Svitlana Matviienko, Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, took part in the press conference “Risks of the poll during the elections”. During the event, experts from NGOs (Center for Political and Legal Reforms, OPORA Civic Network, IFES Ukraine, Reanimation Package of Reforms – RPR) discussed the feasibility and legality of conducting a “nationwide poll”, and in fact – a referendum on election day.

The position of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives is clear, in contrast to the authorities’ actions – without a clear legal basis, written procedures, and awareness of the consequences, Ukraine citizens should not participate in the survey. Svitlana Matviienko explained why:

“The nationwide poll announced by the president is, in fact, a consultative referendum. We call this the formation of a voter’s deceptive involvement in the processes that are taking place. An analysis of the procedures for conducting this poll and the format of the president’s communication gives an understanding of why all this is being done.

The poll is conducted to ensure that voters come to the polls and support the trend of “closeness of the politician to the people”. This will be one of the most difficult elections in the history of Ukraine. Instead of educating voters and protecting citizens in elections, the authorities form a “simple dialogue with citizens.”

I’m worried about money. We have not yet heard at what cost the survey will be conducted. Any experts understand that the classic sociological survey will be much cheaper, more adequate and relevant, and, most importantly – reliable and legitimate. For our part, we urge citizens of Ukraine not to take part in these polls because there is no legal basis for this, much less a wise reason to be further endangered during a pandemic”.

On October 25, 2020, local elections will be held in Ukraine. Many experts consider this election to be one of the most difficult in Ukraine’s history:

• a new electoral system.
• many multi-member constituencies.
• optional voting for candidates on the list.
• funding problems.
• Russian pressure to cancel the election.
• a coronavirus pandemic with weekly record updates.

In addition, it is proposed to conduct a nationwide poll on election day.

Despite one of the basic principles of public policy – predictability, the details of this survey were unknown from the beginning. The questions that citizens are asked to answer were voiced by the President in video appeals, and still (a week before the election and the announced poll) have no formalization.

Although there were statements that the poll would be private (i.e., funded by an “unknown oligarch”), it was announced by the President of Ukraine. Moreover, in September, one of the leaders of the parliamentary majority – Oleksandr Korniienko – registered a bill on public opinion polls (Draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Central Election Commission” on Public Opinion Polls Number, registration date: 4043 dated 03.09.2020). The bill proposes to give the CEC the authority to conduct (according to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers) public opinion polls on the day of voting in local elections. The bill was never passed before the local elections, and Volodymyr Zelensky announced a “nationwide poll” without any legal grounds.

As the constitution of a democratic state, Ukraine’s Constitution establishes that “the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine is the people“. The question arises as to the significance of the opinion of the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power. If the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power supports or does not support a certain issue, it is logical to conclude that the people’s representatives – public authorities – must act following the people’s will, namely – to support or not support a decision. Only the expression of the will of the people to support or not support a certain issue is called not a “public opinion poll” but a “referendum”. And the legitimacy of the results of such expression of the will of the people through a referendum is ensured by predictable, transparent, and understandable for all procedures.

Sociological agencies conduct public opinion polls. The public opinion poll results do not have the status of expressing the will of the people. They do not have to be fulfilled. Public opinion polls do not establish the opinion of every citizen of Ukraine: about 2-3 thousand respondents express the opinion. There is a methodology for conducting opinion polls, which determines and declares a certain level of error as to how correctly a sample of 2-3 thousand respondents conveys all Ukrainians’ opinion. No one has a monopoly on conducting surveys – if you want and have the resources, you can create your sociological agency and conduct surveys on any topic. The poll does not claim to establish the will of the people and has no legal consequences. Unlike a poll, a referendum (which obliges the authorities to respond to the results in one way or another) can only be organized and conducted by the state. It is funded transparently through special funds or budget funds. It aims to reflect the opinion of as many citizens as possible (as a rule, there should also be a certain required level of voter turnout). It involves not a few thousand but millions of citizens.

The “public opinion poll”, as proposed by the bill, will be conducted by the state monopoly. If it is planned to be held on election day, millions of citizens will be asked instead of 3,000. And all this is presented not as a referendum, but as a poll!

Besides, the President assured the citizens that the will of the people expressed during the poll will be fulfilled.

But we emphasize: first, there are no legal grounds for conducting the survey; secondly, the President, by the Constitution, has no authority to announce any “poll”.

At this point, it is worth pausing and congratulating all readers who have read this paragraph. After all, the number of words from the beginning of this article to this paragraph already exceeds the number of words in the draft law introduced by Oleksandr Korniienko.

The procedure for conducting a poll, which by all indications is a referendum, is almost not regulated at the legislative level. The level of turnout, the issue of mandatory participation in the “survey”, its legal consequences, the procedure for counting the results of the “survey”, protection against falsification of results, protection against manipulative issues, the procedure of campaigning, etc. The bill does not regulate all this.

