On 9 March 2026, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, Mykola Tochytskyi, signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Profession of Lawyer. Ukraine became the 28th country to sign this international treaty.

The Convention on the Protection of the Profession of Lawyer is the first international treaty of its kind aimed at protecting this profession. The document establishes common standards for guaranteeing the independence of lawyers and provides for a monitoring mechanism to oversee the implementation of its provisions. It was developed in response to the growing number of reports of attacks against members of the profession — whether in the form of harassment, threats or physical attacks, or through interference with the exercise of professional duties (such as restricting access to clients).

The signing of the Convention is only the first step. Ukraine shall now ratify it in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On International Treaties of Ukraine’. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, noted that the Convention will enter into force upon the eighth ratification (of which at least six must be by Council of Europe member states). As of today, none of the signatory states has yet ratified the Convention.

For ratification, among other things, an official Ukrainian translation of the Convention is required, to be prepared by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Daria Pysarenko, Director of the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, emphasises that this is not merely a technical matter — it concerns the scope of guarantees for the independence of legal professionals.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’ welcome Ukraine’s signing of the Convention while also noting that threats to the independence of the legal profession arise not only externally but also from within the profession itself. In 2022, the mandates of all bodies of the Bar self-government expired. However, the Bar Council of Ukraine has not called elections for four consecutive years. The principle of accountability of the legal profession to its members has been undermined. Advocates have not seen reports on the use of their contributions since 2021. Disciplinary procedures are used as a tool to sanction criticism of the decisions and actions of Bar self-governance bodies. Access to the profession remains non-transparent and carries risks of abuse. These and other issues are outlined in the section ‘Bar Reform’ in the Shadow Report under Chapter 23 of the EU acquis and in the European Commission’s Enlargement Report.

Given that the legal profession occupies a central place in the justice system alongside the judiciary and the prosecution service, it is not possible to speak of justice sector reform without reform of the legal profession. The European Commission has repeatedly highlighted the need for such reform and, in its latest Enlargement Report, clearly stated: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’, while also setting out its proposals for such changes.

In response to the deep institutional crisis in the Bar, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine initiated the establishment of a working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and the practice of law. Accordingly, in January 2026, the Government established such a working group, which includes representatives of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives joined the III Conference on Anti-Corruption Law to discuss these issues and share its perspective.

Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the Law-and-Order Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, participated in the session ‘European Integration Changes in Anti-Corruption Legislation’. Understanding European integration processes and state policy in this area makes it possible to anticipate the changes that Ukrainian legislation will undergo and to identify what requires particular attention in the course of European integration.

The expert noted that the ‘10 priorities of Kachka–Kos’, announced in December 2025, as well as the Rule of Law Roadmap until 2027, provide a clear understanding that the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine) will undergo amendments both in the field of anti-corruption and in other areas.

Interestingly, all the requirements of the EU priority plan coincide with the recommendations of the Shadow Report prepared in 2025 by a coalition of civil society organisations coordinated by the ALI. At present, the Government is working on a consolidated draft of amendments that will be presented to the Verkhovna Rada — and a professional and substantive discussion on this issue will continue at a later stage.

Each year, the Ukrainian Bar Association organises the Conference on Anti-Corruption Law — a professional platform for an expert discussion on how the anti-corruption system in Ukraine operates today, from the pre-trial investigation of corruption-related criminal proceedings to the development of judicial practice. The event brings together representatives of state authorities, judges, defence counsel, lawyers from the corporate sector and experts to discuss the key challenges of anti-corruption law enforcement, analyse practical cases and exchange professional experience.

Together with a coalition of civil society organisations, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives is launching a new cycle of monitoring and evaluation of Ukraineʼs European integration progress. The results will be reflected in the 2026 Shadow Report. Traditionally, the report will cover chapters 23, ‘Justice and Fundamental Rightsʼ, and 24, ‘Justice, Freedom and Securityʼ. This year, experts will also analyse a new section of the ‘Fundamentalsʼ cluster: ‘Functioning of Democratic Institutionsʼ. 

The Shadow Report is a purely civil society product, regardless of its sources of support. In order to strengthen the institutional integrity of the process, we are introducing a new approach this year: the Shadow Report will be funded by independent civil society organisations. The Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine will cover a significant share of the resources needed for the report’s production. As it does every year, the ALI is taking on the mission of ensuring maximum impartiality and independence in the preparation process. We have been able to maintain the stability and expand the coalition, which contributes to a comprehensive and in-depth analysis. This year, the Civil Network Opora and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law have also joined the team working on the report. The coalition now consists of nine civil society organisations. 

This year, the Shadow Report is being prepared by experts from the following organisations: the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe Without Barriers, the Ukrainian Bar Association, the Civil Network Opora, and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law. The report is being produced with media support from European Pravda. 

This report will encompass the following:

1. A descriptive overview of the current state of democratic institutions and the progress of reforms in this area, along with recommendations from the standpoint of civil society.
2. An assessment of Ukraine’s progress under chapters 23 and 24 since the release of the European Commission’s 2025 Report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union Enlargement Package, considering the recommendations from previous Shadow Reports.
3. A detailed analysis of the issues arising from the reform process in each of the chapters covered.

The 2026 Shadow Report will feature a separate section containing the coalition’s specific recommendations on how to address the issues highlighted in each area. These recommendations will serve as guidelines for future government policies in these areas. 

As is customary, this year’s Shadow Report will be released on the eve of the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine’s progress within the EU’s Enlargement Package in 2026.

The production of shadow reports is standard practice for countries seeking to join the European Union. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova, independent coalitions of civil society organisations have conducted alternative monitoring of reform progress in areas such as the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions for years. Ukraine has systematically carried out such work since 2024, when a coalition of civil society organisations first prepared an alternative analysis to the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s Enlargement Package. 

The Shadow Report delivers an independent, alternative analysis of public policy and how effectively the candidate country is complying with its obligations to the EU. Conducted by relevant experts from civil society organisations, it is a systematic audit that does not duplicate official state documents or the European Commission’s assessment. Rather, it is a tool for civic oversight and expert engagement in the reform process. At the same time, it evaluates the extent to which Ukrainian legislation and the entire system meet EU standards. One of the Shadow Report’s tasks is to flag gaps and encourage the effective implementation of changes.

Competitive selection is a basic tool for ensuring professionalism, integrity and political neutrality in the civil service. In Ukraine, this model was developed after 2016 as part of public administration reform, implemented with the EU support.

After the full-scale invasion, the state abandoned competitive selection. This alleviated the staff shortage caused by mobilisation and massive forced displacement, both internally and abroad. At the same time, the prolonged suspension of competitive selection created systemic risks for the quality of governance, institutional memory, and trust in the civil service.

• temporary appointments are gradually becoming the ‘new normal’;
• there is a growing risk of politically motivated decisions and abandonment of the meritocratic approach;
• it will be difficult to return to the standard competitive model after the war.

