Study on the condition of forced migrants from Ukraine living abroad and their plans to return to Ukraine

REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY

AGENCY FOR LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
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Chapter 1

Introduction



Ukraine is currently facing perhaps the greatest challenge in its history due to the threat posed by Russia, which unleashed a full-scale war on our territory in 2022. And for more than 1.5 years now, the struggle for independence and the ability to choose our own future has been ongoing. This aggressive war has triggered large-scale crises, including economic and demographic.

According to the State Statistics Service, on the eve of the full-scale war, in November 2021, Ukraine had a population of around 41 million people[1]. These figures are rather approximate and may be subject to significant error, as the last full census of Ukraine was conducted more than 20 years ago, in 2001. According to its results, 48.5 million people lived in Ukraine back then. And after almost a year of war, as of 1 January 2023, according to the Institute of Demography and Social Studies[2], the population of Ukraine was between 28 million and 34 million people[3].

Ukraine was facing a demographic crisis even before the full-scale war: the birth rate was consistently low year after year, the rate of premature mortality was increasing, especially among mennation was ageing, and natural population decline and large migration outflows were evident. And starting in 2022, after Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine was rocked by the largest migration crisis on record, with millions of Ukrainians fleeing for refuge abroad due to the insecurity and challenges the war brought with it. This threatens to deepen Ukraine's demographic crisis in the future, as most of the forced migrants are young and middle-aged women with children. Families are being separated, which in turn has a negative impact on family relationships. Thus, in the first half of 2023, the number of divorces in Ukraine tripled[4]. The deepening demographic crisis could lead to a significant labour shortage, and thus become a significant factor undermining the country's economic capacity.

As of 30 September 2023, nearly 4.2 million people who fled Ukraine as a consequence of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022 have been granted temporary protection status in EU countries[5].

Given that the war in Ukraine is ongoing, the number of forced migrants is likely to increase. Therefore, the issue of returning as many forced migrants as possible to Ukraine is extremely important in order to develop a capable and sustainable state with strong institutions after the war ends and the country recovers.

The study focuses on the plans of forced migrants to return to Ukraine, what may influence their decision to return to Ukraine or stay abroad, and what may motivate them to change their minds. Based on the results of the study, recommendations have been developed on how to motivate forced migrants to return to Ukraine.

The development of a state policy on the return of forced migrants, along with incentive measures to overcome future labour shortages, should be an integral part of the post-war recovery,

1 https://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/express/expr2021/12/153.pdf

2 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3692466-ciselnist-naselenna-ukraini-variuetsa-vid-28-do-34-miljoniv-demografi.html

3 When analysing these statistics, it is important to take into account that when comparing the population in the given time periods, we are talking about different scales of the country's territory due to the temporary occupation of certain regions of Ukraine.

4 https://opendatabot.ua/analytics/marriages-divorces-half-2023

5 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20231110-1

which will be implemented within the framework of the Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine from the consequences of the war[6], which aims to accelerate rapid economic growth.

In autumn 2022, the EU-funded project Civil Society for Ukraine's Post-War Recovery and EU-Readiness was launched. Within the framework of the project, six Ukrainian NGOs and think tanks, including the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, joined the Consortium. One of the Project's goals was to provide relevant government agencies and society with information to develop and implement a quality policy for the return of Ukrainian forced migrants home.

This study is structured as follows. First, we provide a description of the research methodology, which should help to understand how the main results were achieved. This is followed by an executive summary that outlines the main findings of this study. The next section provides a brief overview of the research already conducted on forced migrants. This is followed by the main results of our study. The most interesting information about the prospects of return of forced migrants and the factors that contribute to this is presented in Section 5.1. Other sections of the main results provide detailed information on various aspects of the lives of forced migrants. Section 5.2 describes the process of their departure from Ukraine – when, how, where and with whom they left. Then, in Section 5.3, we examine the reasons (factors) for the decision to move abroad and the factors that influenced the choice of the country of relocation. In Section 5.4, we describe the process of basic settlement abroad – obtaining residence status in the host country, living conditions there, and the first days of life after moving to the host country. Section 5.5 provides information on the policies of host countries – what kind of assistance forced migrants can receive and the conditions for receiving it. Further, Section 5.6 analyses the economic situation of forced migrants – how they assess their financial situation, what are the prospects for employment in the host country, what does the process of finding a job or starting a business look like, etc. Comparison of the quality of life in Ukraine and abroad in various areas (education, healthcare, security, transport, environment, services) is presented in Section 5.7. Then, Section 5.8 describes the process of integration of forced migrants into the host country environment, including the language issue, the attitude of citizens of these countries towards Ukrainians, the social circle of forced migrants, etc. The last Section of the key findings, 5.9, contains information about the expectations of forced migrants regarding the end of the war in Ukraine – when and with what result it will end and what will happen afterwards (post-war recovery). The main results are followed by the Concept of the State Policy on the Return of Forced Migrants, which contains a description of the problems and alternatives for their solution.

6 Recovery Plan of Ukraine: https://recovery.gov.ua/

Chapter 2

Description of the methodology of the study

Purpose and objectives of the study

The **purpose** of this study is to investigate the current life of forced migrants abroad and the preconditions for their return to Ukraine.

In accordance with this goal, the **study objectives** are formulated as follows:

- to find out the factors that influenced the decision to leave Ukraine, including the choice of the country of destination;
- to get an idea of the living conditions of forced migrants in the host country;
- to find out the level of readiness of forced migrants abroad to return to Ukraine;
- to identify factors that influence the decision of forced migrants to return or not to return to Ukraine;
- to find out what are the expectations of forced migrants abroad regarding the end of the war in Ukraine and further reconstruction.

The comprehensive study of forced migrants from Ukraine includes two components: qualitative and quantitative.

The fieldwork of the study took place in several waves during December 2022–February 2023, May–June 2023, and July 2023.

Qualitative research methodology

The qualitative portion of the study was conducted through in-depth interviews using a semi-structured guide. The average interview duration (online format) was 65 minutes.

The number of interviews conducted during the first wave of the study was 29.

The number of interviews conducted during the second wave of the study was 26.

The sample was selected according to the following criteria:

- geography: respondents represent different regions of Ukraine, as well as different countries abroad;
- types of settlements: covered residents of large and small cities, as well as villages from which respondents had left;
- age and gender: respondents represent different age groups, with the majority being women and the minority being men;
- financial status: respondents have different financial statuses;
- time of departure abroad: those who left Ukraine before the outbreak of full-scale war and after 24 February 2022.

All interviews were transcribed and translated into text format.

Quantitative research methodology

In July 2023, 1,032 Ukrainians aged 18 and over were interviewed: 122 of whom had travelled abroad between 1 January and 23 February 2022, and 910 after 23 February 2022 due to Russia's full-scale invasion.

The method of the survey was to send SMS messages to the numbers of Ukrainians abroad.

The sample represents Kyivstar and Vodafone users who travelled abroad after 24 February 2022 by country of residence, excluding Russia and Belarus. The sample was stratified by market share of each mobile operator and by country according to the latest available UNFPA data (see table below). Within each country, mobile numbers were randomly selected for the survey.

The marginal theoretical sampling error is ±3%.

Breakdown of respondents by country:

Country	%
Germany	21.40%
Poland	19.90%
Czech Republic	7.00%
France	4.17%
Romania	4.17%
United Kingdom	4.10%
Other countries	39.26%
Total	**100.00%**

The response rate is as follows:

	N	%
Targeted SMS sent	168176	
Response rate	7507	4.46%
Conversion rate	1041	13.87%
Failed the screener	1062	14.15%
Drop out rate	5404	71.99%

Chapter 3

Summary of the study



Almost all of the interviewed forced migrants abroad (98%) either actually faced the negative consequences of Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 or feared that they would.

The factors that influenced the final decision to move abroad are divided into security (most often related to shelling and hostilities), socio-economic (most often loss of work and income) and personal (most often psychological trauma). In particular, excessive stress and negative psychological consequences often affect children, as mentioned by the interviewed parents. Adults could return to Ukraine, but they are worried about the psycho-emotional state of their children, so they are forced to stay abroad for their sake. Other important factors include the occupation or threat of occupation and permanent/frequent stay in a shelter.

The wave of migration was the largest at the beginning of the full-scale invasion: every second respondent among forced migrants said they had left Ukraine during this period. Some respondents left Ukraine before 24 February 2022 (12%). They weighed their decisions more carefully and planned to move abroad given the threat of military invasion. For them, economic motives and quality of life were important factors in choosing a country to move to.

For those respondents who had to make a quick decision to leave Ukraine, the key driver was the sharp increase in the level of insecurity. They were frightened by the uncertainty and lack of understanding of when they would be able to return home and whether they would have a place to go back to at all. They were mainly motivated to leave by the desire to protect themselves and their families.

In general, the vast majority of respondents (88%) went abroad in 2022. And, according to the survey, the longer the respondents have been abroad, the less they want to return to Ukraine. In 2023, the share of those who left in June was slightly higher. This surge in migration was probably caused by the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station. This could also have been influenced by the beginning of holidays and school breaks. That is, large-scale negative events, as well as their consequences, can provoke new migration spikes in the future. And hypothetical negative events as well: one in five respondents said that before leaving, they were most afraid of a man-made disaster at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), and for 12% of respondents, this was one of the main factors that influenced their decision to leave Ukraine.

One in five respondents left for abroad alone. The rest went abroad with their children (47.3%), their husbands or wives (22.0%), their parents (15.5%) or other relatives. In Ukraine, 47.3% of respondents have parents, 12.3% have a spouse, 3.4% have children under 18 and 8.6% have adult children. According to the survey, if the respondent has parents, a spouse or children left behind in Ukraine, they are more likely to return to Ukraine, while if they are abroad together, they are less likely to return.

Most of the respondents are based in Europe: Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, France, Romania, and the UK. When choosing a country to leave, Ukrainian forced migrants were guided by various factors: *personal* (relatives, friends, acquaintances in the host country), *pragmatic* (living conditions, convenient logistics, benefits for forced migrants, infrastructure for Ukrainians, etc.) and *economic* (employment opportunities). Most often, Ukrainians went to places where their family members were already staying (22.4%) or friends/acquaintances (26.4%). One third of respondents did not choose a country to leave, but instead went wherever they had the opportunity.

The majority of respondents said that they immediately decided to go abroad rather than to safer regions of Ukraine due to the lack of relatives or friends there, economic reasons (lower chances of finding a job, lower social benefits) and high rental costs. Respondents also sometimes

articulate stereotypes about the oppression of Russian speakers in western Ukraine, and that this was important for them when deciding to emigrate abroad.

The majority of forced migrants abroad have been or are in the process of being legalised in the host country, and have received or continue to receive assistance from the host country. Some respondents say they will stay abroad as long as they have the opportunity to do so – official status and relevant benefits.

As much as 68.0% of forced migrants from Ukraine have received and are still receiving assistance from the country of their stay. Instead, one in four respondents (25.0%) said they had not received any assistance abroad. Each host country offered Ukrainians its own support programmes, which included various types of assistance (material, humanitarian, psychological, etc.). However, the main type of assistance surveyed by Ukrainians was financial (76.9%). The most favourable, according to respondents, are the conditions offered by Germany. In particular, this refers to the amount of social benefits for forced migrants from Ukraine.

Respondents who left in 2022 at the beginning of the full-scale war were impressed by the level of support for forced migrants abroad. They say they received all the help they needed. Foreigners tried to make the first period of stay abroad as easy as possible for Ukrainians, to cover all their needs. On the other hand, those respondents who left later gave less high marks, because they had to do more on their own. They were also provided with fewer essentials and freebies than at the beginning of the war. Respondents say that these difficulties made them think about returning home.

Ukrainian forced migrants abroad mostly live in separate housing – apartments or houses, mostly rented. According to the respondents, rent takes up a significant share of their expenses. Only 1.5% of respondents reported having their own housing abroad. Those who live free of charge in the homes of local residents (which is more of a temporary option) say that after the expiry of their stay, they will look for other affordable housing, and if they cannot find it, they will be forced to either move or return to Ukraine. Ukrainians do not speak very positively about living in shelters or special camps for refugees, especially when they had much more comfortable conditions and more personal space in Ukraine or even at first abroad. According to the study, the higher the assessment of living conditions, the less willing forced migrants are to return.

When asked to assess their financial situation abroad, 32.2% of respondents indicated that their financial situation had deteriorated to some extent compared to what it was in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, 23.8% said it had remained at about the same level, and 44.5% said their financial situation abroad had improved to some extent. Regarding the ability to ensure an adequate standard of living with their current level of income, the majority of respondents indicated that it is more realistic to do so abroad than in Ukraine (62.8%). Approximately the same number of respondents indicated that they have more opportunities to help their relatives financially now than when they were in Ukraine before the war. The assessment of the financial situation affects the intentions of forced migrants to return: the higher the assessment of their financial situation, the less they want to return to Ukraine.

More than half of the forced migrants abroad are currently employed, with 39.1% finding work abroad and 14.0% working remotely in Ukraine. At the same time, every second respondent has a higher opinion of career opportunities in Ukraine. And when it comes to assessing the amount of money paid, the vast majority of respondents gave a higher rating to work abroad. If forced migrants manage to get a job in their host country, their desire to return to Ukraine decreases.

Ukrainian forced migrants abroad have different assessments of the likelihood of their return to Ukraine BEFORE and AFTER the war is fully over. To the best of our knowledge, this study was

the first to use a probability scale to assess the likelihood of return instead of clear "I will return" or "I will not return" to Ukraine, which, in our opinion, reduces the likelihood of socially comfortable answers. Thus, on a 100-point scale, the likelihood of forced migrants returning from abroad BEFORE the end of the war is 33 out of 100 (0 points – definitely not returning – 32%, 1–50 points – rather not returning – 38%, 51–99 points – rather returning – 20%, 100 points – definitely returning – 10%), and AFTER the war is completely over – 66 out of 100 (0 points – 6%, 1–50 points – 27%, 51–99 points – 35%, 100 points – 33%). It is noteworthy that the probability of returning to Ukraine after the war is twice as high as before it ended.

In the regional breakdown, among those who definitely do NOT plan to return BEFORE the end of the war, every third is a resident of the East of Ukraine (32.7%), every fourth – of the South (24.6%); the smallest share (5.7%) is among residents of the West. Among those who definitely do NOT plan to return AFTER the war, the situation is similar: the largest share is among those from the East (31.1%) and South (26.2%), the smallest – from the West and North (4.9% each).

The most important factors that may affect the likelihood of Ukrainians returning BEFORE the end of the war are security in Ukraine, expectations of the end of the war, a spouse who remained in Ukraine, financial situation abroad, inability to adapt to a new country, relatives' reluctance to stay there and disappointment with life in the host country. And AFTER the end of the war – again, expectations about the end of the war, inability to adapt to the new country, the security situation in Ukraine, a spouse who remained in Ukraine, as well as housing conditions, work or study abroad.

The main conditions for the return of Ukrainian forced migrants to Ukraine are the end of the war and an improved level of security, the availability of work (preferably in their field of expertise) and decent pay, the solution of the housing issue, the fight against corruption, the improvement of the quality of life, and the recovery of the Ukrainian economy.

Among the reasons that would motivate respondents to return to Ukraine are security, economic, quality of life, and personal. These factors are often multiple and may combine several reasons from the same or different categories.

Respondents constantly monitor the situation in Ukraine and assess the possibility of returning. Some of them want to return to Ukraine as soon as possible, but have reasonable doubts about the wisdom of such a decision.

Given the fact that in a significant number of aspects/sides of life, Ukrainian forced migrants ranked their host countries as inferior to Ukraine, there is a possibility of certain situations that may call into question their continued stay in the host country, and given the challenging security situation in Ukraine, it is quite difficult for Ukrainian forced migrants to plan their future. On a 7-point scale (from "living one day at a time" to "making long-term plans"), Ukrainian forced migrants abroad described their approach to future planning as situational (3.82 points). In terms of percentage, 34% are closer to the "living one day at a time" approach, 40% are inclined to situational planning, and 27% to long-term planning.

As a result of the arguments given by respondents for returning to Ukraine, we distinguish between deterrents and incentives: deterrents are those that are an obstacle to return at the time of the survey, and incentives are those that are most motivating for respondents to return to Ukraine.

Some respondents indicate that an important argument for them not to return to Ukraine is the availability of official status abroad: they plan to stay abroad as long as their visa or official residence status is valid, and then make a decision upon expiry of this period.

The expectation/confidence that the quality of life in Ukraine will be low even after the war (60%), the likelihood that Russia will be able to attack Ukraine again even after the war is over, and the lack of suitable work in Ukraine (37% each) are the main factors that diminish the desire and readiness of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad to return to Ukraine.

It is noteworthy that the majority of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad expressed a strong desire to return home, to the place where they lived before the large-scale invasion, and a quarter of respondents are ready to consider settling in other regions of Ukraine.

We have also built an econometric model that identifies the key factors influencing the decision to return or stay.

Thus, for Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, the most important factor influencing their willingness to return to Ukraine is the *assessment of the host country* (29% before the end of the war and 43% after), and the least important is the *expectation of war in Ukraine* (12% before the end of the war and 13% after), apparently due to the uncertainty of the situation. Between them are such factors as *risks and fears in the host country* (20% before the end of the war and 16% after), *conditions in the host country* (19% before the end of the war and 15% after) and *conditions in Ukraine* (21% before the end of the war and 12% after).

This means that the decision whether to return to Ukraine depends more on the host country than on Ukraine – the influence of Ukraine is estimated at only 33% for the decision to return before the end of the war and 25% for the decision to return after the war (probably due to the lack of information about what the situation in Ukraine will be like after the war).

Thus, the return of Ukrainians requires, first of all, the assistance of other states. The key factors by which Ukraine is assessed, in addition to the existence of people they care about, are property, business/job and security. Accordingly, in order to facilitate the return of forced migrants, the state should primarily take care of housing reconstruction, employment of returned Ukrainians and security.

When comparing the quality of life abroad and in Ukraine before the full-scale war, some aspects were rated higher by forced migrants at home. The following aspects were rated as *at least twice as good* as in Ukraine before the war: circle of friends, communication; shop opening hours; access to healthcare services; quality of digital services; quality of services in the private sector; service sector development; quality of healthcare services; affordability of rental housing; accessibility and quality of the Internet; speed and quality of logistics and postal/courier services. *Somewhat better* in Ukraine compared to the host countries are the affordability of housing; the possibility of finding a good/skilled job; and career opportunities.

Other aspects of life, according to respondents, are better abroad. For example, there are *somewhat higher* scores of the work of foreign government agencies/local authorities; availability of food/essential goods; and the friendliness of the population. *Significantly higher* scores (at least twice as high as in pre-war Ukraine) were given to such aspects abroad as the quality of infrastructure (roads, transport, etc.); the situation with corruption; the creation of equal conditions for people with disabilities; security; the amount of financial assistance from the state, social benefits; the amount of remuneration after taxes; the rule of law, legal protection; the ability to financially help relatives; the crime rate; the environment; the quality of water from the water supply system; the ability to ensure an adequate standard of living with one's own income; the ability to save money; quality of public utilities; attitude to children in educational institutions; intensity of workload, employers' demands. And since, according to the survey, the higher the respondents' assessment of the quality of life abroad, the lower their desire to return to Ukraine,

these quality of life factors should be taken into account when formulating the state policy of returning forced migrants to Ukraine.

Such aspects of life abroad as the quality of education; overall comfort of stay/living; flexibility/ease of doing business; opportunities for leisure; and opportunities to start their own business were assessed by respondents at *approximately the same level* as in Ukraine before the war.

Among the possible negative situations that could make it impossible to stay abroad, Ukrainian forced migrants consider it more likely that they will not be able to get a highly skilled job in this country without knowing the language, and the least likely that they will be discriminated against by the residents of this country. In general, the likelihood of such situations is seen as average or below average.

Every second respondent among the surveyed forced migrants from Ukraine believes that a full-scale war with Russia will end with the complete de-occupation of Ukrainian territories to the 1991 borders. Significantly fewer respondents support the scenario of partial de-occupation: 12.0% believe that Ukraine will return all the territories occupied after 24.02.2022; 8.8% – only part of them. 24.9% of respondents could not make any predictions. This may mean that a quarter of Ukrainians abroad live in a state of uncertainty.

Ukrainian forced migrants abroad are rather cautious in their predictions of when the war will end – they mostly foresee a protracted war. As many as 24.4 per cent of respondents do not believe that even 2024 will bring victory to Ukraine; 18.3 per cent believe that this will happen no earlier than winter 2024/25. The mood of forced migrants abroad regarding post-war prospects for recovery and security guarantees is also restrained: most expect this process to be long, but Ukraine will still receive security guarantees (44.1 per cent). Half as many respondents believe that, in addition to the fact that the recovery will be long, Ukraine will NOT receive the necessary security guarantees (22.2%).

It is noteworthy that among forced migrants who plan to return to Ukraine at some point in time, the share of those who are more optimistic about the scenarios and timeframes for ending the war is higher than among those who do not intend to return.

Chapter 4

Analysis of existing research on forced migrants from Ukraine

(Published in 2022 – first half of 2023)



In previous stages of Ukrainian society, migration was an indicator of the country's success or failure to develop. In the early 1990s, along with the fall of the Iron Curtain, Ukrainian citizens were able to move relatively freely outside the socialist camp. Since then, outward migration of Ukrainians has been synchronised with the socio-economic development of the society: times of stabilisation and growth are accompanied by positive migration balances, while periods of economic decline and political destabilisation are accompanied by an increase in outward migration.

The full-scale Russian aggression of 24 February 2022 posed an unprecedented challenge to Ukrainian society. The motivations, the severity of the situation of forced migrants, and the scale of the migration flow undoubtedly indicate that the study of various aspects of this phenomenon and, above all, the preconditions for the return of forced migrants is one of the most relevant topics.

Below is an overview of the available research[7] on forced migration from Ukraine, with a special focus on the methodology and methods used by researchers, as well as conclusions about the situation of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad and the preconditions for their potential return to Ukraine.

4.1. Fleeing Ukraine displaced people's experiences in the EU (experience of displaced persons migrating from Ukraine to the EU)

Link to the study results:
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2023/ukraine-survey

TECHNICAL SECTION

Who conducted the study: The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.

When the study was conducted: from 22 August to 29 September 2022.

Research method(s): online survey based on a standardised questionnaire (separate questionnaire for minors).

Target audience (hereinafter referred to as the TA) **and sample:** The survey covered forced migrants, including children, in 10 EU member states (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Spain, Estonia). A total of 14,685 respondents took part in the survey. The vast majority of respondents were women aged 18–64 (87%). Men of this age accounted for only 8% of respondents. The sample also included children aged 12–17 (2%) and respondents aged 65+ (3%).

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: The experience of Ukrainian forced migrants in the host country (socio-economic aspects, living conditions, health).

7 For the analysis of the studies presented in this section, we selected those that were published at the time of the implementation of our Study (until August 2022) and had a similar research target – forced migrants from Ukraine who went abroad due to the full-scale Russian invasion.

Key indicators: The questionnaire was comprehensive and covered the following topics: arrival in the EU; humanitarian assistance and information; settlement in the EU; residence and legal status; housing; education; employment; income and eligibility for social benefits; health; experience of violence and access to healthcare services.

Key findings: The majority of respondents did not face any difficulties when travelling to the EU, and believe that they received sufficient information about their rights. Every third respondent wants to return to Ukraine in the future. The same share would prefer to stay in the host country. Six out of ten respondents lived in private housing at the time of the survey. More than half of them paid for it, partially or fully. For many, their living conditions are far from ideal (lack of privacy, presence of strangers in the same living space). Less than half of those who had studied shortly before leaving Ukraine continued their studies in the host country, with the language barrier being the main reason for this. Four out of ten respondents did not attend language courses in the host country. Almost two-thirds of children used online education provided by schools or universities in Ukraine or studied independently, using materials and other support from Ukraine. Financial issues are a concern for every second respondent. Only one in three respondents believes that their health is good or very good. Every second respondent reports long-standing illnesses or health problems. One in two respondents stated that they often or constantly felt depressed and depressed after arriving in the host country.

4.2. Ewl special report "War refugees from Ukraine. A year in Poland"

Link to the study results:
https://ewl.com.ua/звіт-воєнні-біженці-з-україни/

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: The Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw and the Foundation for the Support of Migrants in the Labour Market "EWL".

Dates of the fieldwork: 10–16 February 2023.

Research method(s): online survey based on a standardised questionnaire and telephone interviews.

Target audience and sample: Ukrainian citizens who arrived in Poland after 24 February 2022. Interviews were conducted in different cities and regions of Poland, including Warsaw, Krakow, Wroclaw, Gdańsk, etc.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: the situation of Ukrainian forced migrants in the Polish labour market, their needs and attitudes.

Key findings: The majority of surveyed forced migrants from Ukraine (83%) have been in Poland for more than six months. Of these, more than half (51%) arrived in the first three months after the start of the full-scale war. Only 5% of people decided to come to Poland in late 2022 and early 2023, after the intensification of attacks on critical infrastructure and civilian objects. Almost half of the forced migrants from Ukraine (45%) had already visited Poland before the start of the

full-scale aggression. 82% of adult forced migrants in Poland have found a job. Almost 1/4 of respondents (27% of the employed) found a job during the first month of their stay in Poland. Every third employed migrant (38%) says that they changed their place of work during their stay in Poland after 24 February 2022. The study showed that 71% of forced migrants plan to return to Ukraine in the near or far future. Almost 90% of forced migrants have no doubt that after the war ends, Polish-Ukrainian relations will be better than before the start of full-scale aggression.

4.3. How many Ukrainians plan to stay in Poland — study

Link to the study results:
https://gremi-personal.com.ua/skilki-bizhenciv-ne-povernutsja-v-ukrainu-doslidzhennja/

TECHNICAL SECTION

Link to the study results: Gremi Personal (International HR company).

Dates of the fieldwork: 3–31 March 2023.

Research method(s): online survey based on a standardised questionnaire.

Target audience and sample: citizens of Ukraine aged 18 to 60 who are in all voivodeships of Poland after the start of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation.

Sample size N=1270.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: the situation of Ukrainian forced migrants in the Polish labour market, their needs and attitudes.

Key indicators: The study records a change in the migration attitudes of Ukrainians in Poland. In October 2022, only 17% of respondents said they did not plan to return to Ukraine, 22.4% intended to go home in the next 3 months, 35% were preparing to stay in Poland for at least a year, and 25.6% planned to return as soon as the war ended. In March 2023, the share of Ukrainians who do not plan to return to the country doubled. Most Ukrainians who have been in Poland for a long time are learning or have already learned Polish, which also opens up new horizons in the employment market. The survey showed that only 10% of Ukrainians do not want to learn Polish, and the same number said they had already learnt it perfectly. 30% of respondents can already communicate fluently.

Key findings: The number of Ukrainians who do not plan to return home has doubled in six months. This may be due to a number of factors: lack of opportunities for living and working in Ukraine, successful adaptation in the host society, and formation of interethnic ties and families. An important factor influencing Ukrainians' plans to stay is the opening of Ukrainian businesses in Poland. Since the second half of 2022, more than 10,000 Ukrainian companies have opened in Poland, seeking to hire Ukrainians. As a result, highly qualified specialists from among forced migrants have the opportunity to improve their position in the labour market.

4.4. Assessment of migration processes and attitudes: report on the results of an online survey

Link to the study results:
https://news.uifuture.org/ocinka-migraciynikh-procesiv-ta-nastr/

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: Ukrainian Institute for the Future (https://uifuture.org/pro-institut/)

Dates of the fieldwork: 20–23 March 2023.

Research method(s): online survey based on a standardised questionnaire.

Target audience and sample: All-Ukrainian survey (excluding temporarily uncontrolled territories), sample size – 1200 respondents. The sample is combined – proportionally stratified by region, with quota screening at the stage of respondent selection, representing the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 and older. The margin of error with a probability of 0.95 does not exceed 2.89%.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: Assessment of migration processes and attitudes of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad.

Key indicators: The study examines respondents' perceptions of the scale of migration from Ukraine after 24 February 2022 and the possibility of forced migrants returning. Respondents from Kyiv and the South were relatively more likely than others to say that more than 90% would return. The main reasons that influence the decision to return are: family ties (60%); familiar lifestyle and environment (46%), safety (42%), availability of work (36%), patriotism (32%), and failure in attempts to settle abroad (27%). Among the main reasons that influence a person's decision not to return are: life prospects abroad (55%), safety (50%), and availability of work (48%). A total of 21% of respondents said that they knew men who went abroad after the outbreak of full-scale war, but had no legal grounds for doing so. The most popular schemes of illegal departure of persons liable for military service nationwide were "volunteering" and bribery at border crossings (23% each). Registration of disability gained 16%, and studying abroad as a scheme of illegal departure – 14%. Among residents of the West, the Centre and Kyiv, the most popular scheme is "volunteering", while for residents of the South and East it is "disability".

Key findings: In the ranking of the main reasons for forced migrants to leave the country, security issues are the most significant. About half of respondents believe that the decision to return to Ukraine is a personal matter. Slightly less than half of the respondents believe that citizens who have left are obliged to return to some extent immediately after the end of the war (21%), if there is no threat of occupation (16.5%), after the country's restoration/reconstruction (10.5%).

4.5. Refugees from Ukraine: intentions to return, impact on the Ukrainian economy and policy recommendations

Link to the study results:
https://ces.org.ua/who-are-ukrainian-refugee-research/

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: Info Sapiens research agency

Dates of the fieldwork: the time of the field stage of the research is not indicated.

Research method(s): two components: quantitative and qualitative survey. 1. Online survey based on a standardised questionnaire. 2. In-depth interviews with Ukrainian refugees (15 interviews). In addition, the study used non-survey methods: analysis of statistical data and management measures.

Target audience and sample: a total of 1003 Ukrainians who were living abroad (except for Russia and Belarus) at the time of the study were interviewed.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: who are the Ukrainian forced migrants in the EU, what are their living conditions and the conditions for returning to Ukraine.

Key indicators: The authors applied the k-model method and, using cluster analysis, identified four groups of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad: 1) Classical forced migrants (25%): middle-aged women with children, not well adapted to life abroad (no friends among locals, no language skills, never been abroad before, dislike the host country); 2) Quasi-labour migrants (29%): older women who left not only for security reasons but also to find work, more adapted to life abroad (speak the language, have family in the host country, less in need of assistance). Their decision to return will not be affected by the end of hostilities. 3) Professionals (29%): more inclined to work in their pre-war speciality, not ready to work in a different speciality and not ready for retraining. Relatively comfortable conditions of stay: receive more assistance, have friends in the host country, and assess the attitude of locals more positively. They plan to return to Ukraine somewhat more often than other groups. 4) People from the war zone (16%): lost the most because of the war. They are not adapted to life abroad, but are ready to take steps to adapt (language learning, retraining courses, etc.). Ready to return to Ukraine under favourable conditions.

Key findings: Ukrainian forced migrants are adapting to EU labour markets faster than migrants of previous waves, which increases the risk that they will not return to Ukraine.

4.6. Report on cross-border mobility "Ukrainian citizens in the Polish labour market. New challenges and prospects". Raport mobilności transgranicznej "Obywatele Ukrainy na polskim rynku pracy. Nowe wyzwania i perspektywy"

Link to the study results:
https://ewl.com.pl/raport-mobilnosci-transgranicznej-obywatele-ukrainy-na-polskim-rynku-pracy-nowe-wyzwania-i-perspektywy/

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: EWL Migration Platform, EWL Foundation and East European Studies of the University of Warsaw (Platforma Migracyjną EWL, Fundacja EWL oraz Studium Europy Wschodniej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego)

Dates of the fieldwork: 4–13 March 2023.

Target audience and sample: A total of 500 adult citizens of Ukraine residing in Poland were interviewed.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: The study focuses on the following issues: how the portrait of Ukrainian citizens living in Poland has changed; which Ukrainian citizens plan to apply for permanent residence in our country and for Polish citizenship; how the percentage of Ukrainian citizens working in accordance with their qualifications has changed; how Ukrainian citizens in Poland assess their financial situation; how much money refugees and migrants from Poland send to Ukraine, etc.

Key indicators: Of the forced migrants from Ukraine living in Poland, 67% are women. 50% of forced migrants live in Poland with their children. 4% of Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland are elderly. 62% (as of the time of the survey) of respondents intended to return to Ukraine in the short or long term. 50% of respondents planned to apply for a temporary or permanent residence permit in Poland. 78% of Ukrainian citizens living in Poland have a paid job. 54% of Ukrainian citizens living in Poland send money to Ukraine.

