Involving international (foreign) experts in selection commissions within judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) is an important element of advancing Ukraine’s European integration interests. It helps to bring national legislation closer to European standards and increases the confidence of European institutions and partners in the reforms. Such involvement stems from Ukraine’s international commitments, as well as from the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The Ukraine Facility Plan provides that ‘further improvement of the selection of new Supreme Court (SC) judges is important, through enhancing the integrity vetting procedure and the meaningful involvement of independent experts’. It also states that the ‘High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) is steadily improving its overall operational effectiveness; however, additional judges are needed, selected transparently and on the basis of integrity vetting, with the involvement of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE)’.

The Rule of Law Roadmap sets out a commitment to fill all 25 vacant positions at the HACC, specifically with the involvement of the PCIE, by the end of the first quarter of 2026.

The European Commission has noted the need to continue involving international experts in the selection of new members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The Commission has also recommended improving the selection of SC judges and the verification of the integrity declarations of SC judges and judges of other higher courts, with the temporary but meaningful involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.

The problem is that, in fulfilling these international commitments, selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts apply different approaches to adopting and publishing their decisions. 

This concerns the selection of candidates for the positions of members of:

• the HQCJ;
• the High Council of Justice (HCJ);
• the head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors (SDI), their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors;
• judges of the CCU;
• judges of the HACC;
• judges of the Specialised District Administrative Court (SDAC);
• judges of the Specialised Administrative Court of Appeal (SACA).

The differing approaches relate both to the structure and reasoning of selection commissions’ decisions and to the issuing of so-called ‘negative conclusions’ (that is, decisions concerning candidates who have ceased to take part in the competition). For example, the Selection Commission for the positions of HQCJ members (the HQCJ Selection Commission) issues no such conclusions at all; instead, it produces only a final list of candidates recommended for the post of HQCJ member. By contrast, the Ethics Council (which assists in establishing whether a candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity) actively uses ‘negative conclusions’.

Another problem is the adoption of unreasoned decisions. Proper reasoning of decisions following the assessment of candidates against the established criteria should give a clear understanding of what guided the selection commissions when assessing those candidates: what was taken into account and what was not, and the grounds for a particular decision. Proper reasoning would not only resolve many questions for candidates (in particular those who did not pass the competition), but would also help to increase confidence in selection commissions’ decisions. While some selection commissions’ decisions are fairly well structured and properly reasoned (for example, those of the HQCJ and the PCIE), others contain only general wording and boilerplate phrasing and lack proper justification. Such problems are present, for instance, in the Ethics Council’s decisions on candidates’ compliance with the criteriaAt the same time, the Ethics Council’s decisions finding candidates non-compliant with the criteria of professional ethics and integrity are, by contrast, well reasoned. of professional ethics and integrity.

The application of inconsistent practice in formulating decisions may create risks for understanding selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates, and does nothing to promote the transparency of their work.

Different selection commissions use different decision-making models. The votes of international (foreign) experts are always decisive; however, the specific models differ. For instance, a joint decision of the HQCJ and the PCIE in selecting HACC judges requires a majority of the total number of participants in the joint sitting, but no fewer than three votes of PCIE members. For commissions such as the Ethics Council or the SDI Selection Commission, four votes are required, two of which belong to international (foreign) experts. This makes the system of selection commissions confusing and difficult to understand, reducing its transparency and coherence.

A separate issue requiring attention is the right to a casting vote, where approaches likewise differ. For example, international experts hold the right to a casting vote (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the Selection Commission for the positions of the head of the SDI, their deputy, and disciplinary inspectors (the SDI Selection Commission), the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), and the Expert Council); the PCIE has the right to veto any candidate for the post of HACC judge on the grounds of non-compliance with the established criteria.

Numerous cases have also been recorded in which the same person may apply for different competitions for posts, both within a single body and across different bodies under different quotas allocated by different appointing/electing entities. As a result, the absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.

Certain differences are also observed in the publication of selection commissions’ decisions. For example, the Ethics Council adopts and publishes a reasoned conclusion on whether each candidate for the post of HCJ member meets the criteria of professional ethics and integrity; the SDI Selection Commission publishes reasoned decisions concerning candidates whose participation was terminated owing to a reasonable doubt as to their compliance with the integrity criterion or the ethical standards established for a judge, but only at the candidate’s written request; for candidates assessed as ‘non-compliant’ against the criteria of high moral qualities or a recognised level of competence in the field of law, the AGE publishes only the operative part of the decision, without setting out the reasons underlying it. The full, reasoned text of the decision is published by the AGE at the written request of such a candidate.

The decisions of some selection commissions (all except the AGE) cannot be challenged in court because they are not regarded as ‘final’. The SC has developed a systematic position on selection commissions, according to which they do not adopt final decisions but merely assist the appointing/electing entity by carrying out a discrete stage of the competitive procedure. Judicial review is instead possible only in respect of the final decision of the appointing/electing entity.

The question of defining the ‘finality of decisions’ is particularly contentious for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For them, such decisions are in essence final (leaving the appointing/electing entity no choice), and the impossibility of challenging them deprives the person of the right to judicial protection. Legislation provides only for the possibility of challenging AGE decisions — specifying which of its decisions may be challenged in court and on which exceptional grounds — whereas no such legislative provision exists for the decisions of other selection commissions.

A further obstacle to the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions in administrative courts is their lack of public-authority powers. The SC’s case law has established an approach according to which selection commissions are not entities vested with public-authority powers in disputed legal relations. Accordingly, in some cases the SC’s case law indicates that disputes against selection commissions are not subject to consideration under the rules of administrative justice (the Ethics Council, the HQCJ Selection Commission, the SDI Selection Commission). Selection commissions are neither bodies of authority nor entities vested with public-authority powers; they do not have the status of legal entities. Representing such commissions, even in administrative proceedings, is hampered by the absence of rules for designating a representative to sign procedural documents on behalf of selection commissions (their heads do not hold such powers) and to take part in court hearings.

The exception is the AGE, which the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court recognisesRuling of the Administrative Cassation Court within the Supreme Court of 20 February 2025 (case No. 990/407/24, proceedings No. П/990/407/24). as a body ‘vested by the state with authoritative and managerial functions in the legal relations arising in the process of forming the judicial corps of the CCU’.

Where such practice is absent:

• the risk of breeding distrust in the functioning of selection commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole increases;
• risks arise in the understanding — by candidates, outside observers, and the public — of these selection commissions’ approaches to assessing candidates.

At present, there are no draft laws addressing the problem described.

1. Applying different approaches to voting and decision-making by selection commissions — in particular regarding the structure and reasoning of decisions and the approach to determining voting results and so-called negative conclusions — breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
2. The absence of public voting results and insufficient reasoning and justification of such decisions breeds distrust in the functioning of these commissions and in the competitive procedure as a whole.
3. The absence of a single database of candidates taking part in competitive procedures gives rise to divergent practice in deciding whether one and the same candidate complies with the established criteria.
4. The absence of unified approaches to determining the finality of decisions for those candidates who, as a result of selection commissions’ decisions finding them non-compliant with the established criteria, effectively cease to take part in the competition. For such candidates these decisions are in fact final — and the impossibility of challenging them, at the level of both regulatory acts and SC case law, deprives them of the right to judicial protection.

The adoption and publication of decisions by selection commissions involving international (foreign) experts in judicial authorities and the CCU require further regulation.

1. Avoid a formalistic approach to justifying decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria.
2. Develop a uniform approach to the structure, justification, and adoption of decisions following the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria within a single commission.
3. Develop and approve a template/model decision for the assessment of candidates’ compliance with the established criteria, together with accompanying guidance enshrining the requirement that such decisions be properly reasoned.
4. Provide that negative decisions of selection commissions be published in anonymised form, and positive decisions be published with the personal data that were public during the candidate’s public interview. If a person who received a positive decision was not appointed to the post, they may apply to the selection commission to have their data anonymised.
5. Develop and introduce a single database of candidate profiles, with a uniform CV format, for those taking part in competitions for posts in judicial authorities and the CCU. Grant access to these profiles to members of the relevant selection commissions and of the relevant bodies to which candidates are appointed/elected.
6. In future, review the approach to granting international (foreign) experts a casting vote.
7. Hold a broad discussion on the question of defining the final nature of decisions adopted by selection commissions.
8. Enshrine in legislation clear grounds for the judicial challenge of selection commissions’ decisions solely on the basis of procedural non-compliance, in particular for candidates for whom such commissions’ decisions on non-compliance with the established criteria effectively mean the termination of their participation in the competition and are therefore final. The legislation should provide for the period over which a selection commission assesses a candidate’s compliance with the integrity criterion.
9. Enshrine in legislation rules governing which selection commissions’ decisions may be challenged and on what grounds, which may not be challenged, and the rules for representing selection commissions in court.
10. Continue consolidating the SC’s case law and developing standard approaches to resolving disputed situations on the issues identified.

This infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), together with a coalition of civil society organisations, has presented the European Commission with the interim findings of this year’s Shadow Report under Chapter 23 ‘Judiciary and Fundamental Rights’ and Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

The presentation, held on 4 June, was joined by representatives of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), which is responsible for the negotiations on enlargement and EU accession with candidate countries and potential candidates, as well as by representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

For the third year running, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the coalition of civil society organisations are monitoring and assessing Ukraine’s progress in the field of European integration. This is an independent, alternative analysis by representatives of civil society and the expert community, coordinated by ALI.

