Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for ‘Ukrainska Pravda’
The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has long ceased to be ‘just a special service’. In times of war, it has become one of the key institutions for the survival of the state. The SSU performs counterintelligence functions, combats organised crime, collaborationism and war crimes, exposes agent networks, counters sabotage and cyberattacks, etc. And at times — its officers also manage to take part in ‘conflicts’ around business and politics.
The Service itself notes — ‘we are developing’. But is such development the reform that the EU expects from Ukraine?
The SSU still combines the function of a classic special service — counterintelligence — and that of a law enforcement body — pre-trial investigation of crimes with a rather broad jurisdiction. Such a concentration of powers creates space for abuse, politicisation of the body, conflicts of competence and risks to human rights.
Reform of the SSU is a European integration requirement, despite an implicit consensus among experts that it is ‘not timely’ because it would weaken the country’s defence capability. The European Union states that over the past year there has been no progress in SSU reform. At the same time, it directly indicates that the SSU should transfer the function of pre-trial investigation to specialised law enforcement bodies, and itself — focus on the sphere of national security (national security tasks) and introduce effective safeguards against abuse.
The European Commission calls for strengthening both internal and external oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms, as well as improving the rules for the selection of senior management and personnel of the Security Service of Ukraine. This is also highlighted by a coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI) in the Shadow Report. The Ukrainian authorities, for their part, have officially committed to changing the SSU by the first quarter of 2026.
It is worth noting that under the sphere of national security our legislation understands a wide range of issues — from defence matters to economic and environmental security. At the same time, there is little difference between the term ‘state security’, customary for the SSU, and ‘national security’ — everything depends on the context, as the legislation lacks systemic coherence in this area.
Thus, the term ‘national security’ is broader than ‘state security’; in some cases, these terms are synonymous, while in others the term ‘state security’ relates only to non-military-time threats, etc. At the same time, the development of legislation has led to the term ‘national security’ being used far more frequently; this applies in particular to responsibility which, under the Constitution, is defined within the powers of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers — the protection of national security. Accordingly, they assign these tasks to the special service — the SSU. Therefore, it is not the name itself that matters, but that the powers of the SSU are clearly defined by law and do not allow for broad interpretation, as cases of unlawful actions by the Service often have nothing to do with its powers, when national security is understood to encompass all spheres of state activity.
Thus, we examine why and what changes the Security Service of Ukraine requires, and how realistic it is to reform this institution in the context of a full-scale war.
War as Justification and as a Trap
By law, the SSU is a central body of special purpose with law enforcement functions. In practice, however — it operates within an excessively broad range of tasks and powers. This is an approach rooted in the Soviet logic of security universalism, when a single structure was responsible for almost everything: from state security to economic crimes. At the same time, a defining feature of democratic societies is precisely that the powers of special services are limited, and their activities are subject to civilian oversight, including parliamentary oversight.
This is why, after the Revolution of Dignity, reform of the SSU became one of the tasks that ultimately was not completed before the full-scale invasion. Since 24 February 2022, the multitasking of the Security Service has only intensified. New challenges have emerged: large-scale international crimes, threats to national security (high treason, collaborationism, propaganda of war, etc.), special operations in occupied territories and on enemy territory, international cooperation, etc.
Experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives note the merging of counterintelligence and counterterrorism in the activities of the structure in wartime conditions. From the perspective of the rule of law, this blurs the boundaries of responsibility and accountability.
Martial law cannot serve as a long-term ‘indulgence’ for preserving old institutional solutions. Yes, war requires flexibility and rapid decision-making, but there is a need to review managerial and legal models and approaches that were shaped in a different security context.
Jurisdiction as a Point of Systemic Imbalance
The issue of jurisdiction remains problematic. This primarily concerns the SSU’s broad pre-trial investigation functions — not limited to national security and terrorism. These also include smuggling, international crimes, crimes related to state secrets and the protection of critical infrastructure. Some of these fall within the economic sphere, which is a frequent source of complaints from business (smuggling, financing of terrorism, collaborationist activities in the form of entrepreneurship, etc.). This is atypical for special services of the European model.
For example, war crimes are in fact investigated by the National Police — given the presence of police officers in all communities, they are the first to be approached, and most of these cases concern ‘strikes’, the consequences of which need to be properly documented. Accordingly, there are calls to expand the jurisdiction of the police or to establish a new body that, in the long term, would be capable of investigating these crimes, in order not to repeat the negative experience of the ‘Maidan cases’.