Key findings: Almost two thirds of the survey respondents were migrants who arrived in Poland before 24 February 2022 (60%), and more than one third were so-called "war forced migrants" – those who arrived after the outbreak of the war. Almost half of Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland are under the age of 36. More than half of Ukrainian citizens living in Poland have higher or incomplete higher education (56%), and one in three has vocational education (32%). One in three speaks Polish well or very well (35%). Almost all Ukrainians currently living in Poland (83%) declare their support for Ukraine. Most often, this support is in the form of money – more than half of the respondents (54%) declare donations to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. More than half of Ukrainian citizens living in Poland declare sending money to Ukraine (56%), while 6% receive money from Ukraine. One in four, at the time of the survey, declared a desire to return to Ukraine without waiting for the end of the Russian invasion (24%).

4.7. Ukrainian refugees in Europe. From the beginning of the full-scale invasion to the present day

Link to the study results:
https://4service.group/social-project/index.html

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: 4Service.

Dates of the fieldwork: The first wave: the field phase of the study lasted from 28 March to 4 April 2022. Second wave: the field phase of the study lasted from 6 June to 20 June 2022. Third wave: The field phase of the study took place from 23 March to 17 April 2023.

Research method(s): online survey.

Target audience and sample: First wave: 3355 respondents in 36 European countries aged 14 and older. The statistical sampling error (with a probability of 0.95%) is ±1.7%. Second wave: 2307 respondents in 35 European countries aged 18 and older. The statistical sampling error (with a probability of 0.95%) does not exceed ±1.78%. Third wave: 2977 respondents in 39 European countries aged 18 and older were interviewed. The statistical sampling error (with a probability of 0.95%) does not exceed ±1.8%. The general population includes 8,240,289 forced migrants who left Ukraine after 24 February 2022 according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as of 01 April 2023.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: A study of the behaviour and attitudes of Ukrainians who were forced to leave for Europe as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Key indicators: The authors of the study recorded the dynamics of the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in different European countries. Thus, Poland initially received the bulk of forced migrants from Ukraine. At the same time, this figure is decreasing. While as of April 2022, Poland hosted 39.5% of all forced migrants from Ukraine, in June 2022–20.5%, and in April 2023 – only 19.6%. The largest increase in the number of Ukrainian forced migrants, on the other hand, is recorded in Germany. While in April 2022, 12.9% of all Ukrainian forced migrants were there, in April 2023, the figure was 28.1%. In June 2022, 84% of forced migrants planned to return to Ukraine. 8% were confident that they would stay abroad. In April 2023, 72% said they intended to return, and 16% said they intended to stay abroad. Of those who declare their intention to stay, 70% speak English. 71% have learnt the local language, and 52% have received/plan to receive a permanent residence permit.

Key findings: The authors of the study tried to draw an aggregate portrait of Ukrainians who are reluctant to return to Ukraine. Most of them had plans to emigrate to Europe before the war (54%). Most of them are young people under 35, who made the decision to go abroad on their own. 64% of them speak one or more foreign languages. According to the factor analysis conducted by the authors, the most significant factors of the intention to return are: the duration of the conflict, the local labour market, leisure opportunities, and the standard of living.

4.8. Media consumption and social and political activity of Ukrainians abroad

Link to the study results:
https://www.oporaua.org/viyna/doslidzhennia-mediaspozhivannia-ta-gromadsko-politichna-aktivnist-ukrayintsiv-za-kordonom-24756

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: The Rating Sociological Group was commissioned by the Civil Network OPORA with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Dates of the fieldwork: 8 April – 19 May 2023.

Research method(s): The study consisted of three parts: 1) an online survey of 1,000 respondents on civic and political activity; 2) an online survey of 2,000 respondents on media consumption; 3) 43 in-depth interviews. The online survey was conducted on the Rating Online platform.

Target audience and sample:

Quantitative – 1 wave of the survey: Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. Sample: 1000 respondents.

Quantitative – 2nd wave of the survey: UK, Israel, Spain, Germany, USA, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Sample: 2000 respondents.

A qualitative survey (in-depth interviews) on media consumption and civic and political activity of Ukrainians who have found refuge abroad: 43 respondents from the Israel, Spain, Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the USA and UK.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

The study is about: social and political activity among Ukrainians who have found refuge abroad.

Key indicators: As many as 54% of respondents found a job in their host country. The highest employment rates are in Israel (74%) and the Czech Republic (70%). Every tenth respondent works remotely in Ukraine. 67% of respondents plan to return to Ukraine. 12% of them plan to do so in the near future, 20% want to wait, and 35% are going to return to Ukraine after the war is over. 18% of respondents do not plan to return. The majority (76%) of respondents who left Ukraine after the start of the full-scale invasion see their future in Ukraine. For IDPs, the most important factors for returning to Ukraine are security in the region of their origin (43%) and emotional connection to their homeland (43%). Answers to the question about the possibility of influencing political life in Ukraine from abroad were divided: 43% believe they can do so from a distance, while 46% do not see such opportunities. 16% of respondents believe that the first post-war elections should be held immediately after the end of martial law. 70% think that it should be delayed for some time: 3–6 months (28%), about a year (30%) or even several years (13%). The majority of respondents declare their readiness to vote in the first post-war elections. They are most likely to participate in the elections if they are in Ukraine at the time (78%) or if electronic voting is available (77%). If elections are organised abroad at a polling station, the number of respondents who are ready to vote decreases to 60%. 59% of respondents are ready to vote by post.

A separate section of the study is devoted to media consumption. The most popular source of information in all 7 countries surveyed was Telegram: it is used most often in Spain (92%) and least often in the Czech Republic (85%). The most popular social network for receiving news was Facebook (43% of respondents). Instagram is much less popular (22%). TikTok and Twitter are used by 7% and 3% of respondents, respectively, to get information about Ukraine. For 18%, other social networks are key to getting news. News websites are used as the main source of information about Ukraine by a quarter of Ukrainian forced migrants. The majority of them (74%) visit Ukrainian news websites. Only 8% of respondents receive information about Ukraine from television.

An unexpected finding was that the majority of forced migrants surveyed agree that Ukraine has a higher level of digital services and less bureaucracy than their host country. In addition, they also highlight the higher level of Ukrainian healthcare, which is more about accessibility than quality.

At least a quarter of respondents have seen fake information about Ukraine. The lowest number of such cases was recorded in the United States and the United Kingdom, the highest number in Europe, and the highest number in Israel. Most fakes about Ukraine, according to respondents, concern the Ukrainian army (53%) and the government (38%). False information about Ukrainian migrants is not widespread abroad and is directed mostly at foreign users, while Ukrainians and Russians are targeted by fakes about the Armed Forces and the Ukrainian government.

Key findings: The work is notable for its systematic approach, use of quantitative and qualitative methods, and coverage of a wide range of issues, including those that have not been studied much (migrants' perceptions of opportunities to influence the situation in Ukraine, fakes in the media, and media literacy of Ukrainian migrants). The questionnaire of the quantitative part of the study includes about one hundred questions.

4.9. Human capital development project in Ukraine: facilitating the return of forced migrants

Link to the study results:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RlXw50nG2qsDskRsqYzbdHhVSstouIoL/view

TECHNICAL SECTION

The research was conducted by: Easybusiness in UA analytical center supported by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and Western NIS Enterprise Fund

Dates of the fieldwork: May 2023

Research method(s): This study is a secondary analysis of numerous sources of statistical, economic, administrative, demographic and sociological data. The sources of information include: State Statistics Service of Ukraine, Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, Razumkov Centre, UN, Council of Europe, European Parliament, Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USA), etc.

Target audience and sample: n/a. Sociological data from various studies collected by different methods were used.

CONCEPTUAL SECTION

What the study is about: socio-economic characteristics of forced migrants, migration and demographic situation and prospects, management steps to stimulate the return of migrants.

Key indicators: According to Eurostat, 3.9 million Ukrainians were under temporary protection in EU countries in April 2022 (according to CES, 3.8 to 4.7 million forced migrants are abroad, including Europe, and about 1.5 million in Russia). The return of these migrants is important for ensuring rapid and sustainable economic growth: to grow at 7% per annum, Ukraine will need to attract 3.1 to 4.5 million people to the labour force by 2032.

For forced migrants, the main problem is security, while people who have already returned to their home regions point to difficult conditions in the places of return. It is worth noting that the factor of restrictions on stay by recipient countries is second only to security in terms of importance for displaced persons abroad. People from the war zone are most willing to return from abroad to safer regions if they are provided with housing, employment and financial support. The end of the war, economic development and the reconstruction of infrastructure and housing are the main factors that will facilitate the return of Ukrainians home.

Key findings: The absence of an effective policy on the return of forced migrants could cost Ukraine up to $113 billion in GDP and significant demographic losses. It is necessary to develop a state programme for the return of forced migrants.

Findings from analysis of available research

Two perspectives can be traced in the available research:

1. studies conducted by Ukrainian researchers prioritise the issue of return of forced migrants;
2. studies conducted by foreign researchers prioritise the issues of adaptation of forced migrants in host societies, various aspects of the behaviour of forced migrants in the labour market of these societies.

A number of studies have documented a growing trend[8] in the proportion of forced migrants who do not intend to return to Ukraine, which is likely due to the following factors: the ongoing intense hostilities, the success of adaptation of forced migrants in host societies, and the lack of institutional support for return.

Studies conducted using online surveys predominate, while a combination of different methods is rare. Some studies have a prognostic and recommendation component.

Some topics are covered in single studies: illegal departure of persons liable for military service from Ukraine, the impact of international policy on the prospects of return of forced migrants, and the specifics of adaptation of children of forced migrants in host societies in the context of education.

8 Due to different methodologies, sample types and wording of questions, we do not compare these studies on the shares of forced migrants who do not plan to return to Ukraine, as such a comparison would be methodologically incorrect.

Chapter 5

Results of the study



5.1. How and where do forced migrants from Ukraine see their future

Probability of forced migrants returning to Ukraine

Ukrainian forced migrants abroad have different assessments of the likelihood of their return to Ukraine BEFORE and AFTER the war is fully over. **Thus, on a 100-point scale (where 0 is definitely NOT returning, and 100 – definitely returning)[9], the probability of forced migrants returning from abroad BEFORE the end of the war is on average 33 out of 100 (0 points – 32, 4 per cent, 1–50 points – 37.7 per cent, 51–99 points – 20.1 per cent, 100 points – 9.8 per cent), and AFTER the war is completely over – on average 66 out of 100 (0 points – 5.9 per cent, 1–50 points – 26.6 per cent, 51–99 points – 34.5 per cent, 100 points – 33.0 per cent).**



D1. How likely it is that you will return to live in Ukraine before the end of the war? (% and a score on a scale from 0 to 100 points)

D2. How likely it is that you will return to live in Ukraine after the end of the war? (% and a score on a scale from 0 to 100 points)

Among Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland, there is a relatively lower percentage of those who, when assessing the likelihood of their return to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war, indicated 0 points (24.9%) and, accordingly, a relatively higher average score of 36.

If we talk about the likelihood of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad returning AFTER the war is fully over, it is also the highest among Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland: Only 3.5% indicated 0 points, and 36.2% of this category of respondents gave 100 points. The average score of the likelihood of returning to Ukraine for forced migrants from Poland is the highest – 69 points.

9 A score of 0 is interpreted as "definitely not returning", the range of 1–50 is interpreted as "from most likely no to possibly", 51–99 is interpreted as "from possibly to most likely", and 100 is interpreted as "definitely returning". Percentages are presented in accordance with the indicated extremes (0 and 100) and intervals (1–50 and 51–99).



D1 How likely it is that you will return to live in Ukraine before the end of the war? (% and a score on a scale from 0 to 100 points)

The highest proportion of those who definitely have no plans to return to Ukraine BEFORE the war is over is among residents of the South and East of Ukraine. This is probably due to the fact that the most active hostilities are taking place in these areas and people have nowhere to return to. When it comes to intentions to return AFTER the end of the war, there are no significant differences in the regional breakdown. At the same time, residents of the South and East are more likely to return to Ukraine AFTER the war is over than residents of other regions.

	Kyiv		North		West		Centre		South		East	
Definitely will not return	34.7%	4.2%	31.3%	3.0%	18.6%	2.9%	30.6%	8.8%	31.1%	6.1%	37.7%	6.6%
Likely will not return	35.6%	27.1%	37.4%	35.4%	37.3%	22.5%	34.7%	29.9%	37.1%	17.0%	42.2%	32.5%
Likely to return	22.0%	40.7%	22,2%	29.3%	27.5%	34.3%	21.6%	27.2%	21.2%	39.8%	13.1%	32.2%
Definitely will return	7.6%	28.0%	9.1%	32.2%	16.7%	40.2%	12.9%	34.0%	10.6%	37.1%	6.9%	28.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Before the war
After the war

For forced migrants from all regions, the end of the war may be a significant factor in their decision to return or not to return home. After the end of the war, the share of those who are ready to definitely return to Ukraine among forced migrants from the East increased by 4.1 times compared to the share of those who declared their intention to return home BEFORE the end of the war. Among forced migrants from Kyiv – by 3.7 times; from the North and South – by 3.5 times; from the Centre – by 2.6 times; from the West – by 2.4 times.

Accordingly, the proportion of those who definitely will not return AFTER the war ends, as opposed to the proportion of those who declare their intention NOT to return home BEFORE the war ends, is significantly reduced: 10.4 times among forced migrants from the North, 8.3 times – from Kyiv, 6.4 times – from the West, 5.7 times – from the East, 5.1 times – from the South, 3.5 times – from the Centre.

Breakdown by age and financial status before the war in Ukraine[10]:

People of younger and middle age groups are more likely to stay abroad until the end of the war (72.1% – 18–24 years old, 75.0% – 25–34 years old, 71.9% – 35–49 years old. Whereas people in the older age group – 50–65 years and over 65 years – are more likely to stay abroad until the end of the war at 58.7% and 57.9%.

After the end of the war, the categories of respondents were more evenly distributed by age: 37.0% of respondents aged 18–24 would definitely or rather stay abroad, 31.5% of respondents aged 25–34, 34.4% of respondents aged 35–49, 27.3% of respondents aged 50–65, and 26.4% of respondents aged over 65.

Depending on their financial situation, those who indicated that they had a very low financial situation before the war in Ukraine are most likely to stay abroad both before and after the war. Almost all respondents who indicated that before the war in Ukraine they had a low financial situation (they did not have enough money even for food) do not plan to return to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war – 94.1%, and AFTER the end of the war – 58.8%, while among other categories, according to the criterion of financial situation, the number of respondents who do not plan to return to Ukraine ranges from 27.9% to 40.0%.

Among those respondents who will definitely not return before the end of the war, the largest share (53.2%) rents an apartment or house abroad. For comparison, among residents of shelters for forced migrants, the number is only 6.3%. The distribution among those who do not plan to return even AFTER the war ends is similar: 45.9% as opposed to 3.3%.

The factor of having a job does not significantly influence the decision to return while the war in Ukraine is ongoing. After the war ends, the share of those who will definitely not return to Ukraine among respondents who have a job there (7.9%) is almost 5 times higher than the share of those who work remotely in Ukraine (1.6%) and twice as high among those who are looking for a job (3.5%).

Factors influencing the return of forced migrants to Ukraine

The econometric modelling mentioned in this section was carried out by the Info Sapiens Research Agency, using the methodology developed by Info Sapiens. The methodology for building an econometric model of the impact of factors on the likelihood of forced migrants returning to

10 Hereafter, we do not present the multivariate (combined) distribution of the data due to the small subsamples that prevent us from drawing statistically significant conclusions.

Ukraine before and after the end of the war, including the general logic of this approach, a description of statistical analysis and modelling, and the procedure for calculating the importance of factors of return to Ukraine are presented in Annex 1.

The results of the study demonstrated that the decision to return to Ukraine or stay abroad is influenced by a variety of factors, which we divided into the following logical groups using econometric modelling:

1. What the person already has (abroad), what he/she took with him/her, what he/she received (conditions in the host country).
2. Whether the person has any reasons to return to Ukraine, any "magnets" (conditions in Ukraine, people who stayed there).
3. How the person assesses their new country, whether they like it better than Ukraine.
4. Whether the person expects any problems or has any fears about the new country.
5. What are the person's expectations about the war in Ukraine and the situation after the war.



Factor 1 – conditions in the country of residence – includes what a person already has (abroad), what they brought with them and what they received, i.e. what are the conditions in the country of residence, how well a person has settled abroad.

This factor is based on the following aspects: when the person arrived in the country of residence at the time of the survey; which family members/relatives are also with them; how they assess their level of knowledge of the language of the country of residence; how they assess their financial situation abroad and living conditions; and what is their current employment status.

Factor 2 – conditions in Ukraine – includes whether a person has reasons to return to Ukraine, some kind of "magnet".

This factor is based on the following aspects: whether a person has important objective reasons or motives to return to Ukraine, such as relatives, friends who remain in Ukraine, having a business, suitable housing, other property in Ukraine, etc., and how a person assesses the security in Ukraine at the moment.

Factor 3 — assessment of the host country — includes how a person assesses the new country, whether they like it better than Ukraine.

This factor is based on the assessment of satisfaction with a wide range of life issues in the host country, ranging from purely practical (e.g., quality of education, healthcare, employment opportunities, services, quality of infrastructure, etc.) to more general (e.g., closeness of the mentality of the host country's population).

Factor 4 — risks and fears in the host country — includes whether a person expects any problems or has fears about the new country.

This factor is based on the following aspects: assessment of the likelihood of losing a job, losing financial support, experiencing discrimination on ethnic grounds, etc.

Factor 5 — expectations about the war in Ukraine — includes the person's expectations about the war in Ukraine and the situation after the war.

This factor is based on the following aspects: expectations regarding the timing and scenarios of the end of the war in Ukraine, as well as scenarios of the post-war situation and reconstruction in Ukraine.

A combination of methods was used to build the model, including factor analysis in conjunction with regression analysis. The coefficients reflect the impact of each factor on the probability of return when the corresponding factor changes. For ease of understanding, the aggregate impact was taken as 100%, and for each factor, the relative impact was calculated, which for the aggregate of factors adds up to 100%[11].

Thus, for Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, the most important factor influencing their willingness to return to Ukraine is the *assessment of the host country* (29% before the end of the war and 43% after), and the least important is the *expectation of war in Ukraine* (12% before the end of the war and 13% after), apparently due to the uncertainty of the situation. Between them are such factors as *risks and fears in the host country* (20% before the end of the war and 16% after), *conditions in the host country* (19% before the end of the war and 15% after) and *conditions in Ukraine* (21% before the end of the war and 12% after).

Therefore, for Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, the most important factor influencing their willingness to return to Ukraine is *the assessment of the host country* (29% before the end of the war and 43% after), and the least important is the *expectation of war in Ukraine* (12% before the end of the war and 13% after), apparently due to the uncertainty of the situation. Between them are such factors as *risks and fears in the host country* (20% before the end of the war and 16% after), *conditions in the host country* (19% before the end of the war and 15% after) and *conditions in Ukraine* (21% before the end of the war and 12% after).

Factors that, according to the regression analysis, have the greatest impact on the likelihood of forced migrants returning to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war

Factor	Coefficient
How would you assess the overall security situation in Ukraine today?	8.8%
When do you think the full-scale war in Ukraine is likely to end?	7.1%

11 A more detailed description of the procedure for applying the econometric model is provided in Annex 1

Factor	Coefficient
Inability to adapt to the new country, to “feel like home”	5.8%
Husband/wife	5.2%
How would you assess your financial situation abroad?	4.7%
Unwillingness of relatives to continue staying in this country	4.6%
Disappointment with life in this country	4.1%

Factors that, according to the regression analysis, have the greatest impact on the likelihood of forced migrants returning to Ukraine AFTER the war ends

Factor	Coefficient
When do you think the full-scale war in Ukraine is most likely to end?	4.6%
Inability to adapt to a new country, to “feel like home”	4.6%
What scenario do you think is most likely for Ukraine after a full-scale war?	4.5%
How do you think a full-scale war in Ukraine will end?	4.3%
I study in educational institutions of the country of my residence	4.1%
How would you assess the overall security situation in Ukraine as of today?	4.0%

Those respondents who had a better financial situation in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion compared to the situation abroad are more likely to return to Ukraine even BEFORE the war ends: 44.2% of those who will definitely return to Ukraine before the end of the war indicated that their financial situation is somewhat worse than it was before the war in Ukraine, and 32.3% of those whose financial situation abroad has improved compared to the situation in Ukraine. Accordingly, those whose financial situation has improved compared to the situation in Ukraine before the war are more likely to stay abroad: half of those who plan to stay abroad (54.6%) said that their financial situation is better abroad than in Ukraine before the war, and a quarter (26.1%) said that their financial situation has worsened.

Those respondents who generally assess their living conditions abroad as better than before the war in Ukraine (including financial situation, housing conditions, employment conditions and opportunities, and living standards in general) are more likely to stay abroad. Among those who will definitely not return AFTER the war, 1.6% of respondents have a much lower standard of living abroad than in Ukraine before the war, 50.8% – a much better standard of living in the host country. As for the intentions to return BEFORE the war, these figures are 4.8% and 23.1% respectively. This indicates that a higher standard of living abroad is a significant factor that reduces the desire of forced migrants to return to Ukraine.

Conditions for returning to Ukraine

One of the key objectives of the study was to find out the main conditions under which Ukrainian forced migrants abroad are more likely to return to Ukraine. Unlike the previous questions, which were closed, with predefined answer options, this question in the survey was open-ended, meaning that each respondent indicated their own vision of the three main conditions for them. The conditions named by respondents were grouped into more than 30 alternatives. The top ten were:

- cessation of hostilities, shelling of the entire territory of Ukraine/end of the war – 34%;
- work and salary (jobs, decent pay, work in the speciality) – 32%;
- overcoming corruption/punishment of corrupt officials – 20%.





D3. Please name three conditions that would make you more likely to return to live in Ukraine, what needs to happen, change? (multiple choice)

> **Man, 65, Sloviansk ➡ UK:** "As soon as it is clear, or at least somehow visible, that there will be no hostilities where we live, and they will somehow move away, there will be some greater safety from shelling, we are going to return to Ukraine."

The top ten most important conditions for the return of Ukrainian forced migrants also included:

- housing (availability of housing, including surviving/restoration/funds for purchase or rent) – 12%;
- security – personal and family/absence of threats to the life of relatives – 11%;
- increased [personal] income and living standards/affordable prices and tariffs/stability and confidence in the future – 11%;
- demining/restoration of infrastructure/stable energy supply/reconstruction – 10%;
- complete victory of Ukraine/complete de-occupation/"1991 borders" – 8%;
- [national] economy and finance: recovery/growth/stability/business development and benefits for business/investment – 7%;
- security guarantees/peace agreement/no threat of re-invasion – 6%.

It should be noted that for Polish and Czech forced migrants from Ukraine, the issue of overcoming corruption is relatively less important (15% and 10% respectively), for Polish forced migrants from Ukraine, the issues of economy and finance are somewhat more important (11%), and for Czech forced migrants, the issues of security – their own and their families' (16%), increasing income and living standards (16%) and demining/recovery/energy supply/reconstruction (13%).

The survey participants were also offered a list of factors that, according to the hypothesis, could increase their desire/readiness to return to Ukraine. Thus, the following factors could increase the desire/readiness of Ukrainian forced migrants to return to Ukraine:

- complete cessation of hostilities at the frontline – 43%;
- improvement of the quality of life in Ukraine – 42%;
- recovery of Ukraine's economy – 39%;
- termination of rocket attacks and air raids – 35%;

> **Man, 33, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ USA**: "Even if the war does not end, but it becomes calmer, we are ready to go back. If there are fewer rocket attacks."

- availability of work in Ukraine – 39%;
- Ukraine's accession to NATO – 28%;
- return of Ukraine to the 1991 borders – 26%;
- emotional connection to Ukraine – 19%;

> **Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translation from Russian):** "And when the danger is over, of course, we will return, whether there is water supply or not. Because this is our homeland. But as long as there is danger, I don't see any point in returning."

- termination of mobilisation/cancellation of martial law – 19%;
- no threat of occupation – 18%;
- restoration of the destroyed infrastructure – 17%;
- desire of children/family members to return to Ukraine – 11%;
- de-occupation of the previous place of residence – 9%:

Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland: "If everything goes well and they [Russians] leave, I will work in Kherson, there is plenty of work as a teacher there. Why not?"



D6.2. Which of the following factors or events might increase your desire and readiness to return to live in Ukraine? (multiple choice)

- cessation of hostilities in the place of previous residence – 8%;
- demining of the place of previous residence – 8%;
- husband's inability to travel abroad from Ukraine – 5%.

At the same time, for 4% of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, none of these factors will change their decision not to return to Ukraine.

Notably, for Polish and Czech forced migrants from Ukraine, the issue of overcoming corruption is relatively less important (15% and 10% respectively), for Polish forced migrants from Ukraine, the issues of economy and finance are somewhat more important (11%), and for Czech forced migrants, the issues of security – their own and their families' (16%), increasing income and living standards (16%) and demining/recovery/energy supply/reconstruction (13%).

The survey participants were also offered a list of factors that, according to the hypothesis, could increase their desire/readiness to return to Ukraine. Thus, the following factors could increase the desire/readiness of Ukrainian forced migrants to return to Ukraine:

It is worth noting certain peculiarities of the opinions of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, depending on the country of residence, on what could increase the likelihood of their return. For example, the decision of Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany would be relatively more influenced by the improvement of the quality of life in Ukraine (48%) and the de-occupation of their previous place of residence (11%), but less by the availability of work in Ukraine (31%) and the cessation of rocket attacks and alarms (29%). The decision of Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic would be relatively more influenced by the availability of jobs in Ukraine (37%), the restoration of destroyed infrastructure (25%), and relatively less by the return of Ukraine to the 1991 borders (18%), Ukraine's accession to NATO (16%) and emotional connection to Ukraine (12%).

There are also some differences in the factors that may influence the decision to return to Ukraine depending on the region where the respondents lived before the full-scale war. Below, four factors that may increase the readiness to return to Ukraine are presented for each region (Kyiv is presented separately):

For respondents from **Kyiv,** the following factors are the most important in terms of returning to Ukraine: 44.1% – Ukraine's accession to NATO, 43.2% – cessation of rocket attacks and air raids, 42.4% – complete cessation of hostilities at the frontline, 40.7% – recovery of the Ukrainian economy.

For residents of the North: 44.4% – improvement of the quality of life in Ukraine, 43.4% – complete cessation of hostilities at the front, 41.4% – cessation of missile attacks and air alerts, 34.3% – recovery of the Ukrainian economy.

For residents of the West: 52.9% – improvement of the quality of life in Ukraine, 45.1% – recovery of the Ukrainian economy, 37.3% – complete cessation of hostilities at the front, 36.3% – availability of work in Ukraine.

For the residents of the Centre: 49.0% – improvement of the quality of life, 44.9% – recovery of the Ukrainian economy, 41.5% – complete cessation of hostilities at the front, 39.5% – cessation of rocket attacks and air raids.

For residents of the South: 43.2% – a complete cessation of hostilities at the front, 38.6% – improvement of the quality of life, 34.8% – recovery of the Ukrainian economy, 33.0% – cessation of rocket attacks and air raids.

For residents of the East: 42.9% – a complete cessation of hostilities at the front, 40.8% – recovery of Ukraine's economy, 40.1% – improvement of the quality of life, 31.1% – cessation of rocket attacks and air alerts.

The decision to return to Ukraine among Kyiv residents who have moved abroad is much more influenced by Ukraine's accession to NATO than among residents of other regions. This indicator in Kyiv differs by at least one and a half times compared to other regions: 44.1% of Kyiv residents and 23.1% to 31.3% in other regions.

Quality of life is important to residents of all regions without exception. This indicator is not in the top four only for respondents from Kyiv[12]. This may indicate a generally higher quality of life in Kyiv compared to other regional centres (especially in smaller settlements). It is noteworthy that quality of life is the most important factor for Westerners in terms of what might make them decide to return to Ukraine. This was stated by every second respondent in the West (52.9%).

The top list of factors that could influence the return of forced migrants from the West did not include rocket attacks, unlike in other regions. This is likely due to the lower level of threat from attacks on the West, as according to air raid statistics, this region suffered relatively less damage[13]. On the other hand, respondents from the West of Ukraine were the only ones who put the availability of work as a priority.

Without exception, all security factors are more important for residents of the regions most affected by the war, in particular the East and South. Certain security factors (cessation of hostilities in the place of previous residence, de-occupation and demining of the place of previous residence) are more than 10 times higher than in other regions. However, it is unexpected that in the overall structure of factors that may influence the decision to return, they do not play the most important role, being outweighed by economic factors and quality of life.

Restoration of the destroyed infrastructure is also the most important factor for residents of the regions most affected by the war: North, South and East (18.2%, 20.5% and 20.4% respectively).

The importance of the factor of emotional connection to Ukraine is relatively lower for residents of the East and South in their decision to return to Ukraine.

Residents of the East of Ukraine are the most uncompromising: 5.2% of respondents said that none of the factors would affect their decision to return to Ukraine. In Kyiv, the number is 1.7%, in the North – 2.0%, in the West – 2.9%.

The factor of the end of mobilisation and the cancellation of martial law is somewhat more significant for residents of Kyiv and the West: 24.6% and 24.5% respectively.

An important aspect of the possible return of Ukrainian forced migrants from abroad is the question of where in Ukraine they would prefer to return: only home or consider starting a new life in another location. More than half of all respondents expressed a desire to return home (57.3%), a quarter would consider starting a new life in another settlement or region (24.4%), and almost one in five could not answer (18.3%).

As for the relatively unaffected Kyiv, the West, the North, and the Centre, about three quarters of respondents from these regions will definitely return to their homes. That is, no global

12 In Kyiv, this figure is also high (38%), although it does not stand out as much as in other regions.

13 Statistics on air traffic alarms in Ukraine are available at https://air-alarms.in.ua/#statistic

redistribution of the population is expected after the refugees return. The situation is different in the South and East. Two-thirds of respondents from the South plan to return home, while another third have not yet decided or are considering moving to another locality. In the East, however, the redistribution of the population will be significant – only half of the respondents are definitely determined to return home. Others are not so sure. Therefore, a significant number of settlements in the East will face demographic problems even after the war is over. This, in turn, further complicates the process of their reconstruction.

Among those who definitely plan to return to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war, 73.5% are ready to return home exclusively, 12.7% are ready to move to another region or settlement of Ukraine, and one in seven (13.8%) have not decided where they will return to in Ukraine. As for the return of Ukrainians from abroad AFTER the war, the figures are 68.4%, 19.8% and 11.8%, respectively.



D3.2. Upon returning to Ukraine, would you consider starting a new life in another region or settlement or would only return home?

In terms of countries of residence, the following differences can be observed: Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland would return home exclusively to a much lower extent (50.2%), among Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic there are fewer those who would consider the possibility of "settling" in another settlement/region of Ukraine (19.1%), and among Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany there are fewer those who hesitate to answer (13.6%).

The data on where forced migrants plan to return to is important in the context of future reconstruction and recovery. As for the relatively unaffected Kyiv, the West, the North, and the Centre, everything is quite predictable and understandable – about three quarters of respondents from these regions will definitely return to their homes. That is, there will be no global redistribution of the population after the Ukrainians return. The situation is different in the South and East. Two-thirds of respondents from the South plan to return home, while another third have not yet decided or are considering moving to another locality. In the East, however, the redistribution

of the population will be significant – only half of the respondents are definitely determined to return home. Others are not so sure. Therefore, a significant number of settlements in the East will face demographic problems even after the war is over. This, in turn, further complicates the process of their reconstruction

Factors preventing people from returning to Ukraine

The following factors reduce the willingness and readiness of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad to return home to the greatest extent:

- expectations/confidence that even after the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low – 60.3%;
- the likelihood that even after the war is over, Russia will be able to attack Ukraine again – 37.1%;

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Japan:** "If the conflict remains frozen at the stage where it is now, I think I will not return home. There's nothing to invest in, so everything you invest in will collapse."

- lack of suitable work in Ukraine – 36.6%;
- the threat of ZNPP[14] destruction – 31.6%;
- advice from relatives and friends not to return to Ukraine – 21.2%;
- consequences of the man-made disaster at Kakhovka HPP – 14.4%;
- lack of own housing in Ukraine before the invasion – 10.9%;
- relatives abroad – 10.5%;
- reluctance of family members to return to Ukraine – 9.8%;
- destroyed housing in Ukraine – 9.7%.

The top factors that reduce the willingness of forced migrants to return to Ukraine in the regional context are as follows[15]:

Kyiv: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (64.1%), even after the end of the war, Russia may attack Ukraine again (47.9%), the threat of destruction of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (36.8%), lack of suitable work (34.2%).

North: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (60.2%), even after the end of the war, Russia may attack Ukraine again (39.8%), lack of suitable work (31.6%), family members and friends who are in Ukraine do not advise to return (26.5%).

14 This threat was actively discussed in the media during the survey period.

15 The factors are listed in descending order.



D5. Which of the following reduces your desire and readiness to return to Ukraine? (multiple choice)

West: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (49.0%), lack of suitable work (43.1%), the threat of destruction of the Zaporizhzhia NPP and the possibility that Russia may attack Ukraine even after the end of the war (22.5% each).