Participants presented and discussed the results in the areas of the rule of law (the courts, the prosecution service and the bar), the fight against corruption and organised crime, the reform of law enforcement agencies, and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. Taking part were Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, and Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area; Kateryna Ryzhenko, Deputy Executive Director for Legal Affairs at Transparency International Ukraine; and Tetiana Pechonchyk, Head of the Board, and Anastasiia Datsiv, Advocacy Manager for European Integration, both of the Human Rights Centre ZMINA.

Karyna Aslanian, Head of ALI’s Rule of Law area, presented the key findings on judicial reform. The focus was on the selection of new judges and the work of the competition commissions, the improvement of disciplinary procedures, and the unresolved problems that require attention now — as well as the latest developments concerning possible cases of corruption in the Supreme Court.

An important achievement during the reporting period was the launch of a comprehensive project on the digitalisation of the judicial system, which the Agency is implementing together with key judicial institutions — the Supreme Court, the High Council of Justice (HCJ), the State Judicial Administration of Ukraine and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU).

The key challenges at this stage are the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court, preventing the HCJ’s work from being halted owing to legislative conflicts, and responding appropriately to possible cases of corruption in the judiciary.

The parts of the Shadow Report concerning the prosecution service and the bar, as well as the strengthening of the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies to counter serious crime, including organised crime, were presented by Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of ALI’s Law and Order area.

He stressed that the competitions cancelled in July 2025 have still not been resumed and that the Prosecutor General retains excessive powers. Despite the European Commission’s demand not only to restore the legislation to its previous state but also to refrain from exercising these powers, there has been no progress whatsoever. The greatest challenge for the development of the prosecution service is the 10 Kachka–Kos priorities for Ukraine for 2026. These concern, first and foremost, changing the politicised procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, as well as introducing a mandatory competition for senior positions. This, in particular, forms part of the drafts of the new Anti-Corruption Strategy that Ukraine is currently developing. The competition for senior positions was due to be introduced back in March 2026, but this did not happen.

Yevhen Krapyvin drew attention to the absence of any progress in reforming the bar: despite the creation in January 2026 of a governmental working group on improving the legislation in this area, only one meeting has been held since. This, together with the resistance of the Ukrainian National Bar Association, is significantly slowing the achievement of a proper outcome and of the objectives of the Rule of Law Roadmap in this area.

Yevhen Krapyvin also addressed the key aspects of the Shadow Report under Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.

This year, the experts also analysed another part of the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster — ‘Functioning of Democratic Institutions’. The coalition, coordinated by ALI, likewise shared its work in this area with the European Commission.

This year’s Shadow Report is being prepared by experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, Transparency International Ukraine, the Human Rights Centre ZMINA, Tomorrow’s Lawyer, Europe without Barriers, the Ukrainian Bar Association, the Civil Network OPORA and the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, with the information support of European Pravda. As has now become customary, it will be published ahead of the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s 2026 Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is a systematic audit by specialist experts from civil society organisations that does not duplicate the state’s official documents or the European Commission’s assessment and is not dependent on their positions. Rather, it is an analytical tool for developing a professional and comprehensive vision of the European integration processes — one that provides for the involvement of experts in the reform process — while also assessing the compliance of Ukrainian legislation and of the entire system with EU standards.

Preparing shadow reports is a regular practice in all candidate countries seeking to join the European Union. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia and Moldova, independent coalitions of civil society organisations have for years carried out alternative monitoring of reform progress in the areas of the rule of law, the functioning of democratic institutions and others. In Ukraine, this work has been carried out systematically since 2024, when a coalition of civil society organisations first prepared an alternative analysis to accompany the European Commission’s report on Ukraine’s progress within the European Union’s Enlargement Package.

The Shadow Report is entirely a product of civil society, regardless of the sources of support. To strengthen the institutional independence of the process, from 2026, ALI is setting a new precedent: the Shadow Report is also funded by independent civil society organisations. A significant share of the funds for its development will be covered by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Transparency International Ukraine. ALI takes on the mission of ensuring the utmost impartiality and objectivity in this preparation process, as it does every year.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy (ACS) defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU). The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.

Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan for its implementation — the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP).

This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant Law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years in practice remained to achieve the expected results.

At present, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which is an unprecedented situation. Previously, Parliament adopted a government draft law, with certain amendments, while alternative drafts were not even submitted.

This time, the initiators are Anastasiia Radina, Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy (Draft Law No. 15230), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Draft Law No. 15230-1) and a group of MPs who are members of the European Solidarity faction (Draft Law No. 15230-2).

Given the volume of the documents and the relatively short timeframe for their consideration and adoption, since, according to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Strategy must be adopted no later than the second quarter of 2026, it is advisable to draw attention to both the positive provisions and the shortcomings of all three versions. This is particularly important in the most significant areas: countering corruption and corruption-related offences, the judiciary and the status of judges, the prosecution service, the Bar and law enforcement agencies.

In this area, the identified problems concern disciplinary, administrative, criminal and civil-law liability for corruption and corruption-related offences. The annexes to all three draft laws contain identical provisions, which may indicate consensus among the subjects of legislative initiative as to these problems and the expected results of resolving them.

In particular, it is proposed to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform state or local self-government functions disciplinarily liable:

• for violating the requirements of anti-corruption legislation or rules of ethical conduct;
• where a court decision imposing an administrative penalty on a person for a corruption-related offence has entered into force;
• where a person has been released from administrative liability due to minor significance or the case has been closed because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty expired.

These provisions have essentially been carried over from the ACS for 2021–2025. Since the defined results were not achieved, the necessary amendments were not introduced into legislation.

At the same time, the issue of holding public servants disciplinarily liable where an administrative offence case is closed because the time limit has expired should be approached carefully. As studies of case law show, when courts apply this ground for closing a case, they rarely establish the fact that the offence was committed and the guilt of the person concerned. Accordingly, imposing disciplinary liability on the basis of a court decision that has not found the person guilty will lead to such decisions being challenged. This leads to an obvious conclusion: the quality of court decisions needs to be improved.

In parallel, the draft ACS for 2026–2030 provides for increasing the time limits for imposing administrative penalties for corruption-related offences, which should reduce the number of cases closed by courts on this ground.

The provision of the draft ACS concerning the consolidation of Supreme Court (SC) case law in cases on corruption-related administrative offences appears somewhat questionable.

Under the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), the Supreme Court considers this category of cases where the ECtHR finds a violation of Convention rights during the consideration of the relevant case by a national court and, as a court of appeal, cases concerning offences under Article 185-3 of the Code (contempt of court). The CUAO does not provide for cassation review of cases, and the ruling of the appellate court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 294 of the CUAO).

Since it began operating in December 2017, the Supreme Court has considered eight cassation appeals against appellate court decisions in administrative offence cases. In all cases, the Court refused to open proceedings, referring to Article 294 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences. Therefore, achieving this strategic result is impossible, at least until legislation on a prejudicial request mechanism is adopted, which would enable the SC to express positions in cases not subject to cassation appeal and ensure consistency of case law in such cases.

A general analysis of all three draft ACSs shows that the problems of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences were largely not resolved during 2023–2025 and require further measures. At the same time, it is also important to analyse the reasons why similar expected results of the ACS for 2021–2025 were not achieved.

In the judicial sphere, the draft ACSs focus on discretion in the formation of judicial governance bodies: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as on ensuring their continuous operation. The latter is a significant step forward in the state’s understanding of one of the basic principles of good governance: the work of a body cannot be suspended without transferring its powers to other bodies. The history of judicial reform over the past 12 years shows that Parliament has twice suspended the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ, which led to a significant shortage of judges in courts and, consequently, worsened public access to justice. The differences in wording between the three draft laws are not substantial, so they should be supported by Parliament in any version.

The difference between Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1 and No. 15230-2 on the formation of judicial governance bodies lies in their approaches to granting a decisive vote to independent experts delegated by international partners within competition commissions selecting members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. The first two draft laws preserve this right for them for the next period, while the initiators of Draft Law No. 15230-2 believe that such experts should have voting rights equal to those of Ukrainian members of the competition commissions.

Although the idea of equal weight for the votes of international and national experts in Ukrainian competitions is correct, at this stage Ukraine is not yet fully ready to abandon the decisive vote of experts delegated by international partners. This is primarily because Ukrainian appointing entities require further reform and currently do not enjoy public trust, which is what led to the need to apply the formula involving international experts with a decisive vote.

The initiators also differ somewhat in their views on the specifics of electing the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU). The ACS in the versions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 proposes introducing electronic voting by all judges for the new composition of the CJU, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 provides for voting by all judges but does not specify the method of voting. Given that Ukraine is facing a full-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation and that Ukraine’s movement towards the EU envisages full digitalisation of the judiciary as one element of an effective court free from corruption, electing new compositions of the CJU through electronic voting appears more appropriate.

At the same time, the provisions of Draft Law No. 15230-2 aimed at minimising corruption risks in the activities of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and expanding additional mechanisms to ensure trust in judicial career procedures, primarily through rotation in administrative positions in courts, deserve support. These provisions are much more detailed than those in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. Implementing the relevant provisions is extremely important for fulfilling European integration commitments, particularly in view of the critical TAIEX report on the functioning of the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre, which was recently provided to Ukraine.

The need for rotation of judges in administrative positions has long been discussed, but there is no consensus. At the same time, hundreds of court presidents and their deputies continue to hold their positions beyond the six-year term provided by law, successfully manipulating gaps in legislation.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 adds an expected strategic result concerning the role of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which is absent from the other versions of the ACS for 2026–2030. It provides that: ‘the Public Integrity Council, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be legally embedded in the system of mutual balance between civil society and the state in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not replace the institutional decision of the judiciary’. This addition also deserves the support of MPs during consideration of the draft laws.

