Material by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives for Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
On 31 October last year, Andrii Kostin stepped down as Prosecutor General after the scandal over ‘prosecutors’ disabilities’. In 2024, following journalistic investigations, law enforcement agencies uncovered large-scale abuses within the system of Medical and Social Expert Commissions (MSECs), which had been issuing fraudulent disability statuses to officials — including those in regional prosecutor’s offices. Although around 5% of officials in the prosecution service had such disability statuses as of 2024, the situation caused irreparable damage to the institution’s credibility and became a symbol of systemic mistrust.
This episode did not halt the reform of the prosecution service, but neither did it provide a fresh start. Despite the crisis of trust, European integration processes continued, even if largely unnoticed by the public — structural reforms are always less visible than personal scandals.
Here, we examine what has changed in the system over the past year and where the reform is heading. Experts from the Agency for Legislative Initiatives analysed developments in this field in detail in the Shadow Report to the European Commission’s 2024 Ukraine Report. In this article, however, we focus on personal leadership — sometimes lacking in the reform process and at other times standing in its way.
From High-Profile Dismissals to Partial Accountability: How Did the ‘Prosecutors’ Disabilities’ Scandal End?
The ‘prosecutors’ disabilities’ story triggered a chain reaction. In addition to Kostin’s resignation (formally at his own request), the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) adopted a separate decision, the Ministry of Health (MoH) launched a review of Medical and Social Expert Assessments, the MSECs were disbanded, and from January 2025, all prosecutors who had disability status were required to have it confirmed. The re-examination process dragged on due to the lack of proper coordination between the prosecution service and the MoH, so some prosecutors avoided the procedure altogether, while others simply ignored the requirements.
In 2025, the MoH lodged 39 complaints against prosecutors with both the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP) and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). In the former case, the maximum consequence was dismissal; in the latter, criminal liability. However, the response was minimal. Ultimately, Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko shifted responsibility for resolving these issues onto the QDCP, arguing that they were merely matters of disciplinary liability. Criminal liability disappeared from the agenda, even though in the pending SBI proceedings there are prosecutors — procedural supervisors — who can and should be held to account.
Thus, the QDCP did take real action and adopted a bold stance on prosecutorial ethics, yet it could have done so on the basis of the MoH complaints without waiting for the green light from the Prosecutor General (who holds the authority over criminal liability). So, has the scandal been resolved? Rather not. As genuine accountability for most prosecutors with disability status has still not materialised.
Reforms Without a Prosecutor General?
After Kostin’s resignation, the reform of the prosecution service continued, despite the fact that the President did not appoint a new Prosecutor General for seven months. The likely reason was the politicised nature of the appointment procedure and the absence of an open competition for the position. During that time, Oleksii Khomenko served as Acting Prosecutor General and now holds the post of First Deputy.
This period demonstrated that the institution is capable of functioning without manual control if stable procedures, personnel policies and internal oversight are in place. The personnel reserve for managerial positions continued to operate, GRECO recommendations were implemented — for example, a draft law to improve disciplinary liability for prosecutors was prepared in March — the evaluation system was being improved, and a random allocation mechanism for criminal cases was being developed. Daily communication with international partners took place, and the prosecution service played an active role in preparing a key European integration document in May — the Rule of Law Roadmap.
At the same time, the Shadow Report recorded that certain processes slowed during this period. In particular, the attestation of prosecutors ‘continues without defined deadlines for completion’, while the reduction in donor funding ‘has stalled reforms in personnel selection’ and ‘put at risk certain aspects of investigations into international crimes’. Thus, this period can be characterised as one in which it was not the system that changed but only some of its individual components. In other words, strategic vision and leadership were lacking.
The Prosecution Service Under New Leadership: Between Trust and Independence
The appointment of Ruslan Kravchenko signalled renewed activity. His rhetoric about justice and restoring trust in the prosecution service may seem appealing after the scandals that undermined the institution’s authority. Yet the methods chosen to achieve this run counter to European integration reforms in many respects. Since 2014, these reforms have sought to deconcentrate the powers of the Prosecutor General in favour of procedurally independent prosecutors who take decisions in criminal proceedings autonomously and bear full responsibility for them.