Centre: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (61.4%), lack of suitable work (36.6%), the threat of destruction of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (36.6%), and even after the end of the war, Russia may attack Ukraine again (32.4%).

South: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (56.3%), the threat of destruction of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (39.9%), even after the end of the war, Russia may attack Ukraine again (36.1%), lack of suitable work (31.9%).

East: after the end of the war, the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time (66.7%), lack of suitable work (41.0%), even after the end of the war, Russia may attack Ukraine again (39.6%), the threat of destruction of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant (26.7%).

As we can see, the opinion that the quality of life in Ukraine will be low for a long time reduces the desire to return to Ukraine of all forced migrants, regardless of their region of origin. Other significant factors that deter them from returning are the belief that even after the war is over, Russia may eventually attack Ukraine again, and the lack of suitable work. The North is the only region where family members and relatives in Ukraine have a somewhat greater influence on the decision than in other regions and do not advise against returning (26.5%).

For obvious reasons, the factor of destroyed housing is more likely to reduce the desire to return among residents of the East (21.9%) and South (10.6%) than among residents of other regions: North – 5%, Kyiv – 0%, West – 1%, Centre – 1.4%. And the factor of negative consequences from the man-made disaster at the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant is a factor for residents of the South (24.3%). This factor is also unexpectedly significant for residents of those regions that were not directly affected by these consequences: it prevents 11.1% of forced migrants from returning from Kyiv, 10.2% from the North, 16.6% from the Centre, and 10.1% from the East.

There are some peculiarities in the responses of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, depending on the country of residence. They mainly concern Ukrainians who have found refuge in the Czech Republic. Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic are more likely than in other host countries to be deterred from returning by the expectation/confidence that the quality of life in Ukraine will be low even after the war (69.2%); lack of suitable work (47.1%); consequences of the man-made disaster at the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant (19.1%) and lack of own housing in Ukraine before the invasion (22.1%). Instead, Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland are somewhat more constrained from returning by the reluctance of family members to return to Ukraine (14.0%).

Plans for further stay

Ukrainian forced migrants abroad assess the current security situation in Ukraine as a whole worse than the security situation in the place where they lived before the full-scale war. Thus, on a 7-point scale (from "very difficult security situation, impossible to live in such conditions" to "the situation is generally normal, it is possible to adapt"), Ukrainian forced migrants abroad rated the security situation in Ukraine as 2.48 points (62.2% rated it as difficult), and the situation in their own settlements as 3.39 points (44.4% rated it as difficult). This situation is often due to the regional dimension of the security situation. Respondents from the East and South of Ukraine gave the lowest assessment of security in Ukraine – 42.9% and 45.5%. Among representatives of the Centre, the North and Kyiv, the figures are 35.4%, 34.3% and 34.7%, respectively, and among forced migrants from the West – 19.6%. In the case of security in settlements, the answers of respondents from the East and South have hardly changed – 43.3% and 47.7% chose the minimum value. However, the proportion of respondents who gave the lowest assessment of security in their settlements in the Centre, North and Kyiv is much lower – 4.8%, 9.1% and 8.5% respectively. Respondents from the West of Ukraine are much more optimistic when assessing the security in their settlements – every second respondent chose the maximum value on the scale.

Thus, it is difficult for Ukrainian forced migrants to plan their future, firstly, due to the difficult security situation in Ukraine, and secondly, because of doubts about their further stay in the foreign country of their choice, as migrants believe that the host countries are inferior to Ukraine in many aspects of life. On a 7-point scale (from "living one day at a time" to "making plans for the long term"), Ukrainian forced migrants abroad described their approach to future planning as situational (3.82 points).



D8. How would you assess the overall security situation in Ukraine as of today?

D9. How would you assess the security situation in the settlement where you lived before the full-scale invasion?

(score on a scale of 7 points and % of 'very difficult security situation, impossible to live in such conditions' – 1+2 points)

> **Man, 65, Sloviansk ➡ Great Britain:** "I don't know what happens next. Everything depends on circumstances that change too quickly."

In terms of percentage, 34.2% are closer to the "live one day at a time" approach, 40.0% are inclined to situational planning, and 27.2% to long-term planning.

In the overall picture, Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany are slightly more inclined (or able) to plan their future more carefully: 31.1% are closer to the "live one day at a time" approach, 37.6% are inclined to situational planning, and 33.0% to long-term planning (mean score 4.11).

Of particular interest is the question of the immediate plans of Ukrainian forced migrants to stay abroad, in particular in the host country. Thus, the majority of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad (61.3%) reported intentions to stay in the host country in one way or another (either to stay as long as possible (43.1%) or to obtain citizenship or a permanent residence/work permit in that country (18.0%). Another 5.5% stated their intention to move to another country, and one in five people planned to return to Ukraine (22.4%). Given that the first precedents[16] for reducing support for forced migrants from Ukraine abroad are emerging in the information space, the share

16 https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/polshcha-pripinit-dopomohu-ukrajinskim-bizhentsjam-nastupnoho-roku-bloomberg.html https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-nimechchyna-bizhentsi-dopomoha/32608755.html



D10.2. Which of the following statements best describes your approach to planning your future? (Percentage and score on a 7-point scale)

of people who plan to stay abroad as long as possible will "migrate" to other categories: either looking for opportunities to support themselves financially (for example, through employment), or moving to other countries where social programmes to support forced migrants from Ukraine are still in place, or returning to Ukraine.

It is important to note that there are certain peculiarities in terms of immediate plans for further stay in the host country. For example, among Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland, there is a slightly higher number of those who plan to return to Ukraine in the near future (25.5%). Among Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic, there is a slightly higher number of those who plan to apply for citizenship or permanent residence/work permit in the Czech Republic (25.1%). Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany are the least likely to plan to move to another country (2.0%).

Among residents of all regions, the highest proportion of those who plan to stay abroad as long as possible: from 45.1% among forced migrants from the West to 53.9% from the East. The lowest number of those who are ready to apply for citizenship or permanent residence is among forced migrants from the South and East – 14.3% and 18.5% respectively.

	Kyiv	North	West	Centre	South	East
I plan to return to Ukraine	19.0%	22.1%	28.6%	25.2%	29.9%	21.7%
I plan to move to another country	3.8%	8.2%	2.2%	4.6%	8.6%	5.9%
I will stay in this country as long as possible	52.4%	45.3%	45.0%	47.3%	47.2%	53.9%
I will apply for citizenship or permanent residence	24.8%	24.4%	23.1%	22.9%	14.3%	18.5%
Other	0%	0%	1.1%	0%	0%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%



D10. Which are your immediate plans regarding further stay in the host country? (one choice)

When it comes to not returning to Ukraine, all the arguments of the respondents (from the in-depth interviews) can be divided into two perspectives:

1. *their assessment of the current situation* – when respondents compare their current life abroad with their past life in Ukraine or possible life in Ukraine if they were here now (based on the information they know about life in Ukraine at the time of the study);
2. *assessment of a hypothetical situation* – when respondents predict possible developments and processes in Ukraine and imagine their future life here.

In both cases, the respondents have strong arguments for why staying abroad is a more likely option for them, although we assume that in the situation of assessing a hypothetical situation, respondents may be more flexible in making a decision – to stay abroad or return to Ukraine, and there are more chances to persuade them to return.

Distribution of respondents' answers, depending on the country of residence

In this section, we will consider the differences and deviations in the answers of Ukrainian forced migrants regarding their vision of their future, the likelihood of their return to Ukraine and the main factors that influence this. It is worth considering the factors that differ between Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic and tracing possible dependencies. The section describes these three countries because they account for about half of all respondents. Accordingly, it is rather dangerous to draw conclusions about other countries (from the perspective of the validity of these conclusions). In addition, these three countries are home to the largest number of forced migrants, which means that if the specifics of certain countries are to be taken into account when developing special measures for forced migrants, it should be done in relation to these countries.

Let us begin by looking at the differences in the responses of Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland. Forced migrants in Poland, more often than respondents from other countries, mention two conditions that could increase the likelihood of their return to Ukraine. The first condition is economic

recovery and growth (11%), and the second is love for Ukraine (9%). Such a condition as overcoming corruption is mentioned by respondents in Poland less often (15%) than among all respondents (20%). Overall, 25% of forced migrants in Poland plan to return to Ukraine in the near future, which is statistically higher than in the other countries surveyed. Speaking about returning to Ukraine, respondents in Poland are less likely to return only to their home (50.2%), i.e. to the place of origin, as opposed to other places. Thus, among forced migrants, Poland has the highest percentage of those who plan to return to Ukraine in the near future, despite the overall negative assessment of the security situation in Ukraine and the economic conditions.

The results of Czech respondents' answers stand out the most among other countries. Among the conditions that increase the likelihood of returning to Ukraine, the Czechs more often than respondents from other countries mention:

- security of their home (16%);
- Increased income and living standards (16%);
- demining/recovery/energy supply/reconstruction (13%).

Among respondents from other countries, these figures are lower. On the other hand, the cessation of hostilities (or the end of the war) is mentioned less often (28%) than in other countries. Some of the results obtained in the Czech Republic differ from other countries in terms of factors that may increase the desire to return to Ukraine. Forced migrants in the Czech Republic rate the availability of work in Ukraine (37%) and the restoration of destroyed infrastructure (25%) higher. Factors such as:

- returning Ukraine to its 1991 borders (18%);
- Ukraine's accession to NATO (16%);
- emotional connection to Ukraine (12%).

in the Czech Republic, on the contrary, are rated lower than among respondents in other countries. It can be noted that personal safety, comfort and economic factors are higher priorities among Czech forced migrants. The results of the survey in the Czech Republic demonstrated the highest percentage of persons planning to apply for citizenship or permanent residence/work permit (25.1%) among the countries under consideration. Forced migrants in the Czech Republic are less likely to consider settling in another settlement/region of Ukraine in case of return (19.1%). The highest results in terms of planning to apply for citizenship or permanent residence/work permit demonstrate a desire to start a full-fledged life in the Czech Republic for a long time. The reasons for this may include low assessments of the security situation in the previous place of residence, the desire to have a job and a higher level of income. In general, the issues of personal security, success and comfort are of higher priority for forced migrants in the Czech Republic compared to other countries, while the cessation of hostilities, return to the 1991 borders and NATO membership are less important.

The answers of forced migrants in Germany have a number of peculiarities of their own that are noteworthy. Two factors would have a greater impact on the potential return to Ukraine of German respondents compared to respondents from other countries. The first is the improvement of the quality of life in Ukraine (48%), and the second is the de-occupation of their previous place of residence (11%). Compared to other respondents, the following factors have a lesser impact on potential return:

- complete cessation of hostilities at the frontline (39%);

- availability of work in Ukraine (31%);
- cessation of rocket attacks and alarms (29%).

For respondents from Germany, as well as for respondents from the Czech Republic, economic factors are more important in terms of returning to Ukraine. In addition, forced migrants in Germany are more pessimistic about the current security situation in their previous place of residence than respondents from other countries. A total of 50.6 per cent of German respondents assessed the situation as unlivable. According to the respondents, more forced migrants in Germany are able to plan their future for the long term, namely 33%, which is higher than in other countries. In general, lower assessments of the security situation and higher assessments of stability and planned life may be the reasons for the decreased desire to return to Ukraine among forced migrants from Germany.

The relative impact of various factors on the willingness of forced migrants to return to Ukraine, according to econometric modelling (see Annex 1 for a detailed description of the modelling methodology).

The econometric modelling mentioned in this section was carried out by the Info Sapiens Research Agency, using the methodology developed by Info Sapiens. The methodology for building an econometric model of the impact of factors on the likelihood of forced migrants returning to Ukraine before and after the end of the war, including the general logic of this approach, a description of statistical analysis and modelling, and the procedure for calculating the importance of factors of return to Ukraine are provided in Annex 1.

The percentage value in the last two columns shows the weight of each factor in the decision of forced migrants to return or not to return to Ukraine. In other words, if we represent this decision as 100%, then this 100% consists of the following factors, each of which has a different share in the decision. The share of weight is transferred as a fraction of 100%.

Logical groups of factors	Direction of influence		Return before the end of the war	Return after the end of the war
Conditions in the host country: what/who is there, other conditions			18.9%	15.3%
Depending on the time/period of arrival in the country where the respondent is currently staying,	*the longer the respondents stay there, the less desire they have to return to Ukraine*	↓	3.7%	2.2%
If a spouse is in the same country...	*... the respondents have less desire to return*	↓	1.9%	0.3%
If a partner (unmarried) is in the same country...	*... respondents have less desire to return*	↓	0.4%	0.1%
Depending on the level of language proficiency in the country of residence	*the higher the level of language proficiency, the lower the desire to return*	↓	1.3%	1.3%

Logical groups of factors	Direction of influence		Return before the end of the war	Return after the end of the war
Depending on the assessment of one's financial situation abroad	*the higher the assessment of one's financial situation, the lower the desire to return*	↓	4.7%	1.1%
Depending on the assessment of their living conditions abroad	*the higher the assessment of living conditions, the lower the desire to return*	↓	0.3%	3.1%
Depending on whether you managed to find a job in this country	*if so, the desire to return decreases*	↓	2.8%	3.0%
Depending on the respondent's education in the country of residence	*if yes, the desire to return decreases*	↓	3.8%	4.1%
Conditions in Ukraine: what/ who remains there			21.3%	12.3%
If there is a child/children under 18 in Ukraine,	*then respondents have a greater desire to return to Ukraine*	↑	1.4%	1.0%
... grandparents	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	0.6%	0.0%
... parents	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	0.5%	0.9%
... husband/wife	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	5.2%	3.0%
... partner (unmarried)	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	1.5%	1.9%
... apartment/house	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	1.5%	1.0%
... business, own practice	*then respondents have a greater desire to return*	↑	0.6%	0.1%
If they continue to work remotely at the job they held before the war	*then respondents have less desire to return*	↓	1.0%	0.4%
Depending on how they assess the security situation in Ukraine as a whole today	*the more optimistic they are, the more they are willing to return*	↑	8.8%	4.0%
Assessment of the host country			28.6%	43.4%
Depending on the accessibility and quality of the Internet	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.1%	1.6%
... affordability of buying a home	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.8%	0.4%

Logical groups of factors	Direction of influence		Return before the end of the war	Return after the end of the war
... circle of friends, communication	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.2%	1.7%
... amount of financial assistance from the state, social benefits	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.2%	0.1%
... availability of rental housing	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.6%	1.2%
... opportunities for leisure	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.0%	1.4%
... availability of food, basic necessities	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.1%	2.0%
...quality of infrastructure (roads, transport, etc.)	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.1%	1.2%
...state of the environment	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	2.2%	1.5%
... quality of medical services	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.5%	1.5%
... security	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.9%	0.9%
... quality of tap water	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.5%	0.9%
... the work of state and local authorities	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.0%	1.4%
... intensity of workload, requirements of employers	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.7%	1.7%
... store opening hours	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0,1%	2,0%
... the amount of remuneration after tax	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0,2%	1,1%
... the situation with corruption	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	2,5%	1,5%
... crime rate	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0,7%	0,5%
... speed and quality of logistics, postal/courier services	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0,5%	1,0%
... development of the service sector	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.0%	0.1%
... availability of medical services	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.8%	1.5%

Logical groups of factors	Direction of influence		Return before the end of the war	Return after the end of the war
... overall comfort of staying/ living, including emotional comfort	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.5%	1.8%
... quality of utilities	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	2.3%	2.5%
... friendliness of the population	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.1%	1.5%
... opportunities to find a good, skilled job	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.9%	1.6%
... attitude towards children in educational institutions	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.6%	2.0%
... career opportunities	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.0%	1.3%
... creating special conditions for people with disabilities	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.6%	0.3%
... flexibility, ease of doing business	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.1%	0.2%
... quality of education	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.0%	1.5%
... opportunities for starting own business	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.0%	0.6%
... quality of services in the private sector (catering, beauty, other services)	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.3%	1.9%
... quality of digital services	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.3%	0.4%
... the opportunity to save money	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.5%	0.4%
... the ability to financially help relatives	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	0.1%	0.7%
... the ability to ensure an adequate standard of living with the available level of income	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	1.5%	0.4%
... rule of law, legal protection	*the better it is there, the less desire to return*	↓	2.0%	1.1%
Risks and concerns in the host country			19.6%	15,7%
Depending on the relatives' unwillingness to continue staying in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	4.6%	2.6%

Logical groups of factors	Direction of influence		Return before the end of the war	Return after the end of the war
... inability to get a highly skilled job without knowledge of the language in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	1.1%	1.6%
... loss of official status abroad	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	0.3%	0.2%
... manifestations of discrimination by residents of this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	0.3%	0.0%
... loss of employment in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	0.9%	0.4%
... inability to adapt to a new country, to "feel at home"	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	5.8%	4.6%
... loss of the right to free healthcare in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	0.6%	1.9%
... loss of the right to free or social housing in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	0.3%	1.9%
... loss of material payments and/or benefits in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	1.5%	0.6%
... frustration with life in this country	*the higher the risk, the greater the desire to return*	↑	4.1%	1.8%
Expectations about the war in Ukraine, assessments of the level of security			11.6%	13.3%
Depending on how respondents think the full-scale war in Ukraine will end	*the more optimism, the more desire to return*	↑	2.0%	4.%
Depending on when, in the respondents' opinion, a full-scale war in Ukraine is most likely to end	*the more optimism, the more desire to return*	↑	7.1%	4.6%
Depending on which scenario, according to respondents, is most likely for Ukraine after a full-scale war	*the more optimism, the more desire to return*	↑	2.5%	4.5%

In the following sections, we will take a closer look at when, with whom and where forced migrants left Ukraine, their situation abroad, and how and when they think the war in Ukraine will end.

5.2. The beginning of a full-scale war: period, direction, circumstances of departure

The period of 24 February – 31 March 2022 saw the most massive wave of migration caused by the war: every second respondent left their place of residence at that time. According to the survey, in the first months of the war, respondents reacted to the full-scale invasion in the following ways:

- 49.2% of respondents left their settlements between 24 February and 31 March 2022;
- 42.1% had already left Ukraine at that time;
- 33.3% had arrived in the countries where they were staying at the time of the survey.

Some Ukrainians reacted to the warnings about the threat of Russian invasion in a preventive manner, and left Ukraine on the eve of the war: 13.9 per cent of respondents **left their places of residence** between 1 January and 23 February 2022, 11.9 per cent **left Ukraine**, and 9.3 per cent **arrived in the country** where they were staying at the time of the survey.

The vast majority of respondents – 87.7% – left Ukraine during 2022, and the remaining 12.3% left in the first half of 2023.

	When did you leave the settlement where you lived before the outbreak of full-scale war?[17]	When did you first leave the territory of Ukraine to seek asylum abroad?[17]	When did you arrive in the country you are currently in?[17]
1 January – 23 February 2022 (before the outbreak of the war)	13.90%	11.90%	9.33%
24 February – 28 February 2022	12.68%	7.31%	2.94%
March, 2022	36.48%	34.81%	30.35%
April, 2022	8.19%	8.57%	9.68%
May, 2022	2.67%	4.28%	5.47%
June, 2022	3.14%	3.75%	5.06%
July, 2022	3.23%	3.91%	4.09%
August, 2022	2.88%	3.61%	4.16%
September, 2022	1.91%	2.08%	3.00%
October, 2022	2.13%	3.06%	2.97%
November, 2022	1.46%	2.13%	2.61%
December, 2022	1.60%	2.33%	2.72%
January, 2023	1.06%	1.54%	2.28%
February, 2023	1.82%	1.82%	2.29%

17 This question had 1 answer option

	When did you leave the settlement where you lived before the outbreak of full-scale war?[17]	When did you first leave the territory of Ukraine to seek asylum abroad?[17]	When did you arrive in the country you are currently in?[17]
March, 2023	1.54%	2.11%	2.70%
April, 2023	0.77%	0.86%	1.43%
May, 2023	1.18%	1.49%	2.45%
June, 2023	3.36%	4.43%	6.47%

The majority of respondents (59.7%) are based in Europe – Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, France, Romania and the UK.

Countries in which forced migrants lived at the time of the survey[18]

This question had 1 answer option

Germany	21.40%
Poland	19.90%
Czech Republic	7.00%
France	4.17%
Romania	4.17%
United Kingdom	4.10%
Italy	3.70%
Spain	3.60%
Netherlands	3.56%
Slovakia	3.15%
Bulgaria	2.65%
Ireland	2.54%
Lithuania	2.04%
Hungary	1.93%
Finland	1.73%
Estonia	1.63%
Denmark	1.53%
Austria	1.32%
Portugal	1.12%

18 Subject to statistical error, the survey data on the countries with the largest number of forced migrants from Ukraine correlate with Eurostat data: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/ukraine/population-migration#news

Sweden	1.02%
Latvia	1.02%
United States	0.81%
Croatia	0.81%
Moldova	0.71%
Belgium	0.61%
Turkey	0.61%
Switzerland	0.51%
Canada	0.41%
Greece	0.41%
Norway	0.41%
Israel	0.31%
Cyprus	0.20%
Georgia	0.20%
Other *(Indonesia, New Zealand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Malta, UAE, Luxembourg, China)*	0.71%

Countries with the highest number of forced migrants from Ukraine

Germany	21.40%
Poland	19.90%
Czech Republic	7.00%
France	4.17%
Romania	4.17%
United Kingdom	4.10%

The overwhelming majority of respondents left Ukraine not alone: almost half of the respondents (47.3%) left with their children (mostly with 1 or 2 children), 22.0% left with their husbands or wives, and 15.5% left with their parents. Only one in five respondents left alone.

One in three is currently abroad with children, 22.4% – with their husbands or wives, 21.5% – with other relatives, 18.8% – with their parents. Every second respondent has parents in Ukraine (47.3%), while 12.6% have a spouse and 12.0% have children. Only 5.2% of respondents said they had no one left in Ukraine.

With whom did you leave Ukraine?

This question offered more than 1 answer option

Alone	20.30%
With a minor child/children (under 18)	41.24%
With an adult child/children (over 18 years old)	6.09%

With grandchildren	3.48%
With parents	15.47%
With spouse's parents	2.85%
With spouse	21.99%
With other relatives	10.73%
With friends/acquaintances	5.43%
Other	0.30%
Family	0.38%
Animals (cats, dogs)	0.65%
Partner (boyfriend, girlfriend)	0.36%

Please indicate how many children (under 18) left Ukraine together with you?

This question had 1 answer option

1 child	57.61%
2 children	30.34%
3 children	8.99%
4 children	1.51%
5 children and more	0.86%
Refusal	0.68%

	Which of your family members/close friends are also currently abroad?[19]	Which of your family members/close friends are in Ukraine (permanent residence, did not leave with you or have already returned)?[19]
Child/children under 18 years old	20.32%	3.39%
Child/children over 18 years old	10.74%	8.64%
Grandchildren	4.68%	2.63%
Parents	18.80%	47.27%
Parents of husband/wife	4.35%	20.32%
Husband/wife	22.42%	12.62%
Partner (unmarried)	4.78%	2.63%
Other relatives	21.50%	53.56%
Close friends	15.29%	38.48%

19 This question offered more than 1 answer option

	Which of your family members/close friends are also currently abroad?[19]	Which of your family members/close friends are in Ukraine (permanent residence, did not leave with you or have already returned)?[19]
Other	0.19%	0.26%
Acquaintances	0.59%	–
Children without specifying age	0.31%	–
No one, I am alone	14.45%	5.19%
Everyone	–	5.19%

Method of making a decision to leave Ukraine

Regarding the method of making the decision to leave Ukraine, we distinguish two categories of respondents:

1. those who planned their departure in advance;
2. those who left spontaneously, without significant preparation.

1. Among the respondents who planned their departure in advance and weighed their decisions more carefully, some left Ukraine shortly before the start of the full-scale invasion (11.9%). These are mostly people who planned to move abroad in view of the threat of military invasion, and for them, economic motives and quality of life were important factors in choosing a country to move to: work connections (28.7%), employment opportunities there (38.5%), knowledge of the country's language (27.9%), previous experience of staying there (31.1%), and satisfactory quality of life (32.8%). As of the time of the survey, most of these respondents had remained abroad. They are also somewhat more likely to stay abroad after the end of the war in Ukraine: almost half (41.8%) indicated that they would not return to Ukraine even after the war ends (of which 9.8% would definitely not return, 32% would rather not return after the war ends). One-third of them (30.3%) indicated that they would definitely return to Ukraine only after the war ends, and only 9% indicated that they would definitely return before the war ends.

This category of respondents also includes those who had planned to emigrate long before the war, and it only became a catalyst and impetus for their departure. Therefore, they carefully studied the information about the country of relocation and left abroad when they were able to complete the preparations for their move.

Some respondents prepared for the possible consequences of a full-scale invasion and planned their departure in advance – they accumulated the necessary things that would allow them to live for some time in extreme conditions, prepared transport for a long trip, formed potential departure routes and looked for friends abroad who could host them for a while, etc.

There are some respondents who wanted to leave and planned to leave, but were unable to do so – residents of the [previously] occupied territories. They said that they left the occupation as soon as they had the opportunity. They had to leave the occupation through numerous Russian checkpoints, sometimes through 'green corridors', sometimes through the filtering procedure. Sometimes, the way out was through the Russian Federation, as it was the only way to escape the occupation.

2. Among those respondents who had to make a quick decision to leave Ukraine, the key driver was a sharp increase in the level of insecurity: shock that a full-scale war had begun and fear for their lives and the lives of their relatives. For residents of those regions of Ukraine that experienced a rapid Russian invasion, it was fear of the approaching frontline and the risk of being occupied, for residents of western Ukraine, it was fear of rocket attacks and a lack of understanding of the scale of the invasion.

> **Woman, 25, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "It was a simple decision to go abroad. When the convoy of tanks, the Russian sabotage group came in, when they entered Beresteiska Street from Kyiv region and started driving down Peremohy Avenue, it became clear to me that I had to flee as quickly as possible. Because the level of danger at that time, as I saw it, was the utmost. I had a very high level of anxiety, I was completely incapacitated, so I realised that I had to run away."

Respondents from regions with an increased level of insecurity also noted that they made quick decisions to leave to avoid being blocked by Russians. People were afraid of not having enough time to leave the [potentially] occupied territory and left while the routes were still open and there was a physical possibility of being safe.

They had no clear plan, mostly acting on an ad hoc basis: getting into transport and travelling wherever they could and where it was safer: sometimes directly abroad via evacuation routes, sometimes first to the west of Ukraine and then abroad after a while.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "We didn't know where to go. We just got on an evacuation train – me, my son, my daughter, our cat, and my female friend with a child. We got on the Kyiv-Warsaw train and went to Poland. Anywhere where we would be accepted."

> **Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands:** "At first, we just travelled somewhere westwards, later we would figure it out where."

Respondents who could not decide to spontaneously leave for the unknown said that they left whenever they had the opportunity: at the invitation of relatives or friends or "for the company", which they considered an easier and safer way than leaving on their own.

Some respondents also indicated that their decision to leave Ukraine was partly influenced by social pressure, as "it seemed that everyone was leaving en masse".

> **Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translation from Russian)**: "It wasn't a conscious choice, we just gave in to the general mood to leave. We got in the car, took only one suitcase, and stood in traffic for a long time. At that time, I hadn't even decided whether I wanted to go to Germany or Spain."

The majority of respondents indicated that they immediately decided to move abroad rather than to safer regions of Ukraine (61.9%).

Did you consider moving within Ukraine to a safer place before you went abroad?

This question had 1 answer option

Yes	38.15%
No, I immediately decided to go abroad	61.85%

The respondents mentioned the following reasons for moving abroad rather than to safer regions of Ukraine, in particular to the west: lack of relatives, friends, acquaintances there; lower chances of finding a well-paid job or other part-time work in Ukraine than abroad; lower social benefits in Ukraine than abroad; difficulties in finding rental housing due to increased demand and, accordingly, higher rental costs in relatively safe regions of Ukraine.

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany**: "We realised that the safest situation at the time was in Lviv, Lviv oblast, and Zakarpattia oblast. We monitored housing prices and realised that we could not afford it."

Sometimes respondents articulate stereotypes when it comes to deciding on their final destination. They say that they decided to go abroad rather than to safer regions of Ukraine, in particular to the west, because of their fears of harassment of Russian-speaking people and the perception of bias against IDPs from the eastern regions, who are more Russian-speaking.

> **Woman, 31, Kherson ➡ Georgia**: "In Western Ukraine, for example, people who come from the East are treated very badly. There are conflicts about language, about some options. That is, we are not like that. We have been speaking Russian all our lives and only now we are trying to speak Ukrainian. This is what I don't like and is very annoying, because each person has to decide for themselves what language to speak."

The decision to move abroad was often very difficult for the respondents, as this process was sometimes sudden and forced. And in the process of moving, they constantly questioned whether they had made the right decision.

> **Woman, 58, Sumy ➡ Czech Republic:** "I had a lot of doubts, I really hated to leave. I was crying all the way, I wanted to go home."

> **Woman, 65, Lviv ➡ Poland**: "Going abroad was a very painful decision for me. My children insisted that I should relocate my grandchildren, they took a ticket once and I refused to go, the second time they took a ticket and I refused to go, and the third time I finally went."

> **Woman, 58, Sumy ➡ Czech Republic:** "I had a lot of doubts, I really hated to leave. I was crying all the way, I wanted to go home."

> **Woman, 65, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "Going abroad was a very painful decision for me. My children insisted that I take my grandchildren, once they took a ticket, I did not go, the second time they took a ticket, I did not go, the third time I went."

The respondents who evacuated at the beginning of the war were frightened by the uncertainty and lack of understanding of when they would be able to return home and whether they would have a place to return to at all. They were mainly motivated to leave by the desire to protect themselves and their families[20].

20 For more details on the reasons for forced migrants to leave abroad, depending on the time of their departure, see Section 5.3. "Reasons and factors of leaving abroad".

5.3. Reasons and factors for travelling abroad

Fears vs reality

Almost all Ukrainians abroad and their family members have suffered [significant] negative consequences as a result of Russian military aggression. Only 2% of them said they had not experienced any consequences.

In the survey, forced migrants from Ukraine were asked not only about the consequences of the war that they had faced, but also what they feared in connection with Russia's military aggression. The results show that some fears were exaggerated, while others were underestimated. **The largest proportion of Ukrainians spoke of fear for their loved ones. In particular, 40.9% of respondents were afraid of their deaths, and 9.1% of respondents said they had suffered such losses because of the war.** Some 11.5% expressed fear that their relatives or friends might go missing, and for 4.4% this became a reality. 24.0% were afraid of getting physical injuries, 6.9% had received them.

Fears were somewhat higher in comparison to the actual consequences in the security sector. 32.1% of Ukrainians surveyed were afraid of hostilities in their settlements, the same number were afraid of the occupation; 26.9% and 25.4% respectively had experienced these events.

There are significant differences between the fears and their materialisation when it comes to encounters with the occupation forces[21]. 27.0% of respondents were afraid of torture and abuse by the Russian military, 3.7% had experienced it; 16.8% feared forcible deportation to Russia, the same number feared looting by the Russian army. Looting was experienced by 9.0% of respondents, and deportation by 2.0%. Forced mobilisation to the occupation forces was feared by 10% of Ukrainians, and 2.9% had encountered this problem in real life.

The fears of housing destruction and food crisis were closer to reality, with 28.7% and 24.4% of respondents choosing them respectively. As a result of the war, 16.8% of Ukrainians have found their homes uninhabitable. Lack of food, water and hunger were reported by 14.7% of respondents.

At the same time, some negative consequences for Ukrainians who have moved abroad have occurred more often than they had predicted. We are talking about security, economic, and personal consequences. In particular, 21.5% per cent of respondents said they were afraid of missile attacks on their neighbourhoods, and twice as many (42.6%) had experienced them in real life. 23.2% were afraid of hostilities near their places of residence, and 35% had faced such a threat. 20.7% of respondents were worried that they would have to stay in a shelter all the time, 30.3% were forced to do so.

The study showed that respondents also underestimated the economic consequences of Russia's military aggression. 18.3% of respondents were worried that they might lose their jobs because of the war, and almost the same number (18.6%) were concerned about a significant reduction in their regular income. At the same time, 38.1% of respondents said that they or their immediate family members had lost their jobs, and 39.2% of families had seen their income decrease. Fears of being unable to meet financial obligations due to the war were expressed by 15.6%

21 When interpreting the data, it is worth considering that people who feared negative consequences from the actions of the Russian army but did not actually face them are those who were not reached by the Russian army.

of Ukrainians abroad, and one in four (24.2%) respondents and their families faced difficulties in paying loans, mortgages, rent and the support of relatives.