Certain criminal prosecution policies are also frequently criticised, for example the prosecution of pensioners for collaborationist activities (likes on ‘Odnoklassniki’) or of those who were forced to remain in occupied territories (of course, not those who went to work in the occupation administration or actively supported the occupation regime). Excessively harsh de facto criminal policy is a consequence of heightened demands for justice, yet it is counterproductive in the long term, especially in the context of de-occupation. In some cases, it is simply the result of working towards quantitative clearance indicators rather than a genuine fight against crime.
According to representatives of the SSU with whom ALI experts spoke in the course of preparing the Shadow Report, the Service is opposed to narrowing the function of pre-trial investigation. The exception is smuggling, jurisdiction over which may be transferred to the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, given its subject-matter focus. However, a broader narrowing of jurisdiction is needed — for example, to determine a phased approach as to what would be transferred to other bodies under martial law and what — after its termination. The investigation of crimes should be secondary in comparison with other tasks related to the protection of the state.
In addition, operational units of the SSU are widely involved in the investigation of criminal offences by all pre-trial investigation bodies (even the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) occasionally involves SSU operatives — there is no conflict in this). At the same time, within the Security Service of Ukraine, units ‘K’ (counterintelligence in the field of combating corruption and organised crime) and ‘E’ (counterintelligence in the economic sphere) have a ‘bad reputation’ — in the past, human rights defenders, journalists and anti-corruption activists often criticised them for interference in the activities of other bodies, surveillance of activists and journalists, etc. Following such criticism, the activities of units ‘K’ and ‘E’ were reoriented in 2021 towards the protection of critical infrastructure (in effect, a significant narrowing of functions took place).
Here it is important to understand that corruption-related offences do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SSU. They are investigated by NABU, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Police. The activities of the aforementioned units take place precisely in the counterintelligence sphere and do not provide for criminal prosecution by the Service for corruption or the economy as such. The economic sphere, threats to the national security of public authorities and other sensitive areas cannot be fully removed from the field of activity of the Security Service of Ukraine as a counterintelligence body, as they constitute areas of influence for foreign intelligence services, industrial espionage, preparation of terrorist acts, etc.
Counterintelligence as a function will always remain with this body, as it is inherent to a special service, unlike pre-trial investigation. The only question is the extent to which the Service is accountable and subject to oversight in a democratic society, so that these powers are not abused.
Undoubtedly, risks of abuse have existed and will always exist. That is precisely why there must be instruments to mitigate them through control, accountability, etc. For its part, this should be the responsibility of Parliament. Both the European Commission and ALI experts in the Shadow Report emphasise the need to strengthen such mechanisms.
Symptoms of a Personnel Illness
A widespread narrative concerns the politicisation of the SSU — due to high-profile scandals surrounding the special service and its officers, as well as past experience when law enforcement bodies became instruments of political struggle. However, such generalisation is overly simplistic.
Interestingly, at the same time, the level of trust in the SSU as of September 2025 stands at 78%. It is clear why, after the Defence Forces, trust in the SSU is the highest. In wartime, the reputation of the SSU correlates with its effectiveness on the battlefield and in the enemy’s rear (let us recall the ‘Alpha’ special unit), as well as with countering internal security threats.
At the same time, there is much talk about the so-called ‘political SSU’ and the ‘other SSU’. Yet such a division is devoid of meaning, as it narrows a structural problem down to individual personalities. It is not enough simply to replace ‘bad’ managers with ‘good’ ones. It is necessary to build a system of checks and balances, define the scope of powers and introduce accountability mechanisms that would make abuses in the work of the Service impossible.
It is important to understand that reform of the SSU cannot be ensured through a universal ‘international experts involved’ recipe in competitive selection procedures. After all, this concerns a special service, not an executive authority or even a court. Re-certification of all personnel or regular reminders in the media space about cases such as that of Shylo and similar ones are insufficient to bring Ukraine closer to EU and NATO standards. These instruments are not applicable to persons who have a high level of access to state secrets, perform tasks involving confidential cooperation and are often non-public individuals. Thus, for example, during the large-scale police attestation in 2015–2016, operational officers were not subject to re-certification — let alone an entire special service.
In this context, the case of NABU detective Ruslan Mahamedrasulov is noteworthy. Together with his father, he was accused by the SSU of allegedly selling technical hemp to representatives of the economic sector of russia. Mahamedrasulov was arrested on 21 July, which is in one way or another linked to attempts to undermine the independence of anti-corruption bodies. His defence publicly stated that they view this case as possible pressure on the detective and his family. The media and civil society also noted that the entire situation may be connected to the investigation into corruption abuses within the President’s inner circle. The disclosure of information regarding Operation ‘Midas’, conducted by NABU and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), has somewhat clarified the situation.