The problems of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in the draft ACSs are included in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’ and do not contain fundamental differences.

The problems identified in the prosecution service, and the expected strategic results for addressing them, concern procedures for selecting prosecutors, material support, internal management processes within prosecution bodies, issues of procedural guidance by groups of prosecutors, criteria for determining the optimal staffing level of prosecution bodies and other matters.

All three draft ACSs differ to some extent in this part.

Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not contain the problem of risks of informal or political influence on the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, nor the corresponding expected strategic results. Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 contain such provisions, although with different levels of detail.

While the main draft has a clear focus on selecting candidates for the position of Prosecutor General with the involvement of a competition commission, the second alternative draft uses the general and evaluative concept of ‘best European practices’ and refers to the Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka. This wording makes the expected strategic result less measurable and less achievable.

In different European countries, the status of the Prosecutor General, their role in the system of state bodies and their level of political weight vary depending on the institutional model of the prosecution service. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to determine which practices are the best.

As regards improving the procedure for expressing a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, Draft Law No. 15230 proposes defining the grounds for this, as well as the body that would have the authority to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position through disciplinary proceedings. Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains no reference to the relevant bodies, which is a significant shortcoming given the existing practice of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP).

By its decision No. 97dp-18 of 28 February 2018, following consideration of disciplinary proceedings concerning Prosecutor General Y. Lutsenko, the QDCP established that there was no legislative mechanism for implementing a disciplinary sanction against the Prosecutor General. This made it impossible to hold him liable for a disciplinary offence. The absence of clear mechanisms and procedures effectively nullifies the institution of disciplinary liability of the Prosecutor General and lowers the level of control over performance in this position.

Therefore, on issues concerning the improvement of procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, the ACS in the version of Draft Law No. 15230 best corresponds to the principles of strategic planning.

The other provisions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 do not differ on these issues. Draft Law No. 15230-2, however, contains a clarification regarding the consequences of the new system for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work: it proposes that, based on such an assessment, not only staffing and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses, but also decisions on disciplinary sanctions, may be taken. This approach is flawed and creates additional corruption risks. Issues of disciplinary liability and assessment cannot be mixed within one procedure.

Assessing the quality of a prosecutor’s work concerns the effectiveness of their performance, which should be taken into account in promotion, informing the prosecutor’s professional profile, influencing bonuses and similar incentives. However, it cannot in any way be used as an instrument of punishment for poor work results, since this would essentially amount to a return to the quota-driven ‘stick system’ of assessment, where the dynamics of statistical indicators automatically leads to punishment if they are negative. This system has de facto existed since Soviet times, and its harmful effects have been minimised only in isolated cases.

The subject of disciplinary liability is a specific disciplinary offence, namely culpable non-performance or improper performance by a prosecutor of their duties. The list of disciplinary offences and the grounds and procedure for holding prosecutors disciplinarily liable are defined by law and provide for such liability for a specific case.

Assessment of the quality of work is a procedure that helps determine how effectively a prosecutor performs the official duties assigned to them over a certain period. Under the current assessment procedure, this period is one year. It is therefore more of an incentive-based tool and serves as motivation for professional development. It helps the manager form a more objective understanding of the team’s potential, form a staff reserve and make decisions on bonuses or other incentives more transparent.

Accordingly, if the results of assessing the quality of work can be used to impose disciplinary liability, this may turn into an instrument of administrative influence over prosecutors and undermine their procedural independence.

Improving the activities of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is addressed in all three draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’. However, it would be advisable to consider it as one of the specialised prosecutors’ offices within the unified system of prosecution bodies.

Both alternative draft laws exclude the provisions of the ACS for 2026–2030 that would grant the Head of SAPO the right independently to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPTI) on the possible commission of a criminal offence by an MP of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge.

At present, this is the exclusive power of the Prosecutor General. It is the result of a political compromise reached in 2019, when parliamentary immunity, meaning immunity from criminal prosecution without the consent of the VRU, was replaced by a special procedure for bringing MPs to criminal liability under the exceptional procedural control of the Prosecutor General. For the Government and MPs, the existence of this political compromise, reached by parliamentarians of the same IX convocation that must consider the ACS for 2026–2030, is a key argument against changing it.

It should be noted that, under the new procedure for bringing MPs to liability, more than 40 MPs have been notified of suspicion, and the number of criminal proceedings may be higher. The Head of SAPO has not stated that there is a direct conflict with the Prosecutor General over problems with entering information into the URPTI and approving motions, from which it may be concluded that the practical problem is rather potential in nature.

If there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may be removed from the draft at this stage, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is a real set of cases in which the Prosecutor General ignores substantiated materials from the NABU and SAPO or if a new convocation of the VRU does not consider itself ‘burdened’ by the political compromise previously reached.

The inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 is due to the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is covered by the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the advocate’s profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks that exist within the Bar, such as obtaining an advocate’s certificate and non-transparent budgets, as well as systemic problems including the continued tenure of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies) since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one member to the QDCP and other issues, the Bar has become part of state policy in the field of European integration. At present, it is also a matter of anti-corruption policy and justice policy.

Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to courts and the prosecution service. No matter how much courts and the prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in state anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices at the level of the entire system. Even from a formal perspective, under Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar is part of the justice system alongside courts and the prosecution service, which means that including the Bar in the ACS is a logical and necessary step.

For the first time, the Bar appears in the Anti-Corruption Strategy as a separate substantive subsection alongside courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.

The problems of the Bar identified by the NACP and the corresponding expected results are included unchanged in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. At the same time, Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains certain changes that do not affect the substance of the proposed state policy measures. They concern clarification of the wording of certain problems, detailing their consequences and similar refinements.

For example, the problem concerning the formation of BSG bodies is supplemented, in addition to the issues already listed above, by ‘the absence of real electoral competition, effective appeal mechanisms, representation of alternative professional groups, the formation of informal stable centres of influence and a lack of leadership rotation’, as well as the corresponding consequence: complicating access to the profession and limiting the ability to ensure disciplinary control and high professional standards.

Certain details that do not affect the substance are also clarified. For example, the wording is not simply ‘online voting’ but ‘secure online voting’, although, in substance, any online voting should have an appropriate level of protection against interference and guarantee data security. Another example is the addition of the word ‘periodic’ to ‘electoral cycle’, although a cycle, by definition, implies periodicity.

Therefore, all three documents contain the initial concept of the drafters of the ACS for 2026–2030, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes certain stylistic amendments and clarified wording that may be discussed as amendments at the stage when the ACS is finalised in the lead Committee.

All draft ACSs for 2026–2030 identify problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).

The version of the ACS appended to Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not address the problem of legal regulation of selection procedures for the heads of the NPU and the SBI, as well as the corresponding expected strategic results, although the need to introduce transparent merit-based competitions for these positions has been repeatedly noted by national experts and international partners.

Given that the subjects submitting Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 are MPs, it can be hoped that these provisions will be preserved in full during parliamentary discussions.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 additionally contains problems relating to the institutional independence of the SBI and the absence of clear criteria for determining the investigative jurisdiction of this body. It states that resolving these problems would allow the following strategic results to be achieved:

• introduction of a mechanism for a comprehensive staffing and institutional reset of the SBI, including an open competition for the position of Director with the involvement of independent experts with a decisive vote, as well as mandatory periodic attestation of Bureau employees;
• ensuring a clear focus for the SBI on its original mission: combating torture, unlawful detention and other criminal offences committed in office in the justice sector, as well as introducing a system of periodic external independent audits of the Bureau’s activities, where a negative conclusion would constitute grounds for early dismissal of its leadership;
• developing the analytical capacity of the SBI to shift towards strategic prioritisation of its activities based on verified data, using European tools such as SOCTA, which would help avoid selective application of the law and pressure on other state bodies.

These proposals reflect urgent problems in the activities of the SBI that have been highlighted by experts and international partners. During 2025–2026, the SBI was repeatedly used as an instrument of political pressure and inter-agency confrontation, diverting the Bureau’s resources away from its core tasks and undermining trust in it. Developing the analytical capacities of the SBI corresponds to European integration changes under which national law enforcement agencies must be integrated into the European system for countering crime.

In addition, the text of Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes that, within 30 days after the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030’ enters into force, the Verkhovna Rada should hear the report of the Director of the SBI on the Bureau’s performance in 2025 and, if its work is found unsatisfactory, the President should dismiss the Director of the Bureau. This proposal is fully consistent with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.

Although, in general, we agree that these issues are relevant, it should be noted that the problems in the activities of the SBI are more complex and require a balanced and well-considered solution.

At present, in accordance with the Rule of Law Roadmap, a comprehensive study is being conducted that should determine the need and feasibility of further reforming the SBI in line with best European practices and should lead to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a law taking into account the necessary recommendations.

The Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka notes that a draft law on SBI reform will be presented by December 2026 based on the results of the study. In preparing such a law, broad discussions involving experts and civil society must also be held.

As in the current ACS for 2021–2025, the drafts do not examine problems in the activities of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) that have a corruption-related nature. While the current ACS has a different structure, the draft ACSs for 2026–2030 should pay attention to the institutional independence and capacity of the Bureau as one of the law enforcement agencies.

In particular, the work of the ESBU internal control units needs to be strengthened, since the integrity and transparency of the Bureau depend to a certain extent on their effectiveness. Attention has also repeatedly been drawn to the uncompetitive level of remuneration of ESBU employees, which prevents the Bureau from attracting the best specialists and creates corruption risks in its activities.

