Providing social services is an important function of any state. However, during the war, the number of people who need support increases manifold. For instance, during the one and a half years of the war, the number of people with disabilities increased by 300,000, reaching 3 million people in total. Russian aggression against Ukraine has been causing untold losses – both human and material. Ukrainians have had to face destroyed infrastructure, loss of homes, vehicles, jobs, just basic means of subsistence. A huge number of people have left their homes. According to the latest data, there are about 5 million such people. Given that the war is still going on, the number of people in need of aid may continue to grow. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has tried to find out what procedures exist today for providing social services to vulnerable populations and what challenges remain.

Social services, according to the current Law of Ukraine, “On Social Services”, are actions aimed at preventing difficult life circumstances, overcoming such circumstances or minimising their negative consequences for individuals/families who are in them. Difficult life circumstances (DLC) are defined as circumstances that have a negative impact on the life, health and development of an individual or the functioning of a family which they cannot overcome on their own. Such circumstances include loss of job, loss of home or other damage caused by fire, natural disaster, man-made disaster, hostilities, terrorist act, armed conflict, or temporary occupation.

To receive a free social service, a person had to contact the Department of Social Protection of the Population, which was supposed to analyse the needs and refer such a person to the appropriate service provider. As a rule, such providers are Social and Psychological Support Centres, Mother and Child Care Centres, Comprehensive Rehabilitation Centres for Persons with Disabilities, etc. At the same time, the responsibility for assessment, planning and provision of social services, in accordance with the law, rests with local self-government bodies. In addition, according to the Law “On Social Services”, 18 basic social services are to be provided precisely at the community level. It is worth noting that not all citizens had the right to receive social services for free. In order to receive the service for free, among other things, a preliminary analysis was conducted, and various factors were taken into account: income level, presence of family members/relatives, etc.

The social services themselves were provided according to the procedure (case management), which included a number of stages, in particular, the analysis of a person’s application/request for the provision of social services, assessment of a person’s/family’s needs for social services; determination of the average monthly total income of the applicant; making a decision on the provision of social services taking into account the individual needs of the person/family; development of an individual plan (that is, specific steps that should potentially help a person overcome difficult life circumstances); concluding an agreement on the provision of social services. Relevant agencies are given 10 working days to decide on the provision of social services. The procedure changes only in the case of one-time or emergency provision of social services (that is when they are provided immediately, mostly within 24 hours, if there is a threat to the recipient of social services).

After February 24, 2022, it became clear that there was no time to complete all the formal procedures, and the Ministry of Social Policy developed recommendations for organising the provision of social services under martial law conditions as early as March 2022. They involved the streamlining and optimisation of the procedure for providing certain social services. One of the key methodological recommendations for local authorities was to provide social services in an emergency (crisis) manner instead of using the full procedure. This type of service provision allows one to make a decision within 24 hours from the moment of receiving the relevant application, request, notification about the need to provide assistance to a person.

However, to optimise the service provision procedure further, regulatory changes are needed. According to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) of June 1, 2020, “On the Organisation of the Provision of Social Services” and the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy of June 23, 2020 “On the Approval of the Classifier of Social Services”, there were only a small number of services that could be provided on an emergency basis. Therefore, in March last year, they first adopted CMU Resolution No. 294 of March 16, 2022, which amended the Procedure for Providing Social Services to Persons with Disabilities and Elderly Persons Suffering from Mental Disorders. Such social services as inpatient care (creating living conditions; food provision), palliative care (assistance in obtaining pain relief), care at home, supported living (provision of accommodation, development and maintenance of self-care skills and other skills necessary for independent living) can now be provided as emergency assistance. Subsequently, the CMU Resolution No. 560 of 05/07/2022 was adopted, which supplemented the previous amendments to the Procedure. As a result, it was clarified that social services might be provided on an emergency (crisis) basis in the event of a threat to a person’s life or health and during a state of emergency or martial law in Ukraine or some of its localities. In addition, 11 services previously provided on a case-by-case basis have been added to existing emergency services during martial law. In the summer of 2022, the same norms were then included in the CMU Resolution “On the Organisation of the Provision of Social Services” and could already be applied to all persons in difficult life circumstances.

Also, on April 14, 2022, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Social Services”, streamlining some norms to optimise the provision of social services. Namely, it:

• increased the powers of local authorities: they were given the right to determine the specifics of the organisation and provision of social services in the territory of the relevant community in the event of the declaration of a state of emergency or martial law. However, this should not contradict the logic of the law and legal norms.
• social services are provided on an emergency (crisis) basis during the period of martial law;
• all social services are provided free of charge to persons (regardless of their income level) who have been harmed by a fire, natural disaster, man-made disaster, hostilities, terrorist act, armed conflict, or temporary occupation;
• the definition of the aggregate income of citizens for the identification of low-income persons was changed. From that moment, the average monthly aggregate income of citizens is determined, taking into account the most recent quarter and not the most recent six months (as it was before).

Also, in August 2023, the Order of the Ministry of Social Policy, “On Approval of the Procedure for Determining the Needs of the Population of an Administrative-Territorial Unit/Territorial Community for Social Services”, came into force. It sets out the procedure for determining the population’s needs for social services during martial law or state of emergency, as well as in the transition period after its termination. The Procedure considers all the changes that were adopted in the previous regulations.

During the first six months of the war, the demand for social services increased by the factor of 2 to 4 when compared to pre-martial law period. Expenditures of local budgets on the social issues ranged from 3 percent to 13 percent of the total. At the same time, the volume of provided social services does not directly correlate with the volume of social expenditures per capita in a region. This is due to the fact that the majority of social expenditures are directed to wages – from 79 percent to 98 percent of the total. On average, less than 10 percent of social expenditures are directed to the organisation and provision of social services. As noted by the Ministry of Social Policy itself, this calls for the introduction of changes in the policy of developing the system of providing social services.

Today, there are legislative mechanisms that allow to involve representatives of the non-government sector as providers of social services. In particular, it can be done through social service procurement. However, the mere presence of legislative mechanisms does not allow it to be applied to the full extent since the involvement of the non-government sector in the provision of social services is weak. Currently, the synchronisation of the efforts of the government and non-government sectors is aimed, in particular, at the financial support of non-government associations of persons with disabilities who can provide social services at the socialisation and integration of such persons into society. On January 27, 2023, the Cabinet adopted the Resolution “Some Issues of Providing Financial Support to Non-Government Associations of Persons with Disabilities,” which provides an opportunity to direct funds from the state budget to support NGAs, ensure a transparent mechanism for the use of funds and improve the provision of social services to persons with disabilities. The resolution also establishes the requirements and criteria for the participation of non-government associations of persons with disabilities in the competition to determine projects for the implementation of which financial support will be provided.

Changes in the legislation in the field of social services were necessary overall with the onset of a full-scale invasion. Still, the state was mostly unprepared for the challenges of war. This also applies to the system of social services. In addition, there are still problems in the area of legislation implementation. These are:

Unequitable access of citizens to social services. According to research results, in 2022, one social service provider could serve from several thousand people to several hundred thousand depending on the region. This also leads to deterioration of the quality of social services.

