.

The temporary nature of the laws enacted in the initial month of the full-scale invasion is apparent. This is not surprising, as the unstable nature of the legislation is directly linked to the broader instability that engulfed the country, resulting from the full-scale invasion. During this time, laws were drafted and passed with haste, which caused problems with technical and legal aspects.

Simultaneously, the need to “keep the finger on the pulse” compelled legislators to repeatedly revisit previously enacted laws with amendments. Currently, despite the global situation appearing to be more stable compared to the disastrous March 2022, the legislative process has not fully recovered, and amendments to the adopted laws are being made more frequently than before the full-scale invasion.

The law is the foundation and framework for regulations, particularly in the context of the general uncertainty of war. Indeed, during times of war, it is imperative to swiftly respond to the circumstances, including through modifications in legislation. But if Ukrainian legislators keep changing the same lines several times within a short period, this once again indicates that the legislative structure is unstable and that Ukrainian legislators are short-sighted. The tumultuous processes of state functioning increasingly resemble a game of Jenga, where players alternate removing blocks from the base of a tower and putting them on top, resulting in a tower becoming taller and less stable.

On September 15, 2023, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) held a training event for parliament and government representatives to discuss problematic issues arising while developing and processing draft laws. This event is prepared within the framework of the “Civil Society for Ukraine’s Post-War Reconstruction and EU Readiness” project financed by the European Union.

Context. The legislative process is a living organism that constantly needs improvement. A legislative impact assessment is one of the tools for this which can be used right now. This practice is rightfully considered an effective tool for improving draft laws, particularly during expert-analytical review.

During the event, the participants discussed existing gaps and challenges in the process of developing draft laws and ways to solve these problems.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyy, director of the analytical direction of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, moderated the discussion. He spoke about the advantages of the legislative impact assessment methodology:

Tetiana Lukeria, the author of the Manual on the preparation of legislative impact assessments, spoke about the international experience of using this tool and the nuances that must be considered when adapting the tool to Ukrainian needs:

Mykhailo Teplyuk, Deputy Head of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – head of the Main Legal Department of the VRU, emphasized the need to rethink the approach to evaluating the effectiveness of draft laws:

Oleh Voitovych, Deputy State Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, noted that the development of quality laws requires the cooperation of the parliament and the government: