Prosecutor General Wants to Dismiss All Prosecutors with Disabilities: Why This Won’t Help

Ruslan Kravchenko plans to appeal to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors (QDCPP) with a request to consider the dismissal of 348 prosecutors with disabilities. While the QDCP does have the authority to dismiss for disciplinary misconduct, there must be legal grounds for doing so. Finding one is difficult, since only a medical institution can confirm whether a disability status is unjustified. How can the problem of prosecutors with disabilities be solved? And why won’t simply firing them all help?

How Many Prosecutors Have Disabilities?

At the end of October 2024, a scandal erupted over “prosecutors’ disabilities”—nearly all prosecutors were accused of having disabilities (and receiving the corresponding benefits). Prosecutor General Andrii Kostin eventually resigned, calling it his personal “political responsibility.” Meanwhile, official data showed that only 5–7% of prosecutors received disability pensions, some of whom genuinely had Group II or III disabilities compatible with work conditions. As of now, that number has gone down to 484 individuals (some resigned voluntarily). Excluding prosecutors with childhood disabilities, combat veterans, etc., 348 individuals remain in question. This is 3.4% of the total prosecutor workforce.

What Happened After the Scandal?

The General Inspectorate of the Prosecutor General’s Office launched an internal investigation, which, as of March this year, has not been completed. The State Bureau of Investigation initiated criminal proceedings for document forgery (Art. 358 of the Criminal Code) and bribery (Art. 369 of the Criminal Code). Some officials were notified of suspicion, primarily for organising a criminal scheme in collusion with the Medical and Social Expert Commissions (MSEC).

At the same time, the disability issue largely falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, which disbandedMSEC and began a review of disability decisions. All prosecutors were referred for reevaluation to specialised institutions. It is known that 74 prosecutors had their disability status revoked. The Prosecutor General’s Office consistently maintained that disciplinary action and dismissal could only be pursued based on such findings, which has not happened yet. 

Meanwhile, Draft Law No. 12278 (authored by H. Tretiakova) is under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Its idea is simple: ban prosecutors from receiving pension payments while still working. This is a radical solution, as it “kills” the incentive for corruption. However, the idea is clearly unfair to prosecutors who have childhood disabilities or other conditions that do not interfere with their duties. Also, Ukraine will soon see the demobilisation of war veterans, some of whom are prosecutors or may work in the prosecutor’s office while having Group II or III disabilities. Passing this draft law would discriminate against such prosecutors, so it needs further refinement.

What Does the New Prosecutor General Propose?

Ruslan Kravchenko has proposed referring all prosecutors with disabilities to the QDCPP for a “review.” At first glance, such a sharp measure may seem appealing, but in reality, it poses more risks than potential benefits.

First, it is unclear what exactly the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Public Prosecutors is supposed to “review”. If it concerns the legality of obtaining a disability certificate from the Medical and Social Expert Commission, such an assessment is conducted by medical professionals based on documents and a physical examination. Should the QDCPP perform medical examinations instead of doctors? The question is rhetorical. If the QDCPP is only supposed to review secondary documentation, it is still unclear what conclusions it could possibly draw without medical expertise.

The previous mechanism addressed this issue: the Ministry of Health conducted assessments, either revoking or confirming disability status. Then, an internal investigation determined the unlawful way in which the disability was obtained. Finally, the General Inspectorate and State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) probed whether prosecutors committed corruption, forged documents, or exerted pressure on those authorised to make decisions on granting disability status. Prosecutors should be held accountable for these specific actions. Has the Ministry of Health found violations regarding these 358 prosecutors? This remains unknown.

This idea looks like an effort to shift responsibility for prosecutors with disabilities onto the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors.

What Are the Pitfalls of the New Prosecutor General’s Idea?

The QDCPP now faces a dilemma: it can either directly refuse this proposal or agree to it. In the first case, it will face public backlash; in the second, it risks triggering lawsuits from wrongfully terminated prosecutors, leading to compensation payouts from the state budget.