Currently, the only legislative initiative aimed at restoring competitive selection during martial law is the Draft Law No. 13478-1. It provides for:

• the gradual restoration of competitive selection procedures;
• the determination of deadlines for competitive selection procedures for positions to which persons have been appointed without competitive selection for the duration of martial law;
• the possibility of continuing service by decision of the appointing authority to preserve human resources, time, and budget;
• the application of positive measures to achieve gender balance in civil service positions in specific state bodies.

The Government supports the adoption of this draft law.

1. Political blocking of the process. Despite the declared political readiness to gradually resume competitive selection procedures during martial law, in practice, this process remains blocked and has not been brought before Parliament for consideration for a long time. This delay indicates a lack of consensus on restoring competitive selection in wartime. The issue of competitions for top civil service positions remains particularly controversialFirst Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Oleksandr Korniyenko: Return to competitive selection for top positions triggers debate among MPs. Interfax-Ukraine. 24.09.2025.. The reasons include the desire to maintain maximum managerial flexibility, concerns of complicating procedures, and the general focus of political attention on security issues. At the same time, this approach ignores long-term risks, as temporary appointments are gradually becoming the ‘new normal.’
2. Unfinished remuneration reform. Resuming competitions without completing remuneration reform creates the risk of an outflowThis is supported by data from an anonymous questionnaire survey of civil servants conducted by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives in December 2025 with the assistance of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning and the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service. of personnel from the civil service. Despite the adoption of the Law of Ukraine No. 4282 and positive developments, the level of remuneration remains one of the key demotivating factors. There are still significant disparities in remuneration between bodies of different jurisdictions, as well as between different categories of positions within the same body. In its conclusions, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine also notesReport of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine on the results of the compliance audit on the topic ‘Reforming the remuneration system in public administration’, approved by Decision of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine No. 26-1 from October 28, 2025. that the reform has not fully achieved its goals of creating a fair, transparent and competitive remuneration system.
3. Institutional instability. Frequent changes in the system of central executive bodies (reorganisations, mergers, changes of powers) destabilise their activities, cause staff turnover, loss of institutional memory and reduced efficiency.
4. Political dependence of senior civil servants. After the reset of power in 2019Based on the Law of Ukraine No. 117-IX ‘On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Restructuring of Government’., state secretaries of ministries and heads of central executive bodies (category ‘A’ positions) remain dependent on political figures. Appointment and dismissal procedures undermine the meaning of competitive selection and create conditions for politically motivated decisionsStarting from September 29, 2019 (the date of entry into force of the Law of Ukraine No. 117-IX), the Commission determines not the winner of the competition, but the candidates for civil service positions who have received the highest total number of points based on the results of the overall ranking of candidates (no more than three per position) for selection of the winner by the appointing authority or head of the civil service.. The practice of frequent changes of state secretaries (who change with the appointment of a new minister, or even more often) makes it impossible for them to perform their key functionFor example, over the past five years, the state secretaries of the Ministry of Culture (in all variations of its name) have changed five times since 2019 (Bidenko A., Dul’ Y., Leshchuk Y., Kurochenko O., Levchuk V.) and none of them has served the full five-year term provided for by law (although the latter still has a chance to do so). — ensuring the stability and continuity of the work of ministries. The Draft law No. 13478-1 does not eliminate these risks.

The restoration of competitive selection is a necessary condition for a professional civil service; however, it must be accompanied by systemic changes. Without the completion of the remuneration reform, reduction of political influence, and ensuring institutional stability, competitive selection may not fully fulfil its function.

Short-term

1. Adopt the Draft Law No. 13478-1 in the first reading (take as a basis).
2. During the revision of the Draft Law No. 13478-1 for the second reading, provide for: 1) strengthening the role of the Senior Civil Service Commission and competitive commissions formed by the appointing authority, granting them the power to determine one winner and the next candidate who can take the position in case of refusal by the winner or vacancy of this position within a year after the competition; 2) establishing the submission of the Senior Civil Service Commission as a mandatory basis for the dismissal of category ‘A’ civil servants; 3) specifying the responsibility for interference in the work of the Senior Civil Service Commission and the competition commissions; 4) bringing the procedure of the Senior Civil Service Commission formation in line with the Constitution of Ukraine.

Medium-term

1. Complete the remuneration reform, taking into account the recommendations of the Accounting Chamber.
2. Introduce the practice of reformatting the system of central executive bodies only based on a functional review of the entire system, identification of all alternatives, and justification of the proposed changes, in particular in terms of financial and human resources.

Infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) has launched a new project supported by the MATRA programme of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine. The project aims to consistently advance the reform of the judiciary and the prosecution, which are crucial for Ukraine’s further progress on its path toward European integration.

The project focuses on two strategic priorities.

The first area is the optimisation of the national network of general local first instance courts.

The current court system does not align with Ukraine’s new administrative and territorial structure or with the realities of wartime, thereby complicating access to justice for citizens and posing additional risks to the effective functioning of the judicial system.

To address these challenges, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives will:

1. Develop a new court mapping methodology that takes into account Ukraine’s updated administrative-territorial division, internal and external migration processes caused by the ongoing war, judges’ workload, and the geographical features of regions, including those located close to the combat zone. At all stages, the recommendations of the Council of Europe European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) will be taken into account.
2. Prepare model court maps for each government-controlled region of Ukraine. Based on the results, universal regional maps will be developed, defining the number of courts and judges, as well as hub territorial communities for the location of new courts of first instance.
3. Develop a detailed step-by-step plan for a pilot project on optimising the network of general local courts in one of Ukraine’s regions, which can later be replicated in all other regions.
4. Assist in developing the legislative framework necessary for this transformation.

This project will help rethink court mapping projects developed before the full-scale invasion and, taking into account significant population migration, propose the most optimal models for the future functioning of the system of general local courts. The goal is to ensure the best possible access to justice for Ukrainian citizens residing in government-controlled territories or using judicial services from abroad.

The second area focuses on strengthening guarantees of prosecutorial independence by enhancing the institutional capacity and autonomy of the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (CPU), as a body of prosecutorial self-governance, and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP), as a body ensuring the functioning of the prosecution.

The current legal design of these bodies prevents them from effectively fulfilling their mandate to protect prosecutorial independence. At the same time, their financial dependence on the Prosecutor’s General Office undermines their institutional autonomy in this process.

The project envisages the preparation of analytical concepts based on EU standards to substantiate proposed solutions, ALI’s expert participation in drafting legislative amendments together with key stakeholders (the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine, and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors), as well as further advocacy for the proposed reforms.

The implementation of the project is expected to create practical preconditions for:

• improving citizens’ access to justice through an updated and rationally structured network of local general courts of first instance;
• ensuring that prosecutors adopt lawful and fair decisions in criminal proceedings by reducing the risks of pressure and interference, including from political actors or senior management, made possible through strengthening the institutional capacity of prosecutorial self-governance to safeguard prosecutorial independence;
• implementing the recommendations of the European Commission and the objectives of the Rule of Law Roadmap, which are necessary for advancing Ukraine’s path toward EU membership.

The project will last for two years.

