Following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, the return of combatants to civilian life and their full reintegration has become one of the key challenges of state policy. Ukraine already has over 2 million veterans, and once the active phase of the war ends their number will rise significantly. At the same time, the current system of support for veterans remains fragmented and is largely based on approaches formed back in the early 1990s.

The principal legislative act in the field of support for veterans and their families is the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection’, adopted in 1993. This Law does not establish a coherent system of state veterans policy; it regulates matters of status and sets out more than 20 benefits, only a few of which work in practice. The regulation of other aspects of veterans support is scattered across dozens of laws and items of subordinate legislation. This leads to the duplication of provisions, gaps in legal regulation and difficulties in accessing services and support.

A further problem is the absence of a legally regulated mechanism for the transition from military service to civilian life. As a result, veterans often face difficulties in accessing medical assistance, mental and psychological support, professional retraining, employment, the launch of their own business, the receipt of social services and participation in community life.

The situation is compounded by insufficient coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies, healthcare institutions, employment services and other actors that provide services to veterans.

The existing system does not take into account the importance of communities as the principal actor in delivering veterans’ reintegration measures. There is also uneven access to services depending on the community of residence, a shortage of trained specialists — particularly in psychological support, rehabilitation and social care — and the insufficient adaptation of many state services to the specific needs of veterans.

The need to create a comprehensive state veterans policy and a system for the transition from military service to civilian life is reflected in the Veterans Policy Strategy until 2030.

The need to develop a comprehensive state veterans policy corresponds to Ukraine’s commitments in the spheres of social policy, employment and inclusion within the process of accession to the European Union.

The European Commission’s Ukraine 2025 Report points to the need to promote the integration of veterans into the labour market and to safeguard the rights of persons with disabilities, whose number is growing as a result of the war.

The need to develop a comprehensive system of support for veterans and their reintegration is also noted in the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) briefing ‘Ukraine’s Veterans Policy’ (2026), which regards veterans as one of the key resources for the country’s post-war recovery.

In June 2026, the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was expanded, addingCouncil of the European Union. ‘EUAM Ukraine: Council broadens the Mission’s mandate to counter hybrid threats and support veteran reintegration’. Press release, 11 May 2026. EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine). ‘EUAM Ukraine Starts Operating under Expanded Mandate’. News release, 15 May 2026. new priorities to its work that include support for the rehabilitation and reintegration of veterans.

At the same time, the Ukraine Facility Plan expressly provides for a reform of the transition from military service to civilian life, encompassing rehabilitation, psychological support, professional retraining, employment and support for veteran entrepreneurship, with a completion deadline in the third quarter of 2026.

• a fragmented and outdated model of veterans support oriented towards a system of benefits and payments;
• limited access to medical and rehabilitation care and to mental health support and psychosocial support;
• reduced employment and economic self-sufficiency owing to the underdevelopment of employment and entrepreneurship-support mechanisms;
• heightened risks of social exclusion, deterioration of psycho-emotional wellbeing and the loss of human capital;
• ineffective use of veterans’ potential for economic recovery, community development and strengthening societal resilience;
• the persistence of fragmented regulation and insufficient coordination among authorities, local self-government and service providers;
• a mismatch with contemporary international approaches to veterans policy and the reintegration of veterans.

In March 2025, Law of Ukraine No. 4285-IX was adopted, setting out priorities for creating a system of support for war veterans, members of their families and the families of fallen Defenders of Ukraine, in particular through the streamlining of veterans policy.

These priorities are to be implemented in a corresponding legislative act. Several draft acts have been developed so far: the draft Law of Ukraine ‘On the Fundamental Principles of State Veterans Policy regarding Veterans Who Took Part in Repelling the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine’ (registration No. 13696, dated 25 August 2025). The draft was prepared to implement step 7.4 of the Ukraine Facility Plan.

In parallel, the Government has drafted the Code of Ukraine on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (the Veterans’ Code) (registration No. 14265, dated 28 November 2025), which aims to codify legislative acts into a single legal instrument.

The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Social Policy and Protection of Veterans’ Rights has prepared its own (alternative) version of the draft Code on the Protection of Statehood, Independence and the Status of Defenders of the State (registration No. 14265-1, dated 17 December 2025).

All of the above draft legislative acts enshrine veterans’ rights in the areas of:

• rehabilitation and medical care, including psychological assistance;
• training, retraining and professional development programmes;
• the conditions necessary for the employment of veterans as a distinct category;
• measures to support veteran businesses.

Persistence of a Fragmented Veterans Policy System

Legislation in the veterans sphere remains scattered across a large number of laws and items of subordinate legislation. In the absence of a comprehensive legislative act, individual aspects of support for veterans and their families continue to be governed by different instruments.

This creates risks of:

• duplication of the functions and powers of public authorities;
• inconsistency among state veterans-support programmes;
• difficulty for veterans in accessing services and support programmes;
• the uneven application of state policy at community level.

Absence of a Coherent System for Transition from Military Service to Civilian Life

Despite the development of individual veterans-support programmes, Ukraine still lacks a legally defined, coherent system for the transition from military service to civilian life that would ensure continuous support for a service member both before and after their discharge.

This increases the risk that:

• veterans will not receive timely information about available services and support;
• veterans’ needs in the spheres of rehabilitation, mental health, education and employment will go unidentified;
• state and local support programmes will operate in isolation from one another;
• the reintegration of veterans will depend largely on their place of residence and the capacity of the particular community.

Loss of Human Capital and of Potential for the Country’s Recovery

Veterans are one of the key groups on which Ukraine’s post-war recovery will largely depend. The absence of an effective system of support and reintegration may limit veterans’ opportunities for employment, education, entrepreneurial activity and participation in community life.

This creates risks of:

• a decline in veterans’ economic activity;
• increased social isolation;
• growing demand for social support in the future and an excessive burden on the social assistance system;
• the underuse of veterans’ potential for community development and the country’s recovery.

Risk of Failing to Meet Commitments under the Ukraine Facility

The entry into force of a legislative act on state veterans policy is defined as one of the steps of the Ukraine Facility Plan. The purpose of this step is to build a comprehensive system of support for veterans, particularly in the spheres of rehabilitation, medical and psychological assistance, professional adaptation, employment and veteran entrepreneurship.

A delay in adopting or implementing the relevant legislation may:

• complicate the fulfilment of the indicators of the Ukraine Facility Plan;
• negatively affect the assessment of reform progress by European partners.

Short-Term (Urgent Legislative Actions)

• Adopt a legislative act on state veterans policy.

A single legislative act should enshrine the foundations of state veterans policy and create the legal basis for forming a system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

In doing so, it is advisable to:

• define the principles and objectives of state veterans policy;
• establish a system for the transition from military service to civilian life;
• define the powers of state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons involved in ensuring the transition;
• provide for mechanisms to identify the individual needs of veterans and members of their families and to introduce case management approaches;
• ensure inter-agency coordination in the field of veterans support.

Medium-Term

• Establish a fully fledged system for the transition from military service to civilian life.

The introduction of such a system should go beyond individual support programmes and provide for the continuous support of a service member from the moment preparation for discharge begins until the reintegration process is complete, engaging numerous stakeholders and ensuring coordination among them.

In particular:

1. introduce a mechanism for assessing a service member’s needs prior to discharge;
2. define the procedure for inter-agency cooperation between the security and defence sector and civilian authorities;
3. ensure continuity of access to medical, rehabilitation, social, educational and other services;
4. create mechanisms for informing veterans about available support programmes;
5. establish a system of coordination among state authorities, local self-government bodies and other persons that provide support to veterans and their families.

• Strengthen the role of territorial communities in implementing veterans policy.

The reintegration of veterans takes place primarily at community level, so state policy should provide appropriate tools to support the local level.

To this end, it is advisable to:

1. define minimum standards for supporting veterans in communities;
2. ensure the development of a system of veteran-support specialists;
3. create mechanisms for coordination among communities, veteran spaces and service providers;
4. help strengthen communities’ capacity to provide services to veterans and members of their families.

• Ensure the transition from a benefits model to a model of restoring human capital.

The further development of veterans policy should be aimed not only at social protection but also at creating conditions for veterans’ active participation in the life of the state and communities.

In particular, it is necessary to:

• expand opportunities for vocational education and requalification;
• improve veteran employment-support programmes;
• develop tools to support veteran entrepreneurship;
• ensure the necessary level of health recovery;
• integrate mental health issues into all stages of reintegration;
• introduce mechanisms for assessing the effectiveness of state veterans policy on the basis of veterans’ outcomes and needs.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Involving international (foreign) experts in selection commissions within judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) is an important element of advancing Ukraine’s European integration interests. It helps to bring national legislation closer to European standards and increases the confidence of European institutions and partners in the reforms. Such involvement stems from Ukraine’s international commitments, as well as from the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The Ukraine Facility Plan provides that ‘further improvement of the selection of new Supreme Court (SC) judges is important, through enhancing the integrity vetting procedure and the meaningful involvement of independent experts’. It also states that the ‘High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is steadily improving its overall operational effectiveness; however, additional judges are needed, selected transparently and on the basis of integrity vetting, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE)’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets out a commitment to fill all 25 vacant positions at the HACC, specifically with the involvement of the PCIE, by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

The European Commission has noted the need to continue involving international experts in the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The Commission has also recommended improving the selection of SC judges and the verification of the integrity declarations of SC judges and judges of other higher courts, with the temporary but meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.

The problem is that, in fulfilling these international commitments, selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts apply different approaches to adopting and publishing their decisions. 

This concerns the selection of candidates for the positions of members of:

• the HQCJ;
• the High Council of Justice (HCJ);
• the head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors;
• judges of the CCU;
• judges of the HACC;
• judges of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC);
• judges of the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).

The differing approaches relate both to the structure and reasoning of selection commissions’ decisions and to the issuing of so-called ‘negative conclusions’ (that is, decisions concerning candidates who have ceased to take part in the competition). For example, the Selection Commission for the positions of HQCJ members (the HQCJ Selection Commission) issues no such conclusions at all; instead, it produces only a final list of candidates recommended for the post of HQCJ member. By contrast, the Ethics Council (which assists in establishing whether a candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity) actively uses ‘negative conclusions’.

Another problem is the adoption of unreasoned decisions. Proper reasoning of decisions following the assessment of candidates against the established criteria should give a clear understanding of what guided the selection commissions when assessing those candidates: what was taken into account and what was not, and the grounds for a particular decision. Proper reasoning would not only resolve many questions for candidates (in particular those who did not pass the competition), but would also help to increase confidence in selection commissions’ decisions. While some selection commissions’ decisions are fairly well structured and properly reasoned (for example, those of the HQCJ and the PCIE), others contain only general wording and boilerplate phrasing and lack proper justification. Such problems are present, for instance, in the Ethics Council’s decisions on candidates’ compliance with the criteriaAt the same time, the Ethics Council’s decisions finding candidates non-compliant with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity are, by contrast, well reasoned. of professional ethics and integrity.

