Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for LB.UA.
International partners make no secret of the fact that the key test of Ukraine’s readiness for European integration is not the passage of laws but real institutional change. The door to the EU is open, but one can pass through it only with reforms that are fully implemented. While we are moving towards that doorway — and progress is indeed visible — the pace remains too slow. This is how the European Commission assessed Ukraine in its 2025 EU Enlargement Report. The document examines Ukraine’s progress across all negotiating chapters, including the rule of law, anti-corruption policy, reform of the prosecution service, the Bar and law-enforcement bodies. A Shadow Report — a roadmap for bringing these reforms to their logical conclusion — was presented at the end of October by a coalition of civil society organisations led by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI).
So, what steps does the Ukrainian Government need to take in the justice and law-enforcement sectors? And how do these two documents intersect to create a ‘roadmap’ without which the movement towards the EU risks remaining nothing more than a loud declaration? ALI examines these issues in this article prepared specially for LB.UA.
Judicial reform: the international component as a key to success
One of the most important signals from Brussels concerns the involvement of international experts in the competition for the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ). The European Commission explicitly calls for the continued participation of independent foreign experts and warns against forming the Commission solely from representatives of ‘non-reformed’ national bodies. This point is also strongly emphasised by ALI experts in the Shadow Report.
The mandate of the international experts who took part in selecting members of the HQCJ expired in the summer, and the hastily adopted 2021 law now allows the creation of a new Commission without them. Both the European Commission and Ukrainian civil society organisations agree that the international component in judicial selection processes significantly raises standards and mitigates corruption risks. Therefore, excluding international experts from these processes could become a flashpoint for backsliding on judicial reform.
The European Commission therefore demands the urgent extension of the mandate of international experts for the selection of HQCJ members and its expansion to include the competition for the Supreme Court. Draft law No. 13382, registered in June 2025, could partially address this issue (although it, too, requires refinement). However, there appears to be no public consideration of the draft law — nor political will to advance it — at this time.
In addition, international experts highlight the need to reboot the national bodies that nominate members to the HQCJ through open competitions with integrity checks. Specifically, this concerns the Council of Judges and the Bar Council.
The European Commission also stressed that the mandate of the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE), which conducts the competition for the High Anti-Corruption Court, must remain in force until all vacancies are filled. The coalition’s Shadow Report echoes these same recommendations.
Judicial reform: strengthening public oversight
Beyond the issue of international participation, the European Commission emphasises the need to reinforce public oversight mechanisms — specifically the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which assists the HQCJ in vetting judges and judicial candidates. Here, too, international partners and civil society share the same view: they recommend improving PIC’s access to information, creating a permanent secretariat and enhancing its analytical capacity.
The Shadow Report proposes amendments that would grant PIC full access to judicial dossiers, provide dedicated state-budget funding for its secretariat, allocate premises and equipment for the Public Integrity Council, and digitalise all related processes.
How staffing shortages and delayed appointments slow down judicial reform
Both the European Commission and the Shadow Report highlight recurring problems in securing quorums within key bodies of judicial governance — primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ) — as well as in the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
Although President Zelenskyy appointed two HCJ members in October 2025 after a lengthy delay, the risk of the body becoming paralysed remains. Four members are still missing from the HCJ’s full composition, and the mandates of two additional members will expire as early as summer 2026. Experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives emphasise that the four-year delay in appointing HCJ members under the Bar quota has obstructed the Council’s work and, consequently, the renewal of the judiciary. The Shadow Report warns of the potential risks: any reduction in the quorum or attempts to change it through legislative amendments, could turn the HCJ into a controlled body where decisions are taken by a minimal majority loyal to the authorities. For this reason, ALI experts recommend rejecting Draft Law No. 13137, which proposes changing the rules for forming the HCJ’s quorum. Such a change would create direct corruption risks and open the way for political pressure.
Instead, the Shadow Report proposes ensuring that all vacancies are filled through transparent and timely procedures — for example, launching competitions for vacant positions at least a year before the mandates of current HCJ members expire. It is also essential to extend the mandate of the Ethics Council in law so that it can complete its competitions.
In addition, experts propose developing an alternative mechanism for convening the Congress of Advocates. Due to delays by the National Bar Association of Ukraine, the Bar quotas in the HCJ and the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors have remained unfilled for years. The Shadow Report recommends introducing legal liability for obstructing these procedures.
The quorum problem has also affected the Constitutional Court, where nearly one-third of the seats are currently vacant: instead of 18 judges, only 13 are serving. The European Commission clearly highlights these risks and stresses that selected candidates must be appointed. ALI notes in the Shadow Report that this situation arises not only from the complexity of the selection process and low candidate participation, but also from delays on the part of the appointing authorities. The President and Parliament either fail to vote on candidates or postpone decisions for long periods.
After the July attempt to subordinate anti-corruption bodies to the Prosecutor General, the authorities tried to reverse the most controversial changes, yet still ‘quietly’ preserved control over the prosecution service through Law No. 4555-IX. However, the Enlargement Report served as a ‘cold shower’, emphasising that institutional independence remains vulnerable.
The European Commission gave a negative assessment of the abolition of the pilot personnel reserve and called for legislative amendments that would make selection, appointment and dismissal procedures more objective, transparent and merit-based (as the competitive procedure for appointments to the prosecution service was effectively abolished).
How can Ukraine address this problem? ALI experts note in the Shadow Report that this can be done fairly quickly — by adopting proposals, some of which are already on the Verkhovna Rada’s agenda.