Resource shortage. This applies to both human resources and material support (shelter, fleet vehicles, technical equipment). In some communities, this problem existed even before the full-scale war. At the same time, according to research, despite the acute shortage of social workers, there are few such vacancies. This is explained by the so-called phenomenon of “hidden vacancies,” when while there are vacancies in the organisation, information about them is not made public. On the one hand, this may happen in the case of management’s expectations that a person (for example, one who received IDP status) can return to his/her position. On the other hand, this practice may have certain ulterior motives when the management has a desire to employ a relative or acquaintance. Also, the duties of an absent employee can be distributed among other employees (for example, a person can both coordinate the process of social services and provide them directly).

The last phenomenon can also be explained by the problem of low labour compensation. After all, as of today, the average salary of a social worker is approximately UAH 9,000. However, the amount of the salary varies depending on the communities, and can be even lower than UAH 6,000. Considering the social importance of this work and the strenuous effort it requires, low salaries do not encourage people to work in this field.

Low involvement of the non-government sector in the provision of social services. Although the Ministry of Social Policy officially implements the policy of such cooperation, not all communities use the existing mechanisms and opportunities. In Ukraine, most social services are provided by government or municipal organisations and enterprises. Government/municipal enterprises or organisations and their branches currently constitute 77 percent of such providers according to the Register of the Ministry of Social Policy. Meanwhile, non-governmental and charitable organisations make up only 14 percent of all registered social service providers in Ukraine. This problem has a long history because the mechanisms for the involvement of non-government organisations were first provided for in the legislation almost 20 years ago. Therefore, its solution requires active work with both authorities and the non-government sector.

The procedure for determining the need for social services during martial law needs to be revised. After all, according to the procedure, the monthly analysis regarding the provision of social services to persons is carried out only for emergency services. At the same time, data on other services are not updated during martial law. It is important to consider that the number of IDPs who need various social services has increased in the rear area communities, and active migration processes force a systematic accounting of such citizens to determine their actual needs.

This material was prepared with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The material represents the opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the International Renaissance Foundation.

When Nestor Shufrych, (still) MP, was accused of treason and subsequently lost the position as Chair of the Committee on Freedom of Speech, the matter arose within the parliament once again: what should be done with the committee, which was hardly distinguished by law-making activities throughout the entire IX convocation, and where only three deputies remained? Should it be liquidated? Or, reorganised and merged with another committee? Or, perhaps, it should stay as is?

Let’s review different political outcomes for the committee.

During this time, only three draft laws were elaborated by the Committee on Freedom of Speech. Of them, all were assigned after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. That is, it has the lowest workload of all the committees of the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation. Its quantitative composition also appears reasonable – only three MPs, the smallest number among the other committees.

According to the transcripts, during the first four meetings of the committee in 2022 (i.e., all of the meetings before the full-scale invasion), each time one of the issues raised was the “illegal” restrictions on the media of pro-Russian politicians, “NASH” and “Ukraine Public News,” (owned by Muraiev and Medvedchuk, respectively) In fact, primarily due to Shufrych being the chair of this committee, it morphed into a mouthpiece for pro-Russian forces, which were able to express once again their remorse for the “persecutions” that had been afflicted upon them.

Looking back, the situation during the eighth convocation is completely different. At that time, the committee was known as the Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy and worked much more actively. The number of elaborated laws was much higher – 109. The committee’s composition was also distinct; at the commencement of the eighth convocation, it consisted of a total of 10 MPs.

Why was there such a drastic weakening of the committee? The issue is associated with modifications made at the start of the ninth convocation. The Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy (a similar committee was called the Committee on Culture and Spirituality in the eighth convocation) was given a broader scope of competence. This happened because of two other committees: the Committee on Freedom of Speech and Information Policy and the Committee on Family, Youth, Sports, and Tourism.

The Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy has the most members, just as the highest number of elaborated laws – 186.

The reason for the redistribution of the committee’s scope of competence could be a purely political decision. Chairing committees has always been a subject of political agreements.

Consequently, during the ninth convocation, OPZZh, an apparently pro-Russian party, received the second-largest faction in the Rada. This faction also possesses a means of exerting influence, as they have also submitted applications for positions in committees. The reluctance to give such an important political resource as the chairmanship of committees to the most toxic faction makes it seem logical to redistribute the scope of competence and give the weaker committee to the OPZZh as part of the general desire of the Servant of the People party to concentrate as much influence as possible in its hands.

The current Committee on Youth and Sports suffered the same fate. No wonder that it is chaired by the MP from the minority faction – “Batkivshchyna.” The complete picture becomes apparent when one considers who was appointed as the Chair of the Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy in 2019. And this is Oleksandr Tkachenko, a man from the ranks of the Servant of the People party who will later become the Minister of Culture and Information Policy.

It is important to improve the balance between committees and ministries. Such reorganisation of the scope of expertise resulted in the emergence of a further issue pertaining to the control mechanism. As previously stated by the Agency, the distribution in the form of “one ministry – one committee” is the best approach for ensuring the highest level of quality performance of the oversight function. In this particular instance, it is evident to each ministry which committee to communicate with and to which to report. The decision to divide the committee duties, however, has led to a dispersion of its oversight function – the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy now has to be accountable to a certain extent to four committees. This has a detrimental impact on both the Ministry’s performance (as the burden increases and coordination deteriorates) and the efficacy of committee oversight.

We now find ourselves at the cross roads: what should we do with such a committee? There are several options. There were suggestions to liquidate the committee altogether or to merge it with another committee. Despite the assertions of opposition figures that this would be a “victory of censorship,” such “censorship” may not extend beyond mere assertions. The Committee on Freedom of Speech now has such a limited scope of powers that its nullification will have little impact on the actual situation. But this does not mean that the Committee on Freedom of Speech should be put out of commission.

Another option is to give the chairmanship to one of the other opposition factions. Each faction deserves to chair at least one of the committees, as we already estimated at the beginning of the ninth convocation using the D’Hondt method. There is only one faction that does not have this privilege, and that is the Voice faction. Nonetheless, such a modification will not address the primary issue, as the Committee on Freedom of Speech will continue to be constrained in its workload. Three laws were elaborated during the entire ninth convocation, which is a telling indicator.

Another way to address the problem is to go back to the scope of competence that was distributed during the eighth convocation. However, there is one caveat: Servant of the People party currently does not preside over three of the 23 committees. Two of them got fewer powers than in the previous convocation. So, will there be a political will to balance the capacity of various committees? This could have a negative impact on the coalition in power.

The military aggression of the Russian Federation, which began in 2014 and expanded in 2022, has caused catastrophic consequences for Ukraine, such as human casualties, large-scale destruction, temporary occupation of part of the territory, mass migration, etc.

According to experts, as of June 2023, since the beginning of the full-scale Russian military invasion, the total amount of direct documented damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure is estimated at $150.5 billion (at replacement cost). The largest share of the total direct losses is the loss of housing stock — $55.9 billion, including approximately $1 billion in losses from flooding and destruction of residential buildings as a result of the hydroelectric power station explosion. The most damaged housing stock was found in the cities of Mariupol, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sievierodonetsk, Rubizhne, Bakhmut, Maryinka, Lysychansk, Popasna, Izyum and Volnovakha. For example, according to preliminary estimates, 90% of the housing stock in Sievierodonetsk was damaged, while cities such as Bakhmut and Maryinka have almost no buildings left intact. Business asset losses are estimated at $11.4 billion and are still growing. Education is also one of the most affected sectors, with direct documented losses from the destruction of educational institutions amounting to $9.7 billion. In total, almost 3,400 educational institutions have been damaged as a result of the hostilities1.