Energy disasters were feared by 18.2% of Ukrainians, and 32.3% of respondents experienced power outages. As for personal experiences, 28.8% were worried about family separation, while 40.0% said they had been forced to leave their relatives. 33.7% of respondents understood that the war would have severe psychological consequences for them, and almost every second respondent (48.1%) felt the negative impact of the war on their mental health and the health of their relatives. One in ten respondents (9.9%) was concerned that children in Ukraine would not be able to attend school offline, and one in four (25.5%) said it was because of Russia's military aggression.

	Please remember what you were most afraid of before you left Ukraine? This is about something that did not happen to you, but you were most afraid of it[22]	Have you or your immediate family members experienced any of the following negative consequences as a result of Russia's military aggression? [22, 23]
Hostilities in the settlement where I lived	32.09%	26.87%
Hostilities near the settlement where I lived	23.19%	35.04%
Rocket attacks on my settlement, shelling of my settlement	39.99%	47.13%
Rocket attacks on neighbouring settlements, shelling of neighbouring settlements	21.53%	42.61%
Permanent/frequent stay in a shelter	20.68%	30.29%
Occupation of my settlement	31.94%	25.41%
Threat of occupation of my settlement	27.96%	25.03%
Destruction of housing (including partial destruction that made it uninhabitable)	28.70%	16.77%
Energy catastrophe/crisis (lack of/frequent power outages)	18.20%	32.27%
Significant reduction in regular income	18.63%	39.15%
Complete loss of income	26.34%	27.86%
Family separation	28.76%	39.96%
Loss of employment	18.26%	38.07%
Inability to fulfil financial obligations (pay off loans, mortgage, rent, support relatives)	15.58%	24.19%

22 This question offered more than 1 answer option

23 When interpreting the data, it should be considered that people who feared negative consequences from the actions of the Russian army but did not actually face them are those who were not reached by the Russian army.

	Please remember what you were most afraid of before you left Ukraine? This is about something that did not happen to you, but you were most afraid of it[22]	Have you or your immediate family members experienced any of the following negative consequences as a result of Russia's military aggression? [22, 23]
Inability to settle in relatively safe regions of Ukraine (West)	9.55%	15.86%
Robberies	10.72%	7.18%
Inability to get proper medical care or lack of critical medicines	19.90%	17.90%
Lack of food, water, hunger	24.41%	14.69%
Physical injuries (wounds, diseases, etc.)	24.03%	6.94%
Death of relatives	40.90%	9.14%
Relatives/friends are missing (no contact or information about their whereabouts for a long time)	11.49%	4.37%
Severe psychological consequences, negative impact of the war on my mental health and my family	33.65%	48.12%
Torture and abuse by the Russian military	27.00%	3.66%
Looting by the Russian military	16.80%	8.99%
Forcible transfer to Russia	16.83%	2.04%
Mobilisation to the Armed Forces of Ukraine	9.00%	9.98%
Fear of a man-made disaster (ZNPP)	19.68%	27.97%
Consequences of the Kakhovka HPP explosion	5.92%	10.06%
Inability of children in Ukraine to attend school offline	9.92%	25.53%
Forced mobilisation to the occupation forces	10.02%	2.88%
Other	0.00%	0.00%
No negative consequences	0.20%	2.30%
Refusal to answer	4.39%	0.96%
Already been abroad/left before the war/ work, study abroad/no time to return	0.84%	0.00%
Low living standards/corruption/lack of prospects in Ukraine	0.37%	0.28%
War/uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine	0.00%	0.00%
Fear for my life, children, husband/wife, relatives	0.40%	0.27%

Reasons for leaving Ukraine

In general, all factors that influenced the final decision to leave Ukraine were divided into three groups[24]: security (15 items), socio-economic (12 items) and personal (6 items). **Security factors had the greatest impact on the decision to leave Ukraine (79%)[25]. This is followed by socio-economic (64%)[26] and personal (52%)[27] factors.** It should be noted that respondents who left for Germany were somewhat more likely than the overall sample to mention personal factors (60%); Ukrainians in the Czech Republic – socio-economic factors (72%); respondents in Poland were somewhat less likely to mention security factors (74%).

Security factors

As noted above, the main reason for Ukrainians to flee abroad was the danger posed by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – 79% of respondents chose **security factors.** Of these, **the largest proportion of Ukrainians fled from missile attacks and shelling of their (34.2%) and neighbouring (21.0%) settlements. The hostilities in the respondents' settlements and nearby**



24 This includes the share of people who selected at least one factor from the group. The higher share of safety factors can also be explained by the higher number of them in the questionnaire.

25 Security factors include: hostilities in my settlement; hostilities near my settlement; rocket attacks on my settlement, shelling of my settlement; rocket attacks on neighbouring settlements, shelling of neighbouring settlements; permanent/frequent stay in a shelter; occupation of my settlement; threat of occupation of my settlement; fear of a man-made disaster (nuclear power plant); consequences of the Kakhovka HPP explosion; consequences of the Kakhovka HPP explosion; war/uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine; fear for my life, children, husband/wife, relatives.

26 Socio-economic factors include: destruction of housing; energy catastrophe/crisis; significant reduction of regular income; complete loss of income; loss of job; inability to meet financial obligations; inability to settle in relatively safe regions of Ukraine (West); robbery; inability to receive proper medical care or lack of critical medicines; lack of food, water, hunger; inability of children in Ukraine to attend school offline; low standard of living/corruption/lack of prospects in Ukraine.

27 Personal factors include: physical injuries (wounds, illnesses, etc.); death of relatives; relatives/friends missing; severe psychological consequences, negative impact of the war on my mental health and my relatives; mobilisation to the Armed Forces.

settlements influenced the final decision to leave for abroad for 17.0% of Ukrainians. Depending on the respondents' place of residence, the danger was of a different nature. In particular, these migration factors were more often mentioned by survey participants from the South, North and East of Ukraine. According to the Air-alarms.in.ua service, these regions of the country were the most frequent recipients of air raid alarms and the largest number of reports of explosions and artillery shelling[28].

> **Woman, 38, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "The main reason [for leaving] was to save my life... I saw explosions from my windows. From my window, I could see the TV tower collapse [exploaded, ed.]. It was scary."

Some respondents who had not considered foreign migration at the beginning of the full-scale invasion made the decision after the rocket attacks in western Ukraine. This was mainly the impetus for the departure of residents of the West and those internally displaced persons who had previously considered Western Ukraine as a safe area for their lives and stayed there.

> **Man, 37, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "A full-scale war, when you go out in the morning in Ivano-Frankivsk at 8 am after all the news and see such a huge column of black smoke in the airport area. And it's clear that you can't hide from this anywhere in Ukraine – not in the West, not anywhere."

For 16.7% of people from the frontline areas, the reason for leaving was the threat of occupation. One in five respondents (20%) had already travelled abroad from the occupied Ukrainian territories. Realising the consequences of the occupation since 2014, people feared for their lives and the lives of their relatives. Respondents named various consequences of the occupation that forced them to leave Ukraine. Firstly, it was accompanied by persecution of residents of the occupied settlements, torture and abuse by the Russian military (4.1%); secondly, it threatened Ukrainian men with forced mobilisation into the Russian army (2%); thirdly, it caused looting (3.3%). 2.6 per cent of Ukrainians surveyed fled because of the threat of forced deportation to Russia.

> **Man, 65, Sloviansk ➡ UK**: "I made the decision because I was most likely on the lists. There was also a danger that Sloviansk would be captured, that there would be an offensive. It was obvious that they wanted to cut off the Donetsk region."

> **Woman, 31, Kherson ➡ Georgia:** "On 24 April we decided to leave. It was at that moment that they started going door-to-door in Kherson with assault rifles and looking for men of military age. That is, they had a plan to mobilise all men of military age to their side."

Overall, 17.3% of respondents made the final decision to go abroad due to permanent/frequent stay in the shelter. Many people hoped that the war would not be long and would end quickly, so they decided to wait it out at home, following the rules of conduct during air raid alerts. However, going to the shelters had its negative consequences, especially for families with children. On the one hand, these are inappropriate conditions for a long-term stay there: a large

28 https://air-alarms.in.ua/

number of people in a small area, heavy air, low temperature, lack of necessary household items, communications, etc.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Bulgaria:** "At first we used to go to the shelters, but with a small child it was difficult because the regime gets lost. We couldn't sleep properly, eat properly, there were a lot of distractions. There were a lot of outside noises, the child wanted to run around, and there were a lot of people and not enough space. The air was so bad that it was hard to breathe. It was quite difficult."

On the other hand, parents noted the negative psychological impact on their children of going down to the shelters and staying there.

> **Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France:** "We had been in the basement for a long time, we moved our beds there. We had no electricity, no gas, no internet, nothing. We spent the night there, and then the temperature in the house dropped to 14 degrees. We woke up in the morning around 8 March and decided that we had to get out somehow."

Some 11. 7% of respondents fled Ukraine for fear of a man-made disaster. People saw such risks in the seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant by the Russian army. It is likely that the retrospective experience of Ukrainians in 1986 provoked fears of a new Chornobyl and, accordingly, attitudes towards migration. Only 1.4% of respondents fled from the consequences of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station explosion.

> **Woman, 23, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "I remember when I was in Khmelnytskyi, there was a night when they started shelling the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and I thought that when I woke up, there might be a new Chornobyl. And in fact, the thought of a new Chornobyl, the thought of new explosions or some problems with nuclear energy also influenced my decision."

Some respondents emphasised that they had left only for the sake of their children (1.9%). Adult Ukrainians were ready to stay in Ukraine despite the danger to themselves, but decided to save their children. These are mostly people who left in the first days of the full-scale war.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "My son is sick. He is very afraid of loud noises and explosions. There have been a couple of explosions in our neighbourhood – he is very scared. Both my daughter and I were afraid. That's why we left. My children wanted to leave, they are afraid. I might not have gone anywhere if I had been alone. But we packed up and left."

Socio-economic factors

Socio-economic hardship has become the second reason for Ukrainians to leave the country after insecurity after the full-scale Russian invasion. 64% of respondents named various economic aspects that influenced their decision to leave the country:

- loss of job, unemployment – 17.6%;
- complete loss of income – 18.0%;

- a significant decrease in regular income – 15.7%;
- inability to fulfil financial obligations (to pay off loans, mortgages, rent housing, support relatives) – 11.3%.

One in ten Ukrainians surveyed said they left because their children could not attend school offline in Ukraine, and the same number said it was because of the energy crisis. 7.4% – because of the destruction of housing (including partial destruction that made it uninhabitable).

The inability to settle in relatively safe regions of Ukraine (the West) prompted 8% of Ukrainians to leave. In particular, for some respondents who were in western Ukraine in February 2022 for some reason, further long-term stay there became impossible due to a sharp rise in rental prices.

> **Woman, 58, Sumy ➡ Czech Republic:** "Well, let's say material wealth. Because everything has gone up there [in western Ukraine]. Both the price of food and the price of living. I didn't have the money to live on."

The food crisis (lack of food, water, hunger) prompted 7.9% of Ukrainians to go abroad, and the inability to receive proper medical care or lack of critical medicines – 8.6%. In the case of medicine, this is especially true for families with family members with cancer. The fear of the lack of life-saving medicines was compounded by the psychological impact of the war on such people. In particular, parents of sick children saw it as their duty to shield them from the stress caused by the consequences of the war (explosions, air raid warnings, etc.).

Other socio-economic factors that prompted Ukrainians to move abroad included: running out of financial savings/accumulations; lack of job security even in the short term; rising prices for food and basic necessities; robberies; low living standards/corruption/lack of prospects in Ukraine.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA**: "Autumn arrived, and there was talk that maybe I wouldn't have a job, maybe I wouldn't have a salary. I bought an apartment, invested in an apartment. And since May, they have been very active in asking people to pay for the apartment. Yes, the construction is ongoing, but please pay, because we just need to pay people's salaries... And one of the biggest reasons I left was because I had to pay the rent. You have a debt, and you have to pay it."

> **Woman, 31, occupied Kherson ➡ Georgia:** "We made the decision literally in one evening because we did not plan to leave. We thought we would stay until the end, but it turned out that we were already running out of money to support my parents and my husband's parents, who are already elderly. There was no work in Kherson and we were running out of money. Of course, there was no humanitarian aid in Kherson. Prices were just terrible: meat, dairy products, bread were very expensive. My husband needed to work somehow, to earn money, so we decided we had to leave."

Personal factors

Personal factors were mentioned by 52% of forced migrants from Ukraine as a reason for going abroad. Most often, respondents pointed to severe psychological consequences, the negative impact of the war on their mental health and the health of their relatives (33.5%). 11.5% left Ukraine because of family separation; 5.6% – because of the death of their relatives; 1.4% – because their relatives went missing. Due to physical injuries (wounds, illnesses, etc.), 4.1% of respondents left the country.

The [potential] mobilisation to the Armed Forces of Ukraine prompted 5.1% of respondents to migrate. The proportion of men who chose this answer is almost 8 times higher than among women[29].

Among the Ukrainians who have moved abroad, there is also a category of people who simply took advantage of the situation due to the full-scale war in Ukraine. That is, at the time of their departure, these people did not feel in danger enough to leave the country. The war was just an impetus for them to migrate. These are mostly respondents from relatively safe areas (western Ukraine) who had considered migration before the war. Some respondents left under the influence of friends who were living or staying abroad at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and were able to shelter them. Some respondents left because they were given the opportunity to officially relocate abroad for their current jobs.

> **Woman, 22, Kyiv ➡ Belgium:** "Back when I was travelling [from Kyiv to Lviv], my director called me and told me to go to Poland: they will meet you there, we have everything there, you will be able to work, Lviv will be bombed too. In the end, I was pressured to go, because everyone who worked was relocated."

Other factors

Other reasons cited by respondents included the recommendation of local authorities, uncertainty, and lack of confidence in the future. Some respondents, realising that the war was approaching, had left the country before 24 February 2022 – these accounted for 11.9%. In particular, these are people whose close relatives have been living abroad for many years. Among those who were abroad for some reason as of 24 February, they decided to stay there in the future.

> **Woman, 30, Lviv ➡ Poland**: "Before the war started, we were in Italy, we were leaving 3 days before it started, there were already alarm bells and my boyfriend said, listen, let's just go to Italy. His mum lives there..."

Main factors that influenced Ukrainians' decision to emigrate abroad

The top ten factors that influenced the final decision to move abroad were:

1. Missile attacks and shelling of their home town – 34.3%;
2. Psychological consequences and damage to mental health – 33.5%;
3. Rocket attacks and shelling of neighbouring settlements – 21.0%;
4. Occupation of their settlement – 20.0%;
5. Total loss of income – 18.0%;
6. Loss of employment – 17.6%;
7. Permanent or frequent stay in a shelter – 17.3%;

29 In the course of the study, we did not ask questions about the method of travelling abroad, whether it was legal or not.

8. Hostilities near their place of residence – 17.1%;
9. Hostilities in their place of residence – 17.0%;
10. Threat of occupation of their place of residence – 16.7%.

B2_2. Select the main factors that influenced your decision to move abroad.

This question offered more than 1 answer option

Rocket attacks on my settlement, shelling of my settlement	34.27%
Severe psychological consequences, the negative impact of the war on my mental health and that of my family	33.48%
Rocket attacks on neighbouring settlements, shelling of neighbouring settlements	21.01%
Occupation of my settlement	20.02%
Total loss of income	17.98%
Loss of employment	17.55%
Permanent/frequent stay in a shelter	17.27%
Hostilities near the settlement where I lived	17.07%
Hostilities in the settlement where I lived	16.99%
Threat of occupation of my place of residence	16.73%
Significant decrease in regular income	15.73%
Fear of a man-made disaster (nuclear power plant)	11.71%
Family separation	11.50%
Inability to fulfil financial obligations (to pay loans, mortgage, rent, support relatives)	11.30%
Energy catastrophe/crisis (lack of/frequent power cuts)	10.10%
Inability of children in Ukraine to attend school offline	10.00%
Inability to get proper medical care or lack of critical medicines	8.43%
Inability to settle in relatively safe regions of Ukraine (West)	7.98%
Lack of food, water, hunger	7.92%
Destruction of housing (including partial destruction that has made it uninhabitable)	7.36%
Death of relatives	5.58%
Mobilisation to the AFU	5.13%
Physical injuries (wounds, diseases, etc.)	4.09%
Torture and abuse by the Russian military	4.06%
Looting by the Russian military	3.30%
Forcible transfer to Russia	2.56%
Already abroad/left before the war/work, study abroad/did not have time to return	2.05%

Forced mobilisation to the occupation forces	2.02%
Fear for life, children, husband/wife, relatives	1.87%
Relatives are missing (no contact or information about their whereabouts for a long time)	1.43%
Consequences of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station explosion	1.36%
Robbery	0.85%
Other	0.66%
War/uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine	0.63%
Inability to receive proper medical care or lack of critical medicines	0.46%
Refusal to answer	5.02%

Analysing the differences in the reasons for leaving abroad, we compared the following categories of respondents: those who left during the most massive wave of migration from Ukraine – after 24 February and during March 2022 (87.7% of respondents) and those who left between April 2022 and June 2023.

The main reasons for Ukrainians leaving at the beginning of the war – after 24 February and during March 2022 – were security concerns: missile attacks on settlements (42.5%) and neighbouring communities (27.8%), the threat of occupation (28.5%), constant or frequent sheltering (23.5%), hostilities near the settlement (23.3%), and severe psychological trauma (39.4%).

The main reasons that influenced the decision to move abroad among those who left after 24 February and during March 2022, when the most massive wave of IDP migration from Ukraine occurred (87.7% of all those who left due to the war in Ukraine)

This question offered more than 1 answer option

Rocket attacks on my settlement, shelling of my settlement	42.50%
Severe psychological trauma, the negative impact of the war on my mental health and of my family	39.40%
Threat of occupation of my settlement	28.50%
Rocket attacks on neighbouring communities, shelling of neighbouring communities	27.80%
Permanent/frequent stay in a shelter	23.50%
Hostilities near the settlement where I lived	23.30%
Hostilities in the settlement where I lived	18.80%
Loss of employment	16.60%
Total loss of income	15.90%
Occupation of my place of residence	14.00%
Fear of a man-made disaster (ZNPP)	12.80%
Significant decrease in regular income	12.60%

Inability of children in Ukraine to attend school offline	12.40%
Lack of food, water, hunger	10.20%
Family separation	10.00%

For those who left between April 2022 and June 2023, in addition to security and severe psychological consequences, economic reasons for leaving abroad are becoming important: complete loss of income (21.1%) and loss of job (20.7%).

Main reasons that influenced the decision to move abroad, among those who left in April 2022 – June 2023 (12.3%)

This question offered more than 1 answer option

Severe psychological trauma, the negative impact of the war on my mental health and of my family	36.60%
Rocket attacks on my settlement, shelling of my settlement	35.50%
Occupation of my settlement	29.70%
Total loss of income	21.10%
Loss of employment	20.70%
Hostilities in the settlement where I lived	19.80%
Missile attacks on neighbouring communities, shelling of neighbouring communities	19.60%
Significant decrease in regular income	18.70%
Permanent/frequent stay in a shelter	17.00%
Family separation	16.70%
Hostilities near the settlement where I lived	15.00%
Inability to fulfil financial obligations (pay loans, mortgage, rent, support relatives)	14.80%
Energy disaster/crisis (lack of/frequent power cuts)	14.30%
Fear of a man-made disaster (ZNPP)	13.40%
Inability of children in Ukraine to attend school offline	11.00%
Inability to settle in relatively safe regions of Ukraine (West)	10.60%

Choosing a destination country

According to respondents, the choice of destination country was usually based on various criteria. **Having family abroad was the reason for 22.4% of Ukrainians to choose a country of migration.** These were mostly close relatives who were living/working abroad at the time of Russia's full-scale invasion or long before, or those who had moved abroad for permanent residence in the past.

> **Woman, 35, Lviv ➡ Italy** (left a few days before the start of the full-scale war to live with her parents): "My parents have been working in Italy for 20 years. We came to visit our parents".

Some 26.4% of respondents chose a country because they had friends or acquaintances from Ukraine, while 9.7% chose a country because they had foreign friends or acquaintances. For this category of people, the policy of the country of migration did not play a very important role. It was the presence of familiar people there that gave them a sense of confidence; an understanding that they would have someone to rely on in the first days of life in a foreign country; and help them with the paperwork.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "The main criterion is that I was invited by my friend, who arranged for us to stay there. I did not think about it [Germany's policy on forced migrants] at all, we just went there."

> **Woman, 47, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "We had an invitation from a Polish family that we could stay at their place due to the outbreak of war."

According to 9.1% of Ukrainian respondents, they decided to go to a particular country because of work connections, 8.3% – because of the large Ukrainian diaspora/Ukrainian sector in that country; 6.0% – they had long dreamed of visiting a particular country.

> **Woman, 31, Romny (Sumy oblast) ➡ Poland:** "And the second factor is that the company I work for has a hub in Poland, where employees like me were accepted and provided with accommodation, assistance and various support, which guaranteed that I would stay in the job in the future."

This country provides certain benefits for Ukrainians during the war (attractive policy of this country towards forced migrants) – this option was chosen by 17.9% of respondents. According to respondents, Germany and the United Kingdom are among the leading countries that offered the most favourable conditions.

Having made the decision to go abroad, some people analysed information about the policies of countries around the world regarding the reception of forced migrants from Ukraine. In particular, the most important things for people in this context were the conditions offered by the host countries to Ukrainians – the amount of payments, the possibility of receiving free housing and healthcare, humanitarian aid, employment, legal regime of stay, etc. For example, in the case of Canada, simplified visa requirements also played an important role; in the case of the UK, a sponsorship programme that allowed Ukrainian citizens and their relatives to come there if they had a sponsor, a person willing to provide forced migrants with their own housing (participation in the programme is free).

> **Woman, 25, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "Germany really provides great conditions for Ukrainians, for their self-fulfilment. Everything is free: language learning, swimming pools, gyms, museums, social assistance, and housing. Germany provides really phenomenal opportunities."

> **Woman, 26, Kryvyi Rih ➡ Canada (translation from Russian)**: "My parents mentioned in passing that if we consider Canada, it would make sense to think about leaving. Canada has made it easier for Ukrainians to get a visa."

Language proficiency was a factor in choosing a country for 11.4% of respondents. Among respondents who stayed in the UK, this criterion was mentioned most often. People often chose countries where citizens speak and use English (mainly EU members). Sometimes, the reason for

choosing a country was the spread of Russian among its citizens. Respondents justified this by saying that Russian would be a common language for them and citizens of the country of migration, which would allow them to communicate. One of the arguments for choosing Poland was the lexical similarity between Ukrainian and Polish.

The logistically convenient location of the country and previous experience of staying in it also played a role in choosing a destination for travelling abroad – these options were chosen by 13.1% and 11.4% of respondents, respectively. Mostly, logistics was an argument for choosing countries that are geographically close to Ukraine (Poland, Georgia, and Hungary). In some cases, people said that they left for the country closest to home because they expected the war to end soon and planned to return to Ukraine in the near future.

As for previous experience, it was mostly a case of a long-term stay in a foreign country for work or study, because in addition to understanding the country's mentality, culture and lifestyle, respondents had a certain network of acquaintances that they could rely on when moving. The share of those who chose a country for migration because of their previous experience of living there is lower among residents of the East and South than among respondents from other regions of Ukraine.

> **Woman, 25, Kyiv ➡Germany:** "I ended up choosing Germany because 6 years ago I was on an exchange between our university and Humboldt University. It was a two-week exchange. I still have friends and connections. And it was by contacting the organiser of that exchange that the organiser was able to help me and offer me accommodation and a German family who could host and support me. Therefore, it was clear to me that this was a one-in-a-million chance that I had to take right now, right away."

According to 21.2% of respondents, the quality of life abroad influenced their choice of country of migration. For 13.4%, it was the economic ability to live in that country. Employment opportunities in the chosen country attracted 19.1% of respondents.

> **Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada:** "The high standard of living. Perhaps not in all provinces, not in all cities... A promising country, a lot of opportunities."

> **Man, 29, Kyiv ➡ Poland**: "I did not want to move further (from Poland), because it is profitable to live here with my level of income, similar language and mentality."

For 32.6% of respondents, they went blindly wherever they could. People said they did not consider specific countries as options for migration. Some simply went to western Ukraine and eventually had the opportunity to go abroad; some relied on volunteers or the church to choose the options available to them at a particular time; some only realised where they were going after crossing the border. In particular, these are respondents from the high-risk areas of eastern, southern and northern Ukraine. There are significantly fewer from the centre and west of Ukraine.

> **Woman, 45, Konotop (Sumy oblast) ➡ Spain:** "No, it was an act of desperation. We got to the western border, and then this volunteer we knew announced that from this point volunteers pick up people at the border and take them to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or Poland. So we were hoping that we would get on a bus with volunteers, but we didn't know where we were going."

> **Woman, 27, Kyiv ➡ Macedonia**: "We did not choose, we were going to nowhere. We didn't know where we were going. We were travelling by car, I can't tell you the details, but we were travelling. We agreed to go. We did not know what country we were going to until the last moment. We were crossing the border of Ukraine at the Sokyryany checkpoint, in the Chernivtsi oblast. And when we crossed Sokyryany, I realised that it was Moldova."

Other factors that influenced the choice of the country of migration include the availability of housing, overcrowding with Ukrainians in other countries (among those considered for migration), scientific internships/studies, and medicine/treatment.

Among the participants of the study, there are people who have changed countries of migration for one reason or another. For example, one of the respondents moved to the Czech Republic at the invitation of her friends, but after a while she moved to Spain for personal reasons – her Spanish partner, with whom she had been corresponding via the Internet for a long time, called her there. In another case, a family turned around on the way to visit relatives in Spain and went to Germany because a programme for forced migrants of Jewish origin, which included the respondent's family, was launched there. Some people moved from Poland to Belgium because of a job opportunity, while others moved from Italy to Germany because the cost of living there was too high. Poland was the most common transit country for Ukrainians. People fled there in search of safety and then moved on to a country that was more attractive to them. 5.5% of Ukrainians surveyed abroad said they planned to move to another country. The lowest number of such people is among forced migrants in Germany (1.8%), the highest number is in Italy (9.1%).

It is worth noting that respondents rarely mentioned a single factor in choosing a country for relocation. Mostly, it was a combination of different aspects that together became an argument for moving to a particular country.

> **Woman, 38, Kyiv ➡Turkey**: "My husband can safely stay here [Turkey], but it is more difficult for him to get a visa to Europe. This is the main factor. The second factor is the cost of living. It is cheaper here than in Europe. The third factor is the proximity to Ukraine, to home. And the fourth factor is the ease of finding accommodation."

In terms of the regional breakdown of the choice of destination country, residents of the East were somewhat more likely to choose the option "attractive refugee policy of the country" – 12.7% vs. 5.2% of Kyiv, 6.6% of the North, 4.2% of the West, 8% of the Centre, 7.5% of the South. And the criterion of the logistical location of the destination country is the least common among this category of respondents (3.4% vs. 6.9%, 7%, 6%, 5.3%, 8.1% respectively). Respondents from the South and East, when choosing a country to leave, least often used their previous experience of staying in it – 3% each. For comparison, the share of such respondents from the West is 9.5%, from Kyiv, the North and the Centre – 6.2% each. The situation is somewhat similar with existing work connections in the destination countries: respondents from the East, South, and Centre chose this option less often than those from the West, North, and Kyiv (1.9%, 3.1%, 2.7%, as opposed to 7.7%, 6.2%, 5.9%, respectively). Residents of the West were much more likely to choose a destination country based on the criterion of knowledge of its language or employment opportunities there: 9.2% and 11.6%. For comparison, these figures for respondents from Kyiv are 5.9% and 6.5%, in the North – 6.6% and 9.7%, in the Centre – 4% and 9%, in the South – 4.9% and 7.1%, and in the East – 3.2% and 8.5%. However, respondents from the West were the least likely to go where they had the opportunity – 5.3% compared to 12.8%,

15 %, 13.3 %, 17 %, 18.3 % of respondents from Kyiv, the North, the Centre, the South and the East, respectively. In the context of age distribution, respondents aged over 65 named having family/relatives there as the top reason for choosing a destination country (39 %). Whereas all other age groups most often travelled where they had the opportunity.

Instead, respondents over 65 years old were much less likely to be guided by such arguments as: having Ukrainian friends or foreign friends abroad, logistically convenient location of the country, work connections, economic viability of living in that country and employment opportunities there. The youngest respondents (18–24 years old) were more likely than other age groups to choose a country based on having friends/acquaintances of Ukrainians in that country (30.2 %), attractive refugee policy (24.8 %), quality of life (29.3 %), economic ability to live in that country (18.9 %), and knowledge of its language (18.5 %). Interestingly, the attractive policies of host countries were somewhat more often cited as a reason for choosing a particular country by the youngest (18–24 years old) and the oldest (over 65 years old) respondents (24.8 % and 21.2 % respectively). For comparison, among such age groups as 25–34 years, 35–49 years and 50–65 years, this figure is 16.3 %, 16.1 % and 18 %, respectively. The same similarities can be observed in the context of choosing a country to travel to because of a long-held dream to visit it.

5.4. Information on staying abroad

Legalisation in the country of residence

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad have been legalised in one way or another or are in the process of being legalised in the host country. Thus, two-thirds of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad have been granted temporary protection status (63.9%), one in five has been granted refugee status (18.7%), and another 5.5% are in the process of processing documents. Those who plan and know how to legalise in the country of residence or do not know how to do so make up 1.3% and 0.9% respectively. Only 4.0% do not intend to legalise in the host country, and another 6% refused to answer.

Have you obtained legalisation in the country where you are currently residing?

This question had 1 answer option

Yes, I have been granted refugee status	18.72%
Yes, I have been granted temporary protection status	63.88%
Yes, I am in the process of processing documents	5.48%
No, I do not plan to legalise in this country	3.99%
No, but I plan to and know how to do it	1.32%
I do not know how to get legalisation in this country	0.85%
Refusal to answer	5.77%

It should be noted that Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic most often report having been granted temporary protection status in the host country (75.0%). On the other hand, a relatively higher share of Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany reported having been granted refugee status (32.9%). Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland stand out in terms of legalisation, as they have a relatively higher percentage of those who are either in the process of processing documents (9.6%) or do not plan to legalise there at all (7.9%).

There are 66.5% of those who believe that they are not at risk of losing their official status abroad in the near future. Also, some respondents note that they will stay abroad as long as they have the opportunity to do so – official status and relevant "benefits": every third respondent at the time of the survey received assistance in the host country (mainly financial, humanitarian, medical assistance and free housing).

In your opinion, how likely is it that you will lose your official status abroad in the near future?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	37.51%
2	15.42%
3	13.57%
4	18.05%

5	6.65%
6	6.17%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	2.64%

The first days of life abroad

Respondents describe the first days of life abroad in the context of shock at the scale and consequences of the war in Ukraine, the sometimes long and exhausting journey abroad, the first adaptation difficulties and disorientation abroad.

The overwhelming majority of respondents indicate that they received help upon arrival in their destination country. Often, it was either their acquaintances in the country of destination or acquaintances of their acquaintances who, by agreement, helped forced migrants from Ukraine during their first period abroad. There were significantly fewer cases when respondents indicated that they had no acquaintances in the country of destination. In this case, assistance was provided by local volunteers specially organised at the places of service; international organisations (e.g. Red Cross), ethnic communities (e.g. Jewish), church organisations, regardless of denomination.

> **Man, 44, a village in Brovary district (Kyiv oblast) ➡ Germany**: "I would probably mention the church. The whole church helps us, no matter what denomination. Both Protestants and Catholics – they all provide some kind of assistance to people."

Regardless of whether they had acquaintances abroad, almost all respondents say that at the beginning of the war they received help upon arrival in their destination country: if they did not have acquaintances, people helped, including people from the Ukrainian diaspora, migrant workers, and other forced migrants who had gone abroad earlier and had already learned from their own experience how to obtain residence permits and arrange their everyday life at the initial stage of their stay abroad.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Japan:** "Ukrainian refugees communicate with each other. That is why we all go to volunteer centres. In Japan, refugee centres have begun to form in large cities, where Ukrainians who are not refugees, that is, who have lived in Japan, work. They also cooperate with Japanese volunteers, and it is they who help and advise us. Of course, they can't do everything you need, but they can at least clarify the situation."

The biggest difficulties that respondents experienced at the beginning of their stay abroad were due to a lack of understanding of how everything works there and bureaucratic difficulties with obtaining a residence status.

> **Woman, 42, Morshyn (Lviv oblast) ➡ Germany:** "It takes a very long time to get documents in Germany. If you are going to travel, you need to understand where you are going and have someone to help you. Because this bureaucratic system really drags you down."

Sometimes, in order to alleviate the apathy and difficulty of staying abroad at first, forced migrants sought employment: volunteering or other assistance to Ukraine.

