Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for Ukrainska Pravda
1,000 hours of recordings, 15 months of work, more than 70 searches. Hundreds of millions of dollars, influence over ministers and top-level officials. And no, this is not the plot of a new season of Money Heist. This is the reality of one of the largest corruption schemes in Ukraine’s energy and defence sectors. On 10 November, the country was shaken by announcements from the anti-corruption bodies revealing details of Operation ‘Midas’.
While on the international stage, the Ukrainian authorities continue to assure partners that corruption in Ukraine has been defeated and that reforms are steadily moving us towards the EU, things look very different on the inside. Some among the President’s close circle continue to live in their own world of stability: bags stuffed full of cash, purchasing high-value property abroad, manipulation, schemes, untouchability and a demonstrative confidence in their own impunity. And all this in a country at war, where the energy system is teetering on the edge, power cuts have long become the norm, and people are exhausted — morally, physically and financially.
Today, this contrast — between the public rhetoric on European integration and reform, and the backstage world of ‘under-the-table deals’ and ‘schemes’ for personal enrichment — has laid bare the central ailment of Ukrainian politics. The authorities display a façade of renewal, yet have merely refined the mechanisms of the old system of ‘fixers’ overseeing all key state bodies and enterprises.
‘Midas’ is not merely another high-profile criminal investigation. It is a signal that the systemic problems in the formation and functioning of the executive branch have tangible consequences and inflict serious harm on the economy and society.
Personnel Reshuffles: Devoid of Substance and Designed to Preserve Control
The system of checks and balances within the governing triangle, as envisaged by the Constitution — though it has in truth never functioned as intended — was entirely dismantled at the start of the current presidential–parliamentary term. The nature of the latest Government ‘reshuffles’, alongside the major corruption scandal, has fully confirmed this. The Cabinet of Ministers, appointed by the Verkhovna Rada, reports to the President, whose Office issues instructions on how to vote in Parliament, while Parliament is unable to approve the Government’s Programme of Activities and therefore unable to oversee it. This has created an extra-constitutional framework defined by a lack of responsibility and the absence of accountability.
Parliament had no influence over the appointment of the new/old Government in July 2025 (just as it had none over the previous two). The effectiveness of the ‘new’ ministries is yet to be assessed, but in practice, rearranging the variables and ministers in the governmental equation does not change the sum.
With each cycle of this ‘Ukrainian odyssey on the same rake’, the consequences become more catastrophic, while the number of lessons learned from previous cycles remains strikingly small. The main — if not the only — indicator of a minister’s effectiveness (or rather usefulness) is their personal loyalty to the ‘patrons’ instead of clearly defined criteria and visible, reported results. The inevitable side-effect (or perhaps the real objective?) in a context where political turnover is impossible is corruption.
As a result of constructing a vertical of loyalty combined with a lack of responsibility, a space emerges in which individuals who boast of close contacts with the President can approach certain ministers, tell them what to do and shape the agenda of the entire executive branch. Whereas in any democratic country an independent minister would immediately call the anti-corruption authorities and report an attempt to exert pressure, in Ukraine, such people are scarcely appointed as ministers at all.
In principle, a parliamentary–presidential system presupposes a primary link between the Government and Parliament, rather than the dominance of the President’s Office over both. Although contemporary research shows that, in practice, parliamentary–presidential systems may acquire presidential superpowers under certain conditions (for example, when there is a pro-presidential majority in Parliament), mechanisms of balance still exist.
Yet even under such conditions, there are instruments that could provide at least some system of checks and balances — instruments that, in Ukraine, have still not been introduced. For example, draft laws on interpellation, which would allow the dismissal of an individual Cabinet member based on their reporting to the Verkhovna Rada, continue to be stubbornly ignored. Meanwhile, the Government’s Programme of Activities (submitted after the deadline) has been gathering dust in a parliamentary committee for a second month. It is on the basis of the Programme’s implementation that Parliament assesses the (in)effectiveness of the Cabinet. When there is no Programme approved by Parliament — yet another situation not envisaged by the Constitution — it becomes unclear on what basis to evaluate the performance of the Government or its members.
What is more, in October 2025, the President even vetoed the adopted draft law on holding Cabinet members accountable for failing to appear when summoned to Parliament. This once again seemed to undermine the Verkhovna Rada’s autonomy, as the draft law, together with the President’s proposals, has never returned to the parliamentary agenda.
However, if the system were to function as it should, it would become more difficult for the President’s Office to dismiss the Government or reshuffle it at will. But even in cases where the Government (or its individual members) failed, responsibility would no longer be concentrated on Bankova.