The CEC should establish the procedure for conducting such a “poll” and its organization (according to the draft law). However, public opinion polls are not within the competence of the CEC. Logically, the CEC organizes the referendum, but the procedure for holding a referendum (according to the Constitution) is established exclusively by laws, not by CEC resolutions. The draft Law on Democracy through an all-Ukrainian referendum adopted in the first reading, although it has shortcomings, will still comprehensively regulate the issue of holding a referendum.

Both public opinion polls and referendums can be forms of consultation with citizens. However, the form of this consultation must be coherent. Public opinion polls should be representative: consider the distribution of citizens by gender, age, place of residence, etc. If proper distribution (representativeness) is not ensured, the results of such consultation will be skewed. The referendum must be held according to prescribed procedures; otherwise, its results will also be distorted.

Citizens of Ukraine are already familiar with the distorted referendums, which were not conducted according to the proper procedure (or rather the procedure did not exist at all, because as of 2014, the Law “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums” was no longer in force) and were not representative. “Referendums” in Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk are good examples of neglect of procedures. And this is a danger to the democratic system. In addition to the pseudo-referendums mentioned above, there are many examples of usurpation of power through a referendum. In such cases, the referendum created an additional channel of legitimacy, allowing a strong figure, usually the president, to bypass parliament or other constitutional bodies and usurp power.

The draft law on public opinion polls proposes polls, which in essence and features are a referendum. Still, it brings the order of its organization into the sphere of bylaws – CEC resolutions. Polls that will claim the will of the people, to which Ukraine’s leaders will refer to making the most important decisions, will not be regulated by law. This opens up a huge space for distorting the will. The Electoral Code of Ukraine has 289 articles to protect the electoral process from distortions and manipulations. The draft Law “On Democracy through an All-Ukrainian Referendum” has 131 articles and occupies 157 pages to protect the referendum process from distortions and manipulations. The rhetorical question is why the draft law on public opinion polls is two pages long and has less than 400 words? Maybe not from, but for manipulation?

At least the questions announced by Volodymyr Zelensky seem manipulative.

Legislation in some countries explicitly prohibits the referendum on issues related to justice. However, we have the question №1:

“Do you support the idea of ​​life imprisonment for corruption on a particularly large scale?“

This question is formulated as if non-support of this type of punishment means supporting corruption on a particularly large scale, leading to an affirmative answer.

This is even though the system of anti-corruption bodies is still not working properly. So far, the accusations supported by the court and, accordingly, the sentences for top corrupt officials have yet to be sought. If the existing system of anti-corruption bodies, which has been built for a long time, cannot ensure the implementation of the current legislation, it is difficult to imagine that increasing the level of punishment will somehow correct this situation.

The peculiarities of the free economic zone’s legal status, which is proposed to be created on Donbas’ territory in question №2, are unclear.

Citizens can only guess whether this economic zone will be “a cat in a bag” or “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”, because the phrase “free economic zone” does not have any specific meaning. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of free economic zones in the world. It is not clear which of them citizens are invited to choose.

The Verkhovna Rada has previously approved the bill on reducing the number of MPs to 300. It is unclear why the President wanted to consult with citizens right now by asking question №3, and not before initiating consideration of this bill.

Although there is a nuance: the Constitutional Court of Ukraine issued an opinion with reservations on this bill. This means that, following the Rules of Procedure, the Verkhovna Rada had to finalize the draft amendments to the Constitution and re-initiate its consideration in the CCU. However, the parliamentary majority did not do so, deciding to ignore the reservations of the CCU, which were purely technical and legal, aimed at preventing inconsistencies between the various articles of the Constitution. In this context, bringing this issue up for a “referendum” looks like an attempt by the President (and his majority in parliament) to legitimize his actions on the bill (again, contrary to the position of the CCU and the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada). Such a populist flirtation with the “people’s expression of will” on, in fact, not a very simple issue, which puts law and procedure on one scale and the will of citizens on another, is alarming in its resemblance to authoritarian regimes.

Questions №4 and №5 are double.

The fourth question can be asked as follows – “Do you support the legalization of cannabis for medical purposes?” and “Do you support pain relief in critically ill patients?” The manipulation is that by supporting pain reduction, we automatically endorse the legalization of cannabis.

The fifth question can also be divided into two: “Do you support Ukraine’s right to use the security guarantees set out in the Budapest Memorandum?” and “Do you support the restoration of Ukraine’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity?” And a person who does not support the memorandum, at the same time, does not support our territorial integrity. The memorandum’s legal force, which has not been ratified by the signatory countries and did not contain any levers of influence or mechanisms to force the signatory countries to adhere to the memorandum, also raises questions.

The level of manipulation of questions in the informal public poll raises significant concerns about the manipulation of public opinion in the case of the adoption of Bill 4043 of 03.09.2020 or in the case of attempts to conduct such a poll without any legal grounds.