Issues related to the functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine are included in the draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’.

The versions of all three draft ACSs largely share a common view of the problem of the institutional resilience and independence of the NABU, except for certain targeted changes proposed in Draft Law No. 15230-2. It states that one way to ensure the Bureau’s resilience and independence is to build a highly professional, integrity-driven team through open, transparent competitions, and to communicate the NABU’s activities effectively through the Public Oversight Council.

Both proposals appear questionable. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’, the Public Oversight Council at the NABU is an instrument for ensuring transparency and civilian oversight of the Bureau’s activities. As stated in the Report on the Results of the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of the Effectiveness of the NABU’s Activities, conducted from March 2023 to November 2024, the members of the Public Oversight Council themselves noted a fairly high level of interaction between the Bureau and the Council. Such interaction takes the form of involving Council members in competition and disciplinary procedures, providing information and semi-annual reports on NABU activities, assessing the amount of public information disclosed by the Bureau and other measures. This indicates a considerable level of transparency of the body.

The openness of competitions for NABU positions is ensured both by involving representatives of civil society in competition commissions, namely persons selected by the Public Oversight Council, and by regularly publishing announcements on the NABU website, which allows any candidate who meets the requirements to take part in the competition.

All three draft ACSs for 2026–2030 contain sound proposals but also leave important issues unaddressed. Compared with previous anti-corruption strategies, before voting in the plenary composition of the Verkhovna Rada, these draft laws must be considered by all parliamentary committees, whereas previous ACS drafts were examined by only five committees.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy. It is also Ukraine’s commitment to international partners, reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Roadmap. The Joint Statement by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka of 11 December 2025 states that the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for its implementation is one of the priorities for 2026 that should demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to strengthen its institutions, achieve substantial progress in reforms under the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster of the EU accession process and continue moving forward on its European path.

The involvement of international (foreign) experts in the work of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the CCU emerged in response to a number of systemic problems:

• the inability of the judicial governance bodies (primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ)) and the CCU to take decisions under political pressure;
• attempts by some judges to interfere in judicial decision-making;
• the persistently low level of public trust in the courts (according to sociological surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and others).

Together, these factors ultimately resulted in an inability to respond effectively to the crises that regularly arose in the judiciary and the CCU. The requirement to involve international (foreign) experts was also enshrined in Ukraine’s commitments to international organisations and partners. In particular, such involvement was regarded as a safeguard that provided additional oversight of compliance with the principles of judicial independence and professional integrity, as well as the prevention of corruption risks.

The active involvement of international (foreign) experts in the composition of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine began in 2018. On the one hand, the introduction of these experts into the work of the competition commissions was a response to the low level of public trust in the judiciary and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. On the other, it was driven by Ukraine’s international commitments (the Ukraine Facility Plan and European Commission reports), as well as by the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The relevance of this study lies in the fact that examining the results of the work of competition commissions with the participation of international (foreign) experts enables not only to assess their effectiveness in the context of judicial reform, but also to formulate well-grounded proposals for improving their work.

For the purposes of this study, the work of the competition commissions was assessed over the period from January 2022 to November 2025 inclusive. As regards the conduct of competition procedures, updated data as of April 2026 were used.

The study focuses on analysing the work (including the legal framework) of the following competition commissions: the Ethics Council; the Competition Commission for the Selection of Candidates for the Positions of Members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (the HQCJ Competition Commission); the Competition Commission for Conducting the Competition for the Positions of Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors and Disciplinary Inspector (the SDI Competition Commission); the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE); the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE); the Expert Council (legal framework only); and the Public Integrity Council (PIC) — the last of these to the extent relevant for comparison with the work of those commissions which, under the law, are to be replaced by the Public Integrity Council once the current compositions complete their terms. The relevant Supreme Court case law was also analysed.

As part of the study, the interviews held were analysed — the special joint meetings of the HQCJ and the PCIE with candidates for the positions of judge of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the CCU; Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head and disciplinary inspectors; and members of the HQCJ and the HCJ. In total, 143 candidate interviews were reviewed and analysed, together with the decisions of the competition commissions concerning those candidates. Interviews were also conducted with members of several competition commissions.

The study centres on analysing the consistency of the criteria for selecting candidates and the consistency of the approaches taken by the competition commissions in determining whether candidates meet the criteria assessed. The work of the competition commissions was assessed in terms of the mechanism for forming their composition, the number of international (foreign) representatives within them, the qualification requirements, the scope of their powers, the assessment criteria, and so on.

Where relevant, the work of the competition commissions was also compared with that of the Public Integrity Council (PIC).

The conclusions drawn from the study rest, in particular, on statistical data from these competition commissions reflecting the outcomes of their work.

A separate part of the report sets out specific recommendations for addressing the problems identified in the course of the study — recommendations that can serve as reference points for the further development of public policy in this area.

This document has been prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of the CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

Making appointments to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) and the High Council of Justice (HCJ) without delay is one of the ten requirements of the Kachka–Kos plan that Ukraine must implement in 2026. It was agreed in December 2025 as a priority plan for Ukraine in the areas of the rule of law and the fight against corruption.

Some progress in appointing members of the HCJ was made in March 2026, when the Congress of Judges of Ukraine voted for two selected candidates. By contrast, five months after the Kachka–Kos plan was agreed, no appointment to the CCU has taken place.

At present, 13 of the 18 judges serve on the Constitutional Court. The term of office of Judge Viktor Horodovenko (Congress of Judges quota) expires in November 2026. Two more terms expire on 2 March and 24 September 2027.

What is happening with the CCU selection competitions? What are the prospects for appointing new judges this year? And most importantly — what other urgent problems need to be resolved to strengthen the CCU and meet the EU integration requirements of the Rule of Law Roadmap? We explain below.

For two and a half years, Ukraine has been selecting and appointing judges of the Constitutional Court under a new procedure. The process is lengthy, imperfect, costly and often ineffective, because competitions are held yet may produce no winner. This has already happened in two previous competitions under the quota of the Congress of Judges and in one competition under the quota of the President of Ukraine. Or someone is selected, but the appointing authority fails to approve them. This happened in 2025, when Parliament did not find enough votes for two candidates under its quota. After the preliminary verification required by law, they had been recommended by the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE).

Since the new procedure was introduced, four new judges have been appointed — two under the President’s quota (in 2025) and one each under the quotas of Parliament and the Congress of Judges (in 2024).

Moreover, in 2025, the CCU was unable to perform its functions for six months because it lacked a quorum. In effect, only one Senate was functioning at that time. Meanwhile, the President and Parliament delayed appointments. Ultimately, the President fulfilled his role, while Parliament failed to vote.

It was probably after this that the EU requirement for Ukraine to make ‘appointments without delay’ emerged.

A new selection process under the parliamentary quota for two vacant positions is underway. Its outcome will become known on 6 May, when the AGE assesses the level of competence of candidates for the positions of CCU judges. This time, 10 people successfully passed the assessment of moral qualities and reached this stage.

Since April, the Advisory Group of Experts has also been reviewing the documents of candidates under the quota of the Congress of Judges. Here, 18 people are competing for two vacant positions. According to ALI, interviews with them will take place in July. By September, the AGE should form a list of candidates for appointment.

By contrast, the competition for one vacant position of CCU judge under the President’s quota has still not started. The start date is unknown.

If both competitions are successful, the appointment of a judge or judges under Parliament’s quota can be expected in the summer, and under the quota of the Congress of Judges in the autumn.

As regards the President’s quota, unless the competition starts within the next two to three weeks, appointments this year are unlikely, given the complexity and duration of the procedures. At the same time, it would be appropriate to announce a competition for the relevant vacancy in the coming months, taking into account the need to appoint a new judge under the same quota as early as March 2027.

We have previously written about how the competition procedures should be redesigned to accelerate the process. Yet things remain unchanged.

Some CCU candidates currently participating in competitions have previously received the green light from the AGE. This brings back the discussion on the need to create a list of reserve candidates who were not appointed for technical reasons.

This concerns situations where the appointing authority, for example, did not have a sufficient number of candidates to make a decision. Specifically, if there is only one vacancy, the law requires at least two people to compete for it. Such a candidate should be able to reach the final stage of the next competition without having to go through the whole procedure again.

Another example is where one of the appointing authorities has fewer vacant positions than the number of qualified candidates in its view (for instance, one vacancy and three qualified candidates). In that case, such persons could be placed in a candidate pool for one or two years and then, without additional competitions, submitted for consideration by other appointing authorities.

This would save the time, money and effort of Ukrainian and international experts serving on the AGE. More importantly, it would not discourage qualified candidates from taking part in competitions. The figures show that fewer people are willing to apply. Instead, many people who have repeatedly received a red light from the AGE keep entering competitions again and again. As a result, there seem to be candidates, but it is difficult, and often simply impossible, to select at least two people for one vacancy.

At the same time, Draft Law No. 14149 has been pending in Parliament since last year and partly addresses these problems, although in a somewhat different way. However, some of its provisions have been criticised by the Venice Commission, so they need to be amended not only to pass the vote in the session hall but also to avoid conflict with our international partners.

For those who closely follow all CCU judge selection processes or actively take part in them, every new competition feels like Groundhog Day. There are two reasons for this. The main one is that CCU judges are unique lawyers — essentially a ‘rare commodity’. A mere desire is not enough to quickly form an independent CCU bench with integrity.