The respondents emphasise that they received a lot of help during their first period abroad: they solved logistical difficulties, looked for accommodation, offered job options, helped with paperwork, etc. The overarching discourse is that forced migrants from Ukraine were not left to their own devices. As soon as they found themselves abroad at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, they were immediately offered assistance, whatever it was. Respondents say that if it were not for the help of locals (acquaintances or not, Ukrainians or foreigners), it would have been much more difficult.

> **Woman, 30, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "Well, perhaps the biggest role was played by my friend, with whom I could live for the first month. He found an opportunity for me to live in a communal apartment for the next few months. It was really a great help for me, because I didn't really want to do everything myself in the first few weeks."

This assistance made the first, most difficult period of stay abroad easier. Instead, those respondents who left not at the beginning, but during the war, in particular in late 2022 or early 2023, indicate that attention and volunteer assistance to Ukrainian forced migrants is gradually decreasing, and this is already quite noticeable.

> **Man, 44, a village in Brovary district (Kyiv oblast) ➡ Germany:** "No, the government is not helping. Volunteers are a bit tired of refugees at this time, but there are some people who provide some services. There are a small number of Germans who are very concerned and are not tired of refugees at this time, they still help to solve some issues."

Of the respondents, ¾ had previously been abroad, and their prior experience of travelling internationally helped them to some extent with orientation and the first adaptation period. Respondents who indicated that they had never been abroad before 24 February 2022 accounted for 28.7% of all respondents.

Have you travelled abroad before 24 February 2022 for the following reasons?

This question offered more than 1 answer option

Tourism	52.70%
Education	4.15%
Business trips, working visits	11.31%
Work abroad	18.67%
Other	1.14%
Visiting relatives/children/friends	2.21%
No, I have never travelled abroad before 24.02.2022	28.69%

Some of the people who have previously lived in a foreign environment indicate that they felt less stress and less disorientation when settling in.

> **Woman, 30, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "Because I have already lived in Germany, I at least understand how everything works here, how some bureaucratic things with doctors work there."

Living conditions in the host country

The majority of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad (65.1%) live in separate housing. In most cases, this is *separate rented housing* – an apartment or a house (44.0%). According to the respondents, rent payments account for a significant share of their expenses. Every fifth respondent lives in *separate housing provided free of charge* by the state/volunteers/friends (19.6%). Also, separate housing includes own housing in the country of residence (1.5%). The rest of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad do not have separate housing. Some of them (13.7%) rent such accommodation at their own expense – renting a room (13.0%) or a hotel/hostel/dormitory (0.7%). Some live with friends/acquaintances or relatives (9.7%) or with family/hosts/sponsors (0.68%), while others live in provided housing – refugee shelters (8.6%) and accommodation provided by their employer (1.6%).

Where do you currently live in your host country?

This question had 1 answer option

Asylum for refugees	8.56%
Separate accommodation provided free of charge by the state/ volunteers/friends	19.59%
With friends/acquaintances or relatives	9.70%
I rent a room	13.04%
I rent an apartment or house	43.97%
Own housing, purchased before or after the war	1.46%
Other	0.66%
Hotel, hostel, dormitory at my own expense	0.65%
Accommodation provided by employer	1.57%
Accommodation with family/hosts/sponsors	0.68%
Refusal to answer	0.10%

The assessment of living conditions abroad was equally divided: 36.4% said that their living conditions are now somewhat worse than they were in Ukraine, and 37.0% said that they are better. A quarter of respondents, 26.5%, said that their living conditions abroad are the same as they were in Ukraine. Among the countries where the survey results show the highest number of forced migrants, the highest rating of living conditions was given by forced migrants in Germany (4.5 on a scale where 1 means living conditions are much worse than in Ukraine, and 7 means living conditions are much better than in Ukraine). The lowest score is for those residing in Italy – 3.18.

How would you rate your living conditions abroad?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – much worse than they were before the full-scale war in Ukraine	11.14%
2	8.70%
3	16.59%

4	26.54%
5	15.28%
6	6.27%
7 – much better than they were before the full-scale war in Ukraine	15.49%

Depending on the time of arrival abroad, large cities were often overcrowded with forced migrants from Ukraine, and it was difficult to find shelter or housing. At that time, Ukrainians were advised to go to the provinces, to regions less saturated with forced migrants, where there were more chances to find foreigners who would be willing to provide shelter or even find a separate apartment.

At the beginning of their stay abroad, people were accommodated wherever possible: locals in their homes or in houses they did not live in; in hotels or hostels for a while; in shelters; those who had friends often settled with them first.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "We live with a German family. It is an extension to the main house. There is one room, one kitchen and a corridor. My friend was looking for this accommodation for us. We travelled for 5 days, and she found the place within those 5 days."

According to the survey, every third respondent believes that in the near future they may lose the right to free or social housing abroad (36.4%).

In your opinion, how likely is it that you will face the loss of your right to free or social housing in this country in the near future?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	35.10%
2	8.10%
3	9.72%
4	10.65%
5	7.00%
6	7.33%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	22.09%

After some time abroad, forced migrants began to look for separate accommodation for various reasons: either people who allowed them to stay at their homes asked them to find another place, or respondents felt uncomfortable living with someone and sought to find separate accommodation. The search for separate housing is also directly related to the financial ability to pay for it, unless it is free housing provided by local residents.

> **Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France**: "My colleague's daughter found a French family for us who took us in. She met us at the railway station and took us to them. At first, they said it was for 3 months, and then we would be given social housing

and move out. But we stayed with them for five months, and they already said that September, the new school season, was starting, they wanted to live separately and could no longer take us in. Then we found a new family."

Those who have experience of [attempting to] rent accommodation abroad often emphasise the significant difficulties in the search process:

- high cost of renting accommodation;
- difficult conditions for obtaining rental housing (requirements to pay in advance for a long period (six months to a year), bureaucracy);
- long search time due to high demand for rental housing abroad;
- refusal to rent to Ukrainians with pets;
- difficulties in searching, including due to discrimination against Ukrainians on national grounds, etc.

In particular, respondents mentioned the need to have guarantors/sponsors, a good credit history, official status of staying abroad, and sometimes official employment in the destination country. And without the help of local residents (foreigners or Ukrainians who have been abroad for a long time), this process could be significantly delayed. Significant difficulties in finding accommodation were noted by respondents who tried to rent a house in Germany. Other difficulties were reported by forced migrants from Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Luxembourg.

> **Woman, 30, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "The second difficulty is finding a place to live, because in Berlin and in big cities in general, the housing situation is not the best. It is quite difficult to find a place to live for all people, and then there are people who have just arrived. You don't have a bank history on a German card or any other such thing that shows that you are a person who can be trusted. And if it's some kind of accommodation like a room in a communal flat, you have to go to auditions. I did not have enough emotional stability for all these things related to the search for housing."

Respondents also emphasised the high cost of renting housing abroad: every second respondent indicated that renting housing is more affordable in Ukraine to some extent. The high cost of renting was mostly mentioned by respondents who lived in highly developed Western European countries. However, in countries with somewhat lower living standards than in Western Europe, such as the Balkans, rents are more affordable, "even on a par with Kyiv".

Please rate the following aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in your host country

This question had 1 answer option

	Affordability of renting a home	Affordability of buying a home
Definitely better in Ukraine	27.05%	30.46%
Rather better in Ukraine	17.40%	15.47%
Slightly better in Ukraine	11.17%	7.61%

	Affordability of renting a home	Affordability of buying a home
Equally	22.89%	20.71%
Slightly better in the host country	6.12%	7.98%
Rather better in the country of residence	8.00%	7.90%
Definitely better in the host country	7.37%	9.87%

Overall, every second respondent (53.5%) said that buying a home in Ukraine is more affordable than abroad. Only 1.5% of respondents reported owning their own home abroad before the full-scale invasion.

In some cases, even employed people noted that they could not always pay the rent, as it sometimes reaches more than half of their income and affects their quality of life abroad.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡Poland:** "There was a problem with renting a house. For example, my salary was 3,000 zlotys, and the price of housing was the same. The money I earned did not cover housing, food, medical services, etc."

There are also cases when the landlord's condition was to pay the rent "in advance" – several months or a year in advance.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Bulgaria**: "When I arrived, I was looking for accommodation through an agency. It was very difficult because Bulgarians do not want to rent to Ukrainians. They wanted payment a year in advance."

Or there are those who absolutely refused to rent out their accommodation because it was Ukrainians who wanted to rent it.

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "We lived in a hotel for 4 months. Then we were looking for an apartment. In this town near Sofia, Banke is the name, many people refused to accommodate us just because we were Ukrainians. It happened that my husband went to look at an apartment here, which cost five hundred euros. That is, it was a lot for Bulgarians. We were ready to accept this price. He went and had a look, [the people who showed it] agreed, but it was not their apartment, it was their son's. They called the son and he said that Ukrainians were absolutely not allowed."

When respondents talk about their experience of finding accommodation abroad, they often use the word "lucky". That is, regardless of the efforts made in the process of finding accommodation abroad, the factor of chance and luck is equally important.

> **Woman, 22, Kyiv ➡ Belgium**: "I was also lucky to find an apartment through a friend of a colleague who lives in Luxembourg. He rented us his empty flat in Brussels. Contrary to my expectations, he did not charge me for the rent. I was very lucky, because housing is a big problem in Brussels."

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg**: "I was very lucky with my accommodation, because here they do not agree to sign a lease agreement with newly arrived workers, they look at the salary specified in the contract. They demand that the salary be at least

3 times higher than the rent. They also refuse to hire people who are on probation. They also don't want to hire you if you don't have a residence permit. I received this permit only after 4 months of my stay here. Therefore, I wrote to Ukrainians in Luxembourg, a Facebook group. I wrote several ads there, and one woman responded, who has been living here for 20 years in Luxembourg, she is from Ukraine, she came here a long time ago, and has already settled here, she has her own house, and in this building I rented and still rent a room, and she is my landlord."

There are significantly higher chances of renting outside megacities, in less densely populated areas. Respondents also note that the cost of renting there is more affordable.

Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada: "Vancouver itself is very expensive in terms of cost – rent and everything else, it's a very expensive city. So we immediately decided that we would live in some smaller city nearby. And that's how it worked out."

In some cases, respondents indicate that they managed to rent an apartment at a discounted rate for Ukrainian forced migrants. In this case, they were able to pay for the apartment financially. However, this discount expires over time, and then Ukrainians are sometimes unable to pay the full cost of housing or are put in a difficult financial situation.

Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv oblast) ➡ Poland: "If you have your own housing, it is definitely [better] there. When I rented an apartment there, they gave me a 50% discount for that period, and in October they planned to raise the price again to the market price. If you look at the ratio of price to salary, and if I paid for this apartment without the discount, I would have almost nothing left to live on. In their country, the primary residence costs at least 20,000 hryvnias in our money. With all the calculations, I would have had 9,000 hryvnias left over – you can't really live on that money in Poland. You'd have to beg for it or pull it out of your savings, so it's unrealistic to survive."

If Ukrainians are "lucky" enough to rent an apartment abroad, another problem arises: utility bills, which, according to respondents, are usually an order of magnitude higher than in Ukraine, are a significant expense. According to the respondents, the cost of utilities abroad, particularly in Europe, is gradually increasing, probably due to the economic and energy crisis caused by Russia's war in Ukraine.

Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany: "They [utilities] are very expensive. They have a different system. We pay every month. Here, they send bills not to the owner, but to you. Gas, water and garbage collection are included in the contract. Water was 120 euros a month, electricity was 100 euros a month, and gas was 230 at first, then 250, now 270. And now, after 1 January, they have made the prices even more ridiculous, i.e. gas costs 430 euros for this house, and it is about 500 metres away."

If the calculation of utility bills is based on a fixed tariff, then there are restrictions on the amount of energy used. And respondents point out that this is an additional stressor, as it is not known whether it will be possible to "fit" this limit and how much extra will have to be paid if it is exceeded.

> **Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France**: "Renting an apartment here is more expensive than in Kyiv. For example, I was told that I would have to pay 80 euros a month for electricity and 20 euros for water for my studio, but I would pay a fixed tariff, and then they would recalculate it in six months. If I use less, they will compensate me, if I use more, I will have to pay extra. I am somehow afraid of this system, because you are constantly thinking about how much you use and whether you will have enough money."

Some countries have internal systems for reviewing the cost of utilities based on family income and may offer discounts or allowances for utilities. In order to get a discount, it is important to have an official residence status and pay taxes locally.

> **Woman, 35, Lviv ➡ Italy:** "Utilities are very expensive, just as expensive as in Ukraine, but there is one nuance: every year everyone who lives here (including me, if I work) submits an annual report of their income. Their tax office looks at the level of income of the family, who lives in the family at the moment, and we get a discount on utilities, because if our income did not cover those payments. They look at income, and vulnerable families are given bonuses. This winter, we received such bonuses that we didn't pay for heating at all. We also have even 400 euros in savings for electricity for the summer."

According to respondents, the quality of public utilities abroad is higher than in Ukraine: 58.6%, as opposed to 19.3% who rated the quality of utilities in Ukraine much higher.

Rate the quality of public utilities

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	7.96%
Rather better in Ukraine	6.07%
Slightly better in Ukraine	5.27%
The same	22.11%
Somewhat better in the country of residence	14.97%
Rather better in the host country	18.82%
Definitely better in the host country	24.80%

The general discourse is that free housing for Ukrainian forced migrants is more of a temporary option: for the most part, upon arrival abroad, respondents could live for free (with foreigners or in allocated housing) for only a certain time, and then, if they did not have the opportunity/desire to return to Ukraine, they had to look for alternative housing options: either rent or settle in other available and free options, including refugee camps, shelters, etc.

Ukrainians do not speak very positively about living in shelters or special refugee camps, especially when they had much more comfortable conditions and more personal space in Ukraine or even at first abroad.

> **Woman, 43, Kyiv ➡ Poland**: "At first we lived with friends. Since the end of September, we have been living in a container in not very good conditions: small space, 3 families living together. Rent is very expensive".

Respondents who managed to settle in separate/adjoining premises assess their living conditions better than Ukrainians who had to live in refugee shelters or other places of general settlement of Ukrainians fleeing the war abroad. This category of respondents said that everything was fine, but they were not used to living in such conditions and felt uncomfortable.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Poland**: "We lived in a refugee camp. It was divided into rooms, each room had 2–3–4 bunk beds, for 8 people. Good conditions, we were well received, we were fed 3 times a day. There was a dining room. The difficulty was that we were not used to living like this. We are used to living in an apartment, where we have our own facilities. There were also amenities there, but there were a lot of people. On average, there were 700 people in that camp."

High-income respondents who did not lose their sources of income after moving abroad or who had substantial savings were much less likely to focus on difficulties in finding housing abroad. They were more likely to be guided by comfort criteria when looking for accommodation. The cost of rent and utilities was not a determining factor. Instead, the quality of life was a decisive factor – no worse than before the war in Ukraine.

Despite all the adaptation difficulties abroad, respondents point out that after a while, the level of discomfort and stress decreases, people get used to it, and begin to assess their living conditions and prospects more objectively. Nevertheless, respondents often say that they were still better off at home and still have a close emotional connection to Ukraine.

5.5. Host countries' policies assessment by forced migrants

Immediately after the start of the full-scale invasion, both small volunteer communities and large international organisations rushed to help our citizens who decided to cross the state borders. This list also includes countries that have begun to accept Ukrainians. Each host country has introduced various initiatives at the state level to support Ukraine. **Although not all respondents chose a country for emigration based on its policy towards forced migrants from Ukraine, the majority of respondents stated that they had used the assistance provided to them – 68.0%.**

In particular, at the time of the survey, 38.2% of respondents indicated that they were still receiving assistance from the host country. Among them, the largest share of Ukrainians is in Germany – almost 70% and people over 65–62.6%. One-third (30.2%) of respondents said that they had received assistance from the host country in the past, but at the time of the survey they were no longer receiving it. One in four (25%) of those abroad did not receive any assistance from the host country at all. Only 6.3% refused to answer this question.

There are a number of differences between Ukrainians in the three main countries of residence: the vast majority in Germany still receive assistance (70%), while among this category there are significantly fewer who no longer receive assistance (12%) or have not received it (9%). Among Ukrainians in Poland, there is a relatively higher share of those who have not received assistance from the host country (39%), while Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are distinguished by the highest number of those who have received assistance before but not now (53%).



G2. Have you received any assistance from the host country since the beginning of your stay? (One answer option)

Those Ukrainians who still receive assistance from the host country named financial assistance as the main type of assistance (almost 80%). The following types of assistance were mentioned:

- free housing – 55.0%;
- medical assistance – 53.9%;
- assistance with the preparation of documents for legalisation – 43.3%;
- humanitarian aid – 40.7%;
- education for minors – 36.3%;
- education for adults – 31.4%;
- improvement of living conditions – 27.7%;
- employment assistance – 25.4%;
- psychological assistance/support – 18%;
- free transport – 15.8%;
- assistance with childcare – 6.1%.

**Note. The following section of the report will contain a more detailed description of the assistance received by forced migrants from Ukraine in different countries of the world based on the results of the qualitative stage of the study – in-depth interviews. The first three countries (Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic) are those in which, according to the survey, the largest number of Ukrainians are staying; the other countries whose policies are briefly described here are those in which other research participants are staying and whose opinions we can present based on the research capabilities.*

In the interviews, respondents who had settled in **Germany** noted that the country allocated monthly cash payments of 400 to 520 euros for an adult and 340 euros for a child. According to the respondents, the amount per adult differs depending on how many parents are with the child: both parents or only one of them. For example, if a woman and her child moved to Germany, while her husband remained in Ukraine, she would receive a higher amount of benefits.

In addition, Germany has the so-called Kindergeld child benefit. Ukrainians who are officially resident in Germany are entitled to this benefit on equal terms with German citizens. This is financial support aimed at helping adults provide their children with a fulfilling life and a good future. According to the respondents, the amount ranges from 200 to 250 euros per child until the child reaches the age of 18. If the child continues to study, the payments continue until the end of his or her studies.

Some respondents noted that the German government did not help them find housing. They did it on their own, then signed a contract, and only after that the state compensated them for housing costs. Others noted that they were provided with free housing. Sometimes these were separate houses or apartments, sometimes places of shared accommodation. Gas costs were also compensated, but Ukrainians pay for electricity at their own expense.

> **Man, 44, a village in Brovary district (Kyiv oblast) ➡ Germany:** "In Germany, the system is different – here, a refugee looks for housing, signs a contract, that is, I do this all by myself, and then Germany compensates you for the money you pay for rent."

In Germany, Ukrainians have been required to attend language courses since September 2022. According to the respondents, until then, it was a voluntary activity for everyone. Since it is almost impossible to find a job in Germany without language skills, most Ukrainians lived on social benefits from the state. Participants in the study suggested that the German government might be trying to encourage Ukrainians to find employment by requiring them to learn German.

Official language courses, as they were called by the respondents, last 6 hours a day and are paid for by the German Employment Centre. After completing a certain level of training, Ukrainians take a German language exam. In this way, Ukrainians can reach the level of language proficiency required for employment. Language courses do not exclude part-time employment. Respondents pointed out that, if they wish, they can work at so-called mini-jobs for 3 hours a day after their German classes. Older respondents who are registered not with job centres but with the relevant social departments are not allowed to work even after completing language courses.

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany:** "Germans invest a lot in learning the language. At first we went to introductory unofficial courses, they lasted 4 hours every day. The official courses take 6 hours, and it is equivalent to a job, the employment centre in Germany pays for it as if we were working, and they explicitly say that before you go to work, you have to learn the language... The job centre staff say they have more than enough people for menial work, they need educated people who can work in their speciality, and for this they encourage us to learn languages."

In **Poland**, almost a few hours after the outbreak of the war, a 'relief machine' was launched: collection points for clothes, food and medicine spontaneously appeared. Many people went to the border to help transport or distribute aid to Ukrainians. Thousands of people declared their readiness to take in forced migrants from Ukraine into their homes. Ukrainians found accommodation both in private homes and in public settlements.

Ukrainians staying in Poland also received financial assistance from the government. Most often, respondents mentioned the "40+ Programme" (Programme "40 zlotys"). These are daily payments aimed at providing/reimbursing housing and food costs for Ukrainians who fled the war. In the first version of the special Polish law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, a period of 60 days was set for the payment of PLN 40 per person. On 27 April 2022, the legislation was amended. In particular, the payment period was extended by 120 days[30]. Since 1 July 2022, Poland has limited the list of categories of Ukrainians who can receive these payments for more than 120 days. According to the respondents, these funds were mainly paid to families who agreed to shelter forced migrants from Ukraine.

Respondents with children noted that at the time of the study, they also used the 500+ Programme, which is aimed at supporting every child in a family under the age of 18. However, according to the study participants, only those Ukrainians who had issued a PESEL UKR number could apply for this assistance. This is a document that allowed them to receive social benefits, use state medical services, and officially work and study.

> **Woman, 47, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "In March, I lived for exactly one week in a foster family that took us in. Then the Polish government organised such a programme for Ukrainian migrants. They paid 40 zlotys per day per person to those Poles who took us in."

30 https://lexukraine.com.ua/programa-40-zlotih-v-polshhi/

> **Woman, 31, Romny (Sumy oblast) ➡ Poland:** "My mother is receiving free medical treatment here, various services... That is, we can concentrate on this: financial assistance, some benefits, etc."

The **Czech Republic** has a similar policy to Poland of compensating homeowners who have taken in Ukrainian forced migrants. According to the respondents, these payments are not large, which could reduce the motivation of Czechs to take in people from Ukraine. Respondents also received medical care, employment assistance and the opportunity to attend language courses in the Czech Republic.

> **Woman, 58, Sumy ➡ Czech Republic:** "We received health insurance and help with finding a job. Everyone who stayed there was helped with employment. And they said this: we want you to work not as menial labourers, but to work in your speciality, what kind of diplomas you have. Therefore, we want you to learn our Czech language and work in your speciality. That's why many Ukrainians started working there."

Respondents who travelled to **Canada** under the CUAET programme received a one-time allowance of CAD 3,000 for an adult and CAD 1,500 for a child. Ukrainians who stayed in the **United States** said that a condition for their move there was a sponsor who guaranteed assistance with settlement and financial support. Most likely, this was the Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) programme, which was introduced by US President Joe Biden and designed to accommodate 100,000 migrants from Ukraine. Under the terms of this programme, Ukrainians were granted the right to enter and reside in the United States for up to 2 years[31].

Information from respondents about financial assistance in the United States varied: some participants said that it was available in the amount of $300–400, but they did not apply for it; others said that the country offered only free insurance, healthcare and food. The difference in the amount of assistance is likely due to different policies towards forced migrants from Ukraine at the state level.

> **Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada**: "The allowance is 3000, when newcomers arrive from Ukraine or wherever they come from. They give a one-time allowance of 3000 for an adult and one and a half for a child. We received that money last year, somewhere in June, probably in July. We received something like 7500. We had an older son, he was 2 years old and I was pregnant."

> **Man, 33, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ USA:** "Well, they [parents] go, yes, and in this programme there should be a sponsor, to whom you go. There must be a sponsor who will pay for your meals here, for example, for the first time until you get all the documents done, until you can go to work. We have a sponsor for housing, and we are living with them for now."

According to the respondents, the system of admission of forced migrants from Ukraine in **Japan** is similar to the US. It is impossible to get there without a so-called guarantor who undertakes to take Ukrainians under his/her care. The financial assistance is €500 per month, but it is paid every three months in the amount of €1,500, provided that there is a guarantor. In case of loss of the guarantor, it is €1,000 per month. The respondent, who was in Japan at the time of the

31 https://visitukraine.today/uk/blog/922/ssa-pravila-vizdu-ta-prozivannya-shho-potribno-znati-ukraincyu

study, noted that according to official statements, the programme of support for Ukrainians will continue until there are more than 2,000 Ukrainian citizens in the country. In her opinion, Japan is too bureaucratic in terms of processing assistance and was not ready to accept forced migrants from Ukraine.

The amount of payments for Ukrainians in **Switzerland** is 1500 francs, which is approximately 1500 euros. First of all, a share of the funds for health insurance, insurance and housing costs is deducted from these funds. The rest (which, according to respondents, is approximately 400–500 francs) is given to Ukrainians in cash to meet other needs. The respondents believe that the amount of the balance is not attractive for living in Switzerland, which they consider to be a very expensive country to live in. Respondents believe that it is more profitable to look for a job in Switzerland, as the wages are quite high and even low-skilled positions can earn wages higher than the financial assistance provided for Ukrainians. Employment does not cancel the allowance if the salary does not exceed the amount of the allowance. However, if a Ukrainian works in Switzerland and earns more than 1,500 francs, the social security benefits are lost.

A respondent who moved to Switzerland from Mariupol noted that giving up benefits in favour of work is beneficial only for single men and women or couples without children. At the same time, it is not beneficial for families with children, especially when only a mother and her child moved. The respondent explains this by saying that kindergartens in Switzerland are too expensive. Accordingly, if a Ukrainian woman refuses to receive benefits and goes to work, she is forced to enrol her child in a preschool and pay for its services. In the end, after paying for the kindergarten, rent and life insurance, she is left with not much left over.

France has a similar policy to Switzerland. If a Ukrainian is unemployed, they receive certain guarantees from the state (payments, food, social housing, free travel and healthcare), but when they go to work, they pay for everything themselves. So, as a Ukrainian woman in France said, "it's even more profitable not to work". At the beginning of the war, France paid 520 euros to forced migrants from Ukraine and provided free housing. Over time, part of the declared amount was deducted from the housing allowance. This forced the respondent to apply to an association that helps Ukrainians, which provided social housing. In this way, she managed to keep her payments of 520 euros.

Bulgaria paid Ukrainian families a one-off allowance of €375. An Italian respondent spoke about a different system of payments for Ukrainians – 2.5 euros per day for each family member. In addition, Italy met the humanitarian needs of people from Ukraine.

> **Woman, 35, Lviv ➡ Italy** (left a few days before the start of the full-scale war to live with her parents): "Plus, once a month, a certain amount of money is allocated, and social workers go with them [Ukrainians] to big cities and buy things, dress children. Whether they need shoes or clothes, they are taken care of by those social workers in the town where they are located. They come twice a week, provide them with food, hygiene products, washing powders, chemicals, and they are pretty good. No one has ever said it was bad. They provide meat and yoghurt for the children, so there are no problems with food."

Ukrainians in **Georgia** receive 345 GEL per month (1 GEL equals approximately 14 UAH); in Spain, 400 EUR. Ukrainians in **Luxembourg** were granted temporary protection, free housing, work opportunities and integration courses. For example, Ukrainians in **Romania** said they received assistance only from religious communities. **Turkey** and the **Netherlands**, according to respondents, did not provide any benefits for forced migrants from Ukraine.

5.6. Economic situation and prospects of forced migrants from Ukraine: welfare, work and income, living standards of Ukrainians abroad

The full-scale war became a moment that divided the respondents' lives into before and after and forced people to look for opportunities to save their lives and to find resources for subsistence. For some respondents, the financial situation did not change significantly, while for others, on the contrary, it worsened or improved. Formerly well-off people who, having lost everything in Ukraine, are trying to restore their financial situation abroad, or low-income people who decided to take the opportunity to go abroad and thus improve their financial situation.

Availability of material resources directly or indirectly affects the process of adaptation of respondents abroad. Sufficient financial capacity provides opportunities, improves the prospects of staying abroad, and also allows to become an active participant in the adaptation process – to choose options rather than accept what is offered.

Assessment of financial situation

According to the assessment of the financial situation before the war in Ukraine and abroad, the percentage ratio is virtually unchanged[32]: 26.1% of respondents declare low financial status in Ukraine before the full-scale war, 69.0% – medium, and 4.9% – high; A total of 29.3%, 66.9% and 3.8% – abroad, respectively. However, there was some rotation between the categories of respondents: some had higher income in Ukraine but lost it after moving abroad, while others improved their financial situation after moving abroad. In particular, when asked to assess their financial situation abroad, 10.8% of respondents indicated that their financial situation had deteriorated significantly compared to what it was in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, 21.4% – slightly deteriorated, 23.8% – remained at about the same level, 21.9% – slightly improved, and 22.6% indicated that their financial situation abroad had improved significantly[33].

Which of these statements best reflects your family's income?

This question had 1 answer option

	Before the full-scale war in Ukraine	Now abroad
We did not have/do not have enough money even for food	1.76%	1.15%
We barely had/have enough money for food, but we had/have to save for other daily needs	7.37%	8.34%
We had/do have enough money for food and other daily needs, but it was/is already difficult to buy clothes	16.98%	19.84%

32 Subject to statistical error.

33 This is likely due to the fact that a significant number of low-income Ukrainians have emigrated, and social assistance abroad is higher than their income in Ukraine.

	Before the full-scale war in Ukraine	Now abroad
Our income was/is enough for food and clothes, but we had to save or borrow money to buy a TV, refrigerator or washing machine	36.,09%	38.54%
There was/is enough money for large household appliances, but to buy, for example, a car, we had to save or borrow	32.88%	28.34%
We had/have high incomes, we did not have/do not have any restrictions on money	4.92%	3.79%

How would you assess your financial situation abroad?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – much lower than it was before the full-scale war in Ukraine	10.84%
2	7.43%
3	13.96%
4	23.76%
5	16.00%
6	5.38%
7 – much higher than it was before the full-scale war in Ukraine	22.63%

When asked about the possibility of ensuring an adequate standard of living with the current level of income, the majority of respondents indicated that it is more realistic to do so abroad than in Ukraine (62.8%).

The majority of respondents (67.6%) indicated that while living abroad, they have more opportunities to help their relatives financially than when they were in Ukraine before the war, while 17.0% had more opportunities to help their relatives financially when they lived in Ukraine.

More than half of the respondents said that the situation with regard to the ability to save abroad was better for them than it was in Ukraine before the war (61.6%). Whereas 22.9% said they had better opportunities to save money when they lived in Ukraine before the war, and 15.4% did not see any difference.

Now, please evaluate various aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in the host country for you personally.

This question had 1 answer option

	Ability to provide an adequate standard of living with my level of income	Ability to help my family financially	Ability to save money
Definitely better in Ukraine	14.13%	8,84%	11,40%
Rather better in Ukraine	8.23%	6.24%	6.43%
Slightly better in Ukraine	4.78%	1.87%	5.10%
The same	10.06%	15.46%	15.44%
Slightly better in the host country	12.26%	13.75%	10.97%
Rather better in the host country	20.64%	19.17%	20.55%
Definitely better in the host country	29.89%	34.68%	30.11%

The greatest financial difficulties are usually experienced by those respondents who, having stayed abroad for a long time, cannot obtain official status and receive social benefits and have no income, but live on their own savings.

> **Woman, 45, Konotop (Sumy oblast) ➡ Spain:** "Yes, I had savings in Ukraine. There were no payments in Spain. It is unrealistically difficult. The Red Cross gave some money there, maybe once, and not to me."

Some respondents said during the interviews that at first, the only money they could afford to live abroad was sent to them by their relatives (e.g. husband or other relatives) from Ukraine. In this case, respondents most often agree to the conditions of stay offered to them and are unable to provide themselves with the desired living conditions. This has a significant negative impact on the psychological state of people who were better off financially in Ukraine before the war.

When people manage to get social benefits or find a job, there is a significant relief in the discourse, as they feel freer, provided they had free housing. They had enough money for household expenses and even managed to save some money. In particular, forced migrants in Germany spoke about this more often.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "From a financial point of view, you can stay here for a very long time, because the benefits paid in Germany are enough to eat and dress normally. If you don't splurge, but distribute your money properly, it's enough, and you can stay here for a very long time."

There is a discourse of gradation of the financial situation: when it was very difficult financially, they felt predictably bad, saved on everything, used only what was available for free.

> **Woman, 65, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "We couldn't even afford to go to the shops often. We ate what we were given, of course, because you know that if you don't eat, you have to go buy something and cook something, and you don't really have those means."

When the financial situation gradually improves, certain ambitions emerge, and the surrounding atmosphere is assessed differently, as basic needs are met.

Respondents, mostly older people who would find it difficult to find a job and get an additional source of income, say that they will be able to stay abroad only as long as they have free housing there. According to them, the amount of social assistance they receive does not allow them to pay rent.

Despite the fact that there are often many programmes abroad, depending on the country of destination, for forced migrants from Ukraine that [fully or partially] cover the costs of accommodation, food (ration cards like in the US), travel, mobile communications, etc., respondents sometimes emphasise that their living standards abroad are not as high as they were in Ukraine before the war.

> **Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France:** "If you live for free, you don't pay for anything. We even got free travel cards and mobile phones. Now I work and we live in social housing. But my salary is minimal, and it is certainly not the same standard of living as in Ukraine."