In general, the motives for initiating such a poll can be twofold: 1) to somehow revive the ratings of the “Sluga narodu” party and mobilize the turnout of its electorate in local elections, and 2) to legitimize dangerous steps for Ukrainian sovereignty in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

On Thursday, July 30, Svitlana Matviienko, Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, took part in presenting the results of the expert survey “Political Quarter: Summer 2020” conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation.

During the event, the speakers discussed the main trends of the political process in Ukraine. Svitlana Matviienko spoke about the observation of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives regarding the work of the parliament and the president. We publish in full the speech of the Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

“There are some positive trends. However, not without a “BUT”. In the first half of the year, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of registered draft laws. That is, the amount of what Pete Cox’s Roadmap calls legislative spam or “legislative tsunami” has decreased. A total of 1,178 draft laws were registered during the 1-2 sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation. Accordingly, the number of registered draft laws decreased by almost a third compared to the same calendar period of the VIII convocation.

During the third session, 13% fewer draft laws were registered than during the first two sessions. Given that during the first two sessions of the IX convocation, almost a third fewer draft laws were registered than during the same period of the VIII convocation. It is tempting to talk about some dynamics of reducing the flow of draft laws. However, it is noteworthy that, along with the decrease in the number of parliamentary draft laws over the past six months, the number of registered government and presidential draft laws has also decreased. And such a synchronous decrease can rather be explained by a long socio-political lockdown during the strict quarantine.

Another positive trend. The share of draft laws adopted in the second reading has increased. In the first and second sessions, this share reached 74% compared to 38% for the same period in the VIII convocation. However, the trend was unstable, and in the third session, their share fell to 49%. We hope that this is due to the peculiarities of the work of the Verkhovna Rada during quarantine restrictions.

Along with this, consideration of draft laws started to take longer. Why is this good? Because the laws passed in the first reading and in general – almost guaranteed – will be of lower quality in terms of legal technique or will not consider all stakeholders’ positions. As a result, it will affect their implementation and effectiveness. Passing almost 75% of the approved draft laws through 2 readings (we don’t mention the third one) is at least a precaution against making people laugh (or rather resent) in a hurry.

As for the turbo mode, which is still popular to mention among the majority. Six months ago, it was already obvious to us and all those who monitor the parliament’s work that this mode is not so “turbo”. As they say: everything is known by comparison. During the first two sessions (read six months) in the ninth convocation, 155 laws, or 13% of registered resent were adopted. In the VIII convocation for the same calendar period, 140 laws, or 9% of the registered ones, were adopted. At the same time, we must remember that the majority began to pass laws (including on amendments to the Constitution) on the first day, immediately after the opening ceremony, and taking the oath. While the MPs of the VIII convocation spent at least the first month on negotiations, working out a coalition agreement and forming the government. So, forget about the turbo.

We did not compare the 3rd session of the ninth convocation with the same period of the VIII session, because this would be irrelevant given the extraordinary circumstances in the form of strict quarantine. The parliament lost two working months.

During the first two sessions, it was noticed that the percentage of adopted laws, the subject of the legislative initiative of which is the government (17% vs. 35% in the VIII convocation) decreased. This trend may indicate a weakening of the role of government in shaping public policies. It also harms the principle of unity of decision-making.

During the 3rd session, the share of the accepted governmental projects is insignificant. Only 7 government draft laws were passed. Is this because the government has a weak position in policy-making, completely subordinate to the President’s Office? Or is it because the government does not see a need to be an independent player, instructing MPs to register the necessary draft laws? Both possible explanations are disappointing. There is a clear distortion of the constitutionally established system of checks and balances against the concentration of powers in one power entity in Ukraine. However, the tendency to weaken the government in the decision-making system is contrary to global trends.

Volodymyr Zelensky, of the last four presidents, registered the largest number of draft laws in his first year – 76 (or 4% of all registered this year). His predecessors exercised the right of legislative initiative, respectively: 48 times – Poroshenko, 39 – Yanukovych, 50 – Yushchenko. The relative share of legislative initiatives of other presidents was not more than 2%. At the same time, the rate of adopted presidential draft laws during Zelensky’s first year of a presidency is twice lower – 38% – compared to previous presidents, where the share of adopted laws ranged from 76% to 82%. This situation is rather strange because the president had his “mono-majority” in parliament for the most calendar year, which became a unique situation in Ukrainian history. Given the frequent personnel changes during the year, as well as the results of a study by the Sociological Group “Rating”, this situation may indicate the active use of the model “good President – bad MPs / officials”, which in turn, leads to a positive image only of the president. Although it no longer helps. Another explanation may be that the “Sluga narodu” party was formed virtually and from people who were not connected with politics in any way before the election. After a while, this affected the weak factional discipline and led to multiple divisions.