Each selected judge must meet exceptionally high professional standards, be more than a good judge or someone who can draft complex texts well, but also have strategic vision. They must also have extremely high internal standards of integrity and ethics.

Moreover, a judge’s independence matters regardless of who appointed them. They must be equally independent from all branches of government.

And this is where the devil is in the detail. For example, AGE members ask candidates for the position of CCU judge about property acquired by their parents 30 years ago. Or they ask whether the candidate attended music school (what relevance does this have for a CCU judge at all?). Or why a Supreme Court judge decided to enter a competition for the CCU.

Here, the question is already for the Advisory Group of Experts: who exactly would they like to see as a candidate if questions arise about the intentions of certain SC judges to move to the CCU? Especially if some of them have spent half their lives working as judges of higher courts. Where else should such highly qualified lawyers go next?

Instead, one would like to hear the AGE more often ask how a candidate for CCU judge sees the solution to long-standing problems, such as the politicisation of the Constitutional Court. Or the prolonged delay in considering the most high-profile constitutional petitions, which have been pending before the CCU for five to ten years. For example, what should be done about lustration, on which the European Court of Human Rights expressed its position long ago, while the CCU is still unable to do the same?

Or they could ask how the work of the CCU should be reformatted so that cases are not considered for decades in the future. The list could go on.

These are the issues the AGE should examine alongside questions about the property of the candidate, their family, parents, grandparents and sometimes even ‘neighbours’. It should not be calculating how many days a male candidate spent on foreign business trips. Members of the AGE or other competition commissions, for example, may also spend weeks on business trips conducting interviews with candidates or preparing for them. Yet no one questions their integrity.

In 2022–2025, between 43 and 50 constitutional petitions were pending before the CCU. At the end of 2025, 48 such petitions remained pending, 32 of which had been submitted to the CCU before 2022.

From the beginning of the full-scale invasion until 2025, 19 constitutional petitions were submitted to the CCU. In the same period, the consideration of 17 petitions was completed, most of which (14) had been submitted back in 2015–2020. For example, a ruling closing one of the proceedings opened as far back as 2015 was adopted only in 2022.

In other words, over four years of war, two thirds of constitutional petitions have not been resolved. These are the country’s most complex issues, on which entire sectors or even the existence of individual bodies may depend.

For example, the constitutionality of the establishment and functioning of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) has been under consideration since 2020. Given that two more higher specialised courts have now been established in Ukraine (which will consider administrative cases involving central executive bodies), a decision on the HACC is not merely timely — it is about four years overdue.

The CCU has also been drawn into the debate on the participation of international experts in competition commissions. Attempts are being made to remove them by manipulating the alleged interference with state sovereignty. This issue should be resolved now, even though CCU judges are currently being selected with the participation of international experts.

The situation is much better with the consideration of constitutional complaints. Since the possibility of lodging such complaints with the CCU was introduced in Ukraine (30 September 2016), persons entitled to a constitutional complaint have submitted more than four and a half thousand constitutional complaints to the CCU. The highest number was submitted in 2018 (690) and the lowest, for objective reasons, in 2022 (248). The CCU began adopting its first decisions following the consideration of constitutional complaints in 2019. There have been 67 such decisions in total.

The issues raised in complaints are less politicised than those in constitutional petitions. This is why the statistics for their consideration are several times better. However, it is worth noting how much procedural ‘clutter’ reaches the CCU. More than half of constitutional complaints do not even meet formal requirements. Many complainants do not understand the true role of the Court or the essence of such an instrument as a constitutional complaint and therefore try to turn the CCU into a ‘fourth’ judicial instance.

Even despite attempts to flood the entire Court with complaints, the introduction of the institution of constitutional complaint in 2016 was the right decision. The CCU is coping with this task.

In addition to the issues already mentioned, attention should also be paid to the systemic problems caused by the Court functioning on the verge of a quorum. One such problem is the inability to ‘assemble’ the required number of votes even for important and progressive decisions. If, out of 18 judges, only 12–14 have been in office in recent years, and at least 10 votes in favour are required, this leads to constant postponements of the consideration of constitutional petitions.

Some decisions cannot even be put on the agenda for discussion. One reason is the reluctance of the rapporteur judge to submit a politically difficult issue for consideration (and nothing can currently be done about this). There are no mechanisms for the compulsory inclusion of such issues on the agenda. At the same time, the accumulation of unresolved cases creates a ‘vicious circle’: new cases continue to be distributed among judges, their total number grows, consideration periods become longer, and judges prioritise cases at their own discretion, giving preference to those they consider most relevant. However, even if mechanisms for mandatory inclusion on the agenda existed, how could a decision be adopted if the rapporteur judge, who knows the materials better than others, does not even want to discuss such a case?

The recusals and self-recusals of judges are also a problem. Given that some judges are former MPs who often voted for what now needs to be examined for constitutionality, the quorum is disrupted. It is one thing when one or two judges are recused or have recused themselves while 17–18 judges are in office. It is quite another when only 12–13 are in office.

Therefore, the unwillingness to appoint even selected candidates to the CCU, or delays in doing so, essentially blocks the Constitutional Court from adopting any decision.

It is now obvious that the Court functions under both internal and external political pressure. Thus, without the appointment of new CCU judges, the resolution of any truly important but highly political issues is effectively blocked. Yes, the Court may obtain a decision declaring minor legislative ‘flea’ unconstitutional. But resolving something that will produce 400 media stories within a couple of minutes is impossible.

We did not aim to list all existing problems of the Constitutional Court. This is the purpose of the Shadow Reports written annually by a coalition of civil society organisations coordinated by ALI and by other civil society representatives.

At this stage, however, it is extremely important to draw attention to the political and personnel dimension. Not only because this is a requirement of the Kachka–Kos plan, but because the balance of power in a country at war depends on a politically independent and internally stable CCU that functions properly. Ukraine must not only survive the battle with a rabid bear. It must also stay the internal dragons that have for years been destroying Ukraine’s attractiveness, above all for its own citizens who decide to raise their children abroad, as well as for our allies in the European Union and NATO, who are no longer as confident when speaking about Ukraine’s rapid accession even to the EU.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) is starting work on a White Paper that will focus primarily on the problems of civil service and patronage service in courts of first instance and courts of appeal, as well as ways to address them. This study is a logical continuation of the Green Paper presented by ALI experts in July 2025.

The White Paper is intended to become a public policy tool and to contribute to systemic changes in attitudes towards the role of court staff in ensuring the administration of justice. In the longer term, ALI’s new study will serve as a basis for transformations in legislation and in the organisation of courts’ work.

ALI experts want to hear directly from those who ensure the daily operation of courts. This concerns civil service and patronage service staff, as well as their experience, needs, vision for change and problems.

1. heads of courts and their deputies: https://forms.gle/uHtC8EM9QM8VcqwA8
2. heads of court offices and their deputies: https://forms.gle/vXsVhmQZ695EvKLE9
3. court staff and everyone interested: https://forms.gle/yFmPM4r1arqNfHFW8 

Your responses will help develop evidence-based recommendations and ensure a high-quality analytical basis for further decisions. Verified data will form the foundation for change. Last year, more than one thousand court office staff took part in the study. It was their active participation that made it possible to describe all existing problems at the level of courts of first and second instance accurately.

Research into the work of court offices is one of ALI’s priorities. After all, it is civil service and patronage service staff who ensure the daily operation of the judicial system. Without proper attention to their problems, needs and motivation, judicial reform will remain superficial, inconsistent and incomplete.

Your experience matters and can become a catalyst for change — join the survey. The deadline for completing the survey is 17 May 2026 inclusive.

The research and survey are being carried out by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives with the support of the Supreme Court and the High Council of Justice.

All questionnaires are completed anonymously, and the data are used in an aggregated form. All information received is processed by ALI experts.

The study is being implemented within the project ‘Reinforcing the European Dimension of the Ukrainian Civil Service in Law-Making, Judiciary, Finances’, implemented by ALI with the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

Competitive selection is a basic tool for ensuring professionalism, integrity, and political neutrality in the prosecution service. The comprehensive reform of the prosecution service in Ukraine has lasted nearly 20 years, and the complete HR reset across all levels of the prosecutor’s office (Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices) was carried out in 2019–2021 through the attestation process. 

Since then, appointments to positions of prosecutors in district prosecutor’s offices were carried out only on the basis of a selection announced and conducted by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP). Appointments to positions of prosecutors in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office were also based on the results of competitive selection for the transfer of prosecutors from district and regional prosecutor’s offices to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The special order of appointment and transfer of prosecutors without competition under martial law was implemented by the Law No. 4555-IX, introduced in July 2025. Any person without a criminal record with the required legal experience received the opportunity to be appointed to higher-level prosecutor’s offices based on the submitted application, which became an opportunity, including for former law enforcement officers who, according to the results of the attestation (vetting), were recognised as not meeting the criteria of professionalism and integrity.

The particular issue was described in the:

1. European Commission report on Ukraine’s progress within the framework of the 2025 EU Enlargement Package, where it is recommended in the coming year to remove the provisions allowing the transfer and appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition and giving the right for the Prosecutor General to access any pre-trial investigation material, abstain from further enforcement of these provisions until they are repealed;
2. Shadow Report complementing the European Commission’s 2024 Report on Ukraine, which provides the recommendation to repeal the amendments introduced by Law No. 4555-IX, that significantly restricted the scope of prosecutorial procedural independence and unjustifiably strengthened the procedural role of the Prosecutor General;
3. Joint Statement between Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka that introduced 10 priorities, one of which is to adopt, within a year, a law, in line with European standards and after consultation with the Venice Commission, to ensure a transparent and merit-based selection process, appointments and transfers for prosecutors to managerial positions and other prosecutorial positions in the Prosecutor General’s Office, regional and district prosecutor’s offices, including clear criteria and a transparent, competitive, and meritocratic selection procedure that includes an assessment of professional competence and integrity;
4. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 that repeat the requirement of removing provisions allowing the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition, and giving the Prosecutor General’s Office the right to access any pre-trial investigation material. 