The MATRA programme of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands supports reforms in the field of democracy and the rule of law in the countries joining the EU. Support for this project is further evidence of the Netherlands’ consistent support, which, even in conditions of full-scale war, remains a loyal partner of Ukraine: strict but fair, and involved at every stage of Ukraine’s integration into the EU.

Responsibility for the content of the project lies with the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Netherlands.

The year 2025 brought Ukraine certain progress in reforming the justice sector.

The Service of Disciplinary Inspectors of the High Council of Justice (HCJ) became fully operational.

The High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) completed a number of competitive selection procedures, as a result of which, for the first time in 12 years, new judges appeared in some courts of appeal. However, not all of them have taken the oath and begun administering justice due to delays on the part of the President.

At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed two new judges of the Constitutional Court (CCU), thereby unblocking its work after a six-month suspension, as well as two members of the HCJ, which in turn appointed another member of the HQCJ, thus completing its composition.

At first glance, it may seem that everything is finally moving in the right direction, albeit not as quickly as everyone would wish.

Unfortunately, far from everything. And here is why.

For the third consecutive year, Ukraine has lacked a comprehensive Strategy for the Reform and Development of the Justice Sector, although its draft has long been prepared by the Office of the President (Office, OP). However, despite the declared importance of this document, the President’s signature had still not appeared on it in 2025.

Political actors pretend that this is acceptable: allegedly, what matters is not the signature but implementation. Moreover, the most important provisions are said to be reflected in the Rule of Law Roadmap adopted by the Government, which records Ukraine’s European integration commitments in this area.

This is both true and not true at the same time. One cannot implement a document that does not exist, even if certain elements of the reform are moving in the right direction. At the same time, there is nothing to reproach the team of the Deputy Head of the Office of the President, Iryna Mudra, or the Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Legal Policy, Denys Maslov — a candidate for the position of Minister of Justice — in this matter. Before the President signs documents within ‘his vertical’, they must bear not only the signature of the concerned deputy (Mudra) but also that of the Head of the Office of the President.

After ‘Mindichgate’, it is entirely understandable why the previous Head of the Office had little time for judicial strategies (although he has recently had his right to practise as a lawyer restored). All hopes now rest with the current Head of the OP, Kyrylo Budanov, who may be far removed from judicial specifics but certainly understands the importance of strategic planning better than the ‘lawyer’ Yermak.

The key judicial institutions — the HCJ, the HQCJ and the Supreme Court — also lack their own strategies. Consequently, even the proper performance of their functions (which is far from always the case) does not lead to substantial — and, crucially, irreversible — positive change. For example, the absence of a strategy within the HQCJ has resulted in the non-priority filling of vacancies in commercial courts of appeal (where, moreover, a crowd of relatives and friends of certain members of the HQCJ and HCJ, and even two sitting members of the High Council of Justice, rushed to apply — something unacceptable in countries with established democracies). Meanwhile, in the courts of appeal of large cities such as Odesa and Dnipro, there is simply no one to work. Although they are expected to receive judges in 2026, this will be one to one and a half years later than it should have been.

The absence of a strategic vision for the development of the Supreme Court (SC) within its Plenum has already led to a personnel crisis during the election of the leadership of the cassation courts. The Civil Cassation Court elected its Head only on the sixth attempt — Maryna Chervynska, who became a compromise figure after five unsuccessful rounds of voting. Meanwhile, the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court (ACC SC) elected Ihor Dashutin as its Head by the minimum number of votes required — a judge who has been the subject of journalistic investigations concerning alleged illicit enrichment. Such a choice is unacceptable, particularly for a court that examines cases against the President and Parliament. It is difficult to explain to international partners why, in a country that seeks to become a member of the EU as swiftly as possible, judges with questionable reputations continue to be elected to senior judicial positions. And all this takes place against the background of the Kniazev case, the DACK and other scandals.

There has also been a change in the Secretary of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court (GC SC): on 13 January, the judges of the GC SC elected the civil law specialist Serhii Pohribnyi to this position. He is regarded as an ideological academic ally of the current Head of Parliament, Ruslan Stefanchuk. It should be recalled that it was precisely thanks to Stefanchuk and a cohort of civil law scholars loyal to him that, in 2025, the Commercial Code of Ukraine (CCU), which had been in force since 2004, was finally repealed. What consequences this will have remains to be seen over the coming years. However, many judges and academics warned against taking such steps during wartime, proposing that a calmer period be chosen for major transformations.

However, the greatest problem of the GC SC lies in the judges of the former Supreme Court of Ukraine who entered the current composition of the SC by circumventing the 2017 reform. Due to complex legislative casuistry and with the support of former colleagues from the Constitutional Court, several judges were transferred to the Supreme Court at the beginning of 2024. Now sitting within the Grand Chamber, they are reinstating old case law and openly lobbying the interests of the old system, blocking further judicial reform and European integration, and effectively steering the ‘new’ SC towards yet another reform. Although at the beginning of 2026 the GC SC managed — by a majority of one vote and after one and a half years of chaos — to return to the agenda one of the previously repealed elements of judicial reform, the Kryvenda–Yemets tandem, according to sources within the SC, is already preparing further attacks on decisions of the HCJ and the HQCJ concerning the dismissal of judges lacking integrity. The remaining judges of the Grand Chamber would therefore do well to reflect carefully on the kind of country in which they — and their children — wish to live: a country of ‘kniazevs-and-vovks’ or one governed by the rule of law.

In 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the National School of Judges of Ukraine adopted their own Strategies. This was certainly timely.

The HACC has faced considerable criticism for the excessive length of its proceedings. The Nasirov case remained pending at first instance for six years, effectively creating an opportunity to avoid punishment, as the limitation period for holding Nasirov liable will expire in April 2026. It is highly unlikely that the appellate court will manage to complete its examination within that timeframe. Unfortunately, this is not the only high-profile case in which proceedings have moved more slowly than a tortoise. 

The HACC is aware that this situation cannot continue. However, time will tell whether the Strategy and the appointment of new judges (who are expected to join the court this year, provided that the next competition to the HACC does not fail) will make a difference.

In October 2025, the prosecution service also adopted its own Strategy for Reform and Development. It largely repeats requirements already contained in other state policy documents — requirements that the prosecution service itself has disregarded, for example by cancelling, in July 2025, the basic competition for positions in higher-level prosecutor’s offices. Is there anything about this in the Strategy? Of course not. This is therefore a case of good intentions leading to a familiar outcome. In the past week, the media and the public have been stirred by news of the formation of a competition commission for selection to senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). Alongside international experts, the commission includes the appointment of a lawyer Oleksii Shevchuk.

The issue here is not at all about whose interests he may have represented in the past (the right to defence is constitutional and universal). The problem lies in how Shevchuk’s candidacy is perceived by society and the expert community: when the state seeks to increase trust in the selection of the leadership of the SAPO, this is certainly not achieved by appointing to competition commissions individuals whose reputation and ethical standards raise questions. Moreover, these are direct statutory requirements — ‘impeccable business reputation, high professional and moral qualities, public authority, integrity’. It is regrettable that the Prosecutor General, holding such a high office and extensive powers, either fails to understand this or, even worse, deliberately undermines trust in the competition commission before it has even begun its work. Why, then, does Ukraine spend the time and resources of our international partners (and donors), if the Prosecutor General disregards such fundamental categories as ethics and morality?