According to Article 94 of Ukraine’s Constitution, the president must within 15 days sign the law adopted by the Verkhovna Rada or return it with his proposals. The average rate (median) of signing bills by Zelensky was 9 days, which is the fastest rate among Ukrainian presidents. For the rest of the presidents, this figure was 15 days. However, some of the laws were signed in violation of the 15-day deadline. Thus, Zelensky signed 13% of all adopted laws in violation of the deadline (for other presidents, the figure ranged from 8% to 17%). And while for many, such a violation may seem insignificant, it is still a direct violation of the Constitution, which may be grounds for declaring laws unconstitutional. It is also worth mentioning the situation with three draft laws that Volodymyr Zelensky “inherited” from Petro Poroshenko: №0975, №0976, №0977. These draft laws were neither signed nor vetoed by the new president for much more than 15 days, which directly violated the Constitution. Zelensky dragged on time until the new parliament was elected to prevent these laws from being passed”.

You can read more about the work of the parliament and the president of Ukraine in the other articles of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The effective functioning of any public authority is impossible without establishing an effective system of control over the implementation of its decisions because the very “effectiveness of any decision depends on control”. For example, the parliament is responsible for the supervision of the activities of the executive branch. And soon the Verkhovna Rada may get more tools for this. In May, MPs registered the draft law №3499, which provides the introduction of the newest form of parliamentary control for Ukraine – interpellation.

This is another form of parliamentary control, which is used to discuss the executive branch’s activities. In general, it can be described as follows: members of parliament have the right to invite government representatives to parliament so that government officials or one particular official can explain their policies, specific documents, or actions. Members of parliament can ask questions to government officials or debate the results of a speech by a member of the government. Sometimes, as a result of such debates, parliament can express a vote of no confidence.

An interpellation is a new form of parliamentary control for Ukraine, which was previously exercised only through parliamentary inquiries and an hour of questions to the government. The procedure of the current Rules of Procedure closest to the interpellation is the procedure of considering the answer to the MP’s request, which is established by Art. 226, but still, the interpellation procedure provides a more specific impact of the parliament on the government’s activities.

In particular, Art. 226 also stipulates that the executive branch members may be summoned to parliament (to discuss a response to an MP’s request). But we will consider the differences:

The procedure of discussing an MP’s request requires twice as many MPs to initiate it, the decision of at least 226 MPs to appoint it, lasts 4 times less and has no clear legal consequences. However, it can apply to any official, not just members of the government.

Considering the interpellation in the Verkhovna Rada’s plenary hall can take about two hours. It includes speeches by the MPs who initiated the interpellation and the “respondent” minister. After that, the discussion takes place in the format of questions and answers. The Prime Minister can also speak.

Based on the discussion results, the Verkhovna Rada may request some additional documents – then, a new date for consideration of the interpellation is set. If there are no additional issues, after discussions, the parliament votes to declare the work of a member of the Cabinet unsatisfactory. If less than 226 MPs voted in favor, then the work of this member of the government is considered satisfactory – and he/she receives “immunity” from interpellation for three months.

Suppose the work of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers is considered unsatisfactory. In that case, the Prime Minister must submit a motion to dismiss such a member of the Cabinet of Ministers within 15 days, or the Verkhovna Rada itself considers the issue of his dismissal.

We emphasize that the interpellation alone cannot lead to the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet. His/her work can only be considered unsatisfactory, and then a new consideration of dismissal of a member of the Cabinet and a new vote on this issue. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect at least 226 votes for the minister’s dismissal once again, after the interpellation vote.

The idea of ​​introducing a law on interpellation is valuable. However, it is alarming that the MPs are trying to introduce an interpellation by a separate law, not through changes to the Rules of Procedure. Thus, there may be a problem of compatibility of this law with the Rules of Procedure.

And here are the likely political consequences of the adoption of this draft law:

• First, the adoption of the draft law could lead to increased parliamentary control over the executive branch. MPs’ inquiries are mostly non-public, and the hour of questions to the government is very vague, as MPs ask different questions on different topics to different ministers, while ministers mostly answer something like “did not know about this situation, we will get to it soon” or say general facts. The interpellation should focus the discussion on a specific list of issues, and this will be the subject of public attention. Finally, the interpellation consideration may result in the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers.
• Secondly, the factions will receive a new instrument of politics implementation, part of the criticism of the government will be carried out in the form of interpellations.
• Third, there will be a strengthening of the ruling majority, which appoints the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, as it is the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, who receives the authority to moderate the interpellation process and may refuse to consider it.
• Fourth, suppose the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada strictly adheres to the Rules of Procedure and the Law on Interpellation and accepts the interpellation initiated by the opposition. In that case, a large part of the plenary time will probably be devoted to the consideration of interpellations.