The application of inconsistent practice in formulating decisions may create risks for understanding selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates, and does nothing to promote the transparency of their work.

Different selection commissions use different decision-making models. The votes of international (foreign) experts are always decisive; however, the specific models differ. For instance, a joint decision of the HQCJ and the PCIE in selecting HACC judges requires a majority of the total number of participants in the joint sitting, but no fewer than three votes of PCIE members. For commissions such as the Ethics Council or the SDI Selection Commission, four votes are required, two of which belong to international (foreign) experts. This makes the system of selection commissions confusing and difficult to understand, reducing its transparency and coherence.

A separate issue requiring attention is the right to a casting vote, where approaches likewise differ. For example, international experts hold the right to a casting vote (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the Selection Commission for the positions of the head of the SDI, their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors (the SDI Selection Commission), the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), and the Expert Council); the PCIE has the right to veto any candidate for the post of HACC judge on the grounds of non-compliance with the established criteria.

Numerous cases have also been recorded in which the same person may apply for different competitions for posts, both within a single body and across different bodies under different quotas allocated by different appointing/electing entities. As a result, the absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.

Certain differences are also observed in the publication of selection commissions’ decisions. For example, the Ethics Council adopts and publishes a reasoned conclusion on whether each candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity; the SDI Selection Commission publishes reasoned decisions concerning candidates whose participation was terminated owing to a reasonable doubt as to their compliance with the integrity criterion or the ethical standards established for a judge, but only at the candidate’s written request; for candidates assessed as ‘non-compliant’ against the criteria of high moral qualities or a recognised level of competence in the field of law, the AGE publishes only the operative part of the decision, without setting out the reasons underlying it. The full, reasoned text of the decision is published by the AGE at the written request of such a candidate.

The decisions of some selection commissions (all except the AGE) cannot be challenged in court because they are not regarded as ‘final’. The SC has developed a systematic position on selection commissions, according to which they do not adopt final decisions but merely assist the appointing/electing entity by carrying out a discrete stage of the competitive procedure. Judicial review is instead possible only in respect of the final decision of the appointing/electing entity.

The question of defining the ‘finality of decisions’ is particularly contentious for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For them, such decisions are in essence final (leaving the appointing/electing entity no choice), and the impossibility of challenging them deprives the person of the right to judicial protection. Legislation provides only for the possibility of challenging AGE decisions — specifying which of its decisions may be challenged in court and on which exceptional grounds — whereas no such legislative provision exists for the decisions of other selection commissions.

A further obstacle to the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions in administrative courts is their lack of public-authority powers. The SC’s case law has established an approach according to which selection commissions are not entities vested with public-authority powers in disputed legal relations. Accordingly, in some cases the SC’s case law indicates that disputes against selection commissions are not subject to consideration under the rules of administrative justice (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the SDI Selection Commission). Selection commissions are neither bodies of authority nor entities vested with public-authority powers; they do not have the status of legal entities. Representing such commissions, even in administrative proceedings, is hampered by the absence of rules for designating a representative to sign procedural documents on behalf of selection commissions (their heads do not hold such powers) and to take part in court hearings.

The exception is the AGE, which the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court recognisesRuling of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 20 February 2025 (case No. 990/407/24, proceedings No. П/990/407/24). as a body ‘vested by the state with authoritative and managerial functions in the legal relations arising in the process of forming the judicial corps of the CCU’.

Where such practice is absent:

• the risk of breeding distrust in the functioning of selection commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole increases;
• risks arise in the understanding — by candidates, outside observers, and the public — of these selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates.

At present, there are no draft laws addressing the problem described.

1. Applying different approaches to voting and decision-making by selection commissions — in particular regarding the structure and reasoning of decisions and the approach to determining voting results and so-called negative conclusions — breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
2. The absence of public voting results and insufficient reasoning and justification of such decisions breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
3. The absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.
4. The absence of unified approaches to determining the finality of decisions for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For such candidates these decisions are in fact final — and the impossibility of challenging them, at the level of both regulatory acts and SC case law, deprives them of the right to judicial protection.

The adoption and publication of decisions by selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts in judicial authorities and the CCU require further regulation.

1. Avoid a formalistic approach to justifying decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria.
2. Develop a uniform approach to the structure, justification, and adoption of decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria within a single commission.
3. Develop and approve a template/model decision for the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria, together with accompanying guidance enshrining the requirement that such decisions be properly reasoned.
4. Provide that negative decisions of selection commissions be published in anonymised form, and positive decisions be published with the personal data that were public during the candidate’s public interview. If a person who received a positive decision was not appointed to the post, they may apply to the selection commission to have their data anonymised.
5. Develop and introduce a single database of candidate profiles, with a uniform CV format, for those taking part in competitions for posts in judicial authorities and the CCU. Grant access to these profiles to members of the relevant selection commissions and of the relevant bodies to which candidates are appointed/elected.
6. In future, review the approach to granting international (foreign) experts a casting vote.
7. Hold a broad discussion on the question of defining the final nature of decisions adopted by selection commissions.
8. Enshrine in legislation clear grounds for the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions solely on the basis of procedural non-compliance, in particular for candidates for whom such commissions’ decisions on non-compliance with the established criteria effectively mean the termination of their participation in the competition and are therefore final. The legislation should provide for the period over which a selection commission assesses a candidate’s compliance with the integrity criterion.
9. Enshrine in legislation rules governing which selection commissions’ decisions may be challenged and on what grounds, which may not be challenged, and the rules for representing selection commissions in court.
10. Continue consolidating the SC’s case law and developing standard approaches to resolving disputed situations on the issues identified.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

European integration assessmentThis refers to (1) the assessment of a draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s international commitments in the field of European integration and (2) the verification of a draft law’s compliance with EU law (the EU acquis). is designed to verify whether a draft law complies with European Union law (the EU acquis). Such an assessment makes it possible to evaluate how far the proposed regulation aligns with the relevant act of EU law and to identify, in good time, provisions that may conflict with EU law and slow down the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation.

The obligation to carry out European integration assessment of draft laws is set out in several legal acts of differing legal force, each governing different stages of the legislative process. This approach does not foster a single, unified mechanism for conducting European integration assessment, since its individual elements are regulated in different ways.

Parliamentary assessment is carried out by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union (hereinafter, the Committee on European Integration). Current legislation does not oblige other committees to respond to the observations and proposals set out in the Committee’s opinions. The absence of any statutory definition of a ‘European integration draft law’, or of the criteria for one, limits the scope for the relevant committee to carry out European integration assessment.

The requirement to assess draft laws for compliance with international commitments on European integration and with EU law is established by several legal acts.

Law of Ukraine No. 1629-IV ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004, remains in force. Law No. 1629-IV provides for the mandatory assessment of all draft laws by the parliamentary committee on European integration. The committee is required to determine whether a draft law falls within an area, the legal relations of which are governed by EU law. Draft laws falling within such areas are referred to the authorised central executive authority for the preparation of an expert opinion on their compliance with the EU acquis.

This Law, however, has not been amended following the enshrinement of the European integration course in the Constitution of Ukraine or the granting to Ukraine of EU candidate status. In practice, although the Law remains formally in force, it is not applied.

Instead, the assessment of European integration laws is governed by several other acts. A draft law initiated by the Government undergoes assessment before it is even registered in Parliament. The Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers require every draft law to undergo a mandatory assessment of its compliance with Ukraine’s European integration commitments and with EU law.

Assessment of European integration laws is provided throughout a draft law’s passage through the Verkhovna Rada: from registration to consideration in the second and subsequent readings.

The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that, after registration, every draft law must be referred to the Committee on European Integration, which assesses the draft law’s compliance with Ukraine’s commitments in the field of European integration and issues an expert opinion. The Committee is required to deliver this opinion within 21 days. In practice, given the volume of draft laws registered in Parliament, meeting this requirement of the Rules of Procedure is unrealistic. Since the start of the ninth convocation, more than 9,000 draft laws have been registeredAs at 01.06.2026, 9,145 draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. in the Verkhovna Rada.

In July 2022, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which provided for additional assessment of European integration draft laws. When preparing such draft laws for the second and subsequent readings, parliamentary committees are required to refer them to the Committee on European Integration and to the Government for additional assessment.

As a result, the mechanism for European integration assessment of draft laws is established by acts of differing legal force, which undermines the development of a consistent practice in assessing European integration draft laws. Moreover, neither the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada nor Resolution No. 2483-IX places main committees any obligation to respond to the observations expressed in the expert opinions of the Committee on European Integration.

At the same time, legislation contains no definition of what constitutes a European integration draft law, which somewhat diminishes the role of such assessment. A draft law may be designated as a European integration draft law at different stages of its passage through the Verkhovna Rada (at registration or after its adoption in the first reading), creating a risk that the relevant committee or the Government may become involved and deliver its opinionFor example, the Committee revised its opinion on Draft Law No. 13071 — determining that the draft law was aimed at implementing a measure under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions — only after the draft law had been adopted in the first reading and after the comparative table for the second reading had been submitted. The Committee on European Integration had not provided an opinion before the first reading. Draft law card, registration No. 13071 of 11.03.2025. only at a late stage. Where a draft law is revised after it has been designated as a European integration draft law, bringing it into line with EU law may require additional time.

For a long time, draft laws were designated as ‘European integration’ by the Committee on European Integration, acting at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative. In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to Membership of the European Union’, which provides that the special ‘European integration’ marker is assigned by the Secretariat of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Law of the European Union. Other draft laws may acquire ‘European integration’ status on the basis of an opinion of the Committee on European Integration.

Whether or not a draft law has been designated as a European integration draft law determines the extent of the Committee on European Integration’s involvement. If a draft law prepared for the second reading is, in substance, contrary to EU law but has not been designated as a European integration draft law, the Committee on European Integration has no right to deliver its opinion.

To strengthen the role of European integration assessment in the consideration and adoption of draft laws in the Verkhovna Rada, the following steps are needed:

• Unify the European integration assessment process across all stages of a draft law’s consideration in Parliament, preferably by introducing a dedicated procedure for the adoption of European integration draft laws.
• Define the concept of, and the requirements for, a ‘European integration draft law’. This would help to resolve the uncertainty surrounding which draft laws are subject to European integration assessment.
• Expand the powers of the Committee on European Integration to conduct assessment at all stages of the legislative process. Assessing every draft law prepared for the second and subsequent readings would be impractical given the Committee’s heavy workload. Instead, the Committee could be granted the right to conduct European integration assessment of draft laws (that have not been designated as European integration draft laws) on its own initiative or at the request of the main committee. Other committees should develop a mechanism for responding to the opinions of the Committee on European Integration — for example, by considering such opinions at committee meetings.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Who should appoint and dismiss the Prosecutor General, and how? Today, that decision rests almost entirely with those in power: the President appoints the head of the prosecution service with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada, while removal can be secured through a parliamentary vote of no confidence — a majority of MPs’ votes.