The situation within the Bar is no better. It lacks not only a comprehensive development strategy (the previous one expired at the end of 2025), but also re-elected leadership that should have been responsible for drafting such a document. Incidentally, it was precisely the absence of any meaningful positive changes within the Bar that the European Union highlighted in its Enlargement Report published in November. Experts have also drawn attention to this issue year after year in shadow reports.

(Literally during the preparation of this material, the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) announced the approval of its Strategy for 2026–2028. Incidentally, the Strategies of SAPO and the HACC were developed with the support of international technical assistance projects.)

The absence of a comprehensive strategic document and a detailed, realistic consolidated implementation plan has already led to delays in fulfilling several of Ukraine’s international obligations.

Under previously approved plans set out in documents such as the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Memorandum with the IMF, Ukraine was expected in 2025 to fill 25 vacancies at the HACC and to adopt new legislation on judges’ integrity declarations.

In the end, the HACC was reinforced by only two new judges, while the draft laws concerning judges’ integrity declarations (as well as disciplinary liability) received numerous critical comments from the Venice Commission and, as of the end of 2025, had not been adopted by Parliament.

Ukraine did not receive almost €700 million under the Ukraine Facility — a significant amount for a country at war — and by the end of the first quarter must remedy the situation regarding the selection of HACC judges (at least 23 more judges), and by the end of the third quarter — regarding integrity declarations. Only then can the country expect to receive the specified funds.

The chances of meeting these obligations in 2026 are fairly high. In December, the qualification examination in the competition to the HACC and its Appeals Chamber was completed. Seventy-three legal professionals successfully passed it. Next, the HQCJ and the Public Council of International Experts will assess the integrity of the candidates. Those who successfully pass this stage will be included in the ranking and will determine their place of work — either at the HACC court of first instance or its Appeals Chamber.

Next in line is the competition to two higher administrative courts — the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC) and the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA). Since Parliament took more than a year to adopt the two laws necessary to launch this competition, last year the HQCJ managed only to collect documents from potential candidates. There turned out to be 268 individuals (356 applications, as some candidates applied to both courts).

This is progress that Ukraine has been awaiting for three years: the SDAC and SACA will examine the ‘political’ category of cases previously heard by the DACK, which was dissolved back in December 2022. It is therefore entirely understandable why the political authorities are in no hurry to ensure the swift launch of these courts.

Overall, at the beginning of 2026, 4,794 judges are serving in Ukraine. This is 208 fewer than as of 1 January 2025. In other words, the HCJ and the HQCJ are operating almost at ‘full capacity’, yet the number of judges continues to decline.

There are currently 1,399 vacancies in courts of first instance, 725 in courts of appeal, 80 judges are lacking in the higher specialised courts (competitions to which are ongoing), and 50 judges are lacking in the Supreme Court, where a competition is also forthcoming.

As regards appointments to courts of appeal, some of the newly selected judges (those who came from the Bar and academia) have already been working for one and a half months without having taken the oath. They have been formally enrolled in the staff of the courts, receive remuneration and undergo training, yet they are unable to perform their primary function — administering justice. The dates for their oath-taking have not been publicly announced by the Office of the President. The judges themselves do not know these dates either, although they indicate that it will be ‘not earlier than March’. Thus, we have an interesting situation: Ukraine has reported to the EU that a certain ‘gestalt’ regarding the appointment of judges under new rules (as required by the Ukraine Facility) has been closed, yet the judges have not actually begun to perform their duties.

Unfortunately, this is precisely the endless paradox of judicial reform that we at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives have written about more than once: one step forward, two steps back, or one step forward — and then standing still. This is exactly what is happening, for example, with the Constitutional Court: the President appointed two judges, yet Parliament failed to secure the necessary votes to appoint two others. At the same time, the Advisory Group of Experts has, on top of everything else, failed for the third time in a row to complete the competition under the quota of the Congress of Judges, having been unable for almost two years to identify a single decent candidate. One may, on the one hand, blame the candidates — as some civil society organisations do — or, alternatively, take a critical look at the competition rules and acknowledge that certain requirements are excessive. What exactly should be amended was analysed in detail as early as a year ago, yet the cart remains where it was.

Ukraine is beginning yet another year of judicial reform — a reform that has been ongoing almost since independence. For conscientious judges, this phrase has long provoked nausea rather than inspiration, while those lacking integrity exploit protracted procedures for their own purposes, obtaining judgments in their favour against Ukraine before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

For example, former judge Tandyr, who fatally struck a National Guard serviceman, received one such judgment last week: namely, that he had been held in detention for an excessive period without the possibility of bail. Yet he himself significantly contributed to the prolonged court proceedings by repeatedly changing his testimony and generally abusing his procedural rights. Unfortunately, this is not the first case in which a judge against whom the Ukrainian justice system has serious concerns receives an opportunity to ‘slip away’ through an ECtHR judgment in his favour. The above-mentioned judges of the former Supreme Court of Ukraine likewise have ECtHR judgments delivered in their favour.

In such stories, the pattern is evident: the absence of clear strategies and a thorough implementation plan, the chaotic conduct of reforms and political decisions that neutralise previous efforts generate legislative inconsistencies. Moreover, poor legislative drafting of draft laws, a long-standing shortage of judges, significant underfunding (the courts are financed at approximately 60% of their needs) and the abuse of rights by judges lacking integrity all contribute to ECtHR judgments against Ukraine. Formally, such judgments may comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, yet in practice they roll back reforms and the years of effort invested by Ukraine.

Is the ECtHR to blame for this? Hardly. Ukraine — consciously or unconsciously — has chosen inconsistency and chaos as the principal drivers of reform in the justice sector and has, for many years, tolerated the absence of honour and dignity in the work of key law enforcement bodies.

When searches are conducted without warrants, beginning at 5 a.m., and people are threatened with walls being broken down. When, during such searches, mothers are not allowed into rooms where their minor children are present and photographs of individuals in their underwear circulate online even before the searches are completed. When photographs of a naked civil society activist are leaked from his seized telephone to Telegram channels and no one is held accountable. When the selection of heads of law enforcement bodies is entrusted to individuals with questionable reputations. When court staff are paid 8,000–10,000 UAH per month for years on end… What kind of European integration can be discussed under such conditions?

If one adds political cases, corruption and the still-existing blue wall of silence among parts of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, then with such a picture even russians are not needed to undermine our state.

Unfortunately, from the words ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘corruption’ the phrase ‘rule of law’ does not emerge. If we do not begin to bring order to this judicial chaos, the hydra will remain a hydra — no matter how many roadmaps are fed to it.