From the very beginning of the election campaign, Volodymyr Zelensky positioned himself as a “non-systemic” candidate, and while already in office, at least in the media discourse, he tried to maintain such an image. However, the president is not only a media actor but also a subject of legislative initiative and a critical element of the system of power, the system of checks and balances. The president has his powers, clearly defined by the Constitution. He exercises these powers to a large extent, not independently, but in cooperation with the Government and the Parliament. Did the president manage to become “different from the old politicians” in terms of interaction with other subjects of the legislative initiative in the first year? The answer to this question can be given by the analysis of the legislative activity of Volodymyr Zelensky in comparison with his predecessors.

It is necessary to right away make a remark about the correctness of the analysis of the calendar year of the president’s work, as the head of state exercises his powers in cooperation with the parliament. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelensky received “his” Parliament and Government not immediately, but only at the end of August 2019. It should be reminded here that Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic. The key role in Ukraine, according to the Constitution, is played by the parliament. It “determines the principles of domestic and foreign policy” (paragraph 5 of Article 85) and forms the government, which, in turn, ensures “the implementation of the domestic and foreign policy of the state, the implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine” (paragraph 1 of Article 116). That is, the President of Ukraine, as a “guarantor of state sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, observance of the Constitution of Ukraine, human and civil rights and freedoms,” exercises his powers regardless of the presence or absence of “his” Parliament and Government. Besides, previous presidents have started their first year from diverse positions. Therefore, in our opinion, it is quite relevant to analyze the results of the work of the president’s calendar year, as well as to compare them with the “predecessors”.

The relationship between the president and the parliament can be discussed in different areas. The most interesting dimension, of course, is the degree of the president’s influence on parliament, but often such considerations are based on facts that are difficult to verify. Instead, we tried to analyze the president’s participation in the legislative process, based on formal indicators, and compare the indicators with previous presidents: with Petro Poroshenko, Viktor Yanukovych, and Viktor Yushchenko.

Zelensky, of the last four presidents, registered the largest number of bills in his first year – 76 (or 4% of all registered this year). His predecessors exercised the right of legislative initiative, respectively: 48 times – Poroshenko, 39 – Yanukovych, 50 – Yushchenko. The relative share of legislative initiatives of other presidents was not more than 2%. At the same time, the rate of adopted presidential bills of Zelensky is twice lower – 38% – compared to the previous presidents, where the share of adopted ranged from 76% to 82%. This situation looks rather strange because the president had his “mono-majority” in parliament for most of the calendar year, which became a unique situation in Ukrainian history. Given the frequent personnel changes during the year, as well as the results of the survey of the Sociological Group “Rating”, this situation may indicate the active use of the model “good President – bad MPs/officials”, which leads to a positive image of the president. Another explanation may be that the party “Servant of the People” was formed virtually and from people who were not connected in any way before the election. This, after a while, affected the weak factional discipline and led to multiple divisions.

Zelensky used his veto only 12 times in the first year. And this is the lowest number among the four presidents. It is logical given the presence of support in the parliament, which previous presidents could not boast of in the first year of their work. It may also indicate a significant influence of the president on the legislative branch and the lack of polarization of views on legislative activity in the party (at least during the first months of work). Given the possible split in the “majority”, it is likely that in the coming years, the president will use his veto more actively. For comparison, during the first year of his presidency, Poroshenko used his veto power 16 times, Yanukovych 30 times, and Yushchenko 58 times (!). Interestingly, the tactics of vetoing by presidents are quite different. Thus, Yushchenko and Poroshenko periodically vetoed bills two or more times.

According to Article 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the president must sign the bill adopted by the Verkhovna Rada within 15 days or return it with his proposals. The average rate (median) of signing bills by Zelensky was 9 days, which is the fastest rate among presidents. For the rest of the presidents, this number is 15 days. However, some of the bills were signed in violation of the 15-day deadline. Thus, Zelensky signed 13% of all adopted laws in violation of the deadline (for other presidents, the figure ranged from 8% to 17%). And while for many such a violation may seem insignificant, it is still a direct violation of the Constitution, which may be grounds for declaring laws unconstitutional. It is also worth mentioning about the situation with three bills that Volodymyr Zelensky inherited from Petro Poroshenko: №0975, №0976, №0977. These bills were neither signed nor vetoed by the new president for much more than 15 days. Zelensky dragged on time until the new parliament was elected to prevent these laws from being passed.

Another illustrative aspect of the president’s work is how often and under which conditions the government changed. Apart from the prime ministers appointed before the presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky, as of the first year, has the same figures as Viktor Yushchenko (2 newly appointed prime ministers). Zelensky resembles not only Yushchenko but also Kravchuk and Kuchma in the pace of change of heads of government. They all replaced the current prime minister with a new one on 9-11 months of their presidencies.

Analyzing the activities of Ukrainian presidents, we cannot ignore the fact that every president of the independent Ukraine tried to change the Constitution. Volodymyr Zelensky is no exception.