In addition to the destruction of infrastructure, the war has led to mass migration of Ukrainians. According to the UN, the number of refugees from Ukraine registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in Europe reached 5 million 8.34 thousand as of August 2023. Part of the territory of Ukraine is still under temporary occupation. According to the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, as of August 2023, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson regions are still temporarily occupied by Russia.

The purpose of the study is to summarise the recovery needs of the de-occupied communities and to develop recommendations for state authorities and local self-government bodies on how to organise the recovery process in the context of the ongoing war. To achieve this goal, on the one hand, the state policies on the restoration of territories (2014-2023) were analysed. Possible shortcomings of previous practices and legal gaps can be considered in the development of current policies and the implementation of modern approaches to the restoration of de-occupied communities. However, it is important to note that after Russia’s full-scale invasion, the level of damage is higher, and the demographic situation is more critical. On the other hand, interviews were conducted with representatives of the authorities (state and local), experts and civil society organisations (from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). To understand the context of the study and interpret the results, it is necessary to make a categorical clarification. In our study, the term “restoration of territorial communities” is the most commonly used. We use the term “recovery policy” to describe the recovery system as a policy measure.

The report consists of several parts. The first section, “Overview of the State Policy on Recovery and Reintegration 2014-2021”, analyses the peculiarities of the coordination processes of recovery, as well as the content of the legal acts adopted during 2014-2021, i.e. before the full-scale Russian invasion. The second section, “Analysis of the practices of restoring the de-occupied territories in 2014-2021”, contains information on how the restoration policy measures were implemented in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the problems faced by local authorities in the process of restoring the territories. The third section, “Overview of the State Policy on the Recovery of Ukrainian Communities after the Full-scale Invasion”, provides information on the existing regulations and a brief overview thereof. The fourth section, “Practices of Recovering De-occupied Communities after a Full-Scale Invasion”, provides information on the processes of recovery of de-occupied communities in Ukraine and the challenges they face. 

This study was conducted within the framework of the EU-funded project “Civil Society for Ukraine›s Post-War Recovery and EU Readiness”.

The findings of this report are the exclusive responsibility of the NGO “Agency for Legislative Initiatives» and do not necessarily represent the position of the European Union.

The text was prepared for “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” (Mirror of the Week newspaper)

The end of 2022 was remembered, among other things, for adopting the scandalous draft law No. 5655, which its critics were easy to call “urban rape reform”. Mass media wrote that it expanded developers’ capabilities, removing almost all responsibility from them while opening up new opportunities for corruption. The prospect of adoption made the public flare up: criticism was heard seemingly from everywhere: the Ministry of Culture, the Association of Ukrainian Cities, the National Union of Architects and many other public organizations, and even the NAPC came out categorically against the weakening of transparency in the field of construction.

Law draft No. 5655 gathered only 228 votes in its favour, with just three MPs providing the majority. A day before the vote, registered was a petition demanding to veto the draft law, which accumulated the required number of signatures in a few days. But time elapsed, and neither the veto nor the signature appeared on the document. All deadlines have passed, and No. 5655 still hangs in “legislative purgatory” as if the scandalous draft law had never existed. Yet thanks to that, another problem popped out, and it had been eroding the Ukrainian constitutional norms for years. What is happening, and how can it be addressed? We suggest you figure that out.

Article 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine defines —“The President of Ukraine, within fifteen days after receiving the law, shall sign it, taking for pursuance, and officially promulgate it or shall return the law with his/her motivated and formulated proposals to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for reconsideration”.

And what if the President won’t do this? The same article states — “If the President of Ukraine does not return the law for reconsideration within the prescribed period, the law is considered to have been approved by the President of Ukraine and must be signed and officially promulgated”. In theory, we have a fairly complete picture of the adoption of draft laws. Regretfully, only in theory.

In practice, everything is a little more complicated. The thing is that the said norm does not provide a clear understanding of who must sign such a draft law if the “15 days of the President” have expired. On the one hand, this can be construed as meaning that the President him/herself must sign and promulgate the law (albeit in violation of the 15-day deadline). On the other hand, the very next paragraph prescribes a rule if the President vetoes the approved draft law and the Parliament overrides the veto with a constitutional majority of 300 votes or more: “If the President of Ukraine has not signed such a law, it shall be officially promulgated by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine immediately and shall be published with his/her signature”. Article 94 is contained in the very section of the Constitution dealing with the Verkhovna Rada.

All this gives reasons to believe that the draft law, which has not been signed by the president, must be signed by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. One way or another, in the second case — when the veto is overcome (paragraph 4 of Article 94) —the directly approved entity is in place to take the last step for publishing the document. Whereas in the first case — when the draft law simply lies unsigned (paragraph 3 of Article 94) — there is no clear understanding of who exactly must sign the draft law that the President has not signed. This is what creates the most problems.

As history shows, it’s very simple: firstly, some Presidents allowed themselves to disregard the 15-day limit, and the fact of violation of the deadline has become a common phenomenon since Kuchma’s era. Subsequently, his successors used this increasingly more often: as of 26 June 2018, three dozen draft laws had been pending then-President Petro Poroshenko’s signature for more than a month. Gradually, lateness turned into nearly a habit — in the first two years of his term, Poroshenko, on average, vetoed the draft laws on the 19th day, thus violating the provisions of the Constitution.

Another very interesting thing happened during Petro Poroshenko’s tenure, the likes of which had not been recorded since the adoption of the Constitution — for the first time ever, a draft law was not signed as a matter of principle (the tenures for both the eighth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada and the fifth President have already expired). The draft law is still on the shelf at the Presidential Office. This refers to the infamous draft law No. 5553, which became a precedent for the abuse of the imprecision in the Constitution. It was aimed at reassuring the depositors of the newly nationalized Privatbank. At the same time, this document contradicted obligations to the IMF, possibly because the President did not turn to the draft law.

But the most crucial thing in this story is something else: never before had Article 94 been tested for strength so directly. It looks like this can be used in the future. This is exactly what is happening now: as of 10 April 2023, 25 unsigned draft laws sit and collect dust at the Presidential Office, with some of them waiting for their fate to be decided for years. For example, the draft Law On Amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine No. 2661 of 20 December 2019 was submitted to the President for signature on 21 January 2020, i.e., more than three years have passed.

Specific trends in “very nearly laws” appear to be rather vague. However, even the existing picture, drawn with broad strokes, seems fanciful. Of the total number of “forgotten” documents, two were submitted as drafts by President Zelenskyi himself and three more — by Prime Minister Shmyhal. The case becomes even stranger considering that the initiators of another 18 draft laws included members of the pro-presidential parliamentary faction, Servant of the People. That is, out of the 25 ignored draft laws, 23 — the absolute majority, 92% (!) — were submitted by members of the ruling coalition or by “Zelenskyi’s people” (including himself, no matter how ironic this sounds).

Other data reveal a greater depth of the overall picture: 13 out of the 25 analysed draft laws were adopted by more than 300 votes — that is, the complete consolidation of the Parliament can be mentioned in their case. And when the President does not sign such draft laws, what we have is a “silent veto”, as it is called, which can’t be overcome. 52% of the draft laws already have a constitutional majority, so the subsequent evolution of the case can be imagined as follows: the President vetoes, and the Verkhovna Rada would have to overrule (of course, if he were to have the political will and once again collect 300 votes for such initiatives). Instead, the “silent veto” — ignoring a draft law submitted for signature — cannot be overcome at the moment.

