The Vice-President Is Gone — Long Live the Head of the Chancellery?

The issue of appointing a new Head of the Office of the President (OP) has receded to the margins of the political agenda while President Zelenskyy is fully immersed in the negotiation process. This, however, has not stopped political commentators, journalists and others from speculating about who will ultimately take the helm of the OP. In parallel, Ukrainska Pravda reports that the President has resumed communication with Andrii Yermak.

Despite this, the moment of ‘office interregnum’ should be used for a kind of after-action review. In other words, we propose to look at the institution of the Administration/Secretariat/Office of the President in a broader perspective and through the prism of international experience, and to examine what, in fact, could function differently with a change in the Head of the OP. And, ultimately, whether there is an institutional problem within the power triangle or a traditional ‘excess of executive discretion’.

What Is the Office of the President (or How Was It Designed)?

The Office of the President of Ukraine is a permanent auxiliary body of the Head of State; it is an institution that replaced the Presidential Administration in this capacity in 2019. Officially, the Office of the President is positioned as an advisory and analytical, communications and organisational centre that ensures the functioning of the Head of State. Formally, the Office of the President does not adopt political decisions, is not a body of executive power and may not assume the functions of the Government or Parliament.

Its main tasks include analytical work, coordination of communications, oversight of compliance with diplomatic protocol, interaction with public authorities, preparation of the President’s documents and administration of working processes. Given the constitutionally defined duties and powers of the President of Ukraine, the Office must possess strategic-level expertise in the fields of national security, international relations, interaction with public authorities and related areas.

What, then, constitutes the basis and legal framework for the establishment and functioning of this auxiliary body? Obviously, it will come as no surprise that the Constitution of Ukraine provides the basic answer to this question, in the part that defines the powers of the President and the apparatus that ensures their exercise. Article 106 of the Constitution sets out the exclusive powers of the Head of State: defence, national security, international policy, appointment and dismissal of a number of officials, submission of draft laws to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), signing adopted laws and exercising the right of veto. Although the Constitution does not contain a separate article on the Office of the President, it is precisely the scope of the President’s powers that necessitates the establishment of an apparatus to ensure the performance of these functions, and paragraph 28 of Article 106 explicitly states that the President ‘establishes, reorganises and dissolves consultative, advisory and other auxiliary bodies and services’.

What Does an ‘Auxiliary Body’ Turn Out to Be in Practice?

If the Office of the President operated strictly within the limits of its formal tasks, the figure of its Head would hardly be an object of such a level of public attention. However, Ukrainian politics and the architecture of power systematically demonstrate weak institutional development. As a result, situations repeatedly arise in which the actual influence of a specific official often exceeds their formal mandate. The Head of the Office/Administration/Secretariat of the President is a classic example of this phenomenon.

At the same time, the same statement is fully applicable to the position of the President of Ukraine itself: everyone who has held it, perhaps with the exception of Leonid Kravchuk, has in one way or another sought to increase their level of influence, expanding their constitutional powers in a non-constitutional manner. The Administration/Secretariat/Office has precisely been the auxiliary instrument that enabled this ‘expansion of influence’.

We will not delve too deeply into history. Primarily due to an entirely obvious fact: the Constitution in the 1996 version granted the President of Ukraine powers close to those of the head of the executive branch. As a result, during the presidencies of Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych, the Head of the Presidential Administration was the ‘right hand’ of the Head of State and a key management hub through which personnel decisions, political arrangements and a significant part of state strategies passed.

However, the more recent framework of the constitutional reforms of 2004/2014 also provides examples of the President’s influence and that of their auxiliary body beyond constitutional powers.

During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, the Administration was renamed the Secretariat, ostensibly to emphasise the renewal of both the auxiliary body’s functionality, with an apparent focus on ‘clerical functions’, and the Head of State himself. In practice, however, the Secretariat became a centre for the formulation of presidential decisions that went beyond the framework defined by the Constitution: from the appointment and dismissal of heads of regional and district state administrations without government submissions to overwhelming the Government with hundreds of decrees on virtually any matter.