The consequence is chronic institutional instability: in all the years of Ukraine’s independence, no Prosecutor General has served a full term of office, and the average tenure falls short of even two years.

The dismissal procedure was criticised as far back as 2014 by the Venice Commission, yet the 2016 constitutional amendments on justice left the office of the Prosecutor General untouched. Ukraine has therefore already committed to depoliticising the procedure as part of its accession to the European Union. The agenda now features a draft law that would introduce an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General with the involvement of international experts — a proposal that has stirred public debate.

In a new policy paper, the experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives examine the substance of Ukraine’s European integration commitments, the relevant European standards and the models adopted by EU member states; weigh the arguments for and against an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General through the lens of constitutionality; and set out concrete scenarios — from the most far-reaching to the most modest — for both appointment and dismissal.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives sets out its own vision: which option is best in the long term, and what can realistically be done right now — under martial law, when amendments to the Constitution are not possible.

Read the policy paper to understand how the office of the Prosecutor General can be depoliticised — and why this is one of the key preconditions for the rule of law in Ukraine.

Following the amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, the powers of the Verkhovna Rada were extended, defining the principles for implementing the state’s course towards acquiring full membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO. At the same time, no amendments have been made to the sectoral lawsThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’, the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Status of the People’s Deputy of Ukraine’, and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Temporary Investigative Commissions and Temporary Special Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’. that would clarify the powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the sphere of European integration.

The role and powers of the Verkhovna Rada and its bodies in the European integration process are regulated only in a fragmentary manner, which prevents the formation of a coherent system of institutional arrangements for EU accession.

As the sole body of legislative power, Parliament adopts laws, including European integration laws. However, the pace at which such laws are adopted is slow: over the course of 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted only eightAs of 17.06.2026. European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate, expedited procedure for adopting European integration laws.

Within its oversight function, the Verkhovna Rada applies certain mechanisms to scrutinise the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the sphere of European integration: holding a ‘Government Question Time’For example, on 01.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the current state of the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, the opening of negotiation clusters, the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of European integration, and the implementation of the list of priority draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 01.05.2026. On 29.05.2026 the Verkhovna Rada held a ‘Government Question Time’, the topic of which was the implementation of state policy in the sphere of Ukraine’s foreign-policy activity under martial law. Verbatim record of the plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 29.05.2026. or hearing representatives of the GovernmentOn 29 April 2026, a meeting of the Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy was held. Committee on Agrarian and Land Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. At the meeting on 06.05.2026, the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy heard information at its meeting on the principal commitments within the negotiation process on Ukraine’s accession to the EU relating to finance, taxation and customs policy. Materials of the Committee meeting of 6 May 2026. Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2026. in committees.

At the same time, there is no coherent legislative mechanism governing how interaction should take place between the Government that currently acts as the principal driving force in the sphere of European integration and Parliament. Certain institutional mechanisms for coordination and procedures for adapting legislation are set out in the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’, adopted in 2004. The Law defined the role of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, of the authorised body in the sphere of adaptation, and of the Coordination Council for the implementation of the State Programme. For example, under this Law, the Coordination Council is to prepare an action plan for implementing the State Programme, the relevant parliamentary committee is to approve it, and the Cabinet of Ministers is to endorse it. However, this Law has not undergone any amendments — neither after the European integration course was enshrined in the Constitution, nor after the Association Agreement entered into force, nor after the start of Ukraine’s EU accession process.

In June 2026, Members of Parliament adopted Resolution No. 4912-IX on parliamentary support for the negotiation process. By this Resolution, the Verkhovna Rada took note of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine ‘On Approval of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis)’ of 01.04.2026 No. 438. It should be noted that measure 2 of strategic outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Public Administration Reform Roadmap provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is to adopt a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme., approved by the Government. The Government has an obligation to agree any changes to the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law with the Chair of the Verkhovna RadaOr, in the Chair’s absence, with the First Deputy Chair or a Deputy Chair of the Verkhovna Rada..

The Resolution relates rather to the oversight powers of the Verkhovna Rada and provides that the Government must report on progress in the sphere of European integration: (1) inform the Verkhovna Rada, the main committee and the Committee on European integration of the results of consultations with the European Union concerning the content of draft laws being prepared by the Government and of draft laws already registered in Parliament; (2) submit a quarterly report on the state of implementation of the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union Law (EU acquis); (3) submit a quarterly report on the current state of negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU; and (4) promptly inform the Verkhovna Rada of decisions taken in respect of Ukraine by EU bodies and of the individual positions of member states, and so on. At the same time, this approach to providing information can hardly be described as inclusive or transparent: Resolution No. 4912-IX does not provide for the consideration of the reports submitted by the Government (whether by the relevant committee or at a plenary sitting of Parliament).

Resolution No. 4912-IX also placesThe National Adaptation Programme also comprises the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions, and the Action Plan for the Protection of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine. the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada under an obligation to ensure coordination of the Verkhovna Rada and its Secretariat with regard to (1) implementing the measures of the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions (in respect of Section III, ‘The Functioning of Parliaments in a Democratic System’); and (2) the procedure for working with the National Adaptation Programme.

Within the Verkhovna Rada of the ninth convocation, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union is in operation. It is this Committee that carries out the parliamentary assessment of draft laws for compliance with Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the sphere of European integration and with the EU acquis. The Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that this Committee prepares an opinion on every draft law registered in Parliament.

In addition, pursuant to Resolution No. 2483-IX, the Committee on European Integration also assesses European integration draft laws ahead of the second and subsequent readings, which increases the workload on the Committee. The Chair of the Committee has repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the Committee’s staffing capacity. The Committee’s powers also include granting a draft law ‘European integration’ status, at the request of the Government or the main committee, or on its own initiative.

Within its oversight powers, the Committee holds monitoring meetings. For example, in April 2026, the Committee held a meeting, where the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to EU Law was presented.

At the same time, the Committee has not been designatedThis is due to the distribution of areas of competence among the committees of the Verkhovna Rada. For example, a draft law concerning the protection of natural resources is considered by the Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management; one concerning the activities of political parties, by the Committee on Legal Policy; one concerning customs policy, by the Committee on Finance, Taxation and Customs Policy, and so on — even though such draft laws may be European integration ones. as the main committee for the preparation of any European integration draft law, which means that the weight of its assessment in the legislative process depends largely on the position of the main committee and its willingness to respond to the comments of the relevant committee. The draft laws that the Committee on European Integration considers as the main committee mostly concern the ratification of Ukraine’s international treaties with the EU and its member states.

In July 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX, which provided for the establishment of European integration subcommittees in all parliamentary committeesNamely, subcommittees on the adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of EU law (EU acquis) and on the fulfilment of Ukraine’s international legal commitments in the sphere of European integration. (other than the Committee on European Integration).

Committees took two approaches: most established new subcommittees, while a smaller number assigned the new areas of competence to existing subcommittees. As of 2026, such subcommittees have been created within all committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; however, Members of Parliament rate their effectiveness as low.

Members of such a subcommittee take part in the meetings of the relevant Committee on European Integration and also hold meetings with the Government on European integration progress. At the same time, these subcommittees have not been given any new instruments for their work or for their participation in the European integration process. At the subcommittee level, there are no agreed approaches to assessing draft laws for compliance with the EU acquis, nor appropriate mechanisms for coordination between subcommittees or between a subcommittee and the Government, which results in varying levels of involvement. A subcommittee’s participation in preparing European integration laws often depends on the individual chairing it and on his/hers expertise and activity.

The institutional mechanism associated with the formation and implementation of state policy in the sphere of European integration has not undergone substantial change, despite progress in the negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This creates a gap in the inter-institutional coordination of Parliament and the Government and a mismatch between the political commitments undertaken and the actual capacity to fulfil them. A modern framework law on the principles of state policy in the sphere of European integration could help bridge this gap and ensure the implementation of the declared course towards EU membership.

The mechanism for informing the Verkhovna Rada introduced by Resolution No. 4912-IX should be supplemented with procedures for the mandatory consideration of the Government’s reports on the state of implementation of the National Adaptation Programme and of information on the European integration process. Such reports and information could be considered at meetings of the Committee on European integration, with the involvement of representatives of other committees, or at plenary sittings. These measures should ensure proper feedback and the broader involvement of Members of Parliament, as well as transparency and inclusiveness in decision-making in the sphere of European integration.

The Committee on European Integration should be more closely involved in the process of adopting European integration laws in the Verkhovna Rada. Other parliamentary committees should develop a mechanism to interact with the Committee on European Integration so that its assessment is taken into account when preparing draft laws for consideration at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.

The Verkhovna Rada should also define standards for the operation of the European integration subcommittees and establish their systematic cooperation with the Committee on European Integration.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 1 April 2026, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to European Union LawIt is worth noting that Measure 2 of Strategic Outcome 5 of the section ‘Policy Development and Coordination’ of the Roadmap on Public Administration Reform provides that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopts a draft law approving the National Adaptation Programme. (EU acquis) (hereinafter – the National Adaptation Programme). The document comprises 1,875 tasks, providing for the implementation of more than 1,600 EU legal acts. Ukraine has set the ambitious goal of fully completing legislative adaptation by 2027, taking into account possible transitional periods. For Parliament, this means adopting almost 300 laws envisaged by the National Adaptation Programme.

At the same time, the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada contain no separate procedure for processing and adopting draft laws aimed at adapting Ukrainian legislation to European Union law (the EU acquis). Moreover, neither the concept of a European integration draft law nor exhaustive criteria for defining one have been established in legislation.

In the absence of a dedicated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws, their priority consideration is not guaranteed, which may delay the adoption of laws needed to fulfil Ukraine’s European integration commitments. The lack of a legally defined status for European integration draft laws, and of requirements applying to them, complicates the systematic review of draft laws for compliance with EU law.

Developing, adopting and implementing legislation on a dedicated procedure for preparing, initiating, considering and adopting European integration draft laws is one of the Verkhovna Rada’s commitments under the Roadmap on the Functioning of Democratic Institutions. The deadline for this measure was set for the fourth quarter of 2025, yet a separate procedure for adopting European integration laws has still not been established.

MPs have registered several legislative initiatives to address this problem, but none has been considered at a plenary sitting of Parliament. The regulation of procedures for considering European integration draft laws currently remains fragmentary.

For a long time, the key piece of specialised legislation was the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’. This law sets out no separate requirements for adopting European integration laws, but it does provide for the examination of draft laws submitted to Parliament for compliance with the EU acquis at every stage of consideration. However, the law has not been amended in connection with Ukraine’s EU accession process: although it remains formally in force, it is effectively inoperative.

After Ukraine obtained candidate status, Parliament adopted Resolution No. 2483-IX ‘On Certain Measures to Fulfil Ukraine’s Commitments in the Field of European Integration’, which introduced some additional tools for adopting European integration laws.