Indeed, Parliament has registered two draft laws: Draft Law No. 13601 of 6 August 2025 on amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Public Prosecutor’s Office’ concerning the reinstatement of competitions for the appointment of prosecutors during martial law and provisions on dismissal; and Draft Law No. 13699 of 26 August 2025 amending the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine and certain legislative acts of Ukraine to improve the functioning of criminal justice bodies. The first reinstates competitions and repeals the new powers granted to the Prosecutor General, while the second, in addition to this, addresses certain procedural issues and strengthens the anti-corruption bodies of the criminal justice system. For the Committee on Law Enforcement Activities, it is sufficient to consider these draft laws, propose one of them for a vote in the plenary hall or refine them and submit an improved version. This can be done hic et nunc (‘here and now’).
At the same time, European partners stated explicitly that the procedure for appointing the Prosecutor General remains politicised. The Shadow Report recommends introducing an open competition with the involvement of prosecutorial self-governance, as required by European standards. A member of the Council of Prosecutors could sit on the commission responsible for selecting the Prosecutor General, or the Council itself — as the highest body of prosecutorial self-governance between All-Ukrainian Conferences of Prosecutors — could organise the competition. There are numerous models, but what matters, ALI experts stress, is to develop and strengthen self-governance in this sector so that prosecutors themselves can safeguard their independence from external — above all, political — interference.
The European Commission also noted that the appointment of the new Prosecutor General, combined with the legislative amendments adopted in July 2025, ‘undermine meritocracy in the prosecution service and create risks of undue interference in criminal proceedings. These amendments should be repealed and meanwhile their application should be suspended’. The message is clear: the changes contradict Ukraine’s European integration commitments, and the use of the new powers must cease — ultimately, the amendments must be revoked.
According to ALI, more than 200 individuals have been appointed to regional prosecution offices and the Office of the Prosecutor General under the new negative provisions of Law No. 4555-IX adopted in July — all outside competitive procedures. At the same time, most of these individuals were likely transferred from lower-level prosecution offices without the competitive procedure required for transfers to higher-level offices. How many of them came ‘from the street’ — former prosecutors, those who failed attestation, or lawyers without prosecutorial experience — remains unknown. Yet these individuals have already become prosecutors and part of the prosecutorial corps, meaning they will now participate in forming self-governance bodies and influence the work of the entire prosecution service. Therefore, it would be appropriate for the prosecution service to explain who entered the system under Law No. 4555-IX and by what procedure, to halt this practice and to demonstrate to the European Commission its readiness to address the problem. It is fair to note that the procedure for transferring to higher-level prosecution offices is quite complex, and it would be reasonable to consider simplifying it — alongside maintaining competitive foundations for the appointment of senior positions, which are planned for introduction in the first quarter of 2026 under the Ukraine Facility and the Rule of Law Roadmap.
Security sector: between reform and control
European partners also paid close attention to the security sector and to combating organised crime in Ukraine — areas of particular concern during wartime. The European Commission calls for implementing the measures of the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform and the Rule of Law Roadmap. Progress in this area must accelerate through the application of European methodologies for strategic analysis and crime prevention planning, including SOCTA. This logic is also reflected in the Shadow Report for Chapter 24 ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’.
The system for combating organised crime in Ukraine lacks legislative coherence. As a result, it exists largely on paper, while in practice it operates in a fragmented manner. Analysts attribute this to the fact that the state continues to rely on the inertia of tools inherited from the 1990s — tools that have been amended over time but not conceptually renewed. Thus, police reform, the creation of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), the Economic Security Bureau (ESBU) and the removal of prosecutors’ investigative powers all took place without updating the ‘framework’ legislation. Today, each of these bodies has its own understanding of priorities and methods of combating crime.
European partners therefore expect the adoption of a law that would delineate the powers of law enforcement agencies and ensure effective coordination and interaction among them. Particularly, this concerns the Security Service of Ukraine, which should focus on national security issues rather than duplicating the functions of the police or anti-corruption bodies. They also highlight the need to reform the SBI. The Shadow Report offers step-by-step recommendations in these areas: embedding the reform in the 2026–2030 Strategy for Combating Organised Crime, establishing the position of National Coordinator for Combating Organised Crime, and ensuring competitive procedures for appointing senior officials of the National Police and the SBI, with moderate involvement of international experts.
At the same time, the Shadow Report proposes creating a single analytical centre or developing shared standards for information exchange — crucial for monitoring and forecasting criminal activity. This would improve cooperation among criminal justice bodies and help streamline processes more effectively.
How the European Commission’s report and the Shadow Report shape a unified reform trajectory — and how Ukraine is moving along it
The enlargement process is not merely a diplomatic gesture of goodwill; it is a policy of requirements that determines whether a candidate country is ready to become part of the common European space. The Enlargement Report is an assessment of reform achievements and shortcomings — a record of ‘what has been done’ and a clear list of ‘what still needs to be done’. Meanwhile, the Shadow Report answers the question of ‘how exactly’ to meet the European Commission’s requirements. Importantly, it is based not only on the subjective views of civil society but also on EU law and standards.
The European Union emphasises: ‘The next step must be to turn intentions into results’. In other words, what matters now is the speed and consistency of reforms and the political will to implement them. Only under these conditions can the words ‘irreversibility of European integration’ have a chance of becoming reality rather than a promise.