The first President of Ukraine is Leonid Kravchuk. For Kravchuk, the change of the Constitution of the USSR to the Constitution of Ukraine seemed logical and natural: a new state – a new Constitution. Leonid Kravchuk started working on the new Constitution before his presidency when he was the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The Constitutional Commission was established. The Concept of the new Constitution was developed. However, the turbulent events of the early 1990s prevented the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the 12th convocation, which was later renamed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 1st convocation, from adopting the Basic Law.

Leonid Kuchma continued the constitutional process, and finally, in 1996, the Constitution was adopted. However, Leonid Kuchma did not limit himself to adopting the Constitution alone. At the end of his first term, he began talking about the need to revise the Constitution, and in 2000 held an all-Ukrainian referendum on reducing the number of MPs to 300 and introducing a bicameral parliament (remember how much this initiative was used in the last election race?). However, the results of the referendum were not embodied in the amendments to the Constitution. And in 2002, against the background of a possible election loss, Leonid Kuchma initiated another reform aimed at strengthening the Verkhovna Rada by reducing the powers of the president and moving to a parliamentary-presidential model. A temporary special commission was set up, and at the end of Leonid Kuchma’s term in 2004, the relevant amendments to the Constitution were adopted.

Viktor Yushchenko took office just after the 2004 constitutional reform (which gradually came into force during 2005-2006), so, unlike his two predecessors, he did not initiate constitutional changes in the first year of his presidency. However, without constitutional changes, Viktor Yushchenko could not hold out. In 2007, the National Constitutional Council was established, headed by the president himself. Maryna Stavniychuk became its secretary. However, Yushchenko did not have enough support in the Verkhovna Rada, so he wanted to amend the Constitution through a referendum, but failed to do so. In 2009, a draft amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. This project, among other things, provided for a bicameral parliament and an increase in the powers of the president. In the end, without the support of the Verkhovna Rada, Viktor Yushchenko could not make any changes to the Constitution.

Viktor Yanukovych has decided not to waste his first year of presidency within the constitutional powers in force at the time, which he inherited from his predecessors. Therefore, at the hands of his fellow party members in parliament, he appealed to the Constitutional Court regarding the illegality of the constitutional changes of 2004. In the fall of 2010, the CCU (the Constitutional Court of Ukraine) declared these changes unconstitutional. At the end of the first year of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych made his first changes to the Constitution, again using the help of the Party of Regions faction in parliament. Among the significant changes, in particular, the president managed to increase the term of office of the Verkhovna Rada and local councils from 4 to 5 years.

After that, on February 21, 2011, Viktor Yanukovych formed the Constitutional Assembly. The Head of the Assembly was Leonid Kravchuk, and the secretary was Marina Stavniychuk. The Constitutional Assembly was to work out amendments to the Constitution regarding the powers of government and local self-government. The next amendments to the Constitution were the expansion of the powers of the Accounting Chamber, which was allowed to control revenues to the state budget.

The events of late 2013 – early 2014 led to the termination of the Constitutional Assembly. That is, the Constitutional Assembly had no results in the form of comprehensive amendments to the Basic Law.

After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity on February 21, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada restored the 2004 version of the Constitution.

Petro Poroshenko also did not hesitate to amend the Constitution. Already in June 2014, he submitted a draft law amending the Constitution (on the powers of public authorities and local self-government), but he withdrew it. And in March 2015 (in the 10th month of the presidency), he set up a Constitutional Commission. This commission was to work out amendments to the Constitution in three areas:

1. Decentralization.
2. Justice.
3. Rights and freedoms of man and citizen.

The first results of the work of the Constitutional Commission appeared in the summer of 2015. At that time, amendments were proposed to the Constitution regarding the decentralization of power (draft law № 2217a). There were intentions to change the entire vertical of power at the local level and introduce a new administrative-territorial system. However, the bill was withdrawn after the presidency passed from Poroshenko to Zelensky.

The changes proposed by Petro Poroshenko in the field of justice proved to be more productive. As a result, the following was approved:

• The High Council of Justice elects judges.
• Instead of a 5-year term, judges are elected indefinitely.
• Neither the President nor the Verkhovna Rada can dismiss judges.
• A constitutional complaint mechanism has been introduced.
• Only lawyers can defend citizens in court.

At the end of his presidential term, Petro Poroshenko initiated two more amendments to the Constitution – consolidating the course of Ukraine’s integration with NATO and the EU.

The second draft of amendments to the Constitution (draft law № 9310 on renaming the Dnipropetrovsk region, actually initiated by a group of MPs) did not receive the necessary support in the hall and was withdrawn from consideration.

Volodymyr Zelensky has not yet set up commissions or assemblies. Still, in the first year of his presidency, he has already initiated eight draft amendments to the Constitution and made changes to the Constitution initiated by his predecessor.

Petro Poroshenko introduced the bill on the abolition of parliamentary immunity, but it was considered and adopted under Volodymyr Zelensky.