At the beginning of 2026, the President publicly announced a course towards renewing the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). He instructed that a relevant draft law be prepared during January and urgently submitted to Parliament. This decision did not emerge spontaneously, as reform of the SBI had been discussed before; rather, it is a political signal of the need to act here and now. Accordingly, it has organically fitted into the agenda both in the context of European integration and against the backdrop of personnel reshuffles.

The quality of these reshuffles is not the subject of this text, whereas reform of the SBI is one of the ten priorities that Ukraine must deliver in 2026 within the framework of frontloading. This is a process launched jointly with the European Union that will allow Ukraine to prepare for the opening of negotiating clusters for EU accession even before the lifting of the Hungarian veto.

In this context, renewal of the State Bureau of Investigation becomes an important test for the Ukrainian authorities: whether they are capable of rethinking the role of yet another law enforcement body with a significant concentration of powers and clear signs of politicisation of its processes.

What, then, should be the role of the SBI in the law enforcement system? Why does this body continue to find itself at the centre of scandals? How can reform be turned from a formality into genuine institutional change?

The idea of establishing the State Bureau of Investigation in 2018 appeared logical. The body was supposed to investigate official crimes — torture, unlawful detention, fabrication of evidence and other crimes against justice — eliminating conflicts of interest when violations are investigated by the same institutions whose employees may be implicated in them. The SBI was meant to become an institution that reduces the sense of impunity and demonstrates that no one stands above the law, not even public officials.

Until November 2018, these crimes were investigated by the prosecutor’s office, and the transfer of jurisdiction to a new body had been envisaged as early as the 1996 Constitution. After several unsuccessful attempts to establish a similar body in 1997 and 2004, the 2012 Criminal Procedure Code required the creation of the SBI within five years. Formally, this task was fulfilled — jurisdiction was transferred, and years-long legislative work was completed. However, the expected effect did not materialise.

The SBI failed to change the rules of the game in combating torture and other official crimes. Medium-level corruption became the de facto priority, and the body itself began to position itself as yet another anti-corruption agency. As a result, its original mission receded into the background — contrary to the expectations of human rights defenders and international partners.

In its first year of operation (2018–2019), the SBI’s governance model resembled a ‘triumvirate’: the Director and his deputies alternated in performing managerial functions, which undermined the vertical of responsibility. This quickly led to scandals, symbolised by the ‘Truba tapes’ — recordings of conversations linked to the then Director, Roman Truba, which gave rise to doubts about informal influence over investigations. It was precisely this that triggered the first attempt at a ‘reset’.

On 3 December 2019, Parliament supported the presidential law on the early termination of the powers of the SBI leadership. While the decision appeared politically understandable, the manner of its implementation raised serious concerns: the powers were terminated automatically, without an individualised accountability procedure. Roman Truba challenged this logic before the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, yet the Court ultimately did not assess his specific case. At the same time, such a scenario is today virtually impossible — as in 2021–2023 the Constitutional Court repeatedly emphasised in its rulings on the attestation of police officers and prosecutors that Parliament cannot substitute personnel procedures with political decisions.

Early termination of the leadership’s mandate made the SBI institutionally vulnerable and entrenched the perception of the Bureau as a body dependent on political expediency. The law was a reaction to a crisis of trust rather than a genuine reset: powers were not reviewed; integrity assessments were not conducted, and safeguards against abuse were not created.

In December 2021, Oleksii Sukhachov was appointed Director of the SBI following a competitive selection. His mandate expires at the end of 2026. However, the volume of criticism directed at the Bureau indicates that even a competitively selected change of leadership did not resolve systemic problems. Thus, the issue is not personalities — but the very model of the SBI.

Over time, the State Bureau of Investigation has turned into a universal ‘investigator of everything’, with resources dispersed and priorities shifted. And these are by no means official crimes, let alone those in the field of justice. A significant share of the Bureau’s caseload today consists of military offences (against the order of military service), which is logical in wartime. Although current criminal statistics are classified (given the scale of unauthorised absence), older reporting forms show that in recent years their share amounted to around 80–90% of the SBI’s entire jurisdiction (in particular, in 2024 — 89,000 out of 98,000 proceedings). Yet when the body was created, this jurisdiction was treated as residual, not as a primary one at all.

At the same time, another portion of the SBI’s resources is directed towards investigating medium-level corruption offences, which by their nature was also not the primary reason for establishing this body. Moreover, the effectiveness of such work raises questions: few cases reach verdicts, while the situation with crimes in the field of justice remains consistently poor and impunity — systemic. Ultimately, torture, unlawful detention and fabrication of evidence are among the lowest priorities of this body. Yet this is precisely what it was created for.

As a result, the SBI is simultaneously overloaded and deprived of a clear priority. It is no coincidence that jurisdiction over military offences is regularly proposed to be transferred to a new specialised body, such as a State Military Justice Bureau, as the SBI is objectively unable to cope with such volume. This concerns not only more than 200,000 proceedings related to unauthorised absence, but also military offences more broadly, including corruption which, in terms of the level of public danger, often does not meet the threshold of jurisdiction of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine.

For some time, the idea was also discussed of transferring the investigation of crimes against national security to the SBI as part of reforming the Security Service of Ukraine, to strip it of pre-trial investigation functions. Today, however, this proposal evokes rather irony among experts and open irritation in society.

Additional questions also arise regarding the SBI’s dependence on the Office of the President of Ukraine and the role of the Bureau in possible ‘political persecutions’. The SBI regularly finds itself at the centre of scandals, while journalists and civil society representatives have repeatedly accused it of pressure, selective law enforcement and politicisation in the context of excessively broad powers.

Events surrounding the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ) in 2025 were illustrative in this regard. The SBI conducted a series of searches at the HQCJ’s premises and at the residence of the then Deputy Head of the Commission and questioned its members. Formally — within the framework of criminal proceedings; however, beyond the procedural framework, much deeper institutional problems became apparent. The HQCJ publicly stated that it regarded these actions as pressure and interference with the exercise of its constitutional functions, a point noted by both international partners and civil society organisations. The events coincided with the intensification of the qualification assessment of judges of the dissolved District Administrative Court of Kyiv and the Pechersk District Court, which at the same time were considering SBI motions for searches and access to documents. The line between law enforcement and pressure proved to be dangerously thin.

Public perception of the SBI’s activities has also been significantly shaped by the active use of urgent searches conducted without a warrant from an investigating judge. Although the CPC of Ukraine allows for such a tool in exceptional cases, in practice it increasingly appears to function as a standard procedure that is subsequently legalised post factum. When scandals and identified violations do not lead to internal investigations or disciplinary decisions, a sense of impunity emerges. This only reinforces narratives about a ‘political SBI’ and undermines trust in the institution.

Scandals surrounding the SBI have not gone unnoticed by international partners. The European Commission, in its Enlargement Reports for 2024 and 2025, explicitly pointed to the need to reform the Bureau. Specifically, Ukraine is required to introduce transparent, merit-based procedures for the selection of the SBI’s leadership with the involvement of independent experts — not a formal competition, but a mechanism capable of guaranteeing institutional independence from political influence. This emphasis is not incidental: previous competitive procedures for the SBI have repeatedly been criticised for lack of transparency and instability of selection commissions, while under martial law their effectiveness has not been analysed at all.