The Resolution designates the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as the principal initiator of European integration draft laws, although in practice most draft laws aimed at European integration — and marked as such on the draft law’s registration card — have been registered by MPsAs of 01.06.2026, 268 draft laws defined as European integration draft laws had been registered in the Verkhovna Rada. Of these, 153 were registered by MPs, 104 by the Government and 11 by the President.. Draft laws initiated by MPs account for more than half of all European integration laws adopted.

The adopted National Adaptation Programme designates ministries and central executive authorities as responsible for drafting laws. They submit draft laws to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no later than six months before the date set by the National Adaptation Programme for their adoption by Parliament. In other words, the Government allows a minimum of six months for completing all internal procedures within the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (inter-ministerial approval of the draft law, the conduct of examinations, and so on) and for the Verkhovna Rada to adopt the draft law — which, given the slowdown in Parliament’s work, may be insufficient.

The National Adaptation Programme also provides that, when drafting laws, ministries and central executive authorities must ensure cooperation with parliamentary committees and MPs, in particular by presenting and discussing the concepts of such draft laws at meetings of the relevant committees.

A separate instrument intended to give weight to European integration draft laws is the Legislative Work Plan of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which is meant to ensure coordination between Parliament and the Government. For example, the Legislative Work Plan for 2026 contains a separate section listing the European integration draft laws that need to be adoptedIt contains 160 draft laws (41% of the total number of draft laws in the Legislative Work Plan for 2026).. Under this Plan, parliamentary committees were expected to ensure the priority consideration of European integration draft laws. However, the Legislative Work Plan is not a particularly effective planning instrument (for example, Parliament fully implemented only 12% of the 2024 Plan): neither the Government nor Parliament takes it into account in its work.

Since the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine do not establish separate procedures for adopting European integration draft laws, MPs consider them under the ordinary procedure. The Rules of Procedure allow the use of accelerated proceduresFor example, shortening the deadline for submitting alternative draft laws, or shortening the deadline for submitting amendments and proposals for the second reading. that speed up the consideration of laws. During the 15th sessionThe 15th session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 9th convocation began on 03.02.2026., such procedures were not applied to European integration laws. The Rules of Procedure also allow laws to be adopted as a whole at first reading. During the 15th session, the Verkhovna Rada adopted eight European integration laws, seven of which went throughOne law concerned Ukraine’s accession to the Convention on International Access to Justice. The Verkhovna Rada adopts decisions on the ratification or denunciation of international treaties at first reading, both as a basis and as a whole. the full two-reading procedure.

While the European integration procedure is still not enshrined in the legislation, the Verkhovna Rada is attempting to introduce fragmented innovations through its resolutions.

Resolution No. 2483-IX (adopted in 2022) introduces innovations such as an additional examination of a European integration draft law before the second and subsequent readings, and provides that committees must take into account tables of the draft law’s compliance with EU law as well as the official translation of EU legislation.

Resolution No. 2483-IX also gives preference to considering European integration draft laws under the two-reading procedure. A European integration draft law may be adopted only where there is a positive opinion from the examination conducted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Given the provisions on additional discussionResolution No. 2483-IX provides for the floor to be given to a representative of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and, at the chair’s discretion, to a representative of the main committee responsible for adapting Ukrainian legislation to the provisions of European Union law (the EU acquis) and for fulfilling Ukraine’s international legal obligations in the field of European integration., Resolution No. 2483-IX is aimed more at the thorough preparation and consideration of a draft law than at an accelerated procedure for its adoption.

In June 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted another resolution, No. 4912-IX ‘On Parliamentary Support for the Negotiation Process on Ukraine’s Accession to the European Union’^[20]. This Resolution additionally requires the Cabinet of Ministers to inform Verkhovna Rada committees of the outcomes of consultations with the European Union on the content of draft laws being prepared for registration in the Verkhovna Rada, as well as of legislative initiatives already registered.

Resolution No. 4912-IX also provides that draft laws submitted by the Government to implement the National Adaptation Programme are granted ‘European integration’ status. In addition, other draft laws (including alternative onesThe Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada provide that draft laws are considered alternative where they contain provisions regulating the same range of issues and, in essence, replicate provisions governing the same social relations.) relating to Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments may be granted such status by decision of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union.

Several draft laws proposing to regulate the process of adopting European integration laws have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada.

In November 2022, the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada registered Draft Law No. 8242, which provides for a special procedure for considering European integration draft laws. Under this draft law, European integration draft laws are placed on the agenda without an additional vote and are subject to higher requirements for their supporting documents (such as the inclusion of a translation of the relevant EU legislation and a clause-by-clause compliance table). Draft Law No. 8242 gives priority to applying the two-reading procedure when considering European integration draft laws, and allows the text of draft laws to be revised between readings to reflect the comments set out in the opinions of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union, the Government, and the expert and legal units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat. The main committeeThe main committee responsible for the preparation and preliminary consideration of Draft Law No. 8242 is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. issued an opinion recommending that the Verkhovna Rada adopt this draft law as a basis, but it was not considered at a plenary sitting.

In August and September 2025, MPs registered Draft Law No. 13653 and an alternative to it, Draft Law No. 13653-1. Both draft laws propose amending not only the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, but also the Laws of Ukraine ‘On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’ and ‘On the Committees of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.

There are conceptual differences between the two draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 envisages a leading role for the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which approves the National Adaptation Programme and acts as the principal initiator of adaptation draft laws, as well as an accelerated procedure for adopting draft laws. The alternative, Draft Law No. 13653-1, by contrast, strengthens the role of the parliamentary Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union in determining the status of such initiatives and allows for broader participation by MPs.

At the same time, both draft laws shorten the deadlines for submitting alternative draft laws as well as the deadlines for committees to provide their opinions. Both also propose introducing two routes for considering draft laws aimed at European integration: (1) an accelerated route (at first reading), where there are no comments from the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; and (2) the two-reading procedure. Where a draft law is considered under the two-reading procedure, MPs may table amendments and proposals for the second reading only with a justification of how they relate to European integration commitments. The Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine prepare an expert opinion on a draft law that has been prepared for the second or repeat second reading.

Both draft laws also include a provision repealing the 2004 Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Programme for Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the Legislation of the European Union’.

At the same time, these draft laws do not strike a balance between the speed and the quality of considering European integration draft laws. Draft Law No. 13653 provides that, at one stage of consideration, the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union must deliver its expert opinion within three days. This period may prove insufficient for providing an expert opinion, particularly for large draft laws and given the committee’s overall workload. Another shortcoming of the draft is the requirement to ‘add’ supporting documents to a draft law if it is recognised as a European integration draft law after registration. In that case, the speed of considering and adopting the draft law will depend on the legislative initiator’s capacity to carry out a swift assessment of compliance with EU law and to prepare a clause-by-clause compliance table.

These draft laws have still not been considered by the main committeeThe committee designated for the preparation and preliminary consideration is the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Parliamentary Ethics and Administration of Verkhovna Rada’s Work. and therefore cannot be brought to a plenary sitting.

1. The Verkhovna Rada should develop a new draft law, or refine the existing ones, on introducing a separate accelerated procedure for adopting European integration draft laws. It should establish exhaustive criteria for defining draft laws as European integration draft laws, as well as requirements for the supporting documents accompanying such draft laws.
2. For a separate European integration procedure, the abuse of accelerated procedures for considering draft laws must not be permitted. Minimum periods should be set to allow sufficient time for MPs to review draft laws and for the committees and the structural units to provide examination opinions. These periods should take into account the real capacity of the committees and the structural units of the Verkhovna Rada Secretariat to process the text of a draft law.
3. At the same time, the mere existence of such a procedure does not guarantee the swift processing and consideration of European integration draft laws. A significant proportion of European integration initiatives are still pending under review of the main committees, despite the current provision on their priority processing.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

In Ukraine, the interaction between citizens and public institutions is governed simultaneously by the current Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ (No. 393/96-VR of 2 October 1996) and by the recently adopted Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’ (No. 2073-IX of 15 December 2023). However, these two acts rest on different governance logics. The Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ introduces a more modern model of public administration, aligned with European standards and oriented towards taking an individual decision on the merits of a case. The Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’, by contrast, retains a more traditional, post-communist approach centred on the obligation to provide a reply within a set deadline. As a result, situations that are identical in substance — complaints, requests, reports of violations, or requests to resolve an individual matter — may fall under two different procedures (stipulated by two different laws). This is inconvenient for the individual, as it obscures which mechanism should actually be used to resolve a problem. At the administrative level, this duality effectively leaves the choice of procedure to the authorities’ discretion, encourages formal responses rather than genuine resolution, and reduces both the predictability and the effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights.

The specific problem has been described in:

1. the European Commission’s enlargement reports on Ukraine for 2024 and 2025: the sections devoted to public administration reform (2025) state explicitly that Ukraine has still not met the requirement to adopt a Law ‘On Appeals’ that would clearly distinguish administrative procedures from other forms of public petition;
2. the Public Administration Reform Roadmap, which requires the current Law ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ to be aligned with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and with European legislation, and a new law to be adopted by the end of the fourth quarter of 2025.

The continued parallel existence of two different approaches to handling appeals (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Citizens’ Appeals’ and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’) creates a number of systemic risks for both the state and citizens, namely:

• it reduces the predictability of interaction with the state: citizens find it difficult to understand the rules under which an authority will consider a particular appeal and whether this will lead to a genuine resolution or merely to a formal reply;
• this uncertainty reinforces a formalistic style of response: rather than resolving the underlying problem, authorities often confine themselves to issuing a reply within the prescribed deadline, which diminishes the practical effectiveness of protecting citizens’ rights; 
• it generates duplication of procedures and additional administrative burden, since similar matters may follow different legal routes and give rise to repeated appeals and challenges;
• it creates risks for the European integration process. In the approach taken by the EU and the OECD, a clear distinction between the two functions of the state is essential: administrative procedure means taking binding individual decisions with procedural safeguards for the individual, whereas the appeals mechanism is a feedback channel between society and the state. This distinction is crucial, as it ensures a balance between individual rights and administrative effectiveness.

The problem of duplication and inconsistency in the regulation of appeals is currently being addressed through the government’s draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024), which is intended to define how the right of persons to apply to public authorities is exercised and to separate the two channels of interaction between citizens and the public authorities:

• administrative procedure (the Law of Ukraine ‘On Administrative Procedure’): used where a person applies to obtain an individual administrative decision (a permit, registration, licence, or other decision on the merits of a case);
• the appeals mechanism (the new Law ‘On Appeals’): covering proposals, reports of problems, comments, and other forms of communication that do not entail an individual authoritative decision concerning a person’s rights.