Which specialists left for other countries

Before the war, one in three (36.1%) of the forced migrants from Ukraine was a skilled worker, 14.4% were private entrepreneurs, 12.9% were technical or humanitarian specialists, and one in ten was a manager of various levels (10.0%). Pensioners make up 7.2%, and 6.1% of the surveyed forced migrants were unemployed before the war.

In the area of employment, 11.8% of forced migrants were employed in trade, 10.2% were educators, 8.2% were IT specialists, and 7.7% were healthcare workers.

Who were the respondents before the full-scale war in Ukraine?

This question had 1 answer option

Head of an enterprise/institution/division	10.04%
Entrepreneur	14.37%
Specialist in technical field/humanities/natural sciences	12.93%
Skilled worker	36.09%
Unskilled worker	4.44%
Freelancer	4.44%
Pupil, student	10.46%
Head of household, maternity leave	7.65%

Pensioner	7.21%
Unable to work (including people with disabilities)	2.16%
Looking for a job	6.11%
Other	0.38%
Refusal to answer	2.88%
Agriculture	0.27%

Employment of respondents before the full-scale war in Ukraine[34]:

This question had 1 answer option

Construction/architecture	5.60%
Accounting and finance	6.63%
Public catering	3.36%
Public service	2.72%
Design (interior/clothing/graphic)	2.30%
Economics	2.39%
Management	4.47%
Housing and communal services	0.98%
Mass media (media)	0.67%
IT (programmers/developers/data specialists)	8.21%
Cultural and entertainment industry	1.47%
Marketing	2.29%
Wholesale and retail trade	11.83%
Education	10.18%
Healthcare (medicine)	7.74%
Industry or energy sector	5.87%
Agriculture	2.08%
Transport and logistics	5.27%
Tourism and hospitality	1.61%
Food industry (food production)	2.45%
Law	1.99%
Other	1.52%
Refusal to answer	6.33%
Service sector	2.05%

34 The list of indicators was developed by InfoSapiens.

Some young highly skilled professionals who have received official employment in their speciality [or a close speciality] abroad and have a high and stable income indicate that they can help their relatives who remain in Ukraine. Such respondents are satisfied with their quality of life, are very optimistic about staying abroad, and consider staying there.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA**: "Now I am already working, I am already earning and I even have the opportunity to pay my loan in Ukraine. I pay for the apartment where I live, and I save, and I pay for an apartment in Kyiv. You can afford more in America. You go to the grocery store, and you don't save on food. If you want to buy something, you go and buy it. It's the same with clothes. I've stopped travelling a bit, so now I can only talk about food and some experiences and clothes and some of my entertainment. In this respect, it's a little better here. Working two jobs in Ukraine, I could afford less than I could afford working one job in America."

IT workers who can continue to work remotely abroad are usually in no hurry to change their place of work, although they point out that, with their income remaining unchanged, their expenses have increased significantly, sometimes by 2–3 times, mainly because it is important for them to ensure a high quality of life. In addition, IT respondents emphasised that they are not donors, but rather recipients abroad, as they bring income to the destination country: if not through paying taxes (and often through paying taxes as well), then at least through spending their income locally.

> **Woman, 30, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "We have not asked anything from any country, in fact, on the contrary. We pay the rent, we live here, so it also brings some benefit to their economy."

Some workers in the education or healthcare sector indicated that they had been looking for a job abroad in their field of study, but, according to them, it was usually either too difficult or impossible to get a job abroad in their field of study. Mostly they were offered low-skilled manual work, which they either had to accept or refused. In this case, the respondents were often more inclined to return to Ukraine and continue working in their speciality.

Employment in the host country

One in two of the surveyed forced migrants said they were employed (53.1%). Among them, 12.0% continue to work remotely at the job they had before the war in Ukraine, 2.0% have found a new remote job in Ukraine, and 39.1% have found a job abroad.

Every fifth respondent is currently looking for a job abroad (22.5%). The same number (22.1%) are solving everyday issues and adapting to life in a new country. Almost a fifth of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad are engaged in childcare (18.1%). Approximately the same proportion of forced migrants (16.7%) are engaged in education or self-education (learning a language):

- studying in educational institutions of the host country – 11.1%;
- studying remotely at Ukrainian educational institutions – 4.7%;
- learn the language of the host country – 0.9%.

Finally, every twelfth Ukrainian forced migrant abroad is involved in volunteer activities (8.4%). Pensioners and disabled persons among Ukrainian forced migrants abroad make up only 2.8%.

What is your current employment status?

This question had 1 answer option

I continue to work remotely at the job I had before the war	11.97%
Found a new job in Ukraine and work remotely	2.04%
I do volunteer work	8.42%
Got a job in this country	39.06%
I am looking for a job in this country	22.48%
I study remotely in Ukrainian educational institutions	4.66%
I study in educational institutions of the host country	11.13%
Solving everyday issues and/or adapting to life in a new country	22.06%
Looking after a child/children	18.10%
Other	1.34%
Learning a language/language courses	0.85%
Retired/unable to work	2.82%
Refusal to answer	0.20%

In general, the employment structure of Ukrainian forced migrants in the three largest countries of residence is characterised by greater similarity between Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland and the Czech Republic and differences in Germany. For example, among Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany, the share of those who have found a job in this country is much lower (20.2%), but the share of those who are solving everyday issues and adapting (33.3%), studying in German educational institutions (29.4%) and looking for a job (25.0%) is higher. In contrast, the share of Ukrainian forced migrants who have found a job in Poland is 51.5%, and in the Czech Republic – 61.8%. It is noteworthy that among Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland, there are more people who continue their pre-war work remotely (14.0%) or have found a new remote job in Ukraine (4.4%) than in Germany and the Czech Republic. Ukrainian forced migrants in the Czech Republic are distinguished by the fact that among them there is a much smaller share of those who solve household issues and adapt (8.8%), take care of children (10.3%); they are not engaged in volunteering and do not study in Ukrainian educational institutions.

The majority (66.1%) of Ukrainian forced migrants abroad, among those who continue to work remotely or have found remote work in Ukraine, rate their jobs quite highly (taking into account the level of salary, working conditions, career opportunities, etc.), 15.5% give average ratings, and only 18.4% give low ratings. On a 7-point scale, Ukrainians rate their current job in Ukraine at 5.06 points, which is above average.

Please rate your overall satisfaction with your job in Ukraine (taking into account salary, working conditions, career opportunities, etc.).

This question had 1 answer option

1 – totally dislike	4.92%
2	2.07%
3	11.45%
4	15.50%
5	19.19%
6	22.62%
7 – totally like it	24.25%

Of those employed, 65.8% believe that they will not lose their jobs abroad in the near future, while 17.9% believe that this may happen to them.

In your opinion, how likely is it that you will face job loss in your host country in the near future?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	38.78%
2	13.73%
3	13.31%
4	16.26%
5	5.64%
6	4.26%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	8.02%

Job search process

According to the survey results, 40.6% indicated that employment opportunities abroad are somewhat worse than they were before the full-scale war in Ukraine, 32.0% – that they are better abroad, and 27.3% – do not see a significant difference.

How would you assess the conditions and your employment opportunities abroad?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – much worse than they were before the full-scale war in Ukraine	15.52%
2	10.12%
3	15.00%
4	27.32%

5	12.41%
6	5.49%
7 – much better than they were before the full-scale war in Ukraine	14.14%

Half of the respondents rate employment opportunities in Ukraine higher than abroad: 47.1%, as opposed to 33.7% who believe that employment opportunities are better abroad.

Please assess the possibility of finding a good, skilled job in Ukraine before a full-scale war and in the host country for you personally.

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	22.53%
Rather better in Ukraine	17.53%
Slightly better in Ukraine	7.01%
The same	19.24%
Slightly better in the host country	8.93%
Rather better in the host country	11.68%
Definitely better in the host country	13.07%

Every second respondent (52.2%) said that they would probably not be able to get a highly skilled job without knowing the language in the host country. While 35.0% are more optimistic.

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face the inability to get a highly skilled job in your host country without knowing the language in that country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	18.47%
2	7.73%
3	8.84%
4	12.73%
5	10.69%
6	13.38%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	28.14%

Respondents say that if a person has the need and desire to work, they can find a job abroad, sometimes quite quickly. Of course, it is more likely to be a low-paid and usually physical job than a professional or immediately high-paid one. Such positions take longer to find.

> **Woman, 42, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Czech Republic:** "If you go to the labour exchange, they offer you a job and there is enough work. If a person wants to work and earn money, there are no problems. The main thing is desire".

They also point out that in early 2022, after the first waves of forced migrants from Ukraine, foreign employers were more loyal, so they often hired Ukrainians even with an elementary level of foreign language skills, mostly English. Now, according to respondents who have experience of looking for work abroad, employers have become more demanding and selective.

A condition for getting a job is often the completion of courses (mainly language courses). If the level of language proficiency is low, you can apply for mostly low-paid, non-prestigious jobs, and if it is high, you can apply for paid and prestigious jobs. Without at least a basic knowledge of the language, it is difficult for forced migrants from Ukraine to find work abroad.

> **Man, 65, Sloviansk ➡ UK:** "The only thing is that it is very difficult to get a job here without knowing English, as far as I understood. As soon as we arrived, I wanted to find a job right away, but unfortunately, I didn't succeed. Because here you need to understand what you are being told. There will be some managers here anyway. And if you don't understand what they're saying, then who will hire you, and why would they want to hire you?"

Respondents often delay the start of a full-time job search because they are not confident in their foreign language skills.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA:** If you count full-time job search, I have been looking for 3 weeks. Because from October, when I moved in, until February, I was working part-time as a cleaner. I went around cleaning. I had money for living and rent, respectively. I was still shy about my English, I couldn't make up my mind. Some time had to pass. I won't say it was adaptation, it was something in my head.

There are also cases when nostrification (confirmation) of a diploma or additional training is required to work in a speciality.

> **Woman, 35, Lviv ➡ Italy:** "This is a very funny topic because our diplomas are not fully recognised here. I have an acquaintance with a medical degree, she says she fled from the war, she came here with her children, and she has a medical degree. It was as if they said that the Italians would at least accept medical diplomas. But it's still a very difficult topic. It is not as easy as it seems. It's one thing to certify it, but they still look at it as a Ukrainian diploma, and you won't find a very good job. So she translated it, certified it, and keeps sending her CV everywhere, but it's all quiet. And even more so with my economics degrees. They are not recognised here. Unless you go to night school and study for a whole year, all the subjects are there – maths, their language, and physics. It would be like a complete secondary education."

Respondents who were looking for a job other than physical work or even a job in their field of study pointed out that the process of getting a job, especially if the goal is to get a high-paying job, takes a long time: you need to send your CV to a large number of vacancies, it takes a lot of time to review CVs, the interview process is also often long, sometimes with several stages of selection. However, there are exceptions when this path is shortened for forced migrants from Ukraine:

> **Woman, 26, Kryvyy Rih ➡ Canada (translated from Russian):** "It takes a very long time to get a response to your CV here. There are many stages of selection if you want to work for a good company. I was just lucky. They gave me the phone number of the

CFO. She scheduled a personal interview for me. They like to conduct the first stage of the interview online or by phone. Then I was immediately hired. I am happy with my job. I am treated well, trained and not treated as a mere labour force."

Among the important conditions that facilitate the search for work abroad are higher education, internationally recognised certificates, previous work experience abroad, and a high level of language skills.

In some cases, respondents say that there was no point in even starting a job search abroad because of the inability to adjust their lifestyle to work or because of unfavourable working conditions (low salaries that, for example, would not even cover the cost of a kindergarten). This was mainly mentioned by mothers who left Ukraine with their children and looked after them and/or provided them with education (if offline, they accompanied them to/from the educational institution, if online, they often helped them set up equipment and communications).

Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ UK (translated from Russian): "I have two small children and I wouldn't be able to work until they are 3 years old, and then they start to get admitted to the kindergarten, even if it's just for a few hours, and before that it's just a kindergarten that costs about £70 a day. No job can cover that for me."

Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany: I had plans to just stay for a few months and that was it. I mean, I didn't plan to do anything so grandiose, like learn a language or get a job. Because I still believed that it would be just 2 months, and we would be able to come back. At first, I was looking for a job, and maybe if I was going alone, without a child, I would have gone to work. But here the thing is that I am tied to taking her to school and picking her up from school. She is there from 8 to 12 o'clock. And in our town, it is simply unrealistic to get a job without knowing the language. There is nothing here, no such businesses or warehouses. And I still have to go to the big city, and by the time I get there, I almost have to go back to pick her up from school, because there is no one to pick her up. So this issue has disappeared by itself."

Respondents indicate that they decided to stay abroad without work, receive social benefits and take care of their children instead of looking for options to organise childcare while they work. They say that if they found a job, they would have to "sacrifice their child/children". Respondents would be ready to go to work only if they were offered a job that was very interesting and well-paid, or if they lost their social benefits.

If forced migrants are deliberately not in a hurry to look for work for no reason and are more focused on social assistance, this is likely to have a direct negative impact on the image of Ukrainians abroad and may cause the level of support for Ukrainians abroad to gradually decline.

Man, 33, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ USA: There are problems here only with those who refuse to go to work, there are people who do not want to work. They want to get everything from the state. They want to be dependent on the state, for the state to think for them and only need the state. If you think about it, there are people who only want to live at someone else's expense.

Employment conditions abroad

Half of the respondents rate career opportunities in Ukraine higher than abroad: 46.5%, as opposed to 31.5% who believe that career opportunities are better abroad. In terms of salary, however, the vast majority of respondents gave a higher rating to foreign countries – 74.1% vs. 17.9%.

And now, please rate various aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in the host country for you personally.

This question had 1 answer option

	Career opportunities	Cash salary after tax
Definitely better in Ukraine	22.48%	8.64%
Rather better in Ukraine	19.00%	4.19%
Slightly better in Ukraine	4.98%	5.06%
The same	22.02%	7.98%
Slightly better in the host country	7.61%	9.74%
Rather better in the host country	11.60%	18.41%
Definitely better in the host country	12.31%	45.99%

Some respondents who do not plan to return to Ukraine note that they would never earn as much in more prestigious jobs in Ukraine as they did in their positions abroad and are fully aware that it will be either very difficult or impossible to reach the level of career they had in Ukraine. So they look for the benefits of the working conditions they have: higher salaries, less stress. Regardless of whether one or both spouses were working at the time of the survey, they emphasised that they were already quite satisfied with their income and could afford much more than they would have been in more prestigious jobs in Ukraine.

> **Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada:** "He [my husband] doesn't work in his profession at all, because his English is intermediate, and he couldn't get a job in his profession yet. He is a bank clerk. Administrative work, financial sector, that's all, then he went to work repairing tents, awnings. Not so much tents, but tents for cargo, for ships, which need to be hemmed and patched. That is, it counts as more physical work, but it is not very difficult."

In-depth interviews show that some respondents who are determined to settle abroad consider finding a job to be a key success factor, as it immediately gives them many advantages: insurance, the possibility of quick legalisation through paying taxes, faster adaptation and integration, etc. At the same time, they are constantly looking for ways to improve their position in the labour market.

Some respondents who left primarily for security reasons interpret their stay abroad as temporary – rather, they prefer to live off the social benefits of the host country while they can. They either postpone looking for a job (as long as they have financial resources and do not face significant financial difficulties) or wait for an attractive job offer.

Advantages and disadvantages of working abroad

Respondents who left Ukraine without relative haste often had the opportunity to assess the labour market in the host country and find a more suitable job before leaving. However, they often had to start from a much lower position due to, firstly, the lack of experience of working abroad, secondly, an understanding of the [labour] culture and specifics of the company, and thirdly, a perfect knowledge of a foreign language.

In cases when respondents find a job in their speciality abroad, they start from a much lower position than they achieved in Ukraine, as they themselves say – they conditionally start "from the bottom". But even in such circumstances, they see prospects for professional growth and, even in lower positions, are much more satisfied with their salaries than in Ukraine. And even if they earned the same or about the same amount, in Ukraine they had to literally "live" their jobs. These are often young, highly skilled professionals, unmarried, with high career ambitions and material needs. If this category of respondents does not have a compelling reason to return to Ukraine, there is a high probability that a significant number of them will remain abroad after the war ends.

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg:** "In Ukraine, I was already at a mid-level, close to a senior lawyer, and here abroad I came to work in a junior position. So, it was also very difficult for me to accept morally, because you were somebody in Ukraine. But now you've come here and you're working in a team where university graduates, 24–25–26 years old, are working at the level of a junior specialist assistant. But I am not afraid, I feel that I will be able to grow in this company during this year."

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA**: "There were moments when I worked two jobs [in Ukraine], but sometimes I had projects remotely. And before the war, to be honest, I was earning the same amount of money as I am now in America. That is, I had a good income, but I had no time for anything. I just worked, worked, worked. And all the money I earned I saved for housing or for repairs. That is, during these last months before the war, when I was earning very good money, I was able to live in America for several months. But it was very difficult in Ukraine, because you can't compare the standard of living in America and in Ukraine."

In terms of workload intensity and employers' requirements, every second respondent rated working conditions abroad higher (48.0%), a quarter said that they were better in Ukraine (25.3%), and the same number said that work in Ukraine and abroad was no different in terms of workload (26.6%).

Please assess the intensity of the workload and the requirements of employers in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in the host country for you personally.

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	10.05%
Rather better in Ukraine	10.14%
Slightly better in Ukraine	5.15%
The same	26.63%
Slightly better in the host country	13.69%

Rather better in the host country	13.76%
Definitely better in the host country	20.58%

Some respondents emphasise that there is a slower work pace abroad, a much lower level of stress, more support at the initial stages of employment, mentoring support, and a clear and regulated work schedule.

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg**: "I like the team, I like the attitude, that is, the employer's compliance with labour law in terms of the absence of stress, the normal working day. If you have to work 8 hours, you will work 8 hours, not 12–15. Because in Ukraine, I've had all sorts of things happen. And it's highly organised, I like it, given that I have enough other stress in my life, so at least I don't get stressed out because of work here."

Such employment experiences were mostly reported by young people, highly qualified professionals who had already had significant career growth in Ukraine and lost their jobs and income due to dismissal as a result of the full-scale war. It was the search for work and the need for a stable, high income that was the main impetus for them to go abroad. Some of them do not plan to return to Ukraine, as they see much better career prospects and income opportunities abroad. A condition for their return may be that they will be in demand as specialists after the war ends and Ukraine is actively rebuilt.

> **Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ UK (translated from Russian):** "They offer positions, but there is no salary support."

A high level of language proficiency is an important argument when looking for a job in a particular field abroad. Respondents who plan to look for a job in their speciality, for example, in Germany, need to take lengthy language courses, confirm their language proficiency, sometimes confirm their higher education diploma, and take refresher courses to adapt their profession to the local labour market.

> **Woman, 42, Morshyn (Lviv oblast) ➡ Germany**: "At the moment, I have no idea what I can do at work. It turns out that in Germany, specialists who were involved in the beauty industry found work here more quickly and are still working. And specialists with higher education – doctors, economists – are finding it very difficult here. Because first I need to learn the language to B2 level. I've been here for almost a year now, and I haven't finished B1 yet. And then I also need to take some courses in accounting, because they have a completely different programme than we do, different laws. And I don't understand whether I will be able to work as an accountant or not. I still can't understand it yet. And this depresses me. But the Germans are very interested in us going to work."

Some respondents from small towns in Ukraine talk about the difference in finding a job: in small towns in Ukraine, it is often necessary to have a protectorate and contacts to get a job, while abroad, according to them, the system is more fair and transparent.

> **Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada**: "I can't compare life because in Ukraine, the job search is completely different and you go to work completely differently,

as in Ukraine, you graduate from an educational institution, they make arrangements for you at work, and you go to work. This is how our system works. Here, you write your CV, describe your advantages, your qualities, your skills and abilities, and send it to the vacancies you want to get into. And accordingly, your chances of getting a job are assessed, a completely different system."

When forced migrants worked in Ukraine in low-skilled jobs and had low earnings, and then find the same job abroad, but with significantly higher earnings, this can influence the decision to stay or return to Ukraine. And there must be a strong argument for returning home.

Woman, 30, Lviv ➡ Poland: "In Ukraine, working in a grocery store, you will not be able to earn 800 euros."

Among the disadvantages of employment abroad are the difficult way to find it, sometimes instability, discrimination on the basis of age (young people are preferred for employment) or nationality (locals are preferred).

Woman, 47, Lviv ➡ Poland: "I don't like the fact that here (in Poland) you have to look for a job all the time, there is no stability."

Respondents who had a high financial status in Ukraine before the war, lost their sources of income and cannot find jobs abroad with the usual amount of income complain about low salaries that do not cover the necessary expenses and do not provide the desired standard of living.

People who are not used to hard physical or low-skilled work cannot work for so long and are looking for other opportunities.

Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland: "I changed 6 jobs. Not because I was fired, but because I didn't like them in terms of salary and working conditions. Because at home you have a restaurant and an IT company, and here you work as a cleaner. It's a very big change. But I worked as a cleaner. The minimum wage here is 3,500 francs. This is a very reasonable amount of money. Then I changed to another job. And the last job I have now is working as a bartender in a casino."

Respondents also believe that locals are preferred for more skilled jobs abroad.

Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France: "There are many cleaning agencies here. I got a job as a cleaner in these houses. It's a hard job and not like we used to work in Ukraine. Now I collect online orders in baskets and send them to the warehouse. As for skilled labour, I think you can try it, but you need a language level not A2, like mine. And I think they will still prefer French people."

Respondents articulate stereotypes that Ukrainians and Ukrainian women work only in factories or in cleaning. They point out that the labour search system abroad is often structured in such a way that it does not encourage work and rather offers low-skilled jobs to Ukrainians.

Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland: "No, I am constantly looking for a job. I took my diploma and all my talents, and no one needs it here, because Ukrainians generally only work in factories, warehouses, 10–12 hours a day, can you imagine? How is this possible?

Although there, for example, a woman can earn $800–1000. But it's a death sentence, to be honest."

Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv oblast) ➡ Poland: "But this attitude towards Ukrainians is a little bit like this: you have arrived, now you will take all our positions, so get better a cleaning job. I don't refuse, I can clean, I can do anything, but when you realise that there is a shortage of these nurses and you apply, I apply for a job in a hospital, just not to clean toilets. And that really pushed me back."

Some of those respondents who left mainly for security reasons and faced difficulties in finding work abroad sometimes do not see prospects for a comfortable life abroad and are more inclined to return to Ukraine.

Remote work in Ukraine

Overall, 14% of respondents said that while abroad, they continue to work remotely in Ukraine (12% of them continue to work remotely at their jobs before the war and 2% have found new jobs in Ukraine and work remotely). For some, this experience is positive, and companies support them in every way (including helping them to leave and find a job abroad). Some report extremely negative experiences, in particular, due to the time difference and the need to work at night when there is a need to communicate with colleagues, insufficient salaries for living abroad, and sometimes overtime.

Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Japan: "It was very uncomfortable to work because of the time difference (about 6–7 hours). Therefore, it turns out that I worked until 2 am or so. Although it was a full-time job of about 12 hours at Ukrainian wages, for Japan it is nothing. When I told the company that it was too low a salary, they hired two interns instead."

Those respondents who do not plan to integrate abroad continue to work remotely to avoid difficulties in finding a job after returning to Ukraine.

Doing business abroad

According to the survey, 14.4% of respondents indicated that they were entrepreneurs before the full-scale war. 11.7% said that they still have a usable business in Ukraine. Those with a business background in Ukraine often assess the business climate abroad and compare it to the pre-war business environment in Ukraine. They also weigh up their options: to restart their business abroad or to continue it upon their return to Ukraine. This largely depends on where they see fewer risks and more benefits.

Respondents assessed the flexibility and ease of doing business as follows: 41.6% rate the conditions for doing business in Ukraine higher, 36.1% – abroad, 22.3% said that the conditions are the same in both countries.

Please rate the flexibility and ease of doing business before the full-scale war and in the host country for you personally

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	15.03%
Rather better in Ukraine	15.42%
Slightly better in Ukraine	11.14%
The same	22.31%
Slightly better in the host country	12.86%
Rather better in the host country	14.01%
Definitely better in the host country	9.22%

Regarding opportunities for starting a business, 36.2% said that conditions in Ukraine are better than abroad, 40.0% gave higher ratings to conditions abroad, and 23.8% said that conditions in Ukraine and abroad are the same.

Please assess the opportunities for starting your own business in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in the host country

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	15.18%
Rather better in Ukraine	13.82%
Slightly better in Ukraine	7.19%
The same	23.76%
Slightly better in the host country	13.21%
Rather better in the host country	14.23%
Definitely better in the host country	12.60%

Among the advantages of doing business abroad are reliability, a transparent and clear legislative framework, a reliable judiciary and a clear tax system.

Among the disadvantages of doing business abroad are difficult conditions for starting a business, including the need to have significant start-up capital. Compared to Ukraine, the cost of renting commercial property abroad is higher, and business owners have to save on hiring labour at the start and perform many functions on their own. According to the respondents, the security of employees is a significant advantage for the labour market, but a significant challenge for start-up businesses.

> **Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ UK (translation from Russian):** "I cannot grow my business there. That's the most important thing. The rent there is crazy. I don't take this level of start-up, I think you need to invest ten times more. It seems to me that it is very difficult there and there will be no such output as in Ukraine."

According to respondents, the advantages of doing business in Ukraine include:

- cheaper cost or lease of commercial property, which means less capital is required at the start;
- lower labour costs for employees;
- faster payback of business in Ukraine – you can reach business profitability much faster than abroad.

The disadvantages of doing business in Ukraine include:

- imperfect and unadapted to the realities of wartime legislation governing business;
- inflexible and non-transparent tax policy;
- lack of tax holidays;
- risks in attracting loans for business development due to high interest rates;
- insecurity of business due to chaotic inspections and incomplete judicial reform;
- difficulties with the supply of goods related to the war;
- the need to frequently train staff due to dismissals and relocations (including abroad);
- reduced purchasing power of the population;
- other war-related risks and the inability to make long-term forecasts.

> **Woman, 38, Kyiv ➡ Turkey:** "It's a big risk if you take out a loan. If they gave you a loan at a minimum rate of 2–3%, you could still justify it somehow, sell off your asset. In addition, our tax authorities do not even allow entrepreneurs to do anything properly at the initial stage, because they immediately impose very large fines. It would be great if companies were given the opportunity to work for 1–2 quarters without paying taxes. And in a year you will already see the next 5 years what will happen to your business, while in Ukraine you cannot see even in a month."

Qualitative changes in business regulation in Ukraine could be one of the strongest arguments for people who are focused on running their own business to decide whether to stay abroad or return to Ukraine.

At the same time, respondents who lost their business in Ukraine as a result of the war believe that it is now more promising for them to invest and develop their business abroad.

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland**: "I want to invest in Switzerland more than in Ukraine now, because I know that if I invest a certain amount in Ukraine, this amount will decrease significantly due to the fall of the hryvnia. That is, I will invest UAH 200,000, and in a year it will turn into UAH 100,000. Only if everything goes well for me in Switzerland, and I have a good income, will I be able to rent a decent apartment in Ukraine and start my life again. And forget about this German language, because it's just disgusting."

They also note that they are targeting Ukrainians as they consider Ukrainians to be better performers than foreigners.

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland**: "If everything goes really well, I think I would consider staying here because I have already started to get used to the people and the mentality. And in Ukraine, you can find some trusted person with whom you can work and recreate a network. Now all the employees I'm going to recruit – I've already started looking for them – are from Ukraine, because our people are perfect. Our people are very experienced."

Respondents who have the opportunity to return to Ukraine and have not lost their business, but have suspended it, believe that they have better prospects for restoring it in Ukraine than starting a business abroad from scratch.

Regarding the prospects for business development in Ukraine after the war, respondents suggest that small businesses are unlikely to be favourably treated during the reconstruction process, while "large business will feel good, as it has been feeling, because for some reason the government is dealing with big business and not small entrepreneurs". Of those surveyed, 7.1% indicated that they would be more likely to return to Ukraine if there was a development of entrepreneurship and business benefits/investments.

When assessing the likelihood of returning to Ukraine, they consider the potential challenges that businessmen will face here, and this may influence their decision whether to return and try to restore their business or stay abroad. And if they are able to make themselves comfortable abroad until the war ends and believe that restoring their business in Ukraine is too risky, this may also influence their decision not to return.

5.7. Quality of life: pre-war Ukraine vs. abroad

Ukrainians abroad rated the main conditions of their life in the host country (financial situation, housing conditions, employment opportunities and general standard of living) on a 7-point scale – from "much worse" than in Ukraine to "much better" than in Ukraine – as follows:

- financial situation – 4.33[35] points (44.0% indicated that the situation is better abroad, 32.2% – better in Ukraine, 23.8% – at the same level);
- housing conditions – 4.07 points (37.1%, 36.4% and 26.5% respectively);
- employment opportunities – 3.84 points (32.0%, 40.7% and 27.3% respectively);
- overall standard of living abroad – 4.35 points (44.9%, 27.3% and 27.8% respectively).

In terms of the countries of residence, the following peculiarities should be noted: Ukrainians in Poland have a slightly lower assessment of their financial situation (4.22 points; 38.4% better than in Ukraine) and the overall standard of living in the host country (4.20 points; 38.0% better than in Ukraine). On the other hand, Ukrainians in Germany are somewhat more positive about their housing conditions (4.49 points; 43.9% better than in Ukraine) and overall living standards (4.62 points; 53.1% better than in Ukraine). And Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are relatively more positive about employment opportunities in this country (4.13 points; 44.1% better than in Ukraine).

In addition, during the survey, respondents were asked to assess various aspects/conditions of life (a list of 37 items) before the full-scale war in Ukraine and at the time of the survey in their host country. According to Ukrainians, these aspects/life conditions can be divided into 5 groups[36]. The first and second groups include aspects that respondents rated as "much better" and "somewhat better" in Ukraine; the third group includes those that were rated approximately equally in Ukraine and abroad; the fourth and fifth groups include those aspects that Ukrainians rated as "somewhat better" and "much better" abroad.

The first group includes aspects where the score "better in Ukraine" is 2 or more times higher than the score "better in the host country":

- circle of friends, communication – 78.2% – "better in Ukraine" vs. 5.6% – "better abroad"
- shops opening hours – 78.4% vs. 9.7%;
- accessibility of medical services – 73.4% vs. 19.3%;
- quality of digital services – 67.3% vs. 16.5%;
- quality of services in the private sector – 64.5% vs. 23.0%;
- service sector development – 64.0% vs. 22.8%;
- quality of healthcare services – 60.8% vs. 26.6%;

35 The indicator represents the average level of assessment on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "things are much worse abroad than in Ukraine" and 7 means "things are much better abroad than they were in Ukraine". Accordingly, the value of the indicator can range from 1 to 7. The higher the value of the indicator, the higher the assessment of conditions abroad compared to Ukraine.

36 Note for the designer: we recommend making a visualisation with a scale, where on the one hand there is "better in Ukraine", on the other – "better abroad" and, accordingly, visualise all the following 5 groups in this way.



D7.1. How would you assess your financial situation abroad?

D7.2. How would you rate your living conditions abroad?

D7.3. How would you assess the conditions and your employment opportunities abroad?

D7.4. How would you rate your overall living standards abroad, taking into account all aspects of your life (financial situation, living conditions, employment, healthcare, social relations, etc.)?

(Score on a scale of 7 points and % better than in Ukraine before the large-scale war – 6+7 points)

- availability of rental housing – 55.6% vs. 21.5%;
- accessibility and quality of the Internet – 53.8% vs. 13.5%;
- affordability of housing purchase – 53.5% vs. 25.8%.

The second group consists of those factors that respondents perceived in Ukraine before Russia's invasion to be somewhat better than in the host country[37]:

- speed and quality of the logistics sector, postal/courier services – 51.4% – "better in Ukraine" vs. 25.8% – "better abroad";
- employment opportunities for good/skilled jobs – 47.1% vs. 33.7%;
- career growth opportunities – 46.5% vs. 31.5%.

37 Subject to statistical error.

The third group consists of aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the Russian invasion and in the host country, which, according to respondents, are more or less comparable:

- overall comfort of stay/living – "in Ukraine and abroad – roughly the same": 47,7% i 43,6%;
- flexibility/ease of doing business – 41.6% and 36.1%;
- opportunities for leisure – 40.7% and 35.5%.
- quality of education – 40.1% and 40.0%;
- opportunities for opening a business – 36.2% and 40.0%.

The fourth group of compared aspects/living conditions consists of those that Ukrainians abroad rated somewhat higher in the host country:

- work of state authorities/local self-government bodies – 33.0% – "better in Ukraine" vs. 48.3% "better abroad"
- friendliness of the population – 25.5% vs. 42.5%;
- availability of food/essentials – 15.6% vs. 41.7%.