So, three trends are distinguished here:

The head of state, time and time again, takes advantage of the shortcomings of the Constitution to reject even those draft laws that were adopted by the constitutional majority (as of 10 April — 52% of such cases).

Most of the unsigned law drafts come from the pro-presidential faction, which indicates weak communication between the President and his party and calls into question the very existence of the single-party majority.

The reasons behind the decisions not to sign are unclear: government officials initiate most draft laws, and only the President himself can say why he did not sign them.

A non-solid attitude towards statutory prescriptions that regulate the course of law-making is characteristic of the work not only of the President but also of the Parliament. In the Verkhovna Rada, violations during the adoption of draft laws have already become a common practice. Increasingly, legislators perceive the Rules of Procedures not as a set of rules but as a list of completely optional recommendations. After the full-scale invasion, two out of three laws passed have some sort of procedural flaw, and in 2021, Ruslan Stefanchuk noted that “in this Verkhovna Rada… not a single law of Ukraine was adopted in full accordance with the Rules of Procedures of the Verkhovna Rada”. In light of this, the library of unsigned draft laws at the Presidential Office no longer seems to be something incredible.

What is the President’s motivation for ignoring certain bills? Several hypotheses can be put forward:

1. Some part of the draft laws, especially those adopted by the Verkhovna Rada at the beginning of martial law, has simply lost their relevance. An example is draft law No. 7153. Like some other law drafts, it was voted on at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, when circumstances constantly changed. After the liberation of a large part of the north of Ukraine, many problems that the draft law was supposed to solve have lost their relevance. Therefore, the draft law’s obsolescence may be one reason for not signing it.
2. The case of draft law No. 5655 On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Reforming the Field of Urban Development is illustrative. It received a lot of criticism, including from the Union of Architects and civil society. Even more: the European Parliament directly stated that adopting this draft law is an obstacle to the EU. Yet it was supported by the majority of votes in the Verkhovna Rada, so the President should have signed or vetoed the law. Still, vociferous fallout seems to have done its job, so the guarantor of the Ukrainian Constitution is not ready to sign it. Then why not use the right to veto? Here comes the time for speculation: conflict of interest? Reluctance to push back lobbyists? In each case, vetoing or signing is a loud message to the concerned groups. It is less provocative to leave the document until better times.

What are the ways to change the current situation? Solving this problem is a complex issue. The thing is that the said imprecision in the Constitution becomes obvious to the public only after the news about another unsigned draft law. This happened both with draft law No. 2689 On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine regarding the Implementation of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law in 2021 and, more recently, with the scandalous draft law No. 5655. Every now and then, a small piece of the Constitution gives rise to scandals, rallies and heated discussions, and each time only the President is accused of not wanting to do something with a given draft law. With time and further regular law violations, the systematic problem of the disproportionate power of the head of state may come to the fore. Yet, at present, it is possible to observe a reaction to just piecemeal symptoms but not to the source of the disease.

The lack of a diagnosis as such is the worst part of the whole situation. Should he wish to do so, the President may stop the work of the entire state machinery by simply not letting anything whatsoever reach Holos Ukrayiny (Voice of Ukraine, an official herald). In retrospect, it can be seen how the head of state abuses this imprecision of the Constitution increasingly more, turning a blind eye to an inconvenient draft law at the right moment. No one can control this, as there is no system of checks and balances in this regard. This is the most alarming red flag of all those noted earlier.

But in addition to the public, there is another group of people for whom the status quo is not beneficial. These are MPs themselves. Ultimately, it is they that suffer most from such arbitrariness of the President. The entire outcome of their work can be crossed out by being ignored — and what if the most important draft law of the opposition party or even the coalition itself is sent to purgatory in the Presidential Office?

Maybe the Constitutional Court has a solution? It repeatedly issued interpretations of Article 94 of the Constitution — in 1997, 1998, and 2008. But there is no answer to the question of what to do when the President does not sign laws. Instead, its decisions concernув the method of calculating days (15 calendar or working days), the peculiarities of submitting proposals and imposing vetoes, signing laws adopted in referendums and the entry into force of the Constitution. Naturally, even under martial law, a group of MPs can turn to the Constitutional Court and ask it to explain the provisions of the Basic Law. However, the court may refuse to address this issue. For example, in 2008, concerning another problem, the court noted that “the procedure for signing and promulgating laws adopted by an all-Ukrainian referendum is not regulated in the Constitution of Ukraine. This issue is exclusively for the legislative body and does not belong to the competence of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine”.

It is quite doubtful that the court will construe Article 94 so that it is the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada who must sign draft laws not signed by the President. After all, such norms are not written directly and clearly. Should the court interpret insufficient regulation so that the President him/herself must sign draft laws that have not been signed before, the verdict will not change the situation: the President is acting this way now. The systemic problem remains the ability of the President to completely block the process of adopting laws that s/he does not like and the inability of the Verkhovna Rada to resolve this situation even if more than 300 MPs wish to do so.

Thus, the most realistic way to solve the problem is to amend the Constitution. This is important, at least for MPs themselves, because their own gains will then be guaranteed. And taking into account the fact that the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada have not been considered as something mandatory for a long time, a comprehensive reform suggests itself. But this should really be the position of the majority — after all, an amendment to the Constitution needs the votes of more than 300 lawmakers.

Still, it must be noted that the Constitution’s changes should be expected after the war, as the Basic Law may not be amended under martial law. This, of course, does not mean that the mentioned reform is not overdue, and public discussions are extremely needed. Although currently, no one from MPs’ chambers articulates the need for specific reforms, there is hope for change, not least thanks to the infamous law draft No. 5655.

The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation has greatly invigorated the debate about granting civilians the right to own firearms freely. Such trends are quite understandable given the need for self-defence, which became especially acute during the war. At the same time, the issue of arms legalisation is an “eternal” topic for Ukrainian society and has been discussed since the Declaration of Independence. However, until now, the problem remains unsolved. Despite the chosen pro-European vector of development, currently, Ukraine remains almost the only country in Europe that still does not have a dedicated arms law. At the same time, avoiding legal regulation creates potential threats of a higher number of illegal arms in the population. How firearms are regulated in other countries and whether there is only one right approach – let’s find it out.

World practice shows that regulating the circulation and ownership of firearms among the civilian population in different states depends on historical conditions, cultural traditions and the legal system. So, countries policies on arms are sometimes drastically different.

In general, two key trends in establishing control over the use of weapons by the civilian population coexist in international practice.

The first of them gravitate towards enhanced legislative regulation of arms possession and use conditions. This national policy is a continuation of the UN position expressed at the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001 when member states of the organisation signed a binding plan to combat small arms. The position of the UN is as follows: the illegal manufacturing and circulation of arms, their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled distribution undermines human security and development. Therefore, the UN has called on states to effectively regulate “civilian” ownership and use of firearms, as this will help curb their illegal trafficking.

At the national level, this trend is associated with the following factors:

• Many governments see a link between gun violence and the uncontrolled or poorly controlled trade in and possession of small arms;
• Firearms in the possession of civilians are often subject to illegal trade and misuse through theft, careless storage or illegal sale.

Within this approach, responsibility for all violations committed by private individuals using firearms rests with the state since it is the national government that is believed to have failed to establish reasonable regulation of private ownership of civilian firearms and also to be unable to protect the population from domestic violence and organised crime.