When the Prosecution Service Becomes Part of a Political Shield
Another consequence of a loyalty-based, hands-on approach to governing the state is that a sector of strategic importance has been transformed into a sphere of influence for several groups, where personal proximity to the President has played the decisive role.
Following the summer reshuffles in the Cabinet, holding Herman Halushchenko, the former Minister of Energy, to account for everything he did (or failed to do) in the energy sector would now be possible only within the framework of a criminal proceeding. As things stand, he is effectively untouchable: as Minister of Justice, he will no longer bear political responsibility for his (in)action in his previous post, and criminal liability — given a Prosecutor General loyal to the President’s Office — appears closer to a fantasy. For the same reason, the Government reshuffles were not an attempt to restore order or improve performance. Rather, they were meant to keep in the system those who, at minimum, ‘do not cause problems’ and do not ask inconvenient questions and at maximum help to ‘sort things out’ and follow the instructions of the fixers.
A criminal proceeding concerning the offence allegedly committed by Halushchenko could, for example, be initiated by the Prosecutor General’s Office and then transferred, according to jurisdiction, to the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). However, during 2025, the powers of the Prosecutor General were significantly expanded and became a mechanism for establishing his own vertical of influence. The Prosecutor General obtained the ability to appoint subordinates without a competitive process, while the personnel reserve — intended to ensure transparency in recruitment across the prosecution service — was effectively dismantled. Under such conditions, the prosecution service, instead of serving as an instrument of oversight, is turning into a component of the President’s political shield. The European Commission also emphasised the politicisation of this sector in its latest Enlargement Report on Ukraine. Where independence should begin, influence is instead strengthened through political pressure, personal ties and similar means. As a result, when the matter concerns representatives of the authorities or their associates, the system simply does not respond.
When appointments are made behind closed doors based on personal loyalty rather than professionalism, the fight against corruption becomes nothing more than an imitation, yielding no real results. This state of play leaves ever fewer chances for genuine reform of law-enforcement bodies. After all, such reform must begin not with declarations and loud statements, but with the restoration of competition and transparent procedures in the institutions tasked with holding the authorities to account.
From Loyalty to Collapse: ‘Midas’ as a Test of the Whole System
It appears that, despite its defeat over the summer in the struggle for control of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and SAPO, the President’s Office did not expect a scandal of this scale. This is evident from the completely chaotic communication at all levels: from Telegram channels close to Bankova to the statements and appeals of officials themselves and everyone connected to the affair. One of the key figures in the investigation, Tymur Mindich, fled abroad a few hours before the search — essentially at the moment when the NABU and SAPO were already on their way to his home. The President managed only to express support for the anti-corruption bodies in his evening address, while Prime Minister Svyrydenko rushed to suspend Halushchenko and the Minister of Energy, Svitlana Hrynchuk, despite having no legal authority to do so. The effectiveness of the Government’s response, therefore, equals zero — if not negative. Only on the second day after the scandal did Zelenskyy state that he would sign a decree imposing sanctions on two individuals implicated in the NABU investigation concerning Energoatom; the Cabinet submitted the relevant proposals on Tymur Mindich and Oleksandr Zukerman to the National Security and Defence Council, and Hrynchuk submitted her resignation. Given that Mindich owns half of Kvartal 95, the entertainment studio that originally launched Zelenskyy as a media figure, the whole situation resembles an ouroboros — a snake devouring its own tail.
The exposure of a scheme of this scale demonstrates how weak state institutions, the appointment of ‘loyalists’ to key positions and the absence of transparency create fertile ground for corruption. This is the consequence of a system in which personnel decisions have long ceased to serve as a mechanism for renewal and have instead become an instrument for convulsive control over state financial flows.
Manual governance based on personal loyalty is convenient and may even appear effective. Yet it runs counter to the logic of building stable democratic institutions and, at the same time, regularly leads to large-scale failures. The cost is terrifying: millions of lives and, indeed, the very existence of our state.
This can only be changed when new appointments are made openly and transparently, based on competitive procedures, clear integrity criteria and public evaluation of results. When the system of checks and balances between the branches of power functions properly, and when a normal system for developing and implementing public policy is in place.
Instead of stabilising and reforming the state, the political leadership is spending its resources on reinforcing the patterns of the old system and supporting its friends. In doing so, it not only erodes the already fragile trust of society but also increases the risk of losing international support — both financial support and support in the EU accession process. Had this scandal erupted on the eve of the European Commission’s Enlargement Report, it is unlikely that our European partners would have been so lenient towards Ukraine. Moreover, it could — and still can — set us back several stages in the EU accession process. It is frightening to consider whether this might, in fact, be the true aim of certain individuals on Bankova who have yet to realise that ‘Midas’ is fully capable of removing them from there, in every sense of the word.
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