The fifth group of compared aspects/life conditions consists of those that respondents rated significantly higher in the host country (the score "better in the host country" is 2 or more times higher than the score in Ukraine):

- the situation with corruption – 5.7% "better in Ukraine" vs. 85.5% "better abroad"
- the amount of financial assistance from the state, social benefits – 6.8% vs. 76.7%;
- rule of law, legal protection – 7.1% vs. 73.4%;
- quality of infrastructure (roads, transport, etc.) – 7.3% vs. 86.7%;
- equal conditions for people with disabilities – 7.4% vs. 83.9%;
- safety – 8.5% vs. 78.8%;
- crime rate – 9.7% vs. 66.9%;
- environment – 13.3% vs. 66.7%;
- ability to financially help relatives – 17.0% vs. 67.6%;
- monetary amount of remuneration after taxes – 17.9% vs. 74.1%;
- water quality from the water supply system – 18.1% vs. 63.7%;
- quality of public utilities – 19.3% vs. 58.6%;
- attitude towards children in educational institutions – 21.0% vs. 52.1%;
- opportunity to save money – 22.9% vs. 61.6%;
- intensity of workload, employers' requirements – 25.3% vs. 48.0%;
- ability to ensure an adequate standard of living with own income – 27.1% vs. 62.8%.



D4. Now, please assess various aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in your current host country for you personally. (One answer option)

The following section provides a brief description of certain aspects of the quality of life abroad that were highlighted by respondents during the interviews[38].

Education

A total of 41.2% of Ukrainians moved abroad with their children. Accordingly, some of them had to deal with the functioning of education in different countries.

When comparing the quality of education abroad and in Ukraine before the full-scale war, respondents were divided. While 40.1% said that education was better in Ukraine, the same number said that it was better abroad (40%), and 19.7% of respondents believed that education in Ukraine was not inferior to that abroad, and vice versa.

The majority of Ukrainians with preschool children had difficulties enrolling their children in kindergartens. Firstly, in order to attend kindergartens, a child needs to be pre-registered long before enrolment. Second, respondents noted that preschool education institutions abroad are mostly private. Thirdly, private kindergartens are very expensive and, accordingly, unaffordable for all forced migrants from Ukraine. It is difficult to get into state-run kindergartens, but in some places, exceptions are made for Ukrainians and children are accepted.

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany:** "We didn't attend the kindergarten, it was very full, and therefore it was impossible to get a place. I had to sign up almost a year in advance. I came, signed up, and was given an appointment for the following May to bring my child to the kindergarten."

> **Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada:** "All kindergartens are fee-based. Well, not only for Ukrainians, but for everyone. Until this year, until April, they cost from $1300 per month to $2200, that's what I found out. Well, we were looking for a kindergarten, different kindergartens. Catholic, Jewish, and ordinary kindergartens, all very expensive, all fee-based, all paid, there are no state kindergartens here."

Among those respondents whose children were enrolled in kindergartens, most parents are satisfied with the quality of services and, in particular, the attitude towards children from Ukraine. In some cases, children attend a Ukrainian kindergarten in the United States. One of the respondents shared her experience of her child's attendance at a preschool institution for children with special educational needs in Germany. The woman is very satisfied with the professionalism of the staff and reports visible results of work with her child.

> **Woman, 31, Romny (Sumy oblast) ➡ Poland:** "I am more than 100% satisfied with it [the kindergarten]. I am very pleased with the approach. I think it doesn't matter whether you are a refugee or not, it is important that you are treated with love here. I am happy with everything, including the psycho-emotional state of my child. Everything is great in this psychological aspect. There are no signs that I could think that something could go wrong, that some special adaptation for refugees is needed."

38 When reading this section, it is important to keep in mind that when assessing living conditions abroad, respondents are mostly guided by personal experience (specific cases, often one-off). Therefore, the same aspects may be interpreted as positive by some respondents and negative by others.

In terms of secondary education, some Ukrainian parents who have sent their children to schools abroad note the lower level of knowledge provided by foreign schools compared to Ukrainian ones. The difficulties that Ukrainian children face in their studies due to their lack of knowledge of the language of the country they are in are also notable. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainian parents are satisfied with the comfortable environment in schools abroad. **52.1% of respondents said that the attitude towards children in foreign educational institutions is better than in Ukraine.** In particular, respondents like the healthy interpersonal interaction between children and teachers, which is based on respect for the student, taking into account the characteristics of each child, i.e. the approach "every child should be treated as a person".

Respondents mentioned different features of school education depending on the host country. For example, in **Germany,** in some locations, special classes were set up for Ukrainian children with teachers who speak Ukrainian and provided more hours to learn German. Ukrainians in Germany are also impressed by the elimination of homework and availability of career guidance for children, which starts in the 6th and 7th grades.

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany:** "Super school. I liked it very much, they have a completely different approach to education, they have a career guidance starting from the 6th or 7th grade, and they start learning about professions. They visit farms, factories, government agencies and see how everything works. Children are already choosing a speciality because they understand where they want to go, because they understand how it works."

Among the disadvantages noted by respondents were the small number of hours spent learning English and the significant lag in the level of difficulty of mathematics tasks compared to similar classes in Ukraine. Some respondents noted that they were forced to send their children to German schools, regardless of whether they were studying online in Ukraine at the same time. A respondent from the Netherlands faced the same situation. He noted that Dutch schools provide a lower level of knowledge than in Ukraine. However, he was interested in the approach aimed at providing children with an understanding of processes rather than learning formulas.

Among the peculiarities in the **United Kingdom** are a large number of teachers' assistants who help children learn the materials presented by the teacher; a lot of creativity in the classroom and special attention to children as individuals.

> **Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ United Kingdom (translation from Russian):** Primary school, the system, the attitude of teachers to children is much better in Britain. Here [in Ukraine] I can't find anything like that, not in private schools, not anywhere... There, children are respected, they are immediately a person, there is a lot of room for creativity, there are a lot of teachers' assistants, so if you are not up to speed, you will receive help, an assistant will work with your child for free, teach him or her to read because he or she does not speak English. It's much more flexible, creative, there are a lot of cool toys and all sorts of creative things to try. In general, a much better primary school for sure."

In ***Poland***, children from Ukraine were provided with interpreters in the classroom and many free activities were organised after school. On the negative side, parents felt that their children were treated very loyally in the context of education, which, in their opinion, negatively affects the quality of knowledge gained, and that there was less workload in mathematics classes.

> **Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv oblast) ➡ Poland:** "Teaching is definitely better in Ukraine. I came to Ukraine after Poland, and I keep telling everyone about it. Ukrainian schools are at the highest level. My child goes to an intellectual class here, so it's not comparable. And she really went to the coolest school there, we were so lucky. This is a big plus for them, but we have taught our children to keep themselves in shape – they need English, they need gymnastics, they need swimming, they need other things, and so on. And they are very loyal to the children, they don't force them, they don't stress them too much, and they have become so good to Ukrainian children especially because of the war."

Ukrainians in the ***United States*** noted the free material support for schools (including meals for students), as well as the opportunity for children to choose their own subjects, while in ***Canada*** they noted the absence of grading.

In the ***higher education system***, Ukrainians see the advantage of obtaining a European-style diploma abroad, which allows them to find a job in any EU country, as well as in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Medicine

According to 60.8% of Ukrainians surveyed, the quality of healthcare is better in Ukraine, 26.6% – abroad, and 12.6% – at about the same level.

Many countries that have agreed to accept forced migrants from Ukraine have provided Ukrainians with free health insurance after they have been granted temporary protection status. However, according to respondents, it covers the costs of only a certain (sometimes minimal/basic) set of services. This is probably due to the amount of social benefits that Ukrainians officially receive from the country in which they reside.

> **Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translation from Russian):** "Here I just hope that I don't get sick, because if it's something serious, it's very, very expensive. Besides, the insurance won't cover it, it only covers the simplest things. And if something serious happens, like a surgery, I have no idea how to deal with it."

The majority of Ukrainians, regardless of their country of residence, report difficulties in accessing medical care abroad: 73.4% of respondents said that healthcare in Ukraine is more accessible. Respondents noted that they had to wait several months, sometimes even longer, to see a specialist doctor. Moreover, to get to a specialist doctor, you need a referral from a family doctor, and their services are not particularly fast. As for access to additional medical examinations (MRI, CT, ultrasound, etc.), they can be obtained free of charge abroad only with a referral from a specialised doctor, if they see the need. But even if a referral is received, such an examination, according to respondents, can also take a very long time.

In the context of access to healthcare, respondents also mentioned problems such as early closure of hospitals and the lack of sufficient polyclinics/laboratories in the settlements where they stayed. Often, respondents had to travel to larger cities or even regional centres to seek medical care. Of course, private healthcare is a solution for quick access to medical services. However, for Ukrainians, especially those on low incomes, it is unaffordable. **In fact, 20.9% of respondents said they were afraid of losing their right to free healthcare abroad.**

> **Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv oblast) ➡ Poland:** "If you wait, yes, everything will be free. Anything else, emergency, you have to die to get someone to come to you. I wanted to check my child's eye – just a simple eye test, I didn't need anything else. I was scheduled for November, which was in February. And the price was such that I did not consider it reasonable. I mean, these are exorbitant amounts. In our private clinic, it's 2 times more expensive than if you go to a public clinic, and the prices are sky-high."

The study also revealed difficulties with access to medicines abroad. In particular, respondents often could not buy the medicines they needed without a prescription from a doctor. At the same time, among those who received a prescription and purchased medicines, they immediately received reimbursement for their cost under the terms of their insurance policy.

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany**: "I had an experience when a child fell out of a window from the 2nd floor of a neighbour's house, and literally 8 minutes after it happened, 2 police crews arrived, 3 ambulances arrived for one child and even a helicopter arrived! We thought it was very bad, since it was an air ambulance. It turned out that the child had just scratched his chin. And it was all free, fast and efficient. A psychologist also came, but not to shame the mother, but rather to help her cope with the situation."

> **Woman, 42, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Czech Republic:** "So, for example, if you want to see a specialist, you can wait for a very long time, a couple of months for an appointment. But if a person is sick or something suddenly happens, then medicine here is at the highest level in terms of the fact that if it is a serious illness, they will cure it and do everything possible."

Another feature of the medical system abroad that was mentioned by respondents is the "different" attitude of doctors to the symptoms of illnesses compared to Ukraine. As a rule, doctors abroad do not prescribe treatment at the first visit, but recommend monitoring the patient's condition for some time. Even those respondents who visited specialists with a high fever and suspected infectious respiratory disease received only symptomatic treatment. Sometimes Ukrainians heard that they were refused hospitalisation even in severe cases. On the contrary, some complained about the prompt prescription of antibiotics to a child without any additional examinations.

> **Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada:** "For example, medicine is a disadvantage here. A disadvantage in what way? In the sense that if, for example, a child has a cough or a cold, no one here will describe any defects or antiviral drugs. I mean, the attitude towards medicine is completely different, our Ukrainians are used to the fact that if a child is sick, they go to the doctor, the doctor prescribes 20 medications and the mother is happy and everyone is happy. Here, when you go to the doctor with such symptoms, they recommend ventilating the room, walking a lot, bathing the child and drinking a lot of water, that's it."

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "Well, they give you an antibiotic right away. My children have been sick here for I don't know how long. My daughter is at home with chickenpox, and my son has just started school today, he's been at home for a month, they get sick very often. And here it's an antibiotic right away. Back home [in Ukraine], when a child got sick, we had blood tests and urine tests to find out what it was. Here,

we have never had any tests... When we came, she looked at us, wrote down the diagnosis and that was it. I mean, there is no such thing... We have a different attitude, I don't know."

Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands: "And now my wife has half a lung working. And she had coughing fits for an hour or more, followed by vomiting. I called the oncology department and asked what to do. I was told that if there was no fever and no temperature, then nothing. One day, during such an attack, I could not stand it and brought her to the hospital. She was examined, found to be in critical condition and was referred for hospitalisation. Only then did she get better."

Ukrainians abroad are also dissatisfied with the bureaucracy in the medical sector. For example, in Germany, a respondent was unable to receive her child's test results by email. She was offered to come to the clinic and pick them up in person, and when she refused, they were sent to the attending paediatrician by fax. Accordingly, it took a long time, and the tests were needed urgently. Among other respondents who had to take tests abroad, many were dissatisfied with the long wait for their results, unlike in Ukraine.

Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany: "Well, they also have a thing [in Germany], they just blew my mind when I asked to see my child's tests live. I wanted to show them to a professor. A nurse calls me and offers to come and get them. I say that I can't go 45 kilometres away, send them to me by email or Viber. And they say: "We can't do that, we can send them by post"... Anyway, what they did was to send the tests to our peadiatrician at the hospital by fax. I haven't seen a fax machine in 20 years. I told them, who needs them but me, come on, they're all protecting private information here, but this is really too much. I got these tests and then went to the professor with these printouts. It's just ridiculous."

In the survey, Ukrainians also mentioned the positive aspects of the medical system abroad. In particular, most of the positive aspects include the availability of modern equipment and highly qualified staff. Some participants also stated that they did not have to wait long for a visit to a doctor, the appointment was quick, efficient and convenient, while others noted the practice of preventive medicine abroad.

Woman, 45, Konotop (Sumy oblast) ➡ Spain: "When a person reaches the upper level, when they get into the hands of cardiac surgeons, neurosurgeons, very complex joint replacement operations are performed here, open heart, open brain. That is, the equipment, the level of specialists is very high, the complexity of the surgery is high."

Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translation from Russian): "But what I like about German medicine is that they send out invitations to undergo examinations – for example, mammology or hearing tests. And it's free. They are so concerned about preventing cancer."

In terms of **emergency medicine**, respondents praised the efficiency and quality of the relevant services in highly developed countries. Ukrainians who stayed in Germany and Poland spoke about the possibility of visiting a doctor on a first-come, first-served basis in case of an emergency. Respondents also noted that seriously ill patients among forced migrants from Ukraine, including cancer patients, were treated by clinics abroad free of charge.

Some respondents to the survey indicated that they were impressed by the general concept of insurance medicine, as it is a guarantee of peace of mind and confidence in the future (especially for people who cannot afford expensive treatment when an emergency arises).

The main disadvantages of healthcare abroad, as pointed out by respondents, are seen in comparison to healthcare in Ukraine. Regardless of the medical reform implemented in 2016, Ukrainians often face similar problems in Ukrainian medicine as they do abroad: bureaucracy, queues, etc. However, in Ukraine, it is easier to get around these issues. For example, Ukrainians are more likely to turn to private healthcare, as it is more affordable than abroad. Informal connections at home (acquaintances, the ability to negotiate, etc.) often help Ukrainians out, which is not easy to do abroad. That is why our people in other countries often turn to volunteers for help. Some even come to Ukraine for treatment.

> **Woman, 42, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Czech Republic:** "If you have health insurance, you can say that everything is covered by this health insurance. The only thing it doesn't cover is dentistry, it covers a small amount, but not completely. God forbid, something happens, but a person knows that they get 100 per cent free medical care. At our work, a man got seriously ill, and he was treated completely... He says that if he were in Ukraine, he doesn't know if he could afford the treatment."

> **Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany:** "You see, we are used to paying for medical services in Ukraine. We fantasised that there is something there or maybe not, we decided to have our children examined, to have tests done and so on, and we paid for it, small money by German standards, small money, but we have the opportunity to choose a specialist through friends, through word of mouth, we can leave the specialist, cross the road and go to any private laboratory, take the tests that were prescribed or that you want. There is no such thing here at all."

Security

During the survey, Ukrainians abroad were asked to assess the current security situation in Ukraine in general and in the locality where they lived before the full-scale war. **The respondents rated the level of security in the country lower than in their settlements – by 2.47 and 3.38 respectively** (on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is a very difficult security situation, it is impossible to live in such conditions, and 7 is a generally normal situation, you can adapt).

Respondents from the East and South gave the lowest security assessments in Ukraine – 42.9% and 45.5%. Among the representatives of the Centre, the North and Kyiv, the figures are 35.4%, 34.3% and 34.7% respectively, and among forced migrants from the West – 19.6%. In the case of security in settlements, the answers of respondents from the East and South have hardly changed – 43.3% and 47.7% chose the minimum value. However, the proportion of respondents who gave the lowest assessment of security in their settlements in the Centre, North and Kyiv is much lower – 4.8%, 9.1% and 8.5% respectively. Respondents from the West of Ukraine are much more optimistic when assessing the security in their settlements – every second respondent chose the maximum value on the scale.

Comparing the security conditions in the host country and in Ukraine before the full-scale war, 76.2% of respondents said that the security situation was better abroad (regardless of the country of residence). Ukrainians feel safe abroad due to illuminated streets at night, installed

CCTV cameras, constant patrolling of streets or other public gathering places (schools, parks, sports complexes, etc.), a ban on drinking alcohol in public places, and public transport running according to the established schedule.

The sense of a safe environment is also felt by forced migrants from Ukraine abroad. For example, Ukrainians in Germany, Switzerland and Poland describe the citizens of these countries as disciplined and law-abiding. Accordingly, the crime rate there is lower than in Ukraine before the war – 66.9% of respondents said so. For example, in Germany, people do not lock their house and garage doors and do not tend to install high fences, as theft or robbery is rare. Respondents also noted the absence of speeding on the roads among foreigners.

> **Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany:** "This is the first time in my life that I have a hundred per cent level of security. I don't worry at all about where my child is. She opened the door, went out for a walk, ran off to her training, and I don't have a single bad thought at all."

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland**: "But a lot depends on the people themselves, on the mentality. I mean, it's safe in Switzerland not because the police are working, but because people do nothing, they are law-abiding. Everyone here is equal before the law, including cars of different classes on the roads. And the fines here are very high. The biggest fine registered here is 1,200,000 francs for speeding."

> **Woman, 30, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "I have not locked my car in Poland and in Ukraine. I am 100% sure that everything will be fine in Poland. Well, at least where I live. In Ukraine, I would be worried."

On the other hand, 5.8% of respondents said that the security situation is better at home. The low sense of security of Ukrainians abroad is often influenced by specific incidents they encountered on the street. For example, in Canada, the survey participants noticed many people under the influence of drugs. The reason for this, in their opinion, is the legalisation of soft drugs in Canada and their abuse among the local homeless. In the United States, the respondent experienced racial discrimination. A Ukrainian woman in France talks about the experience of a robbery of her friends, and the investigation was unsuccessful. The UK is also described by the survey participants as a country with a high level of theft. In London, the areas where black people live are particularly dangerous, as the crime rate, according to respondents, is higher there than in other parts of the capital.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA:** "And he [a dark-skinned man] crosses the road from behind at a red light, comes up to me, starts swearing at me and says: "You're a white bitch!" Well, that's what I heard, that's what I realised I was a white bitch. It was, I'm sorry, an African American. And that's how I feel scared in certain moments. In some places, there are areas of Chicago that you can't go to, that are very discouraged, especially for white people. And it was a shock for me."

> **Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ United Kingdom (translation from Russian):** "For example, in London I am not sure that no one will steal my purse, in Kyiv I am almost sure that it will not be stolen. As for some situations, an accident or something else, the legal system in Britain is certainly good. While we have a system where the richest is the strongest, while there everything as it should be."

Transport

According to 86.7% of Ukrainians surveyed, the quality of infrastructure abroad is better than it was in Ukraine before Russia's full-scale invasion. The share of those who think so among Ukrainians living in Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic is over 90%. And only 7.3% of respondents believe that the quality of infrastructure was better in Ukraine.

The survey participants speak of an efficient, sustainable and multifunctional transport system abroad. **Among the advantages** are the quality of vehicles, cleanliness, intensity and adherence to schedules. Most public transport in Europe is equipped with new vehicles, which ensures a comfortable stay for passengers. Ukrainians are also impressed by the system of travel cards that allow for several transfers on the desired route with one ticket (USA, Switzerland). On the one hand, it is convenient, and on the other hand, it is a significant saving in travel costs. In Canada, according to respondents, all public transport is accessible to people with disabilities. Other advantages that Ukrainians have noticed abroad include strict control over so-called "hares" – fare dodgers – and digitalisation in the transport infrastructure.

> **Woman, 65, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "The quality [of transport] – we were very impressed. If it said it would come at 13:17, it came exactly at 13:17. And they are very comfortable, clean, and big. Compared to Lviv, they are better."

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland:** "I have a travel card, with a travel card you save a lot of money. It gives you 50% off travel throughout Switzerland, you pay 150 euros a year. But a single-city travel card costs about 60 francs under 25 and 80 francs after 25. You pay once and ride any transport, funiculars, and so on. So I save about 100 euros a month with this card."

> **Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland:** "In terms of quality, they are all new, all beautiful, and nice. And for example, you buy a ticket by phone, using an app. You come to the stop, they show you which stop you need. This bus comes to the stop and it just scans you and lets you through without any documents, without anything. Everything is on schedule."

Those Ukrainians who rate transport abroad worse than in Ukraine primarily argues that it is primarily due to the time constrains of its operation. This includes the mode of operation of public transport (for example, the last bus departs at 5 p.m.), deviations from the schedule (sometimes the waiting time takes up to 40 minutes), a large interval between vehicles, and a critical situation with loading during peak hours. For example, Germany also has a problem with rail transport; Belgium has a clogged metro; and the UK has generally poor transport links outside of megacities.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA:** "Public transport in the United States is the worst thing ever, I'll tell you that. You have a schedule. Every bus, public transport has its own schedule. Sometimes this schedule is not realistic at all. At rush hour, there may be a delay of half an hour, 20–30 minutes, a bus may be cancelled, and the next bus arrives only in 20 minutes. In 20 minutes, in half an hour. To get to work, I need to take two types of transport – the metro and a minibus. I leave an hour and a half before I start work. Once I waited 40 minutes for a minibus. And the map showed me that two minibuses had arrived. But there were none. The quality of public transport is very poor. Homeless people often sleep there. If an African-American wanted to smoke – because I didn't see

any white people allow themselves to do that – he would sit in the carriage and smoke. Whether it was weed or cigarettes, it depends. And it's very dirty there, really. There's nothing good to say compared to Ukrainian transport."

Regarding the **cost of public transport**, the vast majority of respondents indicated that it was much more expensive abroad than in Ukraine. Ukrainians were often saved by the fact that, as forced migrants, they were offered free travel. In particular, 15.8% of respondents use or have used this opportunity.

Environment

As noted above, **66.7% of Ukrainians believe that the environment abroad is better to some extent than it was in Ukraine before the full-scale war.** The largest share of those satisfied with the state of the environment is in Germany. Among the advantages abroad, respondents noted the availability of more garbage bins than in Ukraine (USA, Poland); noticeably cleaned streets (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland); uncluttered parks (Germany); predominantly grass pavements that do not produce dust in cities (the Netherlands); and clean water (Italy).

In many countries, Ukrainians noted the practice of street cleaning (Luxembourg, Czech Republic, and Switzerland). Ukrainians consider the obligation of Swiss citizens to hand in plastic bottles for recycling to be positive.

Respondents noted that the war has had a negative impact on the environment in Ukraine. First and foremost, they focused on such consequences as irrational use of resources and harmful air emissions.

Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland: "In Poland, there is sorting, each house has 3 bins: yellow, green and black. At each store, they sort everything and take it away. Everything is clean and everyone mows the grass to make it even. It's a nice, well-kept village."

Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg: "The cleanliness here is very much monitored, the streets are washed, and garbage is constantly removed, even if you compare it to neighbouring France or Germany. Luxembourg is so small, and they look after it as if it were their own house."

Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands: "Where I live is a farming province, it has a wonderful environment. Everything is very green here, ducks, geese, swans fly. There's no open ground, meaning that wherever cars drive, there's asphalt or pavement. And there is almost no dust. My car is clean, although I hardly ever wash it here. If you walk around in sneakers with white soles, they will remain white. And I don't remember the last time I heard exhaust on the roads."

Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland: "Here [in Switzerland] you have to recycle and return bottles, otherwise you will be fined."

Instead, 13.3% of respondents said that the environment is better in Ukraine. In particular, some respondents noted that it is dirtier abroad than in Ukraine. Only the central parts of cities are clean, and the further away from the centre, the more garbage there is. This was especially noted by Ukrainians living in France, Bulgaria, and Germany. According to the respondents, the declared care for animals while walking is also not true. Among other problems, for example, in

Germany, lawns uncleared after tree felling were noticed. Ukrainians staying in Bulgaria had the impression that "everyone smokes around them – from adults to children". Accordingly, they constantly smell tobacco on the street.

> **Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France:** "Honestly, at first it seems very clean and everything is perfect. In fact, over time, you notice that they don't clean up after animals as well, as we are told that in Europe they walk around with a ball – this is not true. And the rubbish. There is no such cleanliness."

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "It's very dirty in Bulgaria. Probably, in Ukraine everything is better. Well, we don't have such rubbish. Somehow we don't smoke as much as everybody else does here. So we have a better environment. There is no such smoke everywhere you walk. And it's also very dirty. Really dirty. They just throw rubbish here and there. We try harder to teach that rubbish should be thrown into a bin."

Some 20% of respondents were unable to decide where the environment is better. In their opinion, it depends on the place you go to, local policies and individual standards of cleanliness.

Service sector

In this section, respondents assessed services in the following areas: digital services, the private sector (including catering), logistics and postal services, banking, quality of communications, and the beauty industry.

Overall, 64.0% of Ukrainians abroad believe that the service sector is better developed in Ukraine than abroad. The same number of respondents share a similar opinion when comparing the quality of services in the private sector.

In particular, 67.3% of respondents said that the quality of digital services in Ukraine is better than abroad. Some 16.5% share the opposite opinion, while 16.1% believe that it is the same.

The opening hours of stores in Ukraine are also better organised than abroad, according to 78.3% of respondents.

More than half of Ukrainians (53.8%) like the availability and quality of the Internet in Ukraine better than abroad; 32.7% believe that they are at the same level; 13.5% said that these aspects are better provided abroad.

The opinions of Ukrainians are similar with regard to the speed and quality of logistics and postal/courier services. 51.4% of respondents believe that it functions better in Ukraine; 25.8% – abroad; 22.8% – said that these services are provided at the same level.

Ukrainians also point to the following shortcomings of the banking system: a significant limit on the amount of cash that can be withdrawn per day; bureaucracy; slow Internet banking and a minimal set of options; the need to make an appointment to visit a bank; the lengthy process of issuing a bank card and receiving it through a physical postal address; and the impossibility of conducting financial transactions in a bank unless you have an account there.

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland**: "Our banking system is just perfect. Because Ukraine has Monobank, you can send money there in a second. And here you can't do that. Here you have to wait 3–4 days, here you need 4–5 apps to make one transaction."

Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands: "Ukraine is also ahead. Because in Ukraine you can do anything in banks, transfer money and so on. And here, for example, the problem with currency exchange is very huge. The Dutch just use the euro, that's all. And in general, here you order a bank card and it arrives in a few days. Everything is easier and more convenient here, we have better support, the same Monobank and Privatbank. But here I had a cultural shock when there was no cash desk at all in a banking institution. To change dollars into euros, I had to go to the regional centre."

Ukrainians are also dissatisfied with public catering establishments. In particular, respondents lacked variety in the choice of dishes, tasty food and quality service.

According to respondents, the beauty industry abroad also offers low-quality but expensive services. To achieve the desired level of quality, respondents looked for nail technicians among other forced migrants from Ukraine who were in the same locality.

Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands: "In Ukraine, it's about 5 times better, or even 10 times better. Girls say that manicures, pedicures, hairstyles and everything else is better in Ukraine. The Ukrainian beauty industry in general is much more developed – the service, attitude and quality are so much better."

Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany: "Their service is generally bad. I keep telling Germans: listen, just come to Ukraine and see how it works."

Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France: "We went to museums, the castle here is very beautiful. But Ukraine has a better level of service. Even a week ago, a mini-zoo was brought to a neighbouring town. There were swings for small children, all sorts of goodies, national dances and a tent with liqueurs. We are better organised. Even in the store where I work, when there is a tasting, they have a girl there, 3 glasses – and that's a tasting."

5.8. Integration of forced migrants from Ukraine into a foreign environment

Overall comfort

Integration into the host country's society largely depended on the following factors:

- level of knowledge of a foreign language;
- attitude of local residents towards Ukrainians;
- manifestations of xenophobia and/or discrimination;
- mentality, style (way of life, pace) of life abroad;
- existing environment (socialisation);
- involvement in the activities of the host society;
- psycho-emotional state of forced migrants from Ukraine.

According to the survey, 47.7% of respondents indicated that they felt more comfortable living in Ukraine to some extent, 43.6% felt more comfortable living abroad, and 8.7% did not see any difference. A total of 60.5% said that they were unlikely to be disappointed with life in the host country in the near future, while one in five (20.0%) believed that this is possible. And the same number, 21.1%, indicated that in the near future they might face relatives' reluctance to continue their stay in this country.

Rate the overall comfort of your stay/life, including emotional comfort

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	25.70%
Rather better in Ukraine	14.20%
Slightly better in Ukraine	7.77%
The same	8.74%
Slightly better in the host country	9.74%
Rather better in the host country	12.95%
Definitely better in the host country	20.89%

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face disappointment with life in this country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	26.95%
2	17.70%
3	15.85%

4	19.51%
5	8.43%
6	3.81%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	7.74%

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face relatives' reluctance to continue staying in this country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	41.64%
2	13.57%
3	11.33%
4	12.32%
5	5.84%
6	4.14%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	11.15%

Language issue

Of those surveyed, ²/₃ said they did not know the language of the country they were currently in (66.4%). Of these, 20.0% do not know the language at all. Only 4.1% of respondents are fluent in the foreign language of the host country.

Please rate your level of knowledge of the language of the host country

This question had 1 answer option

1 – have no knowledge of the language at all	19.62%
2	22.08%
3	24.73%
4	16.96%
5	9.58%
6	2.96%
7 – fluency	4.07%

Distribution of knowledge of the language of the host country, depending on the level of education of the respondents

Level of education/Language proficiency in the host country	Minimum level of language proficiency	Intermediate level of language proficiency	High level of language proficiency
Incomplete secondary	88.9%	11.1%	0.0%
General secondary	68.2%	13.6%	18.2%
Secondary specialised	66.3%	21.5%	12.2%
Higher or incomplete higher	65.5%	16.2%	18.3%
Academic degree (candidate, doctor of sciences)	71.1%	18.4%	10.5%

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian forced migrants, regardless of their country of residence, faced difficulties due to the lack of knowledge or low level of language skills. The language barrier was especially noticeable in the first days of life abroad. While Ukrainians managed to adapt at the household level (e.g., to buy necessary things or food, to communicate with neighbours, etc.), communication with official institutions (paperwork, employment, etc.) became a real challenge for respondents.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "Yes, of course there is, I don't know German. And I constantly face a language barrier. Yes, it's all there. If you want to buy groceries, for example, there is no problem. But when you go to solve some social issues, or when you constantly receive letters with invitations to go somewhere, show some documents, provide something – then yes, of course, there is a language barrier. I use a machine translator, but it doesn't always translate correctly, so this is a problem."

The language barrier was often an obstacle to the professional and educational socialisation of Ukrainian forced migrants. The lack of knowledge of a foreign language was one of the obstacles to Ukrainian children attending school abroad. For the majority of adult respondents, it was an obstacle to employment, especially in highly skilled positions requiring a high level of language proficiency.

> **Woman, 47, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "There was a language barrier because they [employers] need people who can read and write Polish."

The language barrier also significantly limits the social circle of Ukrainians abroad. The respondents deliberately did not make acquaintances among foreigners because, on the one hand, they lacked the knowledge to express their thoughts, and on the other hand, they often encountered complete misunderstanding of the interlocutor.

In general, integration into the host country's society is an important factor in the full life of Ukrainians outside their home. According to the respondents, the language barrier did not contribute to their successful integration abroad.

> **Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translated from Russian):** "Language is the main thing a person needs to integrate. Language and activity. I also have no activity. That's

why I have the syndrome of an emigrant who has found himself in a foreign language environment. That's why I feel detached from the usual way of life, environment, etc."

Woman, 22, Kyiv ➡ Belgium: "Because in Belgium I am still an immigrant who does not speak the language and because of this I cannot feel fully free. In Ukraine, I am at home in my apartment. These basic things are important to me. I mean, to feel my autonomy and independence."

To overcome the language barrier, Ukrainians actively used automatic translation services (e.g. Google Translate). For visits to official institutions, respondents prepared a "cheat sheet" in advance – a possible conversation scenario. Some Ukrainians were reliant on their knowledge of English.

Woman, 27, Kyiv ➡ Macedonia: "Here is their Macedonian language. We don't know it, but we all have English, they know English well here because there are many American universities and many students from different countries. And in general, if you hear someone saying something in Macedonian, you understand some words because they are similar to Russian. It's the Cyrillic alphabet. If they speak not very fast, I understand. I did not learn the language. Our local Red Cross organised language courses, but we have neither the energy nor the time for that because we all work."

At the same time, English was not a solution for understanding between Ukrainians and foreigners in countries where it is not popular and widespread (e.g. Japan).

Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Japan: "English is not spoken here (in Japan). I mean, I can't do anything here, even in the emigration service I can't fill in the forms because they are all in Japanese. Japanese is very different, and the translators are not very helpful."

Countries that host forced migrants from Ukraine have also taken some steps to facilitate the linguistic integration of Ukrainians. First, interpreters were often employed in places of common settlement and administrative offices where forced migrants filled out the necessary documents. Most European countries have introduced free language courses for Ukrainians. Respondents noted that, in addition to language integration, such courses should facilitate the employment of people from Ukraine, as the long-term financial support of numerous forced migrants would have a negative impact on the economy of the host country.

Germany has offered integration courses to forced migrants, which include not only learning the German language, but also history, culture, basic rights and obligations. According to the respondents, this integration course was created to help them adapt to life in Germany. At the end of the course, a German language exam is mandatory for migrants.

Woman, 64, Mykolaiv ➡ Germany (translated from Russian): "Under the auspices of the Jewish community, I had the opportunity to take so-called integration courses, meant to integrate and adapt Ukrainian refugees. They also benefit from this. In addition to integrating them, after completing these intensive courses, they employ Ukrainian refugees of working age. Therefore, they are interested in refugees taking these integration courses. Social services provide these courses free of charge. They last from 6 to 9 months and include 3 stages of language learning – A1, A2 and B1".

Since most countries offered language courses on a voluntary basis, some Ukrainians took the opportunity to learn a foreign language for free right away, while others decided to attend them due to specific conditions. For example, some respondents needed to get a job because they "can't live on benefits". And it is extremely difficult, and often impossible, to work without knowledge of the language. Some participants did not register for language courses because they hoped to return to Ukraine soon and only changed their minds when they realised that the war would last for a long time. Some respondents decided to learn the language when they felt it was necessary for their survival in a foreign country.

> **Woman, 42, Morshyn (Lviv oblast) ➡ Germany:** "Yes, I was sure that I would return. And by the summer, I realised that I couldn't do anything here without the language. And that I need to do something. My son was studying online, I was working online, and I decided to take language courses."

Some respondents said that they had not experienced any problems with the language issue. These are mostly Ukrainians who have stayed in Poland. The success of mutual understanding can probably be explained by the lexical similarity between Polish and Ukrainian.

> **Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv oblast) ➡ Poland:** "Here in Lviv we understand Polish better. From the first days we understood almost everything, and after a couple of months we were already speaking. It's just that she is so homely. So I can even get up and leave today, and she – I know that she will not support me, she will not leave."

The language barrier did not occur even when Ukrainians knew the language of the country they chose to migrate to, but such cases are in the minority.

> **Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada:** "I speak fluent English, my husband has an intermediate level. I mean, he can explain, maybe he understands, but he makes some mistakes. Then we took an English test and got the same result, which proved to be true, as we had a rough idea of our level."

Attitudes towards Ukrainians

The majority of Ukrainian forced migrants report a predominantly positive attitude of foreigners towards them. Almost half of the respondents (42.5%) said that the population abroad is friendlier than in Ukraine, a quarter (25.5%) said that people in Ukraine are friendlier, and 32.0% did not see any difference.

Please rate the friendliness of the population in Ukraine before a full-scale invasion and in the host country

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	9.39%
Rather better in Ukraine	9.43%
Slightly better in Ukraine	6.67%

The same	32.05%
Slightly better in the host country	14.36%
Rather better in the host country	12.64%
Definitely better in the host country	15.47%

Solidarity with Ukraine abroad was felt at both the national and individual levels. In many European countries, respondents saw Ukrainian symbols, mass demonstrations in support of Ukraine, and large-scale gatherings for Ukrainians, both civilians and military. On an individual level, respondents mentioned such private initiatives as humanitarian aid (food, clothing, household items, etc.), housing assistance (some gave away their vacant flats for free, and some even shared a room in their own homes), support in paperwork, and financial assistance. The high readiness to support Ukraine in Poland, according to some respondents, is related to the negative attitude of Poles towards Russians.

> **Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland:** "Thank God, we've been here for 9 months, and nothing like this has happened. Poland loves Ukrainians and hates Russians. Our neighbours are from the village, everyone here knows where we came from – they immediately shout "Putin kurva!", that's how they greet us. They bring potatoes, eggs, milk, and help us. I will also tell you that our landlady of this house comes to visit us, worries about our well-being, whether we have money. She says that if you don't have money, you don't have to pay now. That is, the attitude towards us here is great, we don't feel that we are not well off here."

The emotional support of foreigners was equally important to Ukrainians, especially in the early days of the war. Ukrainians who have returned home often said that they still keep in touch with foreigners who helped them abroad.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA:** "Let me tell you a story. I had 2 interviews for a job: one interview was with an accountant and a financial director, and the other was with an HR manager. When I came to the second interview, I arrived a little early because I was afraid of being late, and, accordingly, I was waiting in the corridor. And then there was a woman of such a small size, a very old woman, I would say about 60 years old. And she was, you know, more of a man's build. And she asks me: "Are you from Ukraine?" I said: "Yes." "From Kyiv?" I said: "Yes, I'm from Kyiv." – "Oh, so it's Zelenskyy, or how do you pronounce it?" I said: "Yes, Zelenskyy." And she hugged me so hard, she was like: "Hang in there, America is with you!" She also called Trump some very ugly words and hugged me so hard that I couldn't breathe. I didn't know who this woman was, I thought she was some kind of worker. But it turned out to be the owner of the company."

Ukrainians abroad noted that the share of supporters of providing assistance to forced migrants among foreigners is decreasing over time. Some respondents believe that the willingness to support is decreasing amid the economic consequences for the residents of host countries. Some representatives of foreign countries, according to the respondents, do not like the passivity of Ukrainians in looking for work and their desire to live solely at the expense of their state and their taxes. The respondents also do not deny that Ukrainians themselves are to blame for the change in attitudes towards them. In particular, they refer to the overly demanding attitudes of forced migrants towards host countries and the often unworthy

behaviour of people from Ukraine abroad. Some respondents say that "they are just tired of us", which is why some foreigners want Ukrainians to return home.

> **Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada**: "When the war started and Ukrainians started coming, they were very nice, they helped with settling in, with schools, with jobs, with furniture, with everything – they just brought us things, helped us. But, of course, not all Ukrainians are so cool, not all are so smart. Many came here and behaved not very well, and many Canadians were disappointed in Ukrainians. And now it seems to me that there is much less help and desire to help. Because there are a few stories where Canadians helped, did things, and then heard complaints about what someone has or doesn't have here. It's a pity, of course, but there are people like that everywhere."

> **Woman, 35, Lviv ➡ Italy:** "You know, Italians are such people – everyone is kind, everyone smiles. But my girls and I have already felt and seen that they are tired of us. There are so many mixed nationalities here, Pakistanis, Africans, Moldovans, and Chinese. There are so many nations here that they are fed up with us, to be honest. They say that we live on their taxes, which the city council allocates us such funds, and they can barely make ends meet here. They don't allow us to have more than one child, because it's such a hard time, the economy has really slowed down in Italy."

Some forced migrants from Ukraine have faced discrimination abroad: 15.6% of respondents indicated that they had already experienced discrimination or were likely to in the near future.

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face discrimination from the residents of your host country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	35.57%
2	20.21%
3	15.57%
4	13.10%
5	6.43%
6	3.34%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	5.78%

For example, respondents spoke about its manifestations in the labour market. Ukrainians seeking employment abroad were forced to compete for jobs with local residents. Accordingly, preference was often given to citizens of the country in which the Ukrainians were staying. There were also cases when foreign employers took advantage of the difficult situation of Ukrainian forced migrants and offered them only low-skilled and low-paid work.

> **Woman, 47, Lviv ➡ Poland:** "In terms of discrimination... Poles have an advantage at work. Ukrainians are in a precarious position because you can be fired at any time."

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ Japan:** "I study different courses in different schools. In two schools for 2 days a week. It's very inconvenient because I couldn't take a normal intensive schedule at the official school, where I have to study five days a week for 6 hours. Because of my guarantor [sponsor], I couldn't go to such a school because he wanted to start his own business, and he wanted me to pay him back for everything he had invested in me."

The study did not record frequent cases of language discrimination. According to the respondents, sometimes foreigners could deliberately not switch to English, knowing that they were dealing with Ukrainian migrants. A Ukrainian woman who fled the war to Canada experienced linguistic discrimination from another Ukrainian woman who had been living in Canada for many years.

> **Woman, 26, Kryvyy Rih ➡ Canada (translation from Russian)**: "Although it happened that one woman who has been living in Canada for many years – she is from Kyiv oblast – told me that since I am already in Canada, after all the events I have to speak Ukrainian."

In terms of xenophobia, Ukrainians in Germany, for example, pointed to the prejudiced attitude of German boys towards Ukrainian girls; in the Netherlands – towards children in schools and towards men, as the Dutch believe they should be at the front fighting in Ukraine, not abroad. In Poland, Ukrainians have heard foul language directed at them from drunken men. The most dramatic cases of hostility were reported by Ukrainians staying in Bulgaria (theft, hooliganism, etc.). In Bulgaria, respondents explained the negative attitude towards Ukrainians by the large proportion of citizens who are supporters of Russia, as well as the political passivity and lack of education of the population.

> **Man, 42, Kharkiv ➡ the Netherlands:** "They may not switch to English, for example, knowing that you don't speak Dutch. I also heard a story about children having quarrels at school because "you are Ukrainian and we are Dutch". Then they even chanted "Putin, well done!". And it's not because they are pro-Russian, it's just ordinary bullying. I took part in the discussion of all this, translated, and the school management assured me that this would not happen again, and they would not tolerate it. I have also encountered the fact that older Dutch people are not happy to see refugee men – they ask me why you are staying here, why you are not fighting. I explain that my wife is ill. To be honest, I would like to go to the front, but I can't. Although there are men here who left in the summer via Kherson and work here, earn money, buy iPhones."

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "There was an incident in Varna [Bulgaria] the year this war started. I came out of the shop and a car was coming towards us, honking its horn. They saw Ukrainian number plates and gave me the middle finger. There were several cases. There were cases when we were travelling on the road. They honked and braked in front of us on purpose, so that we would cause an accident. There were several cases like that for me and my dad. Now it's a bit calmer. When it was just the beginning, there were a lot of things, a lot of Ukrainians had their number plates taken off. They were just renting rooms, that's all. It was just everywhere. You couldn't leave your car unattended. The higher category of people who exist – businessmen and those who work in public spheres – they are against Russia, against all this, and they follow us, the Ukrainians, they support us, but they are a minority."

Difference in mentalities

When sharing their thoughts on life abroad, forced migrants from Ukraine talk about the difference in mentalities. Many Ukrainians find it difficult to integrate into a new society because of mental differences. Even those respondents who speak the language of the host country reported such difficulties.

> **Woman, 33, Chernihiv ➡ Germany**: "This is a mental, cultural aspect, first of all. You may not understand the language – you may know it, but not understand what is being said to you. Well, and in general, an unusual way of life."

Forced migrants from Ukraine describe Europeans as closed, conservative, modest, reserved and unemotional people. They are "people of rules", respondents say. Therefore, it is difficult for Ukrainians, who have always been described as friendly, sincere, hospitable and open-minded people, to integrate into a space that is opposite to these characteristics.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "It is harder from a psycho-emotional point of view. Because it is a completely different mentality, completely different rules. Perhaps a year from the date I left is the most I am ready for. I think I just can't take it anymore."

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg**: "I like it in Ukraine, specifically my life, I like the city itself, the atmosphere, the opportunity to communicate in my native language, the mentality is not so conservative, not so strict. Here, people follow the rules, they are very reserved. They stick to their companies, their families, and don't let anyone into their circle. We are more open-minded."

As for other mental characteristics, Ukrainians pointed out the patriarchy and high value of the family in Macedonia; neutral and even indifferent attitudes to the appearance of others in the United States and Macedonia; a moderate pace of life in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom; and untidiness in Bulgaria. Canadians are seen as very sincere and open. Ukrainians in Poland talk about the mental closeness between Poles and Ukrainians.

> **Woman, 32, Gostomel (Kyiv oblast) ➡ United Kingdom (translated from Russian):** "They don't worry like we do, tomorrow we have one thing, the day after tomorrow, well, we have a rollercoaster, a constant rollercoaster, sometimes a lot, sometimes very little. Everything is so clear, everything is stable, everything is modest, and that's why people are very relaxed, they are, well, I haven't seen any nervous people at all, by the way. It's either ours or Africans who shout at children there. The locals are generally very balanced, calm, everything is fine, they are not in a hurry."

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "It just seems to me that people here are like that, they don't worry, they are never in a hurry. There is no such pace of life here as in our country. Yes, we are constantly running somewhere, we need something, we don't have time to lie there, to rest, and they somehow have it all together... They don't worry about anything, they just let life go on and on, they don't bother with anything."

One third of respondents (33.6%) indicated that in the near future they would be unlikely to be able to adapt to the new country, "feel at home" in it, as opposed to 49% who shared the opposite opinion.

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face the inability to adapt to the new country, to "feel at home" in the host country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	20.18%
2	12.22%
3	16.65%
4	17.38%
5	11.26%
6	7.41%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	14.89%

Social circle

The respondents' social circle is primarily determined by the following factors: time spent abroad, knowledge of a foreign language, relatives/friends/acquaintances abroad, employment, activity and activism. An important role in this process is also played by psychological comfort and the need for communication, as well as the type of temperament of people.

Regarding the assessment of the social circle in Ukraine and abroad, the vast majority (78.2%) said that their social circle was better in Ukraine, and only 6% of respondents rated their social circle abroad higher than in Ukraine.

Please assess various aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in the host country for you personally: circle of friends, communication

This question had 1 answer option

Definitely better in Ukraine	58.55%
Rather better in Ukraine	14.38%
Slightly better in Ukraine	5.24%
The same	15.88%
Slightly better in the host country	2.28%
Rather better in the host country	1.90%
Definitely better in the host country	1.77%

It is logical that as the duration of respondents' stay abroad increases, their circle of contacts expands, but this is only possible if they are open and willing to communicate actively. Another important factor is whether and when respondents plan to return to Ukraine.

Respondents who are not planning to return to Ukraine are more open in their communication and more likely to establish contacts, as their successful adaptation and integration abroad depends on active socialisation.

Respondents who are more likely to return to Ukraine often confine themselves to their usual circle of contacts – relatives/acquaintances in Ukraine and abroad – and do not make new acquaintances as actively.

The circle of communication is often limited to Ukrainian/Russian-speaking[39] people – relatives who are in Ukraine and/or who have been hosted (invited) abroad; with Ukrainians who have been abroad. Communication with local residents is usually somewhat superficial and ad hoc, requiring either the mediation of bilinguals to help with translation or the use of translation apps, which does not always facilitate a thorough conversation and understanding. Due to their lack of foreign language skills, respondents are often shy and hesitant to communicate and take their time getting to know local people.

Also, according to respondents, the choice of a social circle dominated by Ukrainians contributes to a conditional reduction of the distance with Ukraine.

> **Woman, 31, Kyiv ➡ USA:** "My relatives – I communicate with them. But I'm sociable, so I already have a lot of – I can't say that they are friends, but they are good acquaintances with whom I sometimes spend time, with whom I go out. These are Ukrainians, among others. And this is how you reduce a certain distance from Ukraine by communicating with Ukrainians."

Expansion of the social circle occurs when respondents feel the need to join different social groups and networks in the process of settling down abroad, whether it is temporary or longer-term. In particular, this occurs when people are looking for and getting a job, trying to set up their own business abroad, when children attend local educational institutions, need medical care, etc. Good communication and social connections usually have a positive impact on the adaptation process. Conversely, the need to communicate often encourages forced migrants from Ukraine to seek employment opportunities or join various local initiatives.

> **Woman, 31, Ternopil ➡ Bulgaria:** "I only went to work to communicate with someone, because I was sitting at home, different thoughts were going through my head, I didn't want to do anything, and because I had no one to communicate with, I finally started [looking for] a job because I lacked communication. I felt it very strongly."

Ukrainian forced migrants look for additional channels of communication when they lack communication with those who stayed in Ukraine. In particular, respondents who have left the occupied parts of Ukraine spoke about limited communication with relatives/friends/neighbours. They explain that this communication is very superficial due to the unwillingness to harm those who remained in the occupation (we assume that the reason is that these conversations are not confidential and can be listened to by the occupiers).

> **Man, 59, Mariupol ➡ United Kingdom (translation from Russian)**: "[We communicate in the UK] with our neighbours, in shops and at courses. [And in Ukraine] if we talk about those in Mariupol... here, in telephone conversations, you have to speak very carefully and in general terms, so as not to harm them."

39 Depending on whether the respondent is a native speaker of Ukrainian or Russian.

Even if respondents know a foreign language at an adequate level, sometimes they still avoid communicating with foreigners because they believe that it is difficult to understand each other and that all topics of Ukrainians somehow boil down to the war.

> **Woman, 22, Kyiv ➡ Belgium:** "I don't want to [communicate with Belgians], actually, because I think that normal people will not understand me anyway. All conversations with me come down to the war in one way or another."

Involvement in host society activities

Respondents who are willing and financially able to do so actively use the opportunities of their host countries: they attend local cultural institutions and events, sports facilities, and travel. This allows, on the one hand, to better integrate into the local society, and, on the other hand, according to respondents, to distract from thoughts about the war and reflections on their future.

There is a significant difference in the discourse on opportunities and infrastructure abroad between people who have left large cities of Ukraine and those who have left small towns or villages: the latter, less accustomed to a developed cultural or sports infrastructure, a wide choice of cultural events, focus more on the opportunities that they and their children can get abroad. And this can be an important factor for them when deciding on their future.

> **Woman, 42, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Czech Republic:** "In Brno there are a lot of such pools, all kinds of things for children. You can go, learn, and there are special slides for children. There are tennis courts right next door to us, so we use them. We could take the children there and show them... The zoo is not far away".

Respondents who do not have the financial means to pay for leisure activities use so-called "social tickets" to attend cultural events. But often, even if they have the opportunity, respondents refuse to attend cultural events or cannot enjoy them because of the language barrier.

> **Woman, 42, Kharkiv ➡ Germany:** "We can't go to the cinema because we don't understand anything."

However, respondents also noted that Ukrainian cultural institutions such as libraries, cultural centres, etc. are now opening more actively in different countries, and that performances and films are sometimes dubbed into Ukrainian. This, in turn, slows down the assimilation of Ukrainians abroad.

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg:** "I go to the Ukrainian library, by the way, I would like to mention this very much. A Ukrainian library was opened here, there are many books in Ukrainian for adults and children, and I go there from time to time to borrow books to read in Ukrainian. Often there are announcements for Ukrainians that some kind of performance may take place, some dance courses, language courses, they help to learn French, Luxembourgish. Social events, such as a book club, a literary club. The organisation is quite active. That is, there is something for Ukrainians to do here. On weekends, there are cinema screenings in Ukrainian with French subtitles. They do a lot for children, for parents, for their adaptation."

Some respondents deliberately disassociate themselves from various leisure and recreational activities because they feel guilty for having fled the war and being in a peaceful country, unlike many of their compatriots.

> **Woman, 22, Kyiv ➡ Belgium:** "I don't want to go to such things, because of the guilt, because I can't afford to just dance, when there is a war in my country."

While abroad, some respondents take advantage of the opportunity to travel – both within the host country and abroad. These are usually those respondents who were active tourists before the war, as well as those who travelled abroad with their children. In this way, they create a certain variety of leisure activities for their children, distracting them from thoughts of war, home, family and friends who remained in Ukraine.

Respondents pointed out that it is usually not difficult to find a church abroad where liturgies are held in Ukrainian. And for respondents, attending church abroad is an important event in the structure of their leisure time. Perhaps for them, this practice is part of an unchanging tradition brought from Ukraine and integrated into their current life in a new and unfamiliar society.

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg**: "There is also an active religious life here. There are services for Ukrainians in Ukrainian, and Ukrainians actually come here."

> **Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada**: "We go to the Ukrainian church every Sunday, and we also meet Ukrainians there.

Attending a church is also a good opportunity to expand social circles, make new acquaintances with Ukrainians who have been living abroad for some time, and thus receive valuable new information, solve difficulties, and find new opportunities. **Churches also often host events, charity campaigns and cultural activities that promote the integration of forced migrants, and they are actively involved in organising and conducting them.**

5.9. Expectations for the end of the war and the recovery of Ukraine

The outcome of the war

The majority of Ukrainians abroad would not consider the end of the war without Ukraine's victories: the survey participants say that it should end on our country's terms. **At the same time, respondents interpret victory differently. Some 48.9% of respondents abroad believe that a full-scale war in Ukraine will end with the return of all our occupied territories to the 1991 borders.**

> **Woman, 30, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "If we talk about my wishes, of course, I believe that we have to win back Crimea. That is, we must return to the borders of 1991. This is unequivocal. The question is how to do it. Perhaps it would be more logical to first return to the borders of 23 February 2022, then return the entire Donbas, and then Crimea. And not necessarily by military means, so as not to kill a lot of people. Perhaps through negotiations. I mean, I don't understand how we can do it better now."

Among Ukrainians who hope for the return of all occupied territories to the 1991 borders, the share of those who definitely do NOT plan to return to Ukraine even AFTER the war is over is 3.6%. Instead, the number of those who expect the same outcome of a full-scale war but consider returning home AFTER it ends is 7 times higher – 26.2%. That is, among respondents who will definitely NOT return to Ukraine even AFTER the war ends, there are significantly fewer supporters of the most optimistic scenario of the war's end.

The situation is somewhat different among those respondents who plan to return to Ukraine at some point in time. In particular, if all the occupied territories are returned, the share of those who want to return home AFTER the war ends increases 4 times – 10.1% (BEFORE the war) as opposed to 40.3% (AFTER the war). This indicates that the outcome of the war will have a significant impact on the desire of Ukrainians to return from abroad.

Ukraine will regain all its occupied territories to the 1991 borders	BEFORE the end of the war	AFTER the end of the war
Definitely will not return	26.2%	3.6%
Likely not to return	38.7	21.0%
Likely to return	25.0	35.1%
Will definitely return	10.1%	40.3%

According to 12.0% of respondents, Ukraine will return all its territories occupied after 24 February 2022. One of the likely reasons for this scenario, according to respondents, is the symbolic significance of Crimea for Russia, so "it will not be given away easily". 8.8% of respondents said that Ukraine would return only a part of its territories occupied after 24.02.2022.

> **Man, 33, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "Probably, we will return to the borders on 23 February. Because even if we manage to break through to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, I don't

> think it will be that easy with Crimea. For some reason, it seems to me that Crimea is very symbolic for Russia. They may even be ready to give up Eastern Ukraine, but Crimea is a sacred topic."

A quarter of Ukrainians (24.9%) do not name any specific scenarios for ending the war. Ukrainians have no hope that the war will end after the death of Vladimir Putin or other people who advocated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as we are fighting the population of Russia, not individual leaders. Some respondents believe that the war could turn into a frozen conflict, while others are simply desperate and hoping for a miracle.

> **Woman, 39, Kyiv ➡ Germany**: "It seems to me that a miracle has to happen, something unexpected, unpredictable. Otherwise, I don't believe that it will just stop. I do not believe that this person – or whoever is in charge in Russia – that they will stop. So I hope only for some kind of miracle or something we don't understand, we don't know that something like this should happen. Of course, I believe that it will end in our victory. But I can't imagine how it will be formalised, whether it will be exactly like a victory or whether it will be something else. It's hard to imagine. Victory is the cessation of shelling and the withdrawal of troops. Of course, there are opinions that the conflict may be frozen."

The share of those who believe that Ukraine will not be able to return any occupied territories at the time of the survey or will lose additional territories is small – 2.6% and 2.9% respectively. It is noteworthy that these scenarios were chosen much more often by respondents who definitely do NOT plan to return even AFTER the war ends than by those who will definitely return to Ukraine. In particular, among those who do not intend to return, the scenario "Ukraine will not be able to return any occupied territories at the time of the survey" was chosen by every tenth respondent, while among those who will definitely return – only 2.1%; the scenario "Ukraine will lose additional territories" – 14.5% and 0.6%, respectively.

Among those people who definitely do NOT plan to return to Ukraine even AFTER the war is over, there is a higher proportion of those who are more pessimistic about the outcome of the war.

In particular, the scenario where **"Ukraine will not be able to return any territories occupied as of summer 2023"** was chosen by every tenth respondent in this subsample (9.8%). Instead, among those who do not plan to return to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war, but do not rule out such a possibility AFTER the war, there are half as many (4.5%).

Among those respondents who believe that Ukraine **will lose additional territories**, the difference is even more pronounced between those who do NOT plan to return to Ukraine regardless of the outcome of the war and those who consider returning home AFTER the war: 14.8% as opposed to 5.1%.

That is, the more pessimistic the scenario of the end of the war, the greater the difference between those who do NOT plan to return to Ukraine at all and those who may change their minds depending on the course of events.

One in five Ukrainians abroad (24.9%) could not answer the question of how a full-scale war in Ukraine would end.

People who believe in Ukraine's victory emphasise the price we pay every day for this victory. The high human cost of the war, according to some respondents, devalues the victory, as those who have been lost cannot be brought back.

Woman, 31, Kherson ➡ Georgia: "Of course, victory will be on our side, but when will it be and at what cost?... No matter how sad it may look, there will be no winners and losers. Because a large number of people died. The return of the borders to 1991 is, of course, a plus, but no one will return our people. When all the borders are returned, when martial law is cancelled, it will be a victory."

How do you think a full-scale war in Ukraine will end?

This question had 1 answer option

Ukraine will return all its occupied territories to the 1991 borders	48.93%
Ukraine will return all its territories occupied after 24.02.2022	11.96%
Ukraine will return only part of its territories occupied after 24.02.2022	8.79%
Ukraine will not be able to return any territories occupied as of summer 2023	2.60%
Ukraine will lose additional territories	2.85%
Hard to say	24.87%

"The return of all Ukrainian territories to the 1991 borders" is the most common scenario for respondents from all regions of Ukraine. The worse the end of the war scenario is for Ukraine, the lower the share of its supporters.

	Kyiv	North	West	Centre	South	East
Ukraine will return all its occupied territories to the 1991 borders	46.6%	40.4%	58.8%	49.0%	51.1%	47.4%
Ukraine will return all its territories occupied after 24.02.2022	14.4%	15.2%	7.8%	13.6%	12.1%	10.4%
Ukraine will return only part of its territories occupied after 24.02.2022	15.3%	12.1%	2.0%	10.2%	7.6%	8.3%
Ukraine will not be able to return any territories occupied as of summer 2023	0.8%	2.0%	3.9%	2.7%	3.4%	1.7%
Ukraine will lose additional territories	1.7%	0%	2.9%	2.0%	3.0%	4.8%
Difficult to answer	21.2%	30.3%	24.5%	22.4%	22.7%	27.3%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**

If we measure the optimism of the surveyed Ukrainians by their belief in Ukraine's return to its internationally recognised borders of 1991 and in full de-occupation, those in Germany are the most optimistic (55.7%), and those in the Czech Republic are the least optimistic (38.2%). It should be noted that this difference is not due to different visions of other possible options for ending the war (they are almost the same by country of residence), but primarily to the difference in the number of those who could not answer: in Germany, 18.4%, while in the Czech Republic, 29.4%.



D11. How do you think a full-scale war in Ukraine will end? (One answer option)

Timing of the end of the war

The question of predicting when the war will end is a difficult one. Ukrainians abroad are rather reserved in their time forecasts. Thus, only one in five expects the war to end by the spring of next year (8.6% – in autumn 2023 and 11.2% – in winter 2023/24). More than a third of respondents expect the war to end in spring and autumn 2024 (14.4% in spring, 12.9% in summer, and 10.2% in autumn). The majority of respondents believe that the war may not end next year: 18.3% expect it to end by the spring of 2025, and 24.4% – even later.

> **Man, 29, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "I am 100% sure that it will end with our victory. I am not very optimistic that it will end soon. I hope it will be in the next two years."

When do you think the full-scale war in Ukraine is likely to end completely?

This question had 1 answer option

Autumn 2023	8.58%
Winter 2023–2024	11.17%
Spring 2024	14.39%
Summer 2024	12.94%
Autumn 2024	10.22%
Winter 2024–2025	18.27%
Even later	24.43%

Ukrainians in the Czech Republic are more optimistic about the timing of the end of the war: more than half (52.9%) assume that the war will end by autumn next year, another 4.4% – in autumn 2024, 42.7% – in winter 2024/25 or later. Instead, Ukrainians in Germany are the least optimistic about the timing of the war's end: only 43.4% expect the war to end by autumn next year, 10.1% – in autumn 2024, and 46.5% – in winter 2024/25 or later.

Depending on their territorial origin, residents of the South and West of Ukraine are the most optimistic in this regard. The share of those who expect the war to end this autumn is somewhat higher among them than among representatives of other regions – 11.3% (North) and 10.8% (West), compared to 8.3% (East), 7.5% (Centre), 7.1% (North) and 5.1% (Kyiv). Respondents from the North were the most pessimistic in their forecasts of the end of the war: one-third of them (33.3%) believe that the war will not end even by the winter of 2024–2025 or even later. The number of respondents from the West is 28.4%, from the East – 27.7%, from Kyiv – 24.6%, from the South – 19.3%, and from the Centre – 18.4%.

	Kyiv	North	West	Centre	South	East
Autumn 2023	5.1%	7.1%	10.8%	7.5%	11.0%	8.3%
Winter 2023–2024	10.2%	7.1%	14.7%	10.9%	12.9%	10.7%
Spring 2024	14.4%	11.1%	13.7%	15.0%	15.5%	13.5
Summer 2024	10.2%	8.1%	16.7%	20.4%	12.5%	10.7%
Autumn 2024	14.4%	15.2%	2.9%	7.5%	13.3%	8.3%
Winter 2024–2025	21.2%	18.2%	12.7%	20.4%	15.5%	20.8%
Even later	24.6%	33.3%	28.4%	18.4%	19.3%	27.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Ukrainians who do not intend to return home are rather cautious in their timeframe for the end of the war. Among these respondents, the highest number of those who believe that the war will continue in 2025 is 35.7% among those who do not plan to return BEFORE the war ends, and 50.8% among those who do not intend to return AFTER the war ends.

Prospects for recovery

The mood of Ukrainians abroad regarding post-war prospects for recovery and security guarantees is rather reserved. Thus, 14.3% of respondents abroad believe in a quick recovery, security guarantees and further active development, while 22.2% of respondents have a diametrically opposite view – recovery will be long and Ukraine will not receive security guarantees.

If we compare intermediate scenarios – a long recovery with security guarantees and a quick recovery without security guarantees – the vast majority of Ukrainians abroad are inclined to the first scenario (44.1%), while only 4.3% consider the second most likely. It should be noted that 15.1% of respondents were unable to predict how events would develop after the war.

Among those who say they will definitely return to Ukraine (regardless of whether BEFORE or AFTER the war ends), the highest number of supporters of a long recovery with the necessary security guarantees.

Among those who do NOT plan to return to Ukraine BEFORE the end of the war, the share of those who predict a long recovery with the necessary guarantees or a long recovery without the necessary guarantees is 36.6% and 35.1%, respectively. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians who do NOT intend to return to their homeland even AFTER the war ends believe that Ukraine's recovery will be quite long and it will NOT receive the necessary security guarantees.

The most optimistic scenario, "Ukraine will recover quickly, receive the necessary security guarantees, and continue to develop actively", was more often mentioned by those who have some intention of returning to Ukraine (either BEFORE or AFTER the war ends). The majority of optimists are from the West of Ukraine – every fifth (21.6%) believes this scenario to be the most likely for Ukraine's recovery.

What scenario do you think is most likely for Ukraine after a full-scale war?

This question had 1 answer option

Ukraine will recover quickly, receive the necessary security guarantees, and continue to develop actively	14.32%
Ukraine's recovery will be quite long, but it will receive the necessary security guarantees	44.09%
Ukraine will recover quickly, but will NOT receive the necessary security guarantees	4.31%
Ukraine's recovery will be quite long, and it will NOT receive the necessary security guarantees	22.15%
Hard to say	15.13%



D13. Which scenario is most likely for Ukraine after a full-scale war, in your opinion? (One answer option)

There are also certain differences in the vision of Ukraine's post-war development by the country of residence of the respondents. For example, among Ukrainians in Germany, there are somewhat fewer those who consider the worst-case scenario – a long recovery without security guarantees – as the most likely (18.4%), but relatively more who favour an intermediate option – a quick recovery without security guarantees (8.3%). Among those polled in the Czech Republic, there are relatively more supporters of both the most optimistic scenario – a quick recovery with security guarantees and further active development (17.7%) and the most pessimistic scenario – a long recovery without security guarantees (26.5%). The number of those who believe that a long recovery with security guarantees is most likely is also the lowest (33.8%).

Some noted that the duration of Ukraine's recovery will depend