To give effect to this approach, draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ proposes the following innovations:

1. a clear definition of the purpose and a classification of proposal-type appeals (proposals, recommendations, comments, and reports of problems);
2. the introduction of a single procedure for considering all appeals;
3. clarification of the range of entities obliged to consider appeals, with a focus on public administration bodies;
4. extension of the right to submit appeals beyond Ukrainian citizens to other natural and legal persons;
5. stronger legal certainty for applicants as to ‘whom to approach’ and ‘under which procedure’;
6. removal of complaints from the appeals mechanism and the transfer of their full regulation to the sphere of administrative procedure, in line with EU standards;
7. institutionalisation of in-person reception of citizens as a component of the work of public authorities, while allowing it to be delegated to authorised officials.

Draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ was considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and adopted in the first reading as a basis on 24 April 2024 and is currently being prepared for the second reading.

Although draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ (of 13 March 2024) is intended to separate administrative procedure from the appeals mechanism, its revised version does not fully resolve the key systemic problems that give rise to certain risks, namely:

• Risk of institutional uncertainty in the appeals-handling system. The reference to ‘other entities designated by the head of a state authority, an authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, or a local self-government body, within whose powers the matters raised fall’ creates legal uncertainty as to whether the law applies to housing maintenance offices, hospitals, schools, social protection bodies, and other providers of public services.

This will lead to:

1. a regulatory ‘grey zone’: some citizens’ appeals remain outside the legal framework (covered neither by the new law nor by the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’);
2. inequality among citizens: depending on whether a reviewing body recognises itself as such, a person may or may not receive a reply to their appeal;
3. an erosion of the authorities’ legitimacy: citizens will not know whom to approach, or whether their appeal will be considered at all.

The core problem: in the absence of clear criteria, the law will be interpreted by the very bodies that consider appeals, at their own discretion, creating a risk of manipulation and of blocking unwelcome communications.

• Risk of formalistic responses to appeals owing to insufficient time to prepare them. Short deadlines for preparing a reply create an unrealistic pace of administration, particularly under martial law.

This leads to:

1. the formalisation of appeal handling: rather than substantive consideration, authorities will be compelled to issue template replies to ‘meet’ the deadline;
2. inevitable breaches of reply deadlines: staff shortages and heavy workloads make compliance with such deadlines practically impossible;
3. the provocation of additional appeals: any formal failure to meet the deadlines becomes grounds for a new appeal, creating a vicious circle.

The core problem: excessively short deadlines encourage ‘brush-off’ replies instead of substantive communication between the state’s representative and the author of the appeal.

• Risk to European integration and to EU support. Retaining in the draft law both the appellant’s ability to challenge the reply of the body considering the appeal and the excessively short deadlines for preparing a reply — which encourage formalistic handling — runs counter to Ukraine’s commitments under Cluster 1 of the EU negotiating framework (the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration reform, and the rule of law).

Retaining these shortcomings weakens Ukraine’s position in the EU accession negotiations.

The core problem: the draft law meant to eliminate competition with the Law ‘On Administrative Procedure’ and to bring Ukrainian appeals practice into line with European practice instead retains provisions that reproduce that very competition.

Conclusion

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Advancing the reform of legislation on citizens’ appeals requires not merely the formal adoption of a new law, but above all its systemic consistency with the legislation on administrative procedure and with the principles of good governance. Unless the existing conceptual and procedural shortcomings are addressed, there is a risk of perpetuating legal fragmentation, weakening the safeguards for citizens’ rights, and complicating Ukraine’s fulfilment of its European integration commitments.

Short-Term Recommendations (Urgent Legislative Changes):

• Clarify the range of ‘other entities considering appeals’ in draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ by adding to it institutions that perform public administration functions, provide public services, or carry out public tasks.
• Remove from draft Law No. 11082 ‘On Appeals’ the right to challenge a reply to an appeal, retaining only the right to challenge a failure to reply or a refusal to consider an appeal.
• Reconsider the excessively short deadlines for handling appeals. It would be advisable to extend the 15-day deadline for providing a reply to the EU standard of 30 days, and to reconsider the obligation to forward an appeal to the competent body within five days.

Medium-Term Recommendations (1–3 Years):

• The appeals system should become an instrument of feedback between the state and society and a source of governance analytics for identifying systemic problems and improving the quality of public services. Accordingly, implementation of the Law ‘On Appeals’ should provide for (1) its transformation into a tool of evidence-based policy-making, (2) the creation of a national system for analysing appeals, (3) the integration of this analysis into assessments of the performance of public authorities, and (4) a shift towards using feedback to adjust public policy and improve services.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation provide for unifying the legal framework for organising the system of law enforcement agencies, by establishing criteria for distinguishing the areas of activity of law enforcement agencies and other state bodies based on their exclusive functional focus. A similar measure is also set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap.

This concerns the development and adoption of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’, which should define:

1. the system of law enforcement agencies;
2. the unified foundations for their organisation and functioning, the main criteria for delimiting their competence and areas of activity;
3. the entrenchment of the principles of integrity, gender equality and non-discrimination in their activities;
4. the development of their analytical capacities, including criminal analysis and the ILP model;
5. the consolidation of their institutional independence, an adequate level of financial, logistical and technical support and guarantees of social and legal protection for employees of law enforcement agencies;
6. forms of inter-agency cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service, including information exchange, as well as interaction with other public authorities and local self-government bodies.

In addition, state policy documents on the reform of all law enforcement agencies provide for improving internal control and anti-corruption mechanisms, applying uniform integrity criteria and standards to vet employees of all law enforcement agencies and monitor them on an ongoing basis, as well as introducing common ethical principles for employees of law enforcement agencies.

These measures are aimed at addressing problems related to duplication of functions, more clearly delimiting the powers of law enforcement agencies, strengthening their independence, increasing their effectiveness and improving mechanisms for interaction as well as legal and social guarantees for their employees.

• 2.1. Key Definitions

For several decades, legal scholarshipFor example: A. V. Lapkin. Prosecutor in Criminal Proceedings: Theoretical, Legal, Organisational and Methodological Problems: monograph. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2020, pp. 98, 122–123, 287; O.S. Tarasenko. On the Concept of Law Enforcement Bodies of Ukraine. Scientific Bulletin of Public and Private Law. Issue 3, 2025, pp. 246–260; A.V. Stolitnii. Legislative Collisions in Defining ‘Law Enforcement Bodies’ and ‘Law Enforcement Agencies’ in the Context of Prosecutorial Supervision: Ways to Unify Terminology. Current Problems of Innovative Economy and Law. 2026. No. 1, pp. 27–31 etc. has debated the meaning and relationship between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agenciesIn Ukrainian «правоохоронні органи» and «органи правопорядку» properly — first is the ‘law defending/securing bodies’ and second is ‘law and order bodies’ (this semantic difference is not obvious in English, but reflects some conceptual aspects of the Ukrainian legislation development during past years)., a debate that intensified after the 2016 amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.

At that time, the concept of law enforcement agencies appeared in the text of the Basic Law as an object of prosecutorial supervision: in accordance with the new functions of the prosecutor’s office, it supervises covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies (Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

In view of this, it may be concluded that, according to the constitutional functions of the prosecutor’s office, law enforcement agencies are vested with powers to carry out covert and other investigative and search actions. Therefore, from the perspective of constitutional regulation, law enforcement agencies primarily include bodies authorised to conduct pre-trial investigations of criminal offences and covert investigative (search) actions, as defined respectively by the CPC of Ukraine (Articles 41 and 216) and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Operational-Search Activities’ (Article 5).

At the same time, Section I of the Constitution of Ukraine uses the concept of law enforcement bodies: ‘ensuring state security and protecting the state border of Ukraine shall be entrusted to the relevant military formations and law enforcement bodies of the state, the organisation and procedure for whose activities shall be determined by law’ (Article 17 of the Constitution). However, this wording is more likely an artefact of outdated terminology, as indicated by two circumstances: (1) law enforcement bodies are mentioned in the general section of the Constitution in the context of national security, rather than in special provisions concerning the activities of executive authorities and justice; (2) amendments to Section I of the Constitution are extremely difficult, unprecedented and, in practice, almost impossibleA draft law amending Section I ‘General Principles’, Section III ‘Elections. Referendum’ and Section XIII ‘Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’ is submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine or by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and, provided it is adopted by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is approved by an all-Ukrainian referendum called by the President of Ukraine (Article 156 of the Constitution of Ukraine). There are no known cases of amendments to Section I in the history of the current Constitution of Ukraine., because this section defines the general principles of the state system, while constitutional amendments introduced after 2014 were primarily aimed at reforming the justice system and defining the state’s European integration and Euro-Atlantic course.

Practising lawyers often refer to the Law of Ukraine ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, which allegedly defines the list of law enforcement bodies. However, this Law expressly states that the list contained in it may be used only for the purposes of regulation by this Law. Under it, ‘law enforcement bodies’ are the prosecution authorities, the National Police, the security service, the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, state border protection bodies, the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, penitentiary bodies and institutions, pre-trial detention centres, state financial control bodies, fish protection bodies, state forest protection bodies and other bodies exercising law-applying or law enforcement functions (Part 1 Article 2 of the Law).

The problem is, first, that this concept applies precisely for the purposes of that Law, as expressly stated in its text; second, that there is no clear criterion by which those particular bodies are included in the list; and third, that the list is not exhaustive, while defining law enforcement bodies through law application and law enforcement functions expands it to a state of complete uncertainty because the features and the subject of the definition repeat each other. Law enforcement bodies cannot be defined as bodies that perform law enforcement functions, since this definition adds nothing to the content of the concept and does not make it possible to understand what such functions consist of.

The law enforcement function is an extremely broad concept. In theory, it includes not only any activity of public authorities involving the application of legal norms but, in some views, even the activity of any person who obeys legal norms and therefore applies them. In other words, reliance on the definition contained in the Law ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’ is impossible under any circumstances except where practical issues of applying its provisions are being resolved. Moreover, the legal uncertainty of the list of law enforcement bodies is disorientingWhite Paper on the Depoliticisation of Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor’s Office: Appointment/Dismissal of Leadership, Y.O. Krapyvin. Centre for Policy and Legal Reform. Kyiv: O.D. Buria, PE. 2023, p. 46..

In 2023, the Supreme Court resolved an exceptional legal problem consisting in the absence, at the legislative level and in case law, of clear criteria for defining the concepts of ‘law enforcement body’ and ‘employee of a law enforcement body’. This had led to inconsistent application of substantive and procedural law and had an extremely negative impact on the implementation of the principle of legal certainty. The subject of divergent case law was the determination of the victim who enjoys enhanced protection by the state (an employee of a law enforcement body) in the relevant elements of criminal offencesA law enforcement officer is designated as a victim of such criminal offences as resistance (Article 342 of the CC of Ukraine), interference with activities (Article 343 of the CC of Ukraine), threat or violence (Article 345 of the CC of Ukraine), intentional destruction or damage to property (Article 347 of the CC of Ukraine), attempt on life (Article 348 of the CC of Ukraine), taking hostage (Article 349 of the CC of Ukraine) and failure to take security measures (Article 380 of the CC of Ukraine)..