Zelensky’s legislative initiatives have not yet been implemented. Some are now under consideration, and some have already been rejected. Namely – it is:

1. Amendments to the abolition of the lawyer’s monopoly (draft law № 1013), according to which citizens can represent themselves in courts, except for representation in criminal cases. The bill is pending.
2. Changes in regulatory bodies (draft law № 1014), under which the president will be able to form new regulatory bodies, appoint and dismiss the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the State Bureau of Investigations chairpersons. The bill was rejected.
3. Amendments to the legislative initiative of the people (draft law № 1015), according to which the people are given the right of legislative initiative. The bill is pending.
4. Amendments to the Commissioners of the Verkhovna Rada (draft law № 1016), which introduce the position of the Commissioners of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine and regulations in certain areas. The bill received a negative opinion of the Constitutional Court. It is pending.
5. Amendments to reduce the number of MPs and implement the proportional electoral system (draft law № 1017), which reduces the number of MPs to 300, and the Constitution establishes a proportional electoral system. The bill is awaiting consideration, although it has received an opinion from the Constitutional Court with reservations.
6. Changes to expand the grounds for deprivation of an MP’s mandate (draft law № 1027), according to which it is proposed to take away an MP’s mandate in case of impersonal voting or absence of an MP for more than a third of sittings. The bill received a negative opinion of the Constitutional Court, pending.
7. Amendments to additional bodies of the Verkhovna Rada (draft law № 1028), according to which the Verkhovna Rada receives the right to establish advisory and consultative bodies. The bill received a positive opinion of the Constitutional Court, pending.
8. Changes in the decentralization of power (draft law № 2598), which introduces a new structure of local government and a new administrative-territorial system. The bill was withdrawn.

Thus, in the first year of his presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky submitted the most bills on amendments to the Constitution among all Presidents of Ukraine. But it is important to note that the draft amendments submitted by Volodymyr Zelensky are particular, although some of them have repeatedly been positioned, for example, as a “parliamentary” reform.

Also, unlike his predecessors, Zelensky, at least so far, has not created bodies or open and inclusive platforms for drafting amendments to the Constitution. Legislative initiatives of the sixth President of Ukraine can be summarized as follows:

• Among all the draft laws, only the draft law that was being developed during the time of Petro Poroshenko’s presidency was adopted.
• three draft amendments to the Constitution have already received the conclusions of the CCU. They have been preliminarily approved (although the draft amendments № 1017 received the opinion of the CCU with reservations).
• one draft amendment received the conclusions of the Constitutional Court with reservations and has not yet been considered.
• three draft amendments received negative conclusions of the Constitutional Court and, therefore, cannot be adopted.
• one draft amendment was withdrawn without being considered.

In a film about the year of his presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky said: ministers will be changed until they find the perfect government. His words are confirmed by actions – in less than a year of new power, the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers has changed almost entirely (except “one of the most efficient officials”).

On the one hand, the president is right in saying, why should there bad ministers in government? Logically, such people need to be replaced. But to whom? And is there a vision of “ideal government”?

Alternation of power is one of the fundamental principles of democracy. But the fact is that frequent and unjustified rotation of officials can indicate a one-time policy and, as a result, instability in the country. It is important to understand that politics is a process. It is a “long game”. It requires a strategic vision of where to go, an understanding of how to get there, and action. Good government is not where good ministers work, but where good public policies are implemented.

When the members of the coalition of a European democratic country are negotiating the composition of the government, the subject of the negotiations is not the distribution of “flows”, not the invention of new posts, so that they will suffice for all the “right” persons. Government portfolios are divided by parties to implement the policies that voters voted for – health policy, education policy, agricultural policy, etc.

In a situation where the government is formed through the prism of state policy rather than the personalities of ministers, the issue of frequent change of ministers is not relevant. Ministers are people who have passed the party selection, there is a party consensus on them, and therefore there is no need to change them.

In Ukraine reigns a personal principle. Leadership-type parties, instead of programs, are built around a “wise” leader. Accordingly, the government is also formed not based on a particular set of State policies but based on personal considerations. It includes people who are personally loyal to the leader (or his surroundings). When personal loyalty decreases, a change of government occurs.

Stable government = predictable policies = prerequisites for economic growth. Of course, it is not a question of retaining ministers in their posts. But frequent government renewal is a bad sign, for example, for investors. This indirectly indicates that politics in Ukraine is unpredictable, and decisions are one-time. Such an approach is incompatible with long-term planning (and plans to build a new factory is a long-term plan).

Continuous and unclear changes – including personnel – are an indication that there is no strategy. Only “patching of holes” as a reaction to what is happening occurs. This means that development for the country under such an algorithm of actions will not take place. There will be temporary “patches”.

And it’s not just people in government. Strategy, vision is absent everywhere. So it’s too early to be proud. Roads, hospital buildings, and new kindergartens are victories not at the level of the president’s responsibility and authority.

The removal of parliamentary immunity is also a questionable success. In Ukraine, both the rule of law (72 place out of 128 countries) and the independence of the three branches of government are in question. There are, therefore, risks of using law enforcement and judicial systems to prosecute the opposition.