An even tougher position is set out in the Screening Report on the compliance of Ukrainian legislation with EU law (January 2025), which recommends a ‘reset’ of the SBI by analogy with the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU). Although this document is not public, such a recommendation was reported back in February 2025 by Member of Parliament Yaroslav Zhelezniak.

The Rule of Law Roadmap provides for a comprehensive review of the SBI’s institutional structure in the fourth quarter of 2026, the development of integrity and oversight mechanisms, and only thereafter — an assessment of the advisability of further reform and the preparation of relevant legislation. At the same time, the governmental approach appears overly slow, given the scale of the problems and the number of questions addressed to the SBI by politicians, civil society and professional communities. Implementation of such a plan may stretch over years.

An alternative path is proposed by Members of Parliament Yaroslav Zhelezniak and Anastasiia Radina. In August 2025, they registered draft law No. 13602, which provides for a ‘reset’ of the SBI based on the ESBU model — a new procedure for selecting the Director with a decisive vote of international experts and the attestation of personnel. However, this should constitute only the first stage of SBI reform, as it primarily concerns staffing issues.

The key issue of SBI reform, however, lies not in replacing the Director, but in rethinking the logic of jurisdiction, the system of oversight and the role of the body within the overall architecture of law enforcement.

The history of the State Bureau of Investigation already includes attempts at ‘resets’ that failed to produce long-term effects. If the structure continues to combine an excessively broad portfolio of powers, political influence over its activities will be inevitable.

How can this be avoided? A comprehensive reform should primarily address the SBI’s jurisdiction and its place within the law enforcement system. If the SBI is to focus first and foremost on combating crimes in the field of justice and abuses of office, resources and personnel should be channelled precisely into these areas. The reform should start with the specialisation of investigative units and move towards the creation of secure communication channels, the expansion of the whistleblower institution to cover official crimes, etc. Many ideas articulated back in 2021 in the Government Strategy on Preventing Torture have still not been implemented — and it is precisely the SBI that should take this on.

In parallel, it is critically important to develop analytical capacity to forecast crime, ensure effective counteraction, begin working with European instruments such as SOCTA, improve approaches to criminal policy, etc. This would bring Ukraine closer to an EU-model law enforcement system. European approaches in this area are based precisely on data analysis and the strategic prioritisation of objectives.

There is a need to improve the accountability of the SBI and to introduce genuine oversight instruments. The formal existence of internal control units, public oversight councils, etc. does not guarantee results if these mechanisms are unable to exert real influence over the activities of the SBI. They must be sufficiently independent from the leadership and capable of impartially reviewing complaints against Bureau staff. The institutional trajectory can be reviewed, for example, through periodic audits of activities, as a result of which the head may lose their position and the work of the body may be substantially adjusted externally — by the Government and Parliament.

Reform of the SBI today is a test of the ability to build institutions with real checks and balances. Without a systemic rethinking of the role of this body, personnel changes will not work.

Appointing new leadership is only one of many steps required for genuine reform of the SBI. All the more so given that this is a ‘newly established’ body that emerged after the Revolution of Dignity — with competitive selection procedures, a public oversight council and reporting to Parliament. Therefore, personnel reshuffles alone are insufficient, as even the most transparent competition involving civil society and international experts will not resolve the problem if the body continues to operate with the same concentration of powers, blurred jurisdiction and weak safeguards against abuse, without effective external and internal oversight. Old practices will return unless these deeper issues are addressed. If reform changes the logic of how the SBI operates, fixes its clear jurisdiction and provides for safeguards and control mechanisms, this will offer a chance for real change and for meeting priority European integration requirements.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), together with its partners — the NGO Tomorrow’s Lawyer — is deepening its work on reform of the Bar. Experts from the organisations — Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at ALI, and Daria Pysarenko, Executive Director of the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’ — have joined the working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and the practice of law.

The issue of the effective functioning of the Bar in Ukraine is particularly acute — of the entire justice triangle, it is the Bar that remains unreformed to date. Its transformation is one of the European integration requirements. Since 2023, the European Commission has referred to this in its Enlargement Reports, each time noting the absence of any progress.

Participation in the working group continues ALI’s work on the Bar, dating back to 2018, when the Agency published the Shadow Report ‘The Bar of Ukraine: lessons from the first years of self-governance’. Subsequently, the issue of the Bar was addressed in the Shadow Reports to the European Commission’s Reports on Ukraine in 2023 and 2024. Thus, ALI and ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’ will now focus on the practical implementation of these recommendations.

What does the Agency for Legislative Initiatives plan to focus on within the working group? Yevhen Krapyvin notes:

The expert also notes that recently, during discussions of the Anti-Corruption Strategy provisions concerning the Bar, particular interest was rightly sparked by the proposal to introduce a comprehensive register of disciplinary decisions issued against advocates. In the courts and the prosecution service, such decisions have long been public. This makes it possible to analyse practice, identify problems and improve its quality. After all, the issue is not about funding or administration, but about the system’s readiness to operate transparently.

We congratulate the experts and wish them success in reforming the Bar in line with European standards. We will continue to share all findings and updates on the Agency’s platforms.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has long ceased to be ‘just a special service’. In times of war, it has become one of the key institutions for the survival of the state. The SSU performs counterintelligence functions, combats organised crime, collaborationism and war crimes, exposes agent networks, counters sabotage and cyberattacks, etc. And at times — its officers also manage to take part in ‘conflicts’ around business and politics.

The Service itself notes — ‘we are developing’. But is such development the reform that the EU expects from Ukraine?

The SSU still combines the function of a classic special service — counterintelligence — and that of a law enforcement body — pre-trial investigation of crimes with a rather broad jurisdiction. Such a concentration of powers creates space for abuse, politicisation of the body, conflicts of competence and risks to human rights.

Reform of the SSU is a European integration requirement, despite an implicit consensus among experts that it is ‘not timely’ because it would weaken the country’s defence capability. The European Union states that over the past year there has been no progress in SSU reform. At the same time, it directly indicates that the SSU should transfer the function of pre-trial investigation to specialised law enforcement bodies, and itself — focus on the sphere of national security (national security tasks) and introduce effective safeguards against abuse.

The European Commission calls for strengthening both internal and external oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms, as well as improving the rules for the selection of senior management and personnel of the Security Service of Ukraine. This is also highlighted by a coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) in the Shadow Report. The Ukrainian authorities, for their part, have officially committed to changing the SSU by the first quarter of 2026.

It is worth noting that under the sphere of national security our legislation understands a wide range of issues — from defence matters to economic and environmental security. At the same time, there is little difference between the term ‘state security’, customary for the SSU, and ‘national security’ — everything depends on the context, as the legislation lacks systemic coherence in this area.