According to the legal position of the Supreme Court in case No. 633/195/17 (proceedings No. 13-39ks23), law enforcement bodies should include: (1) public authorities defined in the laws of Ukraine as law enforcement bodies or (2) those exercising a law enforcement function assigned to them at the legislative level. When resolving whether a person is an employee of a law enforcement body, it is necessary to proceed from a systemic analysis of: the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences and normative legal acts regulating the legal status of the relevant public authority with which the person is in an employment or service relationship; the employee’s powers under their job description, which provide for the exercise of a law enforcement function, including the application of preventive measures and coercive measures defined by law, as well as measures provided for by criminal procedure legislation and legislation on administrative offences; and legislation on pension provision for the relevant category of employees.

Attention should also be paid to work by auxiliary bodies of Parliament. In 2024, the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine published a document entitled ‘Scientific Concept of Legislative Support for the Activities of Law Enforcement Agencies of Ukraine’. It rightly notes that the existing conceptual and legislative uncertainty regarding the concept, fundamental principles, status, tasks and functions of law enforcement agencies as a separate autonomous system, as well as their delimitation from other state bodies performing related functions, has a negative impact on combating crime and on the effectiveness of the relevant state policy in this field. As a result, this legal uncertainty leads to inconsistency and imbalance in the work of the relevant state institutions, ineffective performance of their functional powers and, consequently, failure to ensure guarantees for protecting citizens from criminal and other unlawful encroachments, failure to observe the rule of law and failure by state bodies to perform their main task of protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen.

In general, imperfect legal regulation has a negative impact on determining the status of a particular state body and its place in the system of public authorities, and leads to inconsistent law enforcement practice, including in criminal proceedings concerning offences against the authority of public authorities.

In our view, the most productive approach to distinguishing between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies is a functional approach, based on the main tasks and functions of the relevant bodies. This approach is fully consistent with the Constitution of Ukraine and corresponds to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

This approach makes it possible to define:

1. the relationship between these concepts. It appears most appropriate to distinguish between law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies as a broader and a narrower category: every law enforcement agency is a law enforcement body, but not every law enforcement body may be classified as a law enforcement agency;
2. the criteria for classifying a particular state body as law enforcement, including functions and corresponding powers, namely: 1) functions: protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments; protection of public order; ensuring public and national security; 2) powers: prevention, detection, solving and investigation of criminal offences; conducting operational-search measures and covert investigative (search) actions; application of direct coercive measures on behalf of the state, including the use of firearms.

• 2.2. The Concept of a ‘Law Enforcement Agency’ and Its Features

Legal order is a term widely used both in legal scholarship and in national and international law. Thus, Part 1 Article 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that the legal order in Ukraine is based on principles according to which no one may be compelled to do what is not provided for by legislation.

Therefore, legal orderTheory of State and Law: textbook for students of higher legal education institutions / O.V. Petryshyn, S.P. Pohrebniak, V.S. Smorodynskyi et al.; edited by O.V. Petryshyn. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2014, p. 337. is the actual state of ordering of social relations through legal means. The latter formulation effectively emphasises three components of this concept: (a) law; (b) coercion; and (c) order. In all cases, therefore, it concerns, in one way or another, the coercive application of the law to protect legal order by the bodies responsible for its protection.

In view of this, the following definition is proposed:

Law enforcement agencies are central executive bodies and structural units of state bodies and military formations whose main functions under the law are to protect the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protect public order and ensure public and national security.

This definition takes into account situations where these functions are not the main functions of a state body or military formation, but its structure includes units that perform such functions, for example the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The main features of law enforcement agencies may be considered to include:

1. performance of functions related to protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protecting public order and ensuring public and national security;
2. the organisation and procedure for the activities of such agencies and their administrative and legal status are defined by law;
3. belonging to the security and defence sector;
4. powers to prevent, detect, suppress, solve and investigate criminal offences;
5. powers to conduct operational-search activities and/or covert investigative (search) actions;
6. the right to apply direct coercion on the grounds and in cases defined by law, including the right to use firearms;
7. prosecutorial supervision over the activities of such agencies in countering offences and carrying out covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies.

• 2.3. Subject Matter of the Law

The following state bodies and military formations that could be classified as law enforcement agencies, or whose units could fall within the scope of the relevant law, were analysed* for compliance with the features listed above: the National Police of Ukraine (NPU); the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI); the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU); the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU); the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU); the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS); the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU); the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine (UDO); penitentiary bodies and institutions and pre-trial detention centres of the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine (SCES); the intelligence body of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine); the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MLES AFU); units of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU); the State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCS); and the Court Security Service (CSS).

The list of bodies and military formations was formed on the basis of Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Laws of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’ and ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

Compliance with the above features is established on the basis of the provisions of the laws of Ukraine regulating the activities of these bodies.

In addition, the analysis identified certain shortcomings in legislation that will need to be addressed.

• 2.3.1. Status of state bodies

The NPU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS have the status of central executive bodies, while the NABU is a central executive body with special status. Under Ukrainian legislation, these bodies belong to the executive branch.

The SBI is a law enforcement body, while the UDO and the SBGS are special-purpose law enforcement bodies. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On Intelligence’, the SBGS is also classified as an intelligence body.

The SSU has the status of a special-purpose state body with law enforcement functions.

The Court Security Service is a state body within the justice system.

The FISU is defined as an intelligence body with the status of a separate state body that is not an executive authority.

The NGU is a military formation with law enforcement functions, while the MLES AFU is a special law enforcement formation within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The status of a central executive body means that such bodies are established in accordance with the Law of Ukraine ‘On Central Executive Bodies’ and that this Law applies to their activities insofar as it does not contradict special laws. Under Article 16, central executive bodies are established to perform specific functions related to implementing state policy. Their activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the relevant ministry. Special status of a central executive body provides for a special procedure for forming the composition of such a body, if it is collegial, or a special procedure for appointing its head, as well as a special form of interaction with the Government.

The concept of a ‘state body’ has a broad and generalising meaning. The Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’ defines this concept as follows: a public authority, including a collegial state body, or another public-law entity, regardless of whether it has the status of a legal entity, which is vested by legislation with powers to exercise authoritative managerial functions on behalf of the state and whose jurisdiction extends to the entire territory of Ukraine or to a separate administrative-territorial unit. Accordingly, this concept covers legislative, executive and judicial bodies.

• 2.3.2. Functions and tasks

The laws regulating the activities of the state bodies and military formations included in the list show different approaches to defining the functions and tasks of these bodies, as well as to the content of the concepts of ‘task’ and ‘function’. However, the prevailing approach is that a body’s function is its main purpose, while its tasks are specific areas of activity.

Protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments is, in essence, a function of all the bodies on the list. Such protection means ensuring the right to life, liberty, inviolability, personal security and private property, preventing crime, combating terrorism and organised crime and protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of its borders.

Ensuring public and national security is also among the functions of all state bodies on the list.

National security is the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the democratic constitutional order and other national interests of Ukraine from actual and potential threats.

Public security and order means the protection of interests vital to society and individuals, as well as the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, the safeguarding of which is a priority task of the security forces, other state bodies, local self-government bodies, their officials and the public, which implement coordinated measures to realise and protect national interests from the impact of threats.

Five bodies on the list have powers to conduct pre-trial investigations: the NPU, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU and the SSU. In addition to these five bodies, operational-search activities may also be conducted by the SBGS, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine. In view of Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, all these bodies are subject to prosecutorial control. However, the FISU and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine cannot be classified as law enforcement agencies, since their main function is intelligence rather than law enforcement activity.

All bodies on the list have the right to use physical force, special means and firearms on the grounds and in cases defined by law. At the same time, the provisions of the laws regulating the activities of the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, the NGU and the Court Security Service are blanket provisions and refer to the relevant provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’.

• 2.3.3. Belonging to the security and defence sector

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS are not included in the security and defence sector.

Three of the listed bodies have almost identical legal status: the NABU, the ESBU and the SBI. In our view, however, their exclusion from the security and defence sector is erroneous.

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the security and defence sector is a system of public authorities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, special-purpose state bodies with law enforcement functions, civil protection forces, the defence-industrial complex of Ukraine, whose activities are subject to democratic civilian control and, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, are functionally aimed at protecting Ukraine’s national interests from threats, as well as citizens and civil society associations that voluntarily participate in ensuring Ukraine’s national security.

Thus, an important criterion for classifying a particular state body as part of the security sector is its functional focus on protecting the national interests of the state from threats.

Ukraine’s national interests are the vital interests of the individual, society and the state, the realisation of which ensures Ukraine’s state sovereignty, its progressive democratic development and safe living conditions and welfare for its citizens.

Accordingly, threats to Ukraine’s national security are phenomena, trends and factors that make impossible or complicate, or may make impossible or complicate, the realisation of Ukraine’s national interests and the preservation of its national values. Crime is among such threats.

The SBI, the NABU and the ESBU were established to counter specific categories of criminal offences. Moreover, the Law ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’ states that this body counters corruption and other criminal offences committed by senior officials authorised to perform state or local self-government functions and constituting a threat to national security. Under the Law ‘On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine’, this body is tasked with countering threats to Ukraine’s economic security, which is a component of national security. Therefore, the SBI, the NABU and the ESBU should be classified as part of the security and defence sector as security forces.

2.3.4. Law enforcement agencies and the list of issues to be regulated by the law

a) the following public authorities, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply in full:

• the National Police of Ukraine;
• the State Bureau of Investigation;
• the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
• the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine.

b) structural units of the following state bodies and military formations, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply partially:

• the Security Service of Ukraine;
• the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine;
• the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine;
• the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine;
• the National Guard of Ukraine;
• the State Customs Service;
• the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
• the Court Security Service.

In the future, the State Bureau of Military Justice and customs may be added to the list of law enforcement agencies to which the provisions of the Law would apply in full.

It is proposed that the subject matter of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ include the following issues:

1. the concept of a law enforcement agency and other definitions related to the activities of such agencies;
2. the organisational and legal status of law enforcement agencies and the features of special status within the executive branch;
3. an exhaustive list of law enforcement agencies;
4. the foundations for the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles of activity, functions, powers, tasks, guarantees of independence, organisational foundations, model structure and the overall authorised staffing level of each agency;
5. the foundations for analytical activity, including the use of the ILP model, consideration of criminal policy in the activities of law enforcement agencies, application of the SOCTA and IOCTA systems, regular assessment of the crime situation through crime surveys and victimisation surveys, as well as public trust in these agencies, including the sense of security as a key component of trust;
6. the foundations of service in law enforcement agencies, including the principles and procedure for appointing heads, candidate requirements, terms of office of heads, grounds and procedure for early termination of their powers, a list of typical positions such as detective and analyst, the procedure for appointing and dismissing employees, requirements for candidates for positions, general principles for wearing uniforms, general principles for awarding special ranks, social protection and guarantees of material support;
7. the grounds and procedure for using physical force, special means and firearms;
8. the foundations for international and inter-agency cooperation and coordination of the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles, coordination and cooperation arrangements, the role of the MIA, the procedure and forms of cooperation and specific features of interaction between law enforcement agencies during martial law;
9. the foundations of integrity and professional ethics for employees of law enforcement agencies, including ethical principles for interaction with participants in criminal proceedings;
10. the audit and internal control system and the foundations for whistle-blower protection;
11. the general procedure and grounds for holding employees disciplinarily liable;
12. external control over the activities of law enforcement agencies, including parliamentary and public oversight.