The QDCPP can review secondary materials, such as medical records, prior investigation files, explanatory notes, etc., and then make a decision based on this review. But on what legal grounds? Article 43 of the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” provides an exhaustive list of such grounds. Perhaps an applicable one is “a one-off gross violation of prosecutorial ethics” (clause 6, part 1 of Article 43 of the Law), since it harmed the reputation of the prosecution service? However, without a medical conclusion confirming fraud, this lacks a legal basis. In this case, prosecutors would have every opportunity to successfully appeal the decision to the High Council of Justice and/or the court. The prosecution service would lose, and compensation from the state budget (after similar situations with certification of the police officers and prosecutors) can become a cruel joke.

There is an even more radical idea to dismiss prosecutors on the grounds of “integrity,” meaning recognising questionable disability claims as “actions that discredit the prosecutor and may raise doubts about their objectivity, impartiality, and independence and about the integrity and incorruptibility of prosecution offices” (clause 5, part 1 of Article 43 of the Law). This might sound good. But here’s the problem: this provision should have been removed from the law long ago, as GRECO Fourth Evaluation Round Report (2017) described it as “insufficient to ensure effective enforcement of the rules, to provide for legal certainty, and to prevent possible misuse of disciplinary proceedings.” It also recommended that specific disciplinary offences are defined more precisely. That is why the draft law submitted to the government in March this year finally implements these recommendations regarding disciplinary proceedings and excludes them from the Law. Applying this ground to more than 300 prosecutors without individualising their guilt is a losing strategy.

The statute of limitations for disciplinary proceedings is one year from the date of the offence. It means that even if wrongdoing is proven, proceedings would be closed, leaving the QDCPP to be blamed by the public.

So How Can Prosecutors be Held Accountable?

Despite the apparent nature of the issue, there is no simple fix—the solution must be comprehensive.

1. It is crucial to complete the process of confirming disability status of prosecutors in specialised institutions. Delays persist, partly because some prosecutors evade re-examination, which is an act that could lead to disciplinary action. Additionally, the Prosecutor General should meet with the Ministry of Health to address the problem, potentially signing a Memorandum outlining steps toward its resolution. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Health should audit this drawn-out process.
2. It is necessary to complete internal investigations by the General Inspectorate and criminal proceedings by the State Bureau of Investigations. These probes can determine how disability statuses were wrongfully obtained and hold those responsible accountable. The Inspectorate should then forward thoroughly reviewed materials to the QDCPP, while court rulings should leave no doubt about a prosecutor’s guilt.
3. It is also necessary to address damage to the state budget. Recovering pension payments poses a legal hurdle: even if they are deemed unjustified, they cannot be reclaimed by the state (clause 1, part 1 of Article 1215 of the Civil Code). While this provision protects a broad circle of pensioners, it significantly softens the liability of individuals who systematically and unlawfully received funds for years. At a minimum, this should factor into offence classification, since there may be alternative means of financial liability.
4. It is necessary to complete the reform of the disability assessment system. Similar schemes exist not only among prosecutors but also judges, civil servants, and individuals, enabling not just illicit payments but also evasion of military service and access to other privileges. For no apparent reason, dismantling the Medical and Social Expert Commissions required a decision of the National Security and Defence Council, yet the effectiveness of the current system of medical commissions remains questionable. We still lack public data on the results of this reform or even basic information about civil servants receiving disability-related payments.
5. Finally, it is important to address unjust special pensions. Another pressing problem within the prosecutor’s service involves special pensions granted by the court based on outdated pension laws for prosecutors. Some prosecutors receive pensions as high as UAH 150,000 per month, with some recipients being under 40 years old. Outdated laws allowed such pensions after just 15 years of service, and court rulings (including by the Constitutional Court) still uphold such payouts today. This extends beyond prosecutors to judges and other officials, demanding legislative intervention.

Only systemic measures (which cannot be implemented by the Prosecutor General alone), requiring coordinated action by Parliament, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Health, and other responsible bodies, can resolve the “prosecutors’ disabilities” scandal and broader pension abuses. Hasty measures, like mass dismissals (though publicly popular in the short-run), could result in prosecutors being reinstated and compensated, ultimately causing even greater long-term damage and failing to bring us any closer to solving the problem.