Thus, the term ‘national security’ is broader than ‘state security’; in some cases, these terms are synonymous, while in others the term ‘state security’ relates only to non-military-time threats, etc. At the same time, the development of legislation has led to the term ‘national security’ being used far more frequently; this applies in particular to responsibility which, under the Constitution, is defined within the powers of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers — the protection of national security. Accordingly, they assign these tasks to the special service — the SSU. Therefore, it is not the name itself that matters, but that the powers of the SSU are clearly defined by law and do not allow for broad interpretation, as cases of unlawful actions by the Service often have nothing to do with its powers, when national security is understood to encompass all spheres of state activity.

Thus, we examine why and what changes the Security Service of Ukraine requires, and how realistic it is to reform this institution in the context of a full-scale war.

By law, the SSU is a central body of special purpose with law enforcement functions. In practice, however — it operates within an excessively broad range of tasks and powers. This is an approach rooted in the Soviet logic of security universalism, when a single structure was responsible for almost everything: from state security to economic crimes. At the same time, a defining feature of democratic societies is precisely that the powers of special services are limited, and their activities are subject to civilian oversight, including parliamentary oversight.

This is why, after the Revolution of Dignity, reform of the SSU became one of the tasks that ultimately was not completed before the full-scale invasion. Since 24 February 2022, the multitasking of the Security Service has only intensified. New challenges have emerged: large-scale international crimes, threats to national security (high treason, collaborationism, propaganda of war, etc.), special operations in occupied territories and on enemy territory, international cooperation, etc.

Experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives note the merging of counterintelligence and counterterrorism in the activities of the structure in wartime conditions. From the perspective of the rule of law, this blurs the boundaries of responsibility and accountability.

Martial law cannot serve as a long-term ‘indulgence’ for preserving old institutional solutions. Yes, war requires flexibility and rapid decision-making, but there is a need to review managerial and legal models and approaches that were shaped in a different security context.

The issue of jurisdiction remains problematic. This primarily concerns the SSU’s broad pre-trial investigation functions — not limited to national security and terrorism. These also include smuggling, international crimes, crimes related to state secrets and the protection of critical infrastructure. Some of these fall within the economic sphere, which is a frequent source of complaints from business (smuggling, financing of terrorism, collaborationist activities in the form of entrepreneurship, etc.). This is atypical for special services of the European model.

For example, war crimes are in fact investigated by the National Police — given the presence of police officers in all communities, they are the first to be approached, and most of these cases concern ‘strikes’, the consequences of which need to be properly documented. Accordingly, there are calls to expand the jurisdiction of the police or to establish a new body that, in the long term, would be capable of investigating these crimes, in order not to repeat the negative experience of the ‘Maidan cases’.

Certain criminal prosecution policies are also frequently criticised, for example the prosecution of pensioners for collaborationist activities (likes on ‘Odnoklassniki’) or of those who were forced to remain in occupied territories (of course, not those who went to work in the occupation administration or actively supported the occupation regime). Excessively harsh de facto criminal policy is a consequence of heightened demands for justice, yet it is counterproductive in the long term, especially in the context of de-occupation. In some cases, it is simply the result of working towards quantitative clearance indicators rather than a genuine fight against crime.

According to representatives of the SSU with whom ALI experts spoke in the course of preparing the Shadow Report, the Service is opposed to narrowing the function of pre-trial investigation. The exception is smuggling, jurisdiction over which may be transferred to the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, given its subject-matter focus. However, a broader narrowing of jurisdiction is needed — for example, to determine a phased approach as to what would be transferred to other bodies under martial law and what — after its termination. The investigation of crimes should be secondary in comparison with other tasks related to the protection of the state.

In addition, operational units of the SSU are widely involved in the investigation of criminal offences by all pre-trial investigation bodies (even the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) occasionally involves SSU operatives — there is no conflict in this). At the same time, within the Security Service of Ukraine, units ‘K’ (counterintelligence in the field of combating corruption and organised crime) and ‘E’ (counterintelligence in the economic sphere) have a ‘bad reputation’ — in the past, human rights defenders, journalists and anti-corruption activists often criticised them for interference in the activities of other bodies, surveillance of activists and journalists, etc. Following such criticism, the activities of units ‘K’ and ‘E’ were reoriented in 2021 towards the protection of critical infrastructure (in effect, a significant narrowing of functions took place).

Here it is important to understand that corruption-related offences do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SSU. They are investigated by NABU, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Police. The activities of the aforementioned units take place precisely in the counterintelligence sphere and do not provide for criminal prosecution by the Service for corruption or the economy as such. The economic sphere, threats to the national security of public authorities and other sensitive areas cannot be fully removed from the field of activity of the Security Service of Ukraine as a counterintelligence body, as they constitute areas of influence for foreign intelligence services, industrial espionage, preparation of terrorist acts, etc.

Counterintelligence as a function will always remain with this body, as it is inherent to a special service, unlike pre-trial investigation. The only question is the extent to which the Service is accountable and subject to oversight in a democratic society, so that these powers are not abused.

Undoubtedly, risks of abuse have existed and will always exist. That is precisely why there must be instruments to mitigate them through control, accountability, etc. For its part, this should be the responsibility of Parliament. Both the European Commission and ALI experts in the Shadow Report emphasise the need to strengthen such mechanisms.

A widespread narrative concerns the politicisation of the SSU — due to high-profile scandals surrounding the special service and its officers, as well as past experience when law enforcement bodies became instruments of political struggle. However, such generalisation is overly simplistic.

Interestingly, at the same time, the level of trust in the SSU as of September 2025 stands at 78%. It is clear why, after the Defence Forces, trust in the SSU is the highest. In wartime, the reputation of the SSU correlates with its effectiveness on the battlefield and in the enemy’s rear (let us recall the ‘Alpha’ special unit), as well as with countering internal security threats.

At the same time, there is much talk about the so-called ‘political SSU’ and the ‘other SSU’. Yet such a division is devoid of meaning, as it narrows a structural problem down to individual personalities. It is not enough simply to replace ‘bad’ managers with ‘good’ ones. It is necessary to build a system of checks and balances, define the scope of powers and introduce accountability mechanisms that would make abuses in the work of the Service impossible.

It is important to understand that reform of the SSU cannot be ensured through a universal ‘international experts involved’ recipe in competitive selection procedures. After all, this concerns a special service, not an executive authority or even a court. Re-certification of all personnel or regular reminders in the media space about cases such as that of Shylo and similar ones are insufficient to bring Ukraine closer to EU and NATO standards. These instruments are not applicable to persons who have a high level of access to state secrets, perform tasks involving confidential cooperation and are often non-public individuals. Thus, for example, during the large-scale police attestation in 2015–2016, operational officers were not subject to re-certification — let alone an entire special service.

In this context, the case of NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov is noteworthy. Together with his father, he was accused by the SSU of allegedly selling technical hemp to representatives of the economic sector of russia. Mahamedrasulov was arrested on 21 July, which is in one way or another linked to attempts to undermine the independence of anti-corruption bodies. His defence publicly stated that they view this case as possible pressure on the detective and his family. The media and civil society also noted that the entire situation may be connected to the investigation into corruption abuses within the President’s inner circle. The disclosure of information regarding Operation ‘Midas’, conducted by NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), has somewhat clarified the situation.