Unifying the key foundations for the activities of the above-mentioned bodies would make it possible to eliminate gaps in legislation, clarify the place of these bodies in the overall system of public authorities and their status, strengthen guarantees of their independence and improve the system of interaction between them so that they can perform their main functions more effectively.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), together with a coalition of civil society organisations, has presented the European Commission with the interim findings of this year’s Shadow Report under Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

The presentation, held on 4 June, was joined by representatives of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), which is responsible for the negotiations on enlargement and EU accession with candidate countries and potential candidates, as well as by representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

For the third year running, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the coalition of civil society organisations are monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress in the field of European integration. This is an independent, alternative analysis by representatives of civil society and the expert community, coordinated by ALI.

Participants presented and discussed the results in the areas of the rule of law (the courts, the prosecution service and the bar), the fight against corruption and organised crime, the reform of law enforcement agencies, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Taking part were Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, and Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area; Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs at Transparency International Ukraine; and Tetiana Pechonchyk, Head of the Board, and Anastasiia Datsiv, Advocacy Manager for European Integration, both of the Human Rights Centre ZMINA.

Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, presented the key findings on judicial reform. The focus was on the selection of new judges and the work of the competition commissions, the improvement of disciplinary procedures, and the unresolved problems that require attention now — as well as the latest developments concerning possible cases of corruption in the Supreme Court.

An important achievement during the reporting period was the launch of a comprehensive project on the digitalisation of the judicial system, which the Agency is implementing together with key judicial institutions — the Supreme Court, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU).

The key challenges at this stage are the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, preventing the HCJ’s work from being halted owing to legislative conflicts, and responding appropriately to possible cases of corruption in the judiciary.

The parts of the Shadow Report concerning the prosecution service and the bar, as well as the strengthening of the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies to counter serious crime, including organised crime, were presented by Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area.

He stressed that the competitions cancelled in July 2025 have still not been resumed and that the Prosecutor General retains excessive powers. Despite the European Commission’s demand not only to restore the legislation to its previous state but also to refrain from exercising these powers, there has been no progress whatsoever. The greatest challenge for the development of the prosecution service is the 10 Kachka–Kos priorities for Ukraine for 2026. These concern, first and foremost, changing the politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, as well as introducing a mandatory competition for senior positions. This, in particular, forms part of the drafts of the new Anti-Corruption Strategy that Ukraine is currently developing. The competition for senior positions was due to be introduced back in March 2026, but this did not happen.

Yevhen Krapyvin drew attention to the absence of any progress in reforming the bar: despite the creation in January 2026 of a governmental working group on improving the legislation in this area, only one meeting has been held since. This, together with the resistance of the Ukrainian National Bar Association, is significantly slowing the achievement of a proper outcome and of the objectives of the Rule of Law Roadmap in this area.

Yevhen Krapyvin also addressed the key aspects of the Shadow Report under Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

This year, the experts also analysed another part of the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster — ‘Functioning of Democratic Institutions’. The coalition, coordinated by ALI, likewise shared its work in this area with the European Commission.

This year’s Shadow Report is being prepared by experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe without Barriers, the Ukrainian Bar Association, the Civil Network OPORA and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, with the information support of European Pravda. As has now become customary, it will be published ahead of the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s 2026 Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is a systematic audit by specialist experts from civil society organisations that does not duplicate the state’s official documents or the European Commission’s assessment and is not dependent on their positions. Rather, it is an analytical tool for developing a professional and comprehensive vision of the European integration processes — one that provides for the involvement of experts in the reform process — while also assessing the compliance of Ukrainian legislation and of the entire system with EU standards.

Preparing shadow reports is a regular practice in all candidate countries seeking to join the European Union. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova, independent coalitions of civil society organisations have for years carried out alternative monitoring of reform progress in the areas of the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions and others. In Ukraine, this work has been carried out systematically since 2024, when a coalition of civil society organisations first prepared an alternative analysis to accompany the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is entirely a product of civil society, regardless of the sources of support. To strengthen the institutional independence of the process, from 2026, ALI is setting a new precedent: the Shadow Report is also funded by independent civil society organisations. A significant share of the funds for its development will be covered by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine. ALI takes on the mission of ensuring the utmost impartiality and objectivity in this preparation process, as it does every year.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy (ACS) defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU). The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.

Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan for its implementation — the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP).

This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant Law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years in practice remained to achieve the expected results.

At present, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which is an unprecedented situation. Previously, Parliament adopted a government draft law, with certain amendments, while alternative drafts were not even submitted.

This time, the initiators are Anastasiia Radina, Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy (Draft Law No. 15230), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Draft Law No. 15230-1) and a group of MPs who are members of the European Solidarity faction (Draft Law No. 15230-2).

Given the volume of the documents and the relatively short timeframe for their consideration and adoption, since, according to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Strategy must be adopted no later than the second quarter of 2026, it is advisable to draw attention to both the positive provisions and the shortcomings of all three versions. This is particularly important in the most significant areas: countering corruption and corruption-related offences, the judiciary and the status of judges, the prosecution service, the Bar and law enforcement agencies.

In this area, the identified problems concern disciplinary, administrative, criminal and civil-law liability for corruption and corruption-related offences. The annexes to all three draft laws contain identical provisions, which may indicate consensus among the subjects of legislative initiative as to these problems and the expected results of resolving them.

In particular, it is proposed to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform state or local self-government functions disciplinarily liable:

• for violating the requirements of anti-corruption legislation or rules of ethical conduct;
• where a court decision imposing an administrative penalty on a person for a corruption-related offence has entered into force;
• where a person has been released from administrative liability due to minor significance or the case has been closed because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty expired.

These provisions have essentially been carried over from the ACS for 2021–2025. Since the defined results were not achieved, the necessary amendments were not introduced into legislation.

At the same time, the issue of holding public servants disciplinarily liable where an administrative offence case is closed because the time limit has expired should be approached carefully. As studies of case law show, when courts apply this ground for closing a case, they rarely establish the fact that the offence was committed and the guilt of the person concerned. Accordingly, imposing disciplinary liability on the basis of a court decision that has not found the person guilty will lead to such decisions being challenged. This leads to an obvious conclusion: the quality of court decisions needs to be improved.

In parallel, the draft ACS for 2026–2030 provides for increasing the time limits for imposing administrative penalties for corruption-related offences, which should reduce the number of cases closed by courts on this ground.

The provision of the draft ACS concerning the consolidation of Supreme Court (SC) case law in cases on corruption-related administrative offences appears somewhat questionable.

Under the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), the Supreme Court considers this category of cases where the ECtHR finds a violation of Convention rights during the consideration of the relevant case by a national court and, as a court of appeal, cases concerning offences under Article 185-3 of the Code (contempt of court). The CUAO does not provide for cassation review of cases, and the ruling of the appellate court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 294 of the CUAO).

Since it began operating in December 2017, the Supreme Court has considered eight cassation appeals against appellate court decisions in administrative offence cases. In all cases, the Court refused to open proceedings, referring to Article 294 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences. Therefore, achieving this strategic result is impossible, at least until legislation on a prejudicial request mechanism is adopted, which would enable the SC to express positions in cases not subject to cassation appeal and ensure consistency of case law in such cases.

A general analysis of all three draft ACSs shows that the problems of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences were largely not resolved during 2023–2025 and require further measures. At the same time, it is also important to analyse the reasons why similar expected results of the ACS for 2021–2025 were not achieved.

In the judicial sphere, the draft ACSs focus on discretion in the formation of judicial governance bodies: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as on ensuring their continuous operation. The latter is a significant step forward in the state’s understanding of one of the basic principles of good governance: the work of a body cannot be suspended without transferring its powers to other bodies. The history of judicial reform over the past 12 years shows that Parliament has twice suspended the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ, which led to a significant shortage of judges in courts and, consequently, worsened public access to justice. The differences in wording between the three draft laws are not substantial, so they should be supported by Parliament in any version.

The difference between Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1 and No. 15230-2 on the formation of judicial governance bodies lies in their approaches to granting a decisive vote to independent experts delegated by international partners within competition commissions selecting members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. The first two draft laws preserve this right for them for the next period, while the initiators of Draft Law No. 15230-2 believe that such experts should have voting rights equal to those of Ukrainian members of the competition commissions.

Although the idea of equal weight for the votes of international and national experts in Ukrainian competitions is correct, at this stage Ukraine is not yet fully ready to abandon the decisive vote of experts delegated by international partners. This is primarily because Ukrainian appointing entities require further reform and currently do not enjoy public trust, which is what led to the need to apply the formula involving international experts with a decisive vote.

The initiators also differ somewhat in their views on the specifics of electing the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU). The ACS in the versions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 proposes introducing electronic voting by all judges for the new composition of the CJU, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 provides for voting by all judges but does not specify the method of voting. Given that Ukraine is facing a full-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation and that Ukraine’s movement towards the EU envisages full digitalisation of the judiciary as one element of an effective court free from corruption, electing new compositions of the CJU through electronic voting appears more appropriate.

At the same time, the provisions of Draft Law No. 15230-2 aimed at minimising corruption risks in the activities of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and expanding additional mechanisms to ensure trust in judicial career procedures, primarily through rotation in administrative positions in courts, deserve support. These provisions are much more detailed than those in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. Implementing the relevant provisions is extremely important for fulfilling European integration commitments, particularly in view of the critical TAIEX report on the functioning of the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre, which was recently provided to Ukraine.

The need for rotation of judges in administrative positions has long been discussed, but there is no consensus. At the same time, hundreds of court presidents and their deputies continue to hold their positions beyond the six-year term provided by law, successfully manipulating gaps in legislation.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 adds an expected strategic result concerning the role of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which is absent from the other versions of the ACS for 2026–2030. It provides that: ‘the Public Integrity Council, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be legally embedded in the system of mutual balance between civil society and the state in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not replace the institutional decision of the judiciary’. This addition also deserves the support of MPs during consideration of the draft laws.

The problems of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in the draft ACSs are included in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’ and do not contain fundamental differences.

The problems identified in the prosecution service, and the expected strategic results for addressing them, concern procedures for selecting prosecutors, material support, internal management processes within prosecution bodies, issues of procedural guidance by groups of prosecutors, criteria for determining the optimal staffing level of prosecution bodies and other matters.