In addition, the Law No. 4555-IX introduced a hidden tool of pressure on the prosecutor — dismissal from the prosecutor’s office in the event of liquidation or reorganisation of the structural unit in which he held the position. This allowed the head of the prosecutor’s office to lay off the independent prosecutors, create a new staffing list, and appoint only those prosecutors who meet the ‘vision’ of the new leader.

Since July 2025, for more than 8 months, no law has been adopted that would abolish non-competitive appointments to the prosecutor’s office, and the prosecutor’s office actively uses the opportunity to appoint prosecutors to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

• abandonment of the meritocratic approach and the destruction of the career growth model for prosecutors;
• undermining the quality of the staff and weakening the independence of the prosecutor’s office;
• formation of lobbying groups in prosecutorial bodies by appointing loyal employees;
• deviation from European standards and reform requirements, and undermining trust from international partners.

Currently, three legislative initiatives (Draft Law No. 13601 dated 06.08.2025, Draft Law No. 13601-1 dated 22.08.2025 and Draft Law No. 13699 dated 26.08.2025) have been tabled in Parliament. All the legislative initiatives are from MPs, not the Government or the President of Ukraine.

The key idea of the first one (No. 13601) is to restore the previous wording of the Law ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’:

• repealing all the amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ introduced by the Law No. 4555-IX and returning to the wording of the law that preceded such amendments;
• restoration of the procedure for appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law.

The second one (No. 13601-1) provides for:

• the gradual cancellation of recruitment for the positions of prosecutors at the district prosecutor’s offices, carried out by the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, which means actual deterioration of the independence of prosecutors through the complete abandonment of any competitive procedures at all levels;
• establishing an equal approach to resolving the issue of appointing prosecutors at all levels during the period of martial law.

The third one (No. 13699) on amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Prosecutor’s Office’ addresses a wider range of issues than HR policy and provides for:

• return to the procedure of appointment to prosecutorial positions in prosecutorial offices at all levels that existed before the introduction of martial law;
• cancels the expansion of the powers of the Prosecutor General regarding the provision of pre-trial investigation materials to him, establishing the time limit and method of its implementation, thereby restoring the independence of each prosecutor in criminal proceedings.

Irreversibility of reform roll-back. The prosecution reform of 2019–2021 established merit-based competitive transfer as the only legitimate pathway to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

Continuation of non-competitive appointments:

1. dismantles the core architecture of that reform;
2. normalises exceptional mechanisms;
3. creates dual standards for prosecutors appointed before and after July 2025.

Once institutional practices shift toward discretionary appointments, restoring competitive mechanisms becomes politically and administratively more difficult. Temporary derogation risks becoming permanent regression.

Undermining prosecutorial independence. Non-competitive appointments to higher-level prosecutor’s offices increase institutional dependence on the appointing authority.

Without transparent procedures and professional assessment, prosecutors may be perceived as personally loyal appointees rather than independent procedural actors. 

This increases the risk that:

1. key positions in regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office will be filled with personally loyal candidates;
2. informal vertical dependencies replace institutional guarantees of independence;
3. prosecutorial discretion in sensitive cases becomes indirectly influenced by personnel expectations.

Legal uncertainty and selective application risk. The absence of clear, transparent criteria for selecting among applicants creates space for selective or inconsistent decision-making.

Even if appointments formally comply with Law No. 4555-IX, lack of:

1. open list of vacancies and job descriptions for positions;
2. ranking mechanisms;
3. independent commission, undermines predictability and equal access to public office.

This creates:

• perception of unfair advancement;
• fragmentation among prosecutors appointed through a competitive and non-competitive procedure.

EU accession and conditionality risk. Merit-based and transparent appointment of prosecutors is directly linked to Ukraine’s obligations under Cluster 1 (Fundamentals) of the EU accession framework. Furthermore, the problem was highlighted in the European Commission report within the 2025 Enlargement Package. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos identified solving the relevant problem as one of ten key priorities. EU accession benchmarks for Ukraine under Cluster 1 underlined the importance of removing provisions that allow the appointment and transfer of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competition.

Maintaining a simplified, non-competitive regime:

• contradicts previously implemented reform commitments;
• weakens Ukraine’s negotiating position in rule of law assessments;
• may affect conditional financial and technical support linked to governance benchmarks.

Given that prosecution reform was repeatedly referenced in European Commission assessments, deviation at this stage carries strategic geopolitical implications.

The continued application of non-competitive appointments to prosecutorial positions at the regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office under Law No. 4555-IX constitutes a direct deviation from the core principles of prosecutorial reform in Ukraine.

Merit-based competitive selection is not a technical HR procedure, but a structural safeguard of independence, professionalism, and political neutrality. Its suspension at the highest levels of the prosecution service undermines the institutional architecture built during the 2019–2021 reform and reverses progress achieved in aligning Ukraine’s prosecution system with European standards.

The argument of wartime necessity cannot justify the systematic replacement of competitive procedures with discretionary appointments. When exceptional mechanisms are applied without strict limitations, they cease to be temporary and instead reshape institutional practice in a way that weakens accountability and transparency.

Moreover, the concentration of HR powers in the hands of prosecutorial leadership creates additional democratic risks. When the same authority simultaneously:

• decides on appointments to higher-level positions without competition;
• has an effective influence over organisational restructuring and liquidation of positions within prosecutorial bodies. This combination of powers creates structural imbalances.

Dismissals based on staff reduction or reorganisation, in a context where appointment decisions are discretionary, may create precedents perceived as instruments of influence rather than as an objective administrative necessity. If prosecutorial leadership can both appoint without competition and eliminate positions occupied by prosecutors, the safeguards against arbitrary HR decisions are significantly weakened.

Such concentration of power contradicts the principle of institutional checks and balances and undermines guarantees of prosecutorial independence. In democratic systems governed by the rule of law, appointment and dismissal mechanisms must be insulated from discretionary political or managerial influence.

Restoring full competitive appointment and transfer procedures is therefore not merely a matter of procedural refinement but a prerequisite for preserving the independence, legitimacy, and democratic accountability of the prosecution service.

Short-term (urgent legislative action):

Immediately repeal the provisions of Law No. 4555-IX that allow the appointment of prosecutors to regional prosecutor’s offices and the Prosecutor General’s Office without competitive selection on the basis of a submitted application.

Competitive appointment must be restored as the only lawful mechanism for access to higher-level prosecutorial positions. 

Abolish the legal provision introduced by the same law that allows dismissal of prosecutors due to liquidation or reorganisation of a prosecutorial body without adequate safeguards.

When a single authority can effectively eliminate a position occupied by an independent prosecutor and subsequently create a new position to which a loyal individual may be appointed, this creates structural conditions for abuse. Such a model contradicts democratic governance principles, weakens institutional checks and balances, and endangers prosecutorial independence.

Medium-term:

Improve and modernise the competitive transfer procedure for prosecutors moving from lower-level to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The restoration of competition should not merely replicate the pre-martial law model but strengthen it. In particular:

• ensure clear, published evaluation criteria;
• establish structured scoring methodology;
• ensure monthly open reporting on available vacant positions and corresponding job responsibilities, and announcement of competitions for lower-level prosecutors to fill such positions.

Mandate the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) to actively resume and systematically conduct competitive selection procedures for transfers to higher-level prosecutor’s offices.

The QDCP should:

1. adopt and publish a detailed methodology for assessing professional competence, managerial skills (where relevant), and integrity;
2. standardise interview procedures;
3. set predictable timelines for regular competitions (once a month or once every three months).

A clear separation of appointments and dismissal powers and a strengthened institutional role of the QDCP are essential to maintain independence and democratic accountability. 

This Infobrief was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

On 9 March 2026, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the Council of Europe, Mykola Tochytskyi, signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of the Profession of Lawyer. Ukraine became the 28th country to sign this international treaty.

The Convention on the Protection of the Profession of Lawyer is the first international treaty of its kind aimed at protecting this profession. The document establishes common standards for guaranteeing the independence of lawyers and provides for a monitoring mechanism to oversee the implementation of its provisions. It was developed in response to the growing number of reports of attacks against members of the profession — whether in the form of harassment, threats or physical attacks, or through interference with the exercise of professional duties (such as restricting access to clients).

The signing of the Convention is only the first step. Ukraine shall now ratify it in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On International Treaties of Ukraine’. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, noted that the Convention will enter into force upon the eighth ratification (of which at least six must be by Council of Europe member states). As of today, none of the signatory states has yet ratified the Convention.

For ratification, among other things, an official Ukrainian translation of the Convention is required, to be prepared by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Daria Pysarenko, Director of the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, emphasises that this is not merely a technical matter — it concerns the scope of guarantees for the independence of legal professionals.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’ welcome Ukraine’s signing of the Convention while also noting that threats to the independence of the legal profession arise not only externally but also from within the profession itself. In 2022, the mandates of all bodies of the Bar self-government expired. However, the Bar Council of Ukraine has not called elections for four consecutive years. The principle of accountability of the legal profession to its members has been undermined. Advocates have not seen reports on the use of their contributions since 2021. Disciplinary procedures are used as a tool to sanction criticism of the decisions and actions of Bar self-governance bodies. Access to the profession remains non-transparent and carries risks of abuse. These and other issues are outlined in the section ‘Bar Reform’ in the Shadow Report under Chapter 23 of the EU acquis and in the European Commission’s Enlargement Report.

Given that the legal profession occupies a central place in the justice system alongside the judiciary and the prosecution service, it is not possible to speak of justice sector reform without reform of the legal profession. The European Commission has repeatedly highlighted the need for such reform and, in its latest Enlargement Report, clearly stated: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’, while also setting out its proposals for such changes.

In response to the deep institutional crisis in the Bar, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine initiated the establishment of a working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and the practice of law. Accordingly, in January 2026, the Government established such a working group, which includes representatives of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and the NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’.

In 2025, more than 100,000 procedural documents related to searches were submitted to courts. Publicly available data include only judicial statistics on motions requesting authorisation for a search, which are considered by investigating judges as part of preliminary (ex-ante) judicial control. In 2024, law enforcement bodies submitted 93,991 such motions, of which 7,239 were rejected (7.7%). For comparison, in 2020, there were 97,367 motions and 15,310 refusals (15.7%). Even in 2022, despite a lower number of requests and the partial authorisation of searches by prosecutors under Article 615 of the CPC of Ukraine, the refusal rate was 18.8%. The downward trend in refusals persists — judges are granting an increasing number of motions.

This may be explained by improved substantiation of the motions. However, there is also another explanation: in cases where the prospect of obtaining judicial authorisation is doubtful, investigators may resort to an urgent search followed by the subsequent legalisation of its results.

Regular media reports about searches create the impression that their number is increasing. However, the problem lies not only in the figures. Searches have become more visible due to the high-profile nature of the proceedings and the strong public demand for justice. In public discourse, the very fact of a search is often perceived as evidence of guilt, although it is merely an instrument for collecting evidence.

Whether the number of searches has indeed increased, whether urgency is gradually becoming the rule and how to maintain a balance between the effectiveness of investigations and human rights — these are the questions we attempt to address.

A search is an investigative action aimed at collecting evidence in criminal proceedings under strict judicial control. It has a clearly defined object of search — the identification and recording of information about the circumstances of a criminal offence, the discovery of the instrument used to commit the offence or property obtained as a result of its commission (evidence) and other relevant materials. This is established in the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC of Ukraine).

However, in practice, searches often go far beyond procedural needs and may be unlawful. In some cases, they are part of political stories — pressure on opponents or the discrediting of civil society actors or representatives of the authorities, when investigative actions turn into a public ‘show’. At times, searches become part of unlawful practices by law enforcement bodies: intimidation of businesses, pressure on competitors, corrupt ‘raids’, protection rackets and other abuses. In such cases, a search ceases to be an instrument for collecting evidence and instead becomes a tool of arbitrariness.

If a search is authorised by an investigating judge, the investigator and the prosecutor are obliged to substantiate the grounds for conducting it. However, the Constitution of Ukraine and the CPC of Ukraine allow, in exceptional cases, for an urgent search: when the investigator believes that delay would lead to the loss of items or documents, the search may be conducted without a prior ruling of the investigating judge. The aim is to ‘preserve property’, which judicial practice interprets to include physical evidence.

Media coverage may create the impression that in 2025 this practice has not been avoided by NABU, the SBI or other bodies. In my view, the perception of increasing abuses during searches may be primarily linked to the more active use of urgent searches and their public exposure. In most cases, it is precisely these searches that generate additional resonance, since they are conducted without prior judicial authorisation and are subsequently subject to review within the framework of ex post judicial control.

To claim arbitrariness, it is necessary to understand how many urgent searches were ultimately not validated by the court and how often the evidence obtained during them was declared inadmissible. Due to the absence of statistical data, society does not have a complete picture, which creates space for assumptions and generalisations. Publicly available data do not include the number of urgent searches conducted by each pre-trial investigation body separately (SBI, NABU, the National Police, the SSU, the ESBU). Negative perceptions are also reinforced by the sometimes-aggressive behaviour of certain representatives of law enforcement bodies during searches (humiliation, attempts to plant evidence, gathering and leaking information about individuals and other practices). According to information published by ‘Dzerkalo Tyzhnia’, NABU has only recently begun to keep statistics on urgent searches, which currently constitute 2% of the total number; other bodies do not maintain such statistics.

Searches conducted by the SBI at the premises of the HQCJ and at the residence of the then Deputy Head of the Commission in 2025 attracted considerable public attention. Formally, these actions were carried out within criminal proceedings. However, beyond the procedural framework, deeper institutional problems became apparent: the HQCJ stated that it regarded these actions as pressure. The events coincided with the intensification of the qualification assessment of judges of the liquidated District Administrative Court of Kyiv and the Pecherskyi District Court of Kyiv, which at the same time were considering SBI motions concerning searches and access to documents. The boundary between law enforcement and pressure proved to be dangerously thin.

Recently, another high-profile scandal unfolded around the ‘Yabko’ chain of stores, where representatives of the ESBU carried out searches. During these actions, allegedly smuggled equipment worth more than USD 100 million could have been seized. Company representatives speak of ‘signs of a commissioned campaign’, while the ESBU claims that its detectives conducted a large-scale operation aimed at de-shadowing the electronics and technology market.

These are only a few cases that received media coverage. However, media visibility does not provide an understanding of the scale of the use of this instrument or allow an objective assessment of its effectiveness or possible abuses. Ultimately, the media often portray urgent searches as potential abuse. Yet the mere fact that a search is conducted without a prior judicial ruling does not automatically indicate a violation. The key issue is whether the mechanism for the subsequent validation of the search was followed and whether judicial control over the use of this instrument was properly exercised.

The weakest point in the entire issue of urgent searches is judicial oversight. It takes place post factum: urgently, but no later than within 24 hours after the search, the investigator must notify the judge, who then verifies its legality. At the moment of review, the search has already taken place. If the court recognises the actions as unlawful, the evidence obtained may be declared inadmissible. However, the damage has already been done: business operations may have been halted and reputations damaged — and this cannot be undone. Moreover, cases where evidence is declared inadmissible are rare — the ‘legalisation’ of the search for the prosecution is usually successful.

The weakness of judicial oversight has fundamental causes. The criteria for authorising a search (‘sufficient grounds’, ‘likelihood of finding evidence’) belong to evaluative concepts. These criteria cannot be exhaustively defined in legislation given the wide variety of real-life situations where an urgent search may be necessary. Such categories should instead be clarified through judicial practice. Unfortunately, that practice remains inconsistent.

As a result, judges often approach the assessment of the grounds for an urgent search formally, and motions are granted without in-depth analysis. Defence counsels accuse courts of ‘playing along’ with the prosecution and of lacking professionalism, arguing that judicial oversight has a biased character. The reasons lie not only in possible external or internal pressure but also in the systemic overload of judges. Judges themselves note that the greatest threat to impartiality is the lack of time to examine the materials of the pre-trial investigation. Excessive workload forces them to rely on personal sympathies and prior working relationships with participants in the proceedings formed in earlier cases.

If chronic time constraints are combined with a heavy workload, the result is a situation in which motions for searches are granted almost automatically — not because judges are convinced of their substantiation but because of routine and mutual trust. Prosecutors bring materials daily, which usually do not contain obvious procedural errors, and judges rarely can examine each case critically.

This situation is well explained by the theory of the ‘courtroom workgroup’, developed by American sociologists of law in the 1960s–1970s. In criminal proceedings, stable ‘working groups’ are formed: the investigator, the prosecutor and the same investigating judge who interact daily. They know each other and have developed a working relationship. In this model, the defence counsel is a variable figure without a permanent institutional presence. The lack of independence, combined with bias arising from excessive workload, contributes to the formation of a prosecutorial bias.

Under martial law, the number of refusals to grant motions for searches decreases, while urgent searches are more easily validated by the court. At the same time, the judicial system remains in a difficult condition: staff shortages, uneven workload, changes in jurisdiction due to the war and constant postponements of hearings because of air raid alerts. In such circumstances, a formalistic approach to judicial oversight becomes a systemic risk.

It is unlikely that we will be able to overcome sociological patterns — ‘working groups’ will always emerge as long as participants in criminal proceedings interact daily. The human factor, cognitive bias and the desire to simplify work are inherent elements of professional activity. Nevertheless, their impact can be minimised.

First and foremost — through legislative amendments, by providing for the participation of the person whose premises were searched during the ex-post validation of the search. The European Court of Human Rights pointed to the necessity of such a measure in the case Korniyets and Others v. Ukraine (2025). The Court found ineffective investigation of complaints, unjustified interference with private life and the absence of effective remedies. The ECtHR emphasised that an urgent search is an exception rather than the rule and must comply with the criteria of ‘in accordance with the law’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and ‘proportionality’. Compliance with these standards would improve the procedural dimension of such cases but would not eliminate the problem of pressure entirely — its roots lie not only in procedure but also in motives and in the system itself.

Another approach would be to narrow the grounds for conducting an urgent search. Such an attempt has already been made: by Law No. 4555-IX of 23 July 2025 the relevant grounds were narrowed by excluding certain economic and official offences, including corruption offences. However, due to risks for proceedings conducted by NABU and SAPO, only a week later Law No. 4560-IX restored Part 3 of Article 233 of the CPC of Ukraine to its previous wording. At the same time, new initiatives with similar proposals continue to appear in Parliament.

Equally important is changing public attitudes towards the presumption of innocence. A search of a flat or office does not automatically mean ‘guilty’. The same applies to the notification of suspicion and the registration of information in the URPTI. Yet in the public sphere, a search is often perceived as moral satisfaction when it concerns ‘corrupt officials’, and as a ‘betrayal’ when investigative actions are carried out with regard to journalists or service members. Such emotional logic has nothing to do with criminal procedure. A search is merely an instrument, and it is the court that must ensure a balanced application of this instrument.

It is also necessary to address the problem of the excessive workload of courts and to strengthen judicial oversight. Investigating judges should more carefully assess the materials of the pre-trial investigation, especially in cases of urgent searches.

Ultimately, clearer criteria for urgency must be developed in judicial practice, and the Supreme Court should be engaged in shaping approaches to the most serious interferences with human rights, particularly the right to privacy.

Such steps could change the situation: investigators would have less incentive to apply to an investigating judge for a search without a genuine intention to obtain evidence, while urgent searches would become the exception rather than common practice.

A search is neither good nor bad. It is an instrument. However, in a system with weak judicial oversight and vague criteria for urgency, any instrument risks turning into a means of pressure. Therefore, the issue is not the number of searches but whether the system can guarantee that the exception does not become the rule and that evidence-gathering does not replace justice.

The issue of Bar self-governance has become so critical in recent years that it was included among the priorities of the Rule of Law Roadmap approved by Ukraine in May 2025. This is also reflected in last year’s Shadow Report to the European Commission’s Report on Ukraine.

In other words, the matter goes beyond the internal ‘kitchen’ of Ukrainian Bar self-governance — and directly affects the entire justice sector and all European integration processes in Ukraine.

Let us examine what exactly has ‘gone wrong’ in Ukrainian Bar self-governance.

Let us begin with the pressing issue — the elective nature of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies). This is a key element of the institutional independence of the Bar and, consequently, one of the fundamental guarantees of the rule of law and access to justice.

It is precisely the BSG bodies that determine the rules governing the profession in Ukraine. Therefore, the system for their election is of key importance. The highest body is the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine, whose delegates are elected at the Conferences of Advocates of the Regions (CAR) according to established quotas. However, this electiveness is merely formal, as the processes within the BSG bodies have for a long time been under the centralised monopoly of the Bar Council of Ukraine and the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA) — since their establishment in 2012 following the adoption of the current Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. In other words, for 13 years the BSG bodies have remained under the leadership of the same individuals, headed by Lidiia Izovitova, who, according to numerous reports, has close ties with Viktor Medvedchuk, accused of high treason. It is the BСU that determines representation quotas and approves the procedure for nominating and electing delegates both to the Conference of Advocates of the Region (CAR) and to the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine.

This effectively preserves Bar self-governance in its existing form and turns it into a closed system with features of manual control, bearing little resemblance to transparency or openness. As a result, the monopoly has produced predictable ‘results’: the term of office of the leadership of the BCU expired as far back as November 2022 (the Law provides for a five-year term, which may be extended only once), yet the Congress of Advocates has not been convened. Everything is attributed to the full-scale war and the alleged impossibility of gathering advocates in one place for security reasons. This not only blocks the re-election of the Bar leadership but also prevents the exercise of constitutional powers — in particular, the delegation of two representatives to the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and one representative to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) under the advocates’ quota.

Instead, the BCU, contrary to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’, unilaterally extended its mandate until the end of martial law, referring to institutional continuity — that is, the principle of continuity of activity.

At the same time, congresses of judges, academics and prosecutors have been held repeatedly, even under conditions of full-scale invasion, although they too could have relied on similar wording and continued to operate in their previous compositions. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also continues its work despite current realities. Yevhen Krapyvin, Head of the ‘Law and Order’ Area at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, does not consider the reference to continuity to be legally justified as a basis for failing to convene the Congress of Advocates after 2022. Particularly given that, for example, prosecutors have already held more than one All-Ukrainian Conference of Prosecutors during the full-scale war.

The expert notes that the ‘principle of continuity’ invoked by the UNBA does indeed exist. However, its meaning is interpreted depending on the branch of law in which it is applied. It may refer to the continuity of the state in international law, the preservation of constitutional institutions during the transition from one legal regime to another, territorial continuity and so forth. Accordingly, if legislative norms are to be invoked, they should be applied in full rather than selectively, and not limited solely to those formulations that are convenient for extending the powers of the BSG bodies.

Over nearly four years of full-scale war, the BCU has repeatedly had the opportunity to initiate changes to the mechanism for holding the Congress of Advocates. For example, through online voting via Diia or other means of simplifying the procedure for electing delegates, as the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has previously written. However, the leadership of the Bar has not done so.

Instead, Lidiia Izovitova seeks reasons why this would not work: ‘Proposals are being made regarding electronic voting. Let us return to our realities: front-line territories… electronic warfare systems — they jam communications, you cannot transmit information — that is the first point… The second — lack of electricity and, as a consequence, lack of internet access. What kind of electronic voting can we speak of?’. At the same time, regions with (potential) hostilities — Kherson, Odesa, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia — have once again been cited among the reasons why elections cannot be held. Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, has noted that such reasoning is at the very least contradictory, as the UNBA previously held large-scale events without difficulty, including in Kharkiv in 2024 at the premises of the Law University.

A de facto non-functioning system of Bar self-governance leads to problems of another nature — disciplinary ones. Among other functions, the work of the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine is also directed at disciplinary matters, as it elects the Head and Deputy Heads of the High Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar (HQDCB), as well as the composition of the High Audit Commission of the Bar (HACB).

According to Daria Pysarenko, Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation gives rise to serious concerns regarding the disciplinary system of the Bar. These concerns were brought into sharper focus by the formation of the competition commission for the selection of senior positions in the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).

Oleksii Shevchuk, a lawyer, was appointed to the commission. According to journalistic investigations, he has been linked to high-profile cases, including a corruption scheme involving the unlawful departure of men abroad and the disappearance of 10,000 military first-aid kits from the United States, worth over UAH 33 million. Notably, in 2023, Oleksii Shevchuk participated in the competition for the High Council of Justice (HCJ), during which he received a negative opinion from the Ethics Council, meaning that he was found not to meet the criteria of professional ethics and integrity. Although such an opinion is not binding for other competitions and does not entail legal consequences of a different nature, it nevertheless established facts of unethical conduct in the past. In the same year, the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar of the Kyiv Region (QDCB) attempted to deprive Oleksii Shevchuk of his right to practise law for violating the Rules of Legal Ethics. However, the decision was overturned, and Shevchuk subsequently assumed the position of spokesperson of the Ukrainian National Bar Association (UNBA).

This raises the question of why the disciplinary system did not function properly in this case. ‘There is no possibility of reviewing all decisions adopted in the relevant disciplinary proceedings, which once again underscores the urgent need to establish a comprehensive public register of disciplinary decisions’, notes Daria Pysarenko.

According to the Director of NGO ‘Tomorrow’s Lawyer’, this situation demonstrates the necessity of strengthening the independence of the disciplinary bodies of the Bar. As is known, the Head of the HQDCB is currently appointed by decision of the Bar Council of Ukraine, whereas the law expressly provides that he or she must be elected exclusively by the Congress of Advocates of Ukraine. ‘Such interference in the activities of a disciplinary body is unacceptable and undermines trust in the entire system of professional self-governance’, the expert emphasises.

The prolonged absence of genuine electiveness and the artificially frozen composition of the governing bodies of the Bar systematically harm the entire sector. Instead of transparent and democratic practices, the UNBA and the BCU pursue advocates for criticising the leadership, while disciplinary practice has become a closed instrument of influence. All of this is justified by reference to the war and to the principle of continuity.

Moreover, the consequences have long extended beyond the Bar itself and directly affect — and damage — the entire justice system. The opacity of disciplinary practice and of the BSG bodies as a whole, the failure to exercise constitutional powers, the blocking of the Congress of Advocates and the deliberate disregard of the obligation to delegate representatives to the HCJ and the QDCP paralyse the renewal of the judiciary and the reform of law enforcement bodies. Accordingly, they also hinder Ukraine’s European integration.

It is therefore logical that the state cannot remain on the sidelines when the governing bodies of the Bar have, since 2019, blocked any attempts to reform the sector. The actions of the Ministry of Justice, in particular the establishment of a working group on improving legislation in the field of the Bar and practice of law, constitute a necessary and logical response to a deep institutional crisis which the Bar itself has long refused to address. Although the Bar is a self-governing profession, the element of state regulation is significant — it is sufficient to examine the relevant Law of Ukraine ‘On the Bar and Practice of Law’. Given that the Bar occupies a central place within the justice system alongside the courts and the prosecution service, it is impossible to speak of reforming the justice sector without reforming the Bar.

These are precisely the European integration obligations concerning the Bar, which each year become more specific and more clearly defined. Whereas previously the European Commission would diplomatically hint, in a single sentence, at the need for reform, the most recent Enlargement Report stated unequivocally: ‘Ukraine needs to urgently launch a comprehensive reform of the Bar’. Moreover, given Ukraine’s inability to independently formulate a reform agenda, the EU has gone so far as to propose substantive directions for change in its reports — something the European Commission would not ordinarily be expected to do. At the same time, European partners have emphasised that ‘Re-elections of Bar self-governance bodies have not been conducted despite the expiry of their mandates’. In essence, they have made it clear that the war is not a reason to postpone the Congress of Advocates and the re-election of the Bar leadership, nor to refrain from reforming the sector.