The new Minister of Health has announced the prospect of restoring the State Sanitary and Epidemiological Service (SES). This step may seem logical and justified because each problem is supposed to have its government agency due to the spread of coronavirus and the panic around it. But this is not entirely true. Problems pass – institutions remain, and it is much harder to liquidate a state body than to create one. Besides, there is currently no exact list of functions that the new SES will perform.

Agency for Legislative Initiatives presented the results of the analysis of the scope and distribution of responsibilities for the implementation of gender equality policy.

Svitlana Matvienko, the Chairwoman of the Council of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, began the presentation.

Dmytro Kuleba, the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, has attended the event. He said that the new government will continue to implement gender equality policies in Ukraine initiated by the previous government.

Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, currently the Chairwoman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Integration of Ukraine into the European Union, and in 2016-2019 the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration in Ukraine, said that to achieve gender equality there is still much work to be done in Ukraine.

“In spite of all the regulations and changes to the legislation that we have been able to adopt in recent years, there is still a lot of work to be done in order to say that our country ensures equality, makes it impossible to discriminate on the basis of sex and display sexism at the public level”, – said Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze.

She also noted that it is necessary to work with the regions so that the national mechanism could ensure equal rights for men and women.

“Our society is full of stereotypes. All of us have seen the rush that has caused the introduction of feminitives in the Ukrainian language. It means that in society it is necessary to explain what equality is and why it is important”, – the politician emphasized.

The Head of the UN Office for Women in Ukraine, Anastasia Divinskaya, agreed with Ivana Klimpush-Tsintsadze. She noted that according to the Beijing Platform for Action, a national mechanism can only succeed if it is part of the government. But it must also be implemented at all levels of the country. It is important to engage with civil society organizations.

“The national mechanism should be able to influence all policies developed by the state so that all laws inevitably have a positive result equal for men and women, boys and girls living in this country”, – Ms. Divinska summed up.

Andriy Vyshnevsky, a lawyer and public administration expert, emphasized that Agency had submitted a draft report that needs further public discussion. He described the methodology of the study, which took place in three stages.

“The main conclusion is that we have a gender mechanism and it is sufficiently developed. But that does not mean that there is nothing to improve. There are a lot of serious problems”, – said Andrey Vyshnevsky.

Finally, Olena Kondratyuk, the Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, took the word. She said that the implementation of gender equality policies requires a coordinated work of government, public and legislative sectors.

You can watch the full presentation here.

Agency for Legislative Initiatives presented the results of the functional analysis of the scope and distribution of responsibilities for the implementation of gender equality policy.

The study was presented by:

• Svitlana Matvienko, the Chairwoman of the Council of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives;
• Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze, currently the Chairwoman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Integration of Ukraine into the European Union, and in 2016-2019 the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration in Ukraine;
• Anastasia Divinskaya, the Head of the UN Office for Women in Ukraine;
• Andriy Vyshnevsky, a lawyer and public administration expert;
• Dmytro Kuleba, the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.

In its study, Agency for Legislative Initiatives analyzed the world experience of building gender mechanisms at the state level and compared the practices of other countries with Ukrainian realities. Agency also studied in detail how the mechanisms for ensuring gender policy in Ukraine work. The study was conducted in several stages, including an analysis of legislation and a survey of government officials responsible for implementing gender equality policy.

At the end of the study, Agency made several recommendations to improve the organization of the mechanism in Ukraine – more effective implementation of gender policy.

The study was requested by the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine in the framework of the UN Women’s Project “Strengthening Accountability for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in National Reforms, Peace and Security”, which aims to support joint efforts of the government, parliament, women’s groups and civil society organizations in fulfilling state commitments on gender equality and women’s rights in the process of reforming and ensuring peace and security.

The election race in Ukraine is over, but the newly elected MPs and the president have no time to relax. The hardest part is ahead.

During the broadcast on the 5 Channel, the Chairwoman of the Council of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives Svitlana Matvienko has discussed what kind of challenges await the new authorities and how not to lose the achievements of the past and increase them in the future.

According to Svitlana, after the elections, Ukraine is in a situation of fragile stability. Therefore, in order to establish the subjectivity of Ukraine on the international arena, the new authorities must continue to stick to the line they have defended before – that means not to talk about Ukraine without Ukraine and not to hide the truth about the war. The rhetoric with international partners should remain unchanged, no matter what kind of agenda may be beneficial for them.

“Representatives of civil society and journalists should keep an eye on what’s going on. The new government has received a huge package of trust, but it means only one thing – the people in Ukraine have completely transferred the responsibility for everything that is happening in the country to one person,” – Svitlana said.

At the same time, the Chairwoman of the Council stressed that Ukrainians are expecting changes from the new president and the Verkhovna Rada in a short time. Therefore high-ranking officials should be prepared for serious challenges and risks.