All three draft ACSs differ to some extent in this part.

Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not contain the problem of risks of informal or political influence on the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, nor the corresponding expected strategic results. Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 contain such provisions, although with different levels of detail.

While the main draft has a clear focus on selecting candidates for the position of Prosecutor General with the involvement of a competition commission, the second alternative draft uses the general and evaluative concept of ‘best European practices’ and refers to the Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka. This wording makes the expected strategic result less measurable and less achievable.

In different European countries, the status of the Prosecutor General, their role in the system of state bodies and their level of political weight vary depending on the institutional model of the prosecution service. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to determine which practices are the best.

As regards improving the procedure for expressing a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, Draft Law No. 15230 proposes defining the grounds for this, as well as the body that would have the authority to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position through disciplinary proceedings. Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains no reference to the relevant bodies, which is a significant shortcoming given the existing practice of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP).

By its decision No. 97dp-18 of 28 February 2018, following consideration of disciplinary proceedings concerning Prosecutor General Y. Lutsenko, the QDCP established that there was no legislative mechanism for implementing a disciplinary sanction against the Prosecutor General. This made it impossible to hold him liable for a disciplinary offence. The absence of clear mechanisms and procedures effectively nullifies the institution of disciplinary liability of the Prosecutor General and lowers the level of control over performance in this position.

Therefore, on issues concerning the improvement of procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, the ACS in the version of Draft Law No. 15230 best corresponds to the principles of strategic planning.

The other provisions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 do not differ on these issues. Draft Law No. 15230-2, however, contains a clarification regarding the consequences of the new system for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work: it proposes that, based on such an assessment, not only staffing and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses, but also decisions on disciplinary sanctions, may be taken. This approach is flawed and creates additional corruption risks. Issues of disciplinary liability and assessment cannot be mixed within one procedure.

Assessing the quality of a prosecutor’s work concerns the effectiveness of their performance, which should be taken into account in promotion, informing the prosecutor’s professional profile, influencing bonuses and similar incentives. However, it cannot in any way be used as an instrument of punishment for poor work results, since this would essentially amount to a return to the quota-driven ‘stick system’ of assessment, where the dynamics of statistical indicators automatically leads to punishment if they are negative. This system has de facto existed since Soviet times, and its harmful effects have been minimised only in isolated cases.

The subject of disciplinary liability is a specific disciplinary offence, namely culpable non-performance or improper performance by a prosecutor of their duties. The list of disciplinary offences and the grounds and procedure for holding prosecutors disciplinarily liable are defined by law and provide for such liability for a specific case.

Assessment of the quality of work is a procedure that helps determine how effectively a prosecutor performs the official duties assigned to them over a certain period. Under the current assessment procedure, this period is one year. It is therefore more of an incentive-based tool and serves as motivation for professional development. It helps the manager form a more objective understanding of the team’s potential, form a staff reserve and make decisions on bonuses or other incentives more transparent.

Accordingly, if the results of assessing the quality of work can be used to impose disciplinary liability, this may turn into an instrument of administrative influence over prosecutors and undermine their procedural independence.

Improving the activities of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is addressed in all three draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’. However, it would be advisable to consider it as one of the specialised prosecutors’ offices within the unified system of prosecution bodies.

Both alternative draft laws exclude the provisions of the ACS for 2026–2030 that would grant the Head of SAPO the right independently to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPTI) on the possible commission of a criminal offence by an MP of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge.

At present, this is the exclusive power of the Prosecutor General. It is the result of a political compromise reached in 2019, when parliamentary immunity, meaning immunity from criminal prosecution without the consent of the VRU, was replaced by a special procedure for bringing MPs to criminal liability under the exceptional procedural control of the Prosecutor General. For the Government and MPs, the existence of this political compromise, reached by parliamentarians of the same IX convocation that must consider the ACS for 2026–2030, is a key argument against changing it.

It should be noted that, under the new procedure for bringing MPs to liability, more than 40 MPs have been notified of suspicion, and the number of criminal proceedings may be higher. The Head of SAPO has not stated that there is a direct conflict with the Prosecutor General over problems with entering information into the URPTI and approving motions, from which it may be concluded that the practical problem is rather potential in nature.

If there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may be removed from the draft at this stage, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is a real set of cases in which the Prosecutor General ignores substantiated materials from the NABU and SAPO or if a new convocation of the VRU does not consider itself ‘burdened’ by the political compromise previously reached.

The inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 is due to the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is covered by the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the advocate’s profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks that exist within the Bar, such as obtaining an advocate’s certificate and non-transparent budgets, as well as systemic problems including the continued tenure of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies) since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one member to the QDCP and other issues, the Bar has become part of state policy in the field of European integration. At present, it is also a matter of anti-corruption policy and justice policy.

Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to courts and the prosecution service. No matter how much courts and the prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in state anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices at the level of the entire system. Even from a formal perspective, under Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar is part of the justice system alongside courts and the prosecution service, which means that including the Bar in the ACS is a logical and necessary step.

For the first time, the Bar appears in the Anti-Corruption Strategy as a separate substantive subsection alongside courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.

The problems of the Bar identified by the NACP and the corresponding expected results are included unchanged in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. At the same time, Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains certain changes that do not affect the substance of the proposed state policy measures. They concern clarification of the wording of certain problems, detailing their consequences and similar refinements.

For example, the problem concerning the formation of BSG bodies is supplemented, in addition to the issues already listed above, by ‘the absence of real electoral competition, effective appeal mechanisms, representation of alternative professional groups, the formation of informal stable centres of influence and a lack of leadership rotation’, as well as the corresponding consequence: complicating access to the profession and limiting the ability to ensure disciplinary control and high professional standards.

Certain details that do not affect the substance are also clarified. For example, the wording is not simply ‘online voting’ but ‘secure online voting’, although, in substance, any online voting should have an appropriate level of protection against interference and guarantee data security. Another example is the addition of the word ‘periodic’ to ‘electoral cycle’, although a cycle, by definition, implies periodicity.

Therefore, all three documents contain the initial concept of the drafters of the ACS for 2026–2030, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes certain stylistic amendments and clarified wording that may be discussed as amendments at the stage when the ACS is finalised in the lead Committee.

All draft ACSs for 2026–2030 identify problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).

The version of the ACS appended to Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not address the problem of legal regulation of selection procedures for the heads of the NPU and the SBI, as well as the corresponding expected strategic results, although the need to introduce transparent merit-based competitions for these positions has been repeatedly noted by national experts and international partners.

Given that the subjects submitting Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 are MPs, it can be hoped that these provisions will be preserved in full during parliamentary discussions.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 additionally contains problems relating to the institutional independence of the SBI and the absence of clear criteria for determining the investigative jurisdiction of this body. It states that resolving these problems would allow the following strategic results to be achieved:

• introduction of a mechanism for a comprehensive staffing and institutional reset of the SBI, including an open competition for the position of Director with the involvement of independent experts with a decisive vote, as well as mandatory periodic attestation of Bureau employees;
• ensuring a clear focus for the SBI on its original mission: combating torture, unlawful detention and other criminal offences committed in office in the justice sector, as well as introducing a system of periodic external independent audits of the Bureau’s activities, where a negative conclusion would constitute grounds for early dismissal of its leadership;
• developing the analytical capacity of the SBI to shift towards strategic prioritisation of its activities based on verified data, using European tools such as SOCTA, which would help avoid selective application of the law and pressure on other state bodies.

These proposals reflect urgent problems in the activities of the SBI that have been highlighted by experts and international partners. During 2025–2026, the SBI was repeatedly used as an instrument of political pressure and inter-agency confrontation, diverting the Bureau’s resources away from its core tasks and undermining trust in it. Developing the analytical capacities of the SBI corresponds to European integration changes under which national law enforcement agencies must be integrated into the European system for countering crime.

In addition, the text of Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes that, within 30 days after the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030’ enters into force, the Verkhovna Rada should hear the report of the Director of the SBI on the Bureau’s performance in 2025 and, if its work is found unsatisfactory, the President should dismiss the Director of the Bureau. This proposal is fully consistent with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.

Although, in general, we agree that these issues are relevant, it should be noted that the problems in the activities of the SBI are more complex and require a balanced and well-considered solution.

At present, in accordance with the Rule of Law Roadmap, a comprehensive study is being conducted that should determine the need and feasibility of further reforming the SBI in line with best European practices and should lead to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a law taking into account the necessary recommendations.

The Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka notes that a draft law on SBI reform will be presented by December 2026 based on the results of the study. In preparing such a law, broad discussions involving experts and civil society must also be held.

As in the current ACS for 2021–2025, the drafts do not examine problems in the activities of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) that have a corruption-related nature. While the current ACS has a different structure, the draft ACSs for 2026–2030 should pay attention to the institutional independence and capacity of the Bureau as one of the law enforcement agencies.

In particular, the work of the ESBU internal control units needs to be strengthened, since the integrity and transparency of the Bureau depend to a certain extent on their effectiveness. Attention has also repeatedly been drawn to the uncompetitive level of remuneration of ESBU employees, which prevents the Bureau from attracting the best specialists and creates corruption risks in its activities.

Issues related to the functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine are included in the draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’.

The versions of all three draft ACSs largely share a common view of the problem of the institutional resilience and independence of the NABU, except for certain targeted changes proposed in Draft Law No. 15230-2. It states that one way to ensure the Bureau’s resilience and independence is to build a highly professional, integrity-driven team through open, transparent competitions, and to communicate the NABU’s activities effectively through the Public Oversight Council.

Both proposals appear questionable. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’, the Public Oversight Council at the NABU is an instrument for ensuring transparency and civilian oversight of the Bureau’s activities. As stated in the Report on the Results of the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of the Effectiveness of the NABU’s Activities, conducted from March 2023 to November 2024, the members of the Public Oversight Council themselves noted a fairly high level of interaction between the Bureau and the Council. Such interaction takes the form of involving Council members in competition and disciplinary procedures, providing information and semi-annual reports on NABU activities, assessing the amount of public information disclosed by the Bureau and other measures. This indicates a considerable level of transparency of the body.

The openness of competitions for NABU positions is ensured both by involving representatives of civil society in competition commissions, namely persons selected by the Public Oversight Council, and by regularly publishing announcements on the NABU website, which allows any candidate who meets the requirements to take part in the competition.

All three draft ACSs for 2026–2030 contain sound proposals but also leave important issues unaddressed. Compared with previous anti-corruption strategies, before voting in the plenary composition of the Verkhovna Rada, these draft laws must be considered by all parliamentary committees, whereas previous ACS drafts were examined by only five committees.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy. It is also Ukraine’s commitment to international partners, reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Roadmap. The Joint Statement by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka of 11 December 2025 states that the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for its implementation is one of the priorities for 2026 that should demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to strengthen its institutions, achieve substantial progress in reforms under the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster of the EU accession process and continue moving forward on its European path.