According to NABU, Detective Mahamedrasulov took part in the collection of evidence for this operation. As early as 3 December, the prosecution changed its position on the need to keep Mahamedrasulov and his father in custody, as a result of which the court released them from pre-trial detention under a personal recognisance.
Is there a role of the SSU in this? Undoubtedly. At the same time, this concerns the politicisation of the entire system — from prosecutors, whose head is the result of political agreements, to the Office of the President, which traditionally stands outside the branches of power and duplicates all other spheres of state activity. After all, criminal proceedings involve various actors: an investigator who collects evidence, a prosecutor who exercises procedural guidance and an investigating judge who oversees compliance with human rights and freedoms, including the application of preventive measures.
In other words — the Mahamedrasulov case or other ‘political’ cases are an indictment of the entire criminal justice system, not exclusively of the SSU. Moreover, if the SSU is maximally removed from this system (which is precisely the idea of the reform, which, among other things, limits the Service’s jurisdiction), the possibility of involving it in political cases will also decrease. What follows is the depoliticisation of the entire criminal justice system, which is beyond the scope of this article.
In this respect, it would be more effective to shift the focus of the discussion from attachment to individual personalities to the search for systemic institutional solutions. Thus, it is worth speaking about gradual reform of the Service, which would transform and develop the structure itself, while at the same time strengthening democratic oversight over it. This can be done by Members of Parliament through the specialised Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence.
At the beginning of 2027, it is planned to establish a separate Verkhovna Rada Committee that will ensure the Parliament’s oversight functions over special-purpose bodies with law enforcement functions, law enforcement bodies of special purpose and intelligence bodies. It will operate in accordance with best European practices and will be protected from unjustified political influence. This measure of the Rule of Law Roadmap strengthens the Parliament’s role in oversight of the SSU.
In addition, the work of the Service should be monitored by an independent ombudsman / oversight body to investigate individual complaints and other issues related to the activities of the SSU. The establishment of this position or body in line with European standards is envisaged by the Roadmap by the first quarter of 2027.
A Reform That Has Been ‘Timely’ Since 2021
Discussion of reform has been ongoing since 2021. Its aim is to transform the special service into a small, mobile, high-tech structure, similar to the UK’s MI5, with an exhaustive list of tasks: counterintelligence, counterterrorism and the protection of state secrets.
The foundation for this was intended to be Draft Law No. 3196-d, adopted at first reading in January 2021. It provided for the demilitarisation of the Service, the removal of non-core functions of pre-trial investigation of the aforementioned types of economic crimes and the strengthening of the counterintelligence block. The relevant initiative was prepared considering EU and NATO recommendations and strategic documents on the development of the security sector.
However, the context has changed radically. At present, this draft law is no longer sufficient, and the necessary changes will be attempted through several legislative initiatives, the central one of which should be a new Law of Ukraine ‘On the Security Service of Ukraine’.
The Rule of Law Roadmap sets deadlines for these innovations. The SSU itself participated in its development, and the European Commission also provided its assessment. In the fourth quarter of 2025, the analysis of EU and NATO legislation is to be finalised, and by the first quarter of 2026 — a new Law ‘On the SSU’ is to be adopted. In accordance with the requirements of international partners, it should focus the Service’s activities on counterintelligence, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and the protection of state secrets. In addition, a substantial block of reforms related to the activities of law enforcement bodies will apply to investigative and operational units.
Changes to the legislation are possible. In 2025 alone, two laws were adopted that clarify the structure, strengthen social guarantees and increase the number of SSU personnel. The Service has also been granted the right to independently submit draft legislative amendments to the Government or the President (previously this was done through the Ministry of Internal Affairs).
What Is Needed Now Is Not Debate, but Change
The time for discussing whether SSU reform is necessary has long passed. The Ukrainian authorities now have clear obligations — both to society and to the European Union. Changes to the structure must also be in the interests of the SSU itself: the body needs to cleanse its reputation and to restore public trust both in the rule of law and in the fact that old patterns will not be repeated and that the special service will not become yet another instrument of political influence and coercion.
Scandals surrounding the SSU, the events of July 2025, subsequent criminal proceedings in which NABU detectives are suspects and the experience of ‘political shaking’ of the leadership of certain institutions point to long-term negative consequences in wartime conditions. Therefore, restoring trust in the SSU not as an ‘organ of political persecution’ or a ‘punitive club of the President’ has become a relatively new development goal for the Service, which emerged in 2025.
Moreover, reform of the SSU is a condition for Ukraine’s further European integration. The Security Service of Ukraine can transform from a multifunctional law enforcement body with features of politicisation into a modern strategic special service of the European model, aligned with EU and NATO standards. The only question is whether the Ukrainian authorities will have sufficient political will not to waste this opportunity.
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