Under Petro Poroshenko, the Presidential Administration effectively performed the functions of a political headquarters, a decision-making centre and a coordinator of key policy areas. For example, in 2016, it was the President and his Administration who became the key architects of the judicial reform.

With the launch of the OP in 2019, the ‘unloading’ of the institution and its depoliticisation were declared, but in practice, it became an even stronger centre of decision-making concentration, albeit within a new, more informal architecture. At the same time, several groups of claims can be identified that have regularly appeared in the media space regarding the OP and its leadership.

• Excessive lack of transparency and concentration of power. According to journalists, key decisions were made within a narrow circle without the necessary communication with the Government, Parliament and/or the expert community. This gave rise to conclusions about ‘manual governance’, politicisation and the personalisation of processes that should have been institutional in nature. This category also includes a subcategory relating to personnel decisions. Appointments of ministers, heads of law enforcement bodies and top officials often appeared to be personal arrangements and the construction of a vertical of loyalty rather than a systemic approach based on professionalism and achievements.
• Conflicts of interest and issues of trust. Certain publications highlighted corrupt links, informal or improper influence, which cast doubt on the impartiality and professionalism of the decisions taken.
• Parallel ‘centres of power’ and a struggle between towers. Publications often described internal conflicts between different groups of influence within the OP, which led to blocked decisions, ineffective coordination and information contradictions. This category also includes materials related to communication crises surrounding sensitive issues.

How can such a media discourse around the Office of the President and its leadership be explained? The Regulation on the OP contains a rather broad range of functions of a strategic nature, from analysing the situation in the world to providing expertise on adopted laws and developing its own legislative initiatives. The structure of the body, in fact, reproduces the architecture of the executive branch: so-called ‘sectoral’ units are responsible for the development of specific authorities. As a result, despite the declared ‘minimalist’ concept of the Secretariat/Office/Administration of the President, which would be limited solely to organisational matters, it has in practice turned into a ‘fourth’ branch of power alongside the legislative, executive and judicial branches.

The Office of the President became not merely an analytical or advisory body. It turned into a bridge between the President and the entire system of government and often into a de facto filter for access to decision-making. In the presence of a presidential ‘mono-majority’ in Parliament, this created such an imbalance in the system of checks and balances, such an over-centralisation and personalisation of power, that the Head of the Office of the President began to be informally referred to as a ‘Vice President’.

If the OP is viewed from this perspective, it becomes clear that the history of scandals, accusations of ‘grey cardinal schemes’, conflicts of interest and information wars between different ‘towers’ within the presidential circle is the result of a convergence of historical preconditions, a structural flaw in the architecture of power and specific political realities, rather than of individual personalities. In this sense, it can be argued that the role and place of the auxiliary body and the extent of influence of its Head are determined by the governing style of the President himself, within the limits permitted by the legislative framework.

What Does International Experience Say about Advisory Bodies Attached to the President?

In Ukraine, in the search for a ‘proper recipe’ for any reform, reference is traditionally made to ‘best international practices and standards’. We, however, propose to look at international experience in regulating and operating auxiliary bodies attached to the president, bearing in mind the identified problem and its genesis in Ukraine.

Globally, there is a wide range of models for organising presidential offices, apparatuses, administrations and secretariats, ranging from purely administrative and support structures to powerful political decision-making centres.

In parliamentary republics (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and others), the president does not possess executive powers and his role in the legislative process is largely limited to symbolic or procedural functions. Accordingly, the activity of the president’s office is predominantly administrative and protocol-oriented.

Its main functions include the preparation of documents for promulgation, technical support for decrees and the organisation of protocol events. Presidential advisers perform the functions of secretaries and rapporteurs and do not exert substantive influence on policy. In complex or controversial legislative situations, the president relies not on his own analytical apparatus but on the expertise of government structures or the decisions of the Constitutional Court.

In semi-presidential systems (France, Poland, Lithuania, Romania and others), where the president has real levers of influence over the executive branch, the president’s office acquires significant political weight. Such a body is effectively integrated into the system of public administration: it analyses draft laws, elaborates options for the use of veto powers and participates in consultations with the government and parliament. In this case, the president’s office acts as an extension of the powers of the Head of State.