According to NABU, Detective Mahamedrasulov took part in the collection of evidence for this operation. As early as 3 December, the prosecution changed its position on the need to keep Mahamedrasulov and his father in custody, as a result of which the court released them from pre-trial detention under a personal recognisance.

Is there a role of the SSU in this? Undoubtedly. At the same time, this concerns the politicisation of the entire system — from prosecutors, whose head is the result of political agreements, to the Office of the President, which traditionally stands outside the branches of power and duplicates all other spheres of state activity. After all, criminal proceedings involve various actors: an investigator who collects evidence, a prosecutor who exercises procedural guidance and an investigating judge who oversees compliance with human rights and freedoms, including the application of preventive measures.

In other words — the Mahamedrasulov case or other ‘political’ cases are an indictment of the entire criminal justice system, not exclusively of the SSU. Moreover, if the SSU is maximally removed from this system (which is precisely the idea of the reform, which, among other things, limits the Service’s jurisdiction), the possibility of involving it in political cases will also decrease. What follows is the depoliticisation of the entire criminal justice system, which is beyond the scope of this article.

In this respect, it would be more effective to shift the focus of the discussion from attachment to individual personalities to the search for systemic institutional solutions. Thus, it is worth speaking about gradual reform of the Service, which would transform and develop the structure itself, while at the same time strengthening democratic oversight over it. This can be done by Members of Parliament through the specialised Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence.

At the beginning of 2027, it is planned to establish a separate Verkhovna Rada Committee that will ensure the Parliament’s oversight functions over special-purpose bodies with law enforcement functions, law enforcement bodies of special purpose and intelligence bodies. It will operate in accordance with best European practices and will be protected from unjustified political influence. This measure of the Rule of Law Roadmap strengthens the Parliament’s role in oversight of the SSU.

In addition, the work of the Service should be monitored by an independent ombudsman / oversight body to investigate individual complaints and other issues related to the activities of the SSU. The establishment of this position or body in line with European standards is envisaged by the Roadmap by the first quarter of 2027.

Discussion of reform has been ongoing since 2021. Its aim is to transform the special service into a small, mobile, high-tech structure, similar to the UK’s MI5, with an exhaustive list of tasks: counterintelligence, counterterrorism and the protection of state secrets.

The foundation for this was intended to be Draft Law No. 3196-d, adopted at first reading in January 2021. It provided for the demilitarisation of the Service, the removal of non-core functions of pre-trial investigation of the aforementioned types of economic crimes and the strengthening of the counterintelligence block. The relevant initiative was prepared considering EU and NATO recommendations and strategic documents on the development of the security sector.

However, the context has changed radically. At present, this draft law is no longer sufficient, and the necessary changes will be attempted through several legislative initiatives, the central one of which should be a new Law of Ukraine ‘On the Security Service of Ukraine’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets deadlines for these innovations. The SSU itself participated in its development, and the European Commission also provided its assessment. In the fourth quarter of 2025, the analysis of EU and NATO legislation is to be finalised, and by the first quarter of 2026 — a new Law ‘On the SSU’ is to be adopted. In accordance with the requirements of international partners, it should focus the Service’s activities on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and the protection of state secrets. In addition, a substantial block of reforms related to the activities of law enforcement bodies will apply to investigative and operational units.

Changes to the legislation are possible. In 2025 alone, two laws were adopted that clarify the structure, strengthen social guarantees and increase the number of SSU personnel. The Service has also been granted the right to independently submit draft legislative amendments to the Government or the President (previously this was done through the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

The time for discussing whether SSU reform is necessary has long passed. The Ukrainian authorities now have clear obligations — both to society and to the European Union. Changes to the structure must also be in the interests of the SSU itself: the body needs to cleanse its reputation and to restore public trust both in the rule of law and in the fact that old patterns will not be repeated and that the special service will not become yet another instrument of political influence and coercion.

Scandals surrounding the SSU, the events of July 2025, subsequent criminal proceedings in which NABU detectives are suspects and the experience of ‘political shaking’ of the leadership of certain institutions point to long-term negative consequences in wartime conditions. Therefore, restoring trust in the SSU not as an ‘organ of political persecution’ or a ‘punitive club of the President’ has become a relatively new development goal for the Service, which emerged in 2025.

Moreover, reform of the SSU is a condition for Ukraine’s further European integration. The Security Service of Ukraine can transform from a multifunctional law enforcement body with features of politicisation into a modern strategic special service of the European model, aligned with EU and NATO standards. The only question is whether the Ukrainian authorities will have sufficient political will not to waste this opportunity.

The Civilian Security Sector Reform (CSSR) programme has been launched, bringing together the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and other civil society organisations, think tanks and experts to discuss how to reform the civilian security sector and make it more effective, transparent and aligned with EU standards.

The discussion also focused on how civil society can meaningfully influence the implementation of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform (OAS) – the key transformation document for 2023–2027. An important part of the event was identifying ‘entry points’ for civil society organisations to support the authorities in implementing the reform, particularly through contributing to the preparation of draft laws and strategic documents.

Evhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the ALI, spoke about the progress made and the challenges encountered in implementing the OAS Action Plan.

As noted by the expert, reform of law-enforcement agencies requires a comprehensive approach: Chapter 24 of the EU acquis contains not only a list of specific measures, but first and foremost refers to the Overarching Strategic Plan. In other words, the task is twofold and concerns not only individual institutions, but also the rules under which they operate — changes to criminal procedure, forensic activity, criminal policy and so on. The main institutions responsible for implementing these measures are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. At the same time, Yevhen Krapyvin noted that there are far fewer civil society organisations specialising in these areas than in anti-corruption or judicial reform.

Regarding the implementation of the Overarching Strategic Plan, session participants discussed the following issues:

• how the OAS and its Action Plan are embedded in the fulfilment of obligations under Chapters 23 and 24;
• the role of the OAS Plan in reforming law enforcement agencies;
• why implementation of the Action Plan is effectively equivalent to fulfilling the EU’s requirements;
• where in this process the involvement of civil society is essential.

It should be recalled that the adoption of the Overarching Strategic Plan in 2023 constituted the implementation of one of the seven recommendations made by the European Commission in June 2022 regarding the granting of EU candidate status to Ukraine. The following year, by Order No. 273 of 23 August 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Action Plan, which contains a detailed list of measures for implementing the strategic priorities and is specifically aimed at delivering the OAS. In 2025, the OAS became an integral part of the Rule of Law Roadmap, as its implementation is one of the EU integration measures under Chapter 24 of the EU acquis.

Some of the strategic priorities of the Action Plan are examined in greater detail in a separate article by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The Civilian Security Sector Reform (CSSR) programme is aimed at supporting Ukraine’s European integration objectives by assisting Ukrainian partners in reforming the law-enforcement sector in line with the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as part of Ukraine’s security and defence sector for 2023–2027 and its Action Plan. The programme is implemented with the support of the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office.