Signs of political influence and manual control have reappeared within the prosecution service. One of the new Prosecutor General’s first decisions was to abolish the personnel reserve. This effectively nullified a year of work on piloting the selection of heads of prosecutor’s offices — a gradual transition towards competitive appointments, as recommended by the EU.
The events of July 2025 — when the authorities attempted to undermine the independence of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) — deserve particular attention. The President’s law did not repeal all the harmful amendments adopted on 22 July 2025. More precisely, it did not repeal them at all for the prosecution service: while SAPO’s procedural independence was preserved, the same independence for other prosecutors was not. The strengthened role of the Prosecutor General over prosecutors other than anti-corruption prosecutors remains in place.
The key issue, however, is that heads of prosecutor’s offices may now hire prosecutors ‘from the street’, that is, without competition. The amendments that remain in force allow the appointment to the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) and to regional prosecutor’s offices of anyone holding a full higher legal education and legal work experience — five years for the PGO and three years for the regional level. In other words, it is now possible to enter the central tier of the system without any competition, testing or integrity checks. This creates a risk of reverting to a system of favouritism, where key positions are filled not by the most qualified candidates but by ‘insiders’.
Paradoxically, competitive procedures remain in place in lower-level prosecutor’s offices — with open processes, candidate rankings and the involvement of the independent QDCP (although MPs have proposed abolishing these as well ‘to keep things consistent’). Ostensibly, these changes are temporary, limited to the period of martial law, but how many people have already entered the prosecution service bypassing all procedures? And crucially, they will remain in the institution even after competitive selection becomes mandatory again. They will form the future bodies of prosecutorial self-government, they will supervise new prosecutors recruited through competitions and so on. The consequences of this political decision are long-term — and unequivocally negative.
The Shadow Report stresses that the bodies of prosecutorial self-government — the Council of Prosecutors of Ukraine (CPU) and the QDCP — remain overly dependent on the Prosecutor General’s Office and lack real powers. The Rule of Law Roadmap provides for a functional audit of the CPU and the QDCP, followed by strengthening the institutional independence of these bodies. This would prevent them from being mere formalities and enable them to genuinely safeguard prosecutorial independence within the institution. After all, prosecutors suffer most from interference by their superiors, who act not on the basis of the rule of law but according to political expediency. Addressing this is a key reform task for the coming year.
At the same time, Ruslan Kravchenko’s attempt to restore public trust in the prosecution service is understandable. After high-profile scandals, society needs signals of justice — and he provides them through public statements, involvement in high-profile cases and initiatives to protect business, among other steps.
However, strategically, this approach will only work in the short term and will not build institutional trust. The Prosecutor General may intervene in one case or another but cannot cover hundreds of thousands: management theory recognises the problem of a leader who works on behalf of subordinates — it does not last. It is impossible to change a system by appealing solely to emotion. Moreover, the logic of European integration reforms is about stability, predictability and independence. We need proper work from all prosecutors, not just from one, regardless of how high his position is. The level of the Prosecutor General is a strategic one — and this is precisely where leadership is lacking.
The European Integration Test of Independence
The EU expects Ukraine to build a European-style prosecution service — open, of high integrity, and institutionally autonomous. The Rule of Law Roadmap envisages competitive selections for managerial positions, updated integrity criteria, unified ethical standards and greater independence for the CPU and the QDCP. These are not merely technical steps — they are about long-term transformation. Ultimately, trust is built not on public slogans but on transparent procedures, predictable policy and the absence of selective accountability.
Even with changes in the leadership of the prosecution service, there are units within the Prosecutor General’s Office that have continued to work professionally on reforms and to maintain constant dialogue with international partners. Despite reorganisations, most staff remain committed to integrating the Ukrainian prosecution service into the EU — this potential for change has not disappeared; it simply requires political will to prevent it from being stalled.
The Ukrainian prosecution service has a real opportunity to complete its shift from personal loyalty to institutional stability. This requires not only political will but also a readiness to follow clear rules and to stay the course of European integration, even when the process is lengthy and does not yield immediate results.
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