The degree of legislative regulation of the status and powers of such offices varies across countries. For example, in Romania and Lithuania, the functions of the presidential administration are defined by law. In Poland and Lithuania, there are direct constitutional and legislative provisions that delineate the auxiliary role and structure of the office. In contrast, in France, a significant part of the activities of the President’s Chancellery is based on constitutional custom and internal orders of the president.

For Reference

The Statute of the Romanian Presidential Administration provides that presidential advisers (consilieri) hold the rank of minister, while the staffing and structure of the administration are approved by presidential decree. As a result, presidential advisers are formally endowed with a high status and access to state authority resources. In practice, strategic policy in areas where the Head of State plays a leading role is often shaped through the presidential apparatus. For example, in foreign policy and security, presidential advisers participate in the development of defence doctrine (as provided for by legislation); in domestic policy, they are involved in shaping international policy on anti-corruption matters, among others. Thus, the Romanian Presidential Administration has formally established an influence and scope that corresponds to the constitutional functions of the Head of State.

The Chancellery of the President of Lithuania in practice constitutes an important centre for diplomacy, defence and appointments. Under the Constitution of Lithuania, the President defines the main directions of foreign policy and, together with the Government, implements it, appoints diplomatic representatives, and plays a key role in the field of national security and defence. The only impeachment in Lithuania’s history was linked to the fact that President Rolandas Paksas, in 2003–2004, allowed business partners and donors connected to Russian business and special services into his close circle, which posed a threat to Lithuania’s national security.

The Offices of the Presidents of France and Poland, alongside their formally defined functions, also perform informal ones: they prepare analytical materials, oversee personnel policy, coordinate legislative initiatives and shape the President’s position. However, a substantial share of this influence occurs outside the boundaries of normative regulation and proper public oversight.

What these countries have in common is the presence of a broad staff of expert advisers who wield significant informal influence. On the one hand, this provides the President with access to high-quality analysis and comprehensive information, which is critically important when decisions must be taken on the promulgation of laws, the exercise of veto powers or appeals to the Constitutional Court under tight time constraints. On the other hand, such a model creates risks: advisers who do not bear political responsibility may exert non-public influence over the fate of laws, shaping a behind-the-scenes agenda. In the absence of clear mechanisms of democratic oversight, this increases the risks of backroom decision-making and potential abuses.

Does a Fateful Dismissal Create an Opportunity for Change?

Both a brief historical excursus and a review of international experience suggest that, at this stage, Ukraine is not unique in its ‘office–presidential discourse’:

• the formal status and informal influence of auxiliary bodies may differ;
• their functions may be regulated or may instead be based on political and organisational traditions;
• depending on the specific individuals holding office, new practices may emerge, as well as various difficulties and crisis episodes.

International experience underscores the absence of a one-size-fits-all approach to addressing these issues and demonstrates the need to build functioning institutions as an alternative to a personalised style of governance.

Is it possible to change anything in the specific socio-political and wartime circumstances? Unlike politicians, we have no need to promise ‘golden mountains’ or lure anyone with ‘castles in the air’. Therefore, to be completely frank, we are rather sceptical about the prospects of changing an already entrenched approach that has proven its propensity to generate problems. At the same time, the illusory nature of these prospects is no reason to give up or to refrain from demanding more.

We nevertheless propose to view the change of the Head of the Office of the President not merely as a political or personnel gesture. It is an opportunity to reconsider the very architecture of the institution which, in Ukraine’s political system, has traditionally acquired excessive, often informal, influence.

What needs to change is the model of operation in favour of a more transparent one, with clearly defined procedures for interaction within the triangle of power, analytically capable and less personalised, rather than simply selecting a ‘better person’. This would help avoid the hyperconcentration of power in the hands of the head of the President’s auxiliary body, who exercises his powers in the context of a full-scale war and the presence of a pro-presidential ‘mono-majority’. Of course, this is provided that Yermak’s resignation and his rapid transition to the status of a service member are not part of a cunning plan for a triumphant return and the preservation of influence, in light of his own statement about reforming the OP by involving service members and veterans across all departments.