The second trend is manifested in the attempt to find a reasonable balance between introducing restrictions on the possession of arms and the right to their legal use by civilians. The main goal of governments is to prevent the misuse of arms and improve public safety. However, within this approach, there are also differing positions regarding what restrictions should be applied. For instance, some countries tend to impose strict controls on firearms use, while others use more liberal legislation. Yet no state in the world allows unlimited possession and use of weapons by civilians.

So, to find out the specifics of approaches to regulating the use and circulation of firearms in the civilian population, let’s turn to the practice of individual countries.

Proponents of gun legalisation often appeal to the legal tradition of the United States of America, where as early as in 1791, the Second Amendment to the Constitution was adopted and legalised citizens’ right to keep and bear firearms freely. Still, at the time of the introduction of these constitutional changes, a certain culture of handling small arms already existed in the country. Additionally, the nationwide right of Americans to keep arms at home for self-defence purposes was enshrined in the US Supreme Court rulings of 2008 and 2010. The last high-profile decision of the Supreme Court, handed down in the summer of 2022, also extended the right to carry arms outside one’s home.

However, the right to arms is not absolute in the US — the law prohibits some populations from carrying them (examples are the mentally ill, persons guilty of domestic violence using weapons, etc.). In addition, the country has introduced a number of restrictions on the types of small arms that can be used by the public, as well as bans on carrying guns in certain places, such as government buildings or schools.

However, gun ownership in the United States is still controversial, as the US leads both in the number of suicides and that of gun crimes. Further, this trend has a direct correlation with easy access to firearms for many Americans.

Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, the state faced a significant problem with firearms smuggling due to military conflicts in the region. However, since 2013, when Croatia became a full member of the European Union, the national policy has been regeared to reduce the circulation of illegal arms significantly. Particularly, in 2007, the Croatian government permanently confiscated arms. The trend was also carried on with the 2018 Law on Arms.

The country has successfully implemented an “amnesty program” aimed at combating the high rates of illegal possession of firearms in the civilian population. The primary purpose of this program is to persuade citizens to drop off any illegally held firearms, and reporting them to the police. The experience of implementing similar programs is also possessed by Estonia and Finland.

For a long time, a large number of illegal arms, which remained from the time of the Second World War, could be found within the country. However, according to the latest estimates, the total number of illegal firearms in Estonia is small. Among other things, this is due to the adoption of arms laws in 1991 and 2001. Estonia’s legislation was almost the first in the post-Soviet space to allow civilians to have short-barrelled firearms for self-defence purposes. Unlike most European countries, Estonians can also own semi-automatic arms. But fully automatic ones are reserved exclusively for Kaitseliit, the Estonian Defence League, which is in fact the equivalent of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence.

Nevertheless, the state provides for preventive measures that guarantee the safety of the civilian population when handling arms — requirements for their storage were established, strict skills tests were introduced, and a mandatory weapons register is in place.

At the same time, after joining the European Union in 2004, Estonia enhanced some of the rules for the handling of arms, following EU directives. In particular, this concerns the provisions of the Firearms Directive, which has also been revised several times by the European Commission in order to beef up the fight against the illegal circulation of firearms. This policy was based on the need to apply a more coordinated and coherent approach after the terrorist attacks of 2015. In general, Estonian legislation can be characterised as quite liberal regarding the rules of private gun ownership. This approach contrasts with most other post-Soviet countries, which remain quite restrictive in arms regulation.

The right to own weapons in this state was restored after the collapse of the USSR. In addition, in the summer of 2021, the Czech Parliament adopted a revolutionary decision, thereby approving an amendment to the Constitution allowing self-defence using weapons. This constitutional provision supplemented the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic with the provision that “the right to defend one’s life or the life of another person, even with the help of a weapon, is guaranteed under the conditions established by law.”

The current arms legislation of the Czech Republic is quite liberal. In particular, this country allows buying arms for self-defence purposes, and a loaded weapon may be carried concealed. To that end, it is necessary to obtain a special permit, which is granted after passing an appropriate inspection. This permit is only valid for ten years, and the owner of the weapon is required to undergo a health check every five years to confirm the legality of the reasons for ownership. In addition, unlike many European countries, it is legally allowable to keep a loaded weapon at home if the owner has the appropriate licence.

At the same time, the very fact of the right to have a weapon for self-defence purposes is not identical to the unlimited possibility of its use. A number of restrictions are in effect in the state, so the use of weapons is allowed only in case of extreme necessity.

Swiss legislation has allowed citizens to carry weapons as early as 1997. This country is considered one of the most armed states in Europe and globally. At the same time, Switzerland has a fairly high level of gun culture, as the ownership and use of firearms are closely related to the traditions of state-building and the protection of democracy. Hence any person may openly carry a weapon if there is an appropriate permit for this. The permit is valid for five years. Still, if the Swiss wish to obtain a permit for concealed carry, they should additionally undergo a background check and an arms inspection by the police and also substantiate the reasons for that need.

In response to the European Union’s adoption of firearms directives, the Swiss authorities had to enhance national legislation slightly. The state’s population also endorsed this initiative to introduce stricter arms bans in the 2019 referendum. However, in general, the Swiss arms policy remains fairly liberal.

Thus, international experience proves that there is no uniform approach to the development of arms policy worldwide. At the same time, the trends irrevocably point to one thing — proper legal regulation is a must-have for the effective implementation of a state firearms legalisation strategy. So, the adoption of the relevant law in Ukraine would provide for a significantly lower number of cases of illegal handling of arms and a higher overall level of public safety. Yet the development of a dedicated law must be approached in a balanced manner to ensure the maximum quality of legal regulation and avoid potential risks.

Verkhovna Rada is one of the most important state institutions. It was that before, but during the war, the Verkhovna Rada increased its importance even more. If, on February 24, the members of the Verkhovna Rada had dispersed and had not approved the President’s decrees on the introduction of martial law and general mobilization, had not adapted the legislation, and had not redistributed budget funds. It would have made a compelling and centralized state counteraction to Russian aggression impossible.

Oleksandr Kornienko noted that “The beginning of armed aggression and the introduction of martial law created many challenges in the work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, starting from the danger of holding long meetings of MPs and the difficulty of moving around the territory of Ukraine, ending with the impossibility of using traditional forms of communication […] Despite difficult times, the Parliament continued to be the heart of democracy since the first day of the full-scale invasion. After all, the citizens delegated the MPs the right to make decisions in tough times. And through dialogue between parliamentarians and civil society representatives, this heart beats even stronger in wartime”.

The full-scale invasion, in turn, also affected the MPs and the Verkhovna Rada. A lot of time has passed since February 24, the seventh regular session of the Verkhovna Rada ended, so it is possible to analyze how the full-scale invasion affected the work of the Verkhovna Rada. This analysis can have the following structure:

1. Adaptation of legislation to the conditions of a full-scale war
2. Reducing the influence of pro-russian politicians
3. Security measures of the Verkhovna Rada
4. Unexpected effects of war

Such was the first month of adaptation of the Verkhovna Rada to the war. However, the adaptation continued even after that. Priority needs have changed to more long-term and less urgent draft laws. But there were still many such needs. From February 24 to the end of the 7th session (September 6), adopted 229 laws (data only on laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada as a whole. Resolutions, appeals, vetoed laws and proposals of the President were not taken into account).

The number of laws passed during the 7th session during which martial law fell is a record number of laws passed during one session for the third to ninth convocations (data for the first two convocations are not available in the open data format on which the calculation was based).

If we consider the ninth convocation, half as many laws were adopted during the entire 6th session as during six months of the war; another comparison – 229 laws are more than were adopted during the 3rd and 4th session of the ninth convocation together.

The record number of adopted laws is the result of joint efforts of MPs and employees of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada. Achieving political consensus, expert-analytical processing, and processing of draft laws in committees – all these processes have been significantly accelerated. For example, the time for drafting draft laws in committees, compared to the 6th session, decreased by 12-200 days, depending on the committee. The overall speed of adoption of draft laws, in comparison with the 6th session, has also significantly increased. Half of all draft laws passed in the first reading and, as a whole were passed in less than 8 days. For 80% of such draft laws, the time for adoption decreased by 10-100 days. The time spent processing draft laws between the first reading and adoption in the second reading has also decreased. For 70% of such draft laws, the time was reduced by 30-112 days. For 70% of draft laws adopted in the second reading and as a whole, the time from registration to adoption also decreased by 42-168 days.

Moreover, the number of days required for the draft law’s adoption correlates (there is a moderate positive correlation according to the Spearman method, rho = 0.46, p-value = 2.986e-13) with the number of days that have passed since February 24. In the first days/weeks/months after February 24, draft laws went from registration to adoption faster than later.

Another feature of Verkhovna Rada’s adaptation to martial law was the workload division between committees. If we compare the number of submitted conclusions to draft laws for the 6th session and during the six months of the war, the number of submitted conclusions increased the most:

• Committee on National Security (+ 48 provided conclusions),
• Committee on Finance (+ 39 provided conclusions)
• Committee on Economic Development (+ 36 provided conclusions)

The Committee on Social Policy reduced the number of submitted conclusions the most during the six months of the war (-15 submitted conclusions). In addition, the Committee on Law Enforcement was very busy during the 6th session and martial law. This committee provided 71 conclusions during the six months of the war.

The situation when a large number of laws are considered and adopted in a short time is what I would like to call a “turbo regime.” At least, such a name will suit the work of the Verkhovna Rada during martial law more than the work of the Verkhovna Rada during 1-2 sessions. After all, during the six months of the war, one and a half times more laws were adopted. Some of the terms of the passage of draft laws were shorter than during 1-2 sessions. However, the number of violations of the legislative procedure during 1-2 sessions was more significant than during martial law. During six months of the war, the share of laws that had procedural violations was 41-67% (depending on the type of violation). And during 1-2 sessions, it was 45-83%. The violation of the procedure is, to some extent, a payment for the high speed of passage and a significant number of adopted laws. Oleksandr Kornienko noted that the violations are directly related to martial law: “what is a violation in peacetime is a normal practice for the work of the parliament under martial law”.

Another negative manifestation of adaptation to martial law conditions is unusual parliamentary practices— for example – «matryoshka» laws. “Matryoshkas” can be called laws, the content of which cannot be guessed from the name alone because one word hides several laws, different in Regulation and content. Usually, such laws have one range and focus at the first reading stage. But then amendments are made to them, which add completely new provisions that were not only not considered during the first reading but also belong to a different area of Regulation. This practice is a violation of Part 1 of Art. 116 of the Regulation:

Proposals and amendments to the draft law, prepared for the second reading, can be made only to the text of the draft law (sections, chapters, articles, parts, clauses, subsections, paragraphs, sentences) that the Verkhovna Rada adopted as a basis. As an exception, the main committee may consider the proposals and amendments made regarding corrections, clarifications, and elimination of errors and/or contradictions in the text of the draft law. Other structural parts of the draft law and/or other legislative acts that were not considered in the first reading if the need for their introduction as indicated in the conclusions of this main committee and/or expert division of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada and announced by the chairman of the plenary session during the consideration of such a draft law in the first reading. Such proposals and amendments must correspond to the subject of legal Regulation of the draft law.

For example, we can mention two cases. The first example – the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada was created through the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Peculiarities of Proceedings in Cases of Establishing the Fact of Birth or Death of a Person in Conditions of Martial Law or State of Emergency and in Temporarily Occupied Territories.” Establishing birth or death is quite far from the parliamentary research service. However, these two unrelated issues were merged into one law.

The second example is the Law “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Functioning of the Civil Service and Local Self-Government During the Martial Law.” The version of the first reading, it referred to the distribution of powers between local self-government bodies and military administrations. And at the stage of amendments to the second reading, provisions were added that expanded the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and the President (in particular, based on these new norms, the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights was dismissed). The new provisions added to the second reading not only did not correspond to the subject of legal regulation of the draft law in the wording of the first reading but also violated the Constitution (in fact, they expanded the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and the President).

According to Oleksandr Kornienko, the need to adopt draft laws is also due to the war: “The practice of introducing the draft into the original text before the second reading is not extremely common, but sometimes it is necessary. Such a mechanism saves time for prompt decision-making or in cases where the issue is consensual and does not require additional procedures of passage and discussion. As in the case of the Research Service […] Therefore, in conditions of war or emergency, this practice is acceptable”.

In addition to “matryoshka”, during martial law, the cases when draft laws are revised after voting on the text of this draft law have become much more frequent. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada almost always authorizes amendments to draft laws. It isn’t easy to find a case when a draft law is adopted differently. The essence of the revision mechanism is that MPs need to see the final text of the draft law they are voting on. The final text is determined not by people democratically elected and authorized to adopt laws but by the Apparatus employees. These employees may be more qualified in the issues of normative design and technical and legal nuances of the law-making process, but they need a direct mandate to adopt laws. Experts note that in the first months of the functioning of the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation, the practice of authorizing amendments was necessary to ensure the minimum quality of the adopted laws in conditions of lack of experience and knowledge. However, later its purpose was forgotten, and currently (despite the MPs gaining experience and knowledge of standard design), the revision is used everywhere.

The assessment of the practice of universal refinement is different. Some experts consider this practice extremely negative. The negative evaluation of this practice is based on the position that MPs do not see the final text for which they are voting. This means both spaces for violations and manipulations with the final text and the limitation of the MP’s mandate. Other experts consider this practice acceptable. This position is based on the fact that, in most cases, minor technical and legal editing is carried out, and the essence of the law remains the same. Oleksandr Kornienko adheres to this position: “The procedure itself to a greater extent concerns the legal style of the text and the documentary design of the law, ways of constructing its text, requisites, etc. […] And the prescription “technical and legal refinement” is a tool for improving the legal perfection of the text of a draft law or law”.

The term “pro-russian politicians” is used for MPs who were part of the “Opposition Platform for Life” faction, taking into account the decision of the National Security Council of March 18, 2022, according to which the activities of the party of the same name were suspended due to “anti-Ukrainian political and organizational activities (…) demonstration of manifestations collaborationism (…) dissemination of information about the justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of the armed aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine”.

The main event that testified to the decrease in the influence of pro-Russian politicians was the dissolution of the “Opposition Platform for Life” (OPFL – ex-party of former fugitive president Yanukovuch). As of the beginning of the full-scale invasion, about a quarter of the MPs of this faction left Ukraine, and some turned out to be state traitors. Gradually, some MPs began to leave this faction. On March 20, it became known about the National Security Council’s decision to ban some parties’ activities, including the Opposition Platform for Life faction. However, it did not discuss the faction’s activities.

As of April 14, those MPs who were still part of the Opposition Platform for Life faction reacted to the announcement of the suspension of the faction’s activities. On April 21, they created the parliamentary group “Platform for Life and Peace”. According to Art. 59 of the Regulations, a MP may belong to only one faction or group. Therefore, the entry of these MPs into the Platform for Life and Peace led to the fact that these MPs ceased to be members of the Opposition Platform for Life faction. This, in turn, led to the fact that the number of MPs in the Opposition Platform for Life faction fell below the minimum set level. And by Part 4 of Art. 60 of the Regulations, on May 12, the dissolution of the “Opposition Platform for Life” faction was announced precisely based on a decrease in its numerical composition.

A month later, on May 22, the MP group “Recovery of Ukraine” was created. It included mainly those MPs who left the Opposition Platform for Life faction before April 14.

On May 3, a law was adopted, according to which the suspension of the party’s activity entails the suspension of the faction’s activity, and the banning of the party leads to the dissolution of the faction. This law entered into force on May 18. That is, the dissolution of the Opposition Platform for Life faction is not related to its activities, the National Security Council’s decisions, or the party’s banning. At the same time, the MPs of this faction are not deprived of mandates because there is an exclusive list of constitutional grounds for this, which still need to be satisfied.

MPs who were part of Opposition Platform for Life faction significantly reduced their parliamentary activity. Before the dissolution of the Opposition Platform for Life faction, MPs of this faction initiated only 2 draft laws during the six months of the war; another 4 draft laws were created by MPs from the newly formed group of the Platform for Life and Peace (i.e., former members of the Opposition Platform for Life faction), and another 10 draft laws were initiated by MPs of the “Restoration of Ukraine” group. The groups “Restoration of Ukraine” and Platform for Life and Peace were created mainly by MPs from the disbanded Tthis Platform. For comparison, MPs from the “For the Future” group initiated 9 draft laws, and from the “Trust” group – 4 draft laws. If we compare these indicators with the indicators of the factions, the MPs of the “Fatherland” faction initiated 24 draft laws; all other factions initiated even more draft laws. The MPs who were part of the Opposition Platform for Life faction continued to create draft laws, although less than at the pre-war level.

Nevertheless, draft laws registered by former members of the Opposition Platform for Life faction remain laws. At the same time, all other factions and groups (their MPs) initiated at least one adopted law. As for the draft laws considered in the hall, only one draft law initiated by the MP from “Restoration of Ukraine” was considered in the session hall. Draft laws initiated by MPs from Opposition Platform for Life faction were not considered in the hall.

The decline in the influence of pro-Russian politicians is partly due to their physical absence from Ukraine. Ilya Kyva, a former MP and member of the Opposition Platform for Life faction, left Ukraine before the war and later lost his mandate as an MP. Another part of the MPs left Ukraine and, during the six months of the war, did not return at all or almost did not return. The most famous are Vadym Rabinovych, Vadym Stolar, Hryhorii Surkis, Serhii Lyovochkin, Nataliia Korolevska, Taras Kozak. And Viktor Medvedchuk escaped from custody, then he was found and arrested, and in the end, he was exchanged for Ukrainian prisoners of war. Of the well-known and influential former members of the Opposition Platform for Life faction, only the head of the faction, Yurii Boyko, remained in Ukraine and continued to work in the parliament.

With the invasion’s beginning, the Verkhovna Rada meetings began to be held semi-secret. Meetings are not broadcast live, and the general public needs to be informed about them. The corridors of the Verkhovna Rada are closed to journalists (except representatives of the Rada TV channel). The territory around the Verkhovna Rada is also completed. And the entrance to the “government quarter,” in which the Verkhovna Rada is located, is carried out with special passes.

In the spring, MPs were informed about the meeting 2-3 days in advance to get to Kyiv. Such secrecy is necessary given the danger of rocket attacks on the parliament. In March, the Verkhovna Rada was in the zone of potential impact by russian Multiple rocket launcher, but even after the retreat of the russians from near Kyiv, there is a danger of impact by ballistic or cruise missiles. Despite the threat, MPs held and continue to hold meetings in the building at Hrushevsky 5 St.

For example, 90% of all laws adopted in the first reading were considered in the hall for less than 2 minutes. And if the law passed two readings and both took place after February 24, then for half of such draft laws, consideration took up to 6 minutes.

Moreover, the amount of time spent considering the draft law in the session hall correlates (there is a moderate positive correlation according to the Spearman method, rho = 0.57, p-value = 2.2e-16) with how many days have passed since February 24. In the first days/weeks/months after February 24, draft laws were considered in the session hall more quickly than later.

For the physical safety of the MPs, they had the opportunity to obtain firearms. Firearms were distributed in late February, at the beginning of a full-scale invasion. Then there was information that they wanted to “physically destroy the MPs or force them to vote on the surrender documents.” Representatives of almost all factions and groups took advantage of this opportunity.

Another measure for the security of  MPs was the closure of information about them. On the website of the Verkhovna Rada, information about MPs (personal pages of MPs) still needs to be made available. In addition, from March to April 21, data is only available regarding the votes of MPs, as changes were made to the settings of the Rada-3 voting system.

The Verkhovna Rada also partially secures information on the work of the Conciliation Council and committees. The Conciliation Council is now meeting in a secure session. Some committees have also switched to a closed work mode – they do not publish protocols, transcripts, or meeting information. Most reports were closed by the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Law Enforcement Enforcement. Such measures make it possible to control information about what Verkhovna Rada is planning in the future.

The Constitution of Ukraine grants the right of a legislative initiative to three subjects – the President, the Cabinet of Ministers, and MPs of the Verkhovna Rada. All of them used this right during the war. However, the war unexpectedly changed the distribution of roles between these subjects in the legislative process.

War is an emergency, a crisis, and in times of war and emergencies, power is usually concentrated in the hands of a small circle of people for efficient and prompt decision-making.

The Government reduced the share of registered draft laws to 10%, registering 62 draft laws during the six months of the war (usually, the Government registered about 100 draft laws per session). While MPs of the “Servant of the People” faction initiated almost 62% of draft laws, which is a record share for the entire ninth convocation.

The average time to receive the committee’s opinion on the first reading has more than halved, compared to the 6th session, both for the President and MPs. But the average time for obtaining conclusions for the Government has increased. The situation is similar for the passage of draft laws. The time from registration to the adoption of the draft law, in the second reading and as a whole, for MPs decreased by a third, while for the Government, it remained at almost the same level. At the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Government formally registered the most urgent initiatives through MPs. One of the possible reasons is the formalized and complex procedure for developing and approving the text of the draft law by the Government and the absence of formal requirements for the preparation of parliamentary draft laws.

Many more exciting changes occurred with the legislative role of the President. The President has almost wholly distanced himself from domestic politics. 28 of the 30 adopted presidential laws are ratifications, international agreements, and approving decrees (continuation of mobilization and martial law). The other two laws are relatively symbolic:

1. Amending Article 73 of the Labor Code of Ukraine regarding establishing a holiday – the Day of Ukrainian Statehood – was adopted in the first reading and as a whole.
2. Establishment of legal and social guarantees for citizens of the Republic of Poland who are in the territory of Ukraine – adopted in the second reading and in general.

However, the draft laws of these subjects still need to undergo approval by the President. His busyness can explain changes in the legislative role of the President with other areas of work, and this should not be perceived as necessarily negative. It is possible that martial law demonstrated (by showing in critical conditions) the distribution of spheres of responsibility in power should be based on what principles the distribution of spheres of power should be.

Another unexpected effect of a full-scale war is the depoliticization of parliament. The scale of political life and political discussions (political in the sense of politics) has significantly decreased since February 24, especially in the spring. It gradually began to recover in the summer, but it still had insignificant volumes. But the military actions, closure of meetings, and information about the work of the Verkhovna Rada also significantly reduced political statements and discussions in the parliament itself.

Previously, MPs tried to speak from the podium for any reason, using all available time (15 minutes for the first reading and an unspecified amount of time to consider amendments in the second). During six months of the war (as already mentioned), 90% of all laws adopted in the first reading were considered in the hall for less than 2 minutes. And if the law passed two readings and both took place after February 24, then for half of such draft laws, consideration took up to 6 minutes. One reading usually took 2-3 minutes, which is time for 1 performance and 2-3 lines. According to the testimony of the MPs, speeches began to be devoted to the essence of laws and constructive discussion. Meetings of the Conciliation Council were also closed, which led to its members stopping using this platform for political statements. In this unexpected way, one of the recommendations of the Mission of the European Parliament was implemented.

On this occasion, Oleksandr Kornienko noted: “the meeting hall was transformed from a platform for debating political positions into a place for making constructive decisions to ensure the country’s vital activities in conditions of armed aggression. At the same time, most of the discussions, as I already mentioned, moved to the preparatory stage in the format of meetings, active interdepartmental working groups, round tables, and work at the level of subcommittees and Committees of the Verkhovna Rada”.

The Verkhovna Rada spent only 36 hours of total time considering draft laws. This is half as much as in session 6 (84 hours) and three times less than was spent during session 5 – the previous spring session (134 hours). But at the same time, a record number of laws were adopted during the third-ninth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada.

During the six months of the war, the Verkhovna Rada was able to mobilize, demonstrating a high pace of processing draft laws and a record number of adopted laws. At the same time, high rates and a record number were accompanied by increased violations and questionable law-making practices. At the same time, the key topics on which Verkhovna Rada worked were defense, security, and finance. And the central activity area was the legislation adaptation to the realities of martial law.

The influence of pro-Russian politicians generally decreased but did not disappear entirely and has many exciting nuances.

Security measures have changed many aspects of the activities of the Verkhovna Rada – a large part of the information has become closed, and the consideration of draft laws has become much faster.

An unexpected impact of martial law was the redistribution of roles between subjects in the legislative process. The President left internal politics to the discretion of the Cabinet of Ministers and MPs. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada turned into a voting machine, reducing political discussions to a minimum.

In general, in their majority, the MPs of the ninth convocation demonstrated a statesmanlike position, ensuring smooth and productive work of the Verkhovna Rada during six months of the war. Ukrainian parliamentarians will win if people in the parliament consider an independent Ukraine an absolute value.

The other day Volodymyr Zelensky announced the Green Country project. Under this project, forest areas will be increased by 1 million hectares over the next 10 years. To do this, it is planned to plant 1 billion trees in the first 3 years.

But how realistic is this plan? We asked experts.

Vice President of the Forestry Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Professor of Ecological Economics, National Forestry University of Ukraine Ihor Soloviy told us about the current state of afforestation and reforestation in Ukraine. According to him, now the pace of planting and reforestation is far from what is needed to implement the ambitious plan of Zelensky.

The State Agency of Forest Resources of Ukraine, in its response, told us that it supports Zelensky’s idea.

The agency’s position also states that for the optimal level of forest cover in Ukraine (20%), it is necessary to create more than 2 million hectares of new forests. That is twice as much as the Green Country project offers.

Zelensky’s new initiative really has a noble goal. However, it is too early to talk about positive changes, as there are too many questions. Is there land for planting? How to encourage landowners to plant? How well thought out is this initiative, and is there a strategy for its implementation?

We could not stay away from when we heard about Volodymyr Zelensky’s new initiative – to build a “Presidential University”, which “should become a modern innovative educational and research center.”

The university is planned to teach specialists in the following fields: information technology, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, aerospace, energy technology, biotechnology, and health sciences, globalization, and international communications.

According to the Minister of Education and Science, the construction of the new higher education institution will cost 7.2 billion UAH. The university itself should be located on the territory of the “Expocenter of Ukraine”.

The President’s initiative has yet to be approved separately by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Still, we draw attention to the need to address other issues that accompany higher education as a matter of priority.

The education system is a critical area for the country’s development, so changes should be carried out comprehensively, using research rather than the desire to raise the rating. The creation of a new university, no matter how good it will be, does not solve systemic problems, of which there are many in Ukraine. This includes low salaries of research and teaching staff, corruption on some levels of higher education, and an epidemic of plagiarism, and, most importantly, in this case, a large number of already established educational institutions that do not provide consistently high-quality education for all students.

In 2016, the experts of the Agency prepared a Shadow Report, analyzing the reform of the education system, and unfortunately, many of the problems mentioned in it are still relevant today. In this report, we noted the need to provide priority funding for “strong” Ukrainian education institutions that have the potential to join the leading universities in Eastern Europe by gradually reducing state support for lower-level higher education institutions.

We should also not forget that universities are created not only for students. First of all, they are research centers. The money planned to be allocated to the new university could be used to fund research programs in the areas mentioned above.

Universities that have existed in Ukraine for decades already have the necessary base and reputable capital, so they will need much less financial investment than creating a new institution. As a result, the probability of spending 7 billion UAH on the construction of the “Presidential University” seems to be an inefficient use of available funding and certainly not a priority step to improve the quality of education in Ukraine.

Another problem with Zelensky’s new project is that it is planned to be implemented in Kyiv. The capital already has a significant number of universities, including the most prestigious and best in the country. Implementing a project of this scale outside Kyiv could accelerate economic development and increase investment attractiveness for the regions.

The creation of a new university can be seen as a purely populist step, as it completely ignores the institutional problems of Ukrainian education, turning its attention to one striking point example that creates the visibility of changes.

Why is Ukraine still not in NATO? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky wants to address this question to the new US President Joe Biden. But the American president is unlikely to have an answer to this question. After all, he cannot push the magic button for Ukraine to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. This button does not exist at all. Instead, for the issue of Ukraine’s full membership in NATO to be taken seriously, the country must accomplish many tasks.

Ukraine began cooperating with NATO almost immediately after independence. We were one of the first countries in the post-Soviet space to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Since then, fruitful cooperation between Ukraine and the North Atlantic Alliance has begun, which could well have escalated into more serious membership talks in 2005-2008. Then Ukraine has officially announced its intention to become a member of the Alliance.

But in 2010, during Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency, Ukraine’s foreign policy was changed – the authorities changed their minds and chose a non-aligned status for Ukraine + distance from NATO + rapprochement with Russia. Ukraine could return to “joining NATO” only in 2014 when the war with Russia had already begun. In 2019, this course was enshrined in the Constitution. But this is not enough for the North Atlantic Alliance membership.

Ukraine must confirm its intentions with specific actions and indicators. To this end, Ukraine annually approves the NATO-Ukraine Annual National Program. This program sets out measures to implement reforms that meet Alliance standards. If Ukraine implements the Annual National Programs properly, it will be able to join the NATO Membership Action Plan to prepare for potential membership and demonstrate its ability to meet its commitments. But participation in this program is not a guarantee of membership for Ukraine or any other country.

The North Atlantic Council decides to invite a country to become a full member of NATO based on consensus among all Alliance members. That is, not the American president can make this decision.

After the introduction of the “weekend lockdown”, Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovy stated that Lviv would not support a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers. But can the city, represented by local governments, refuse to comply with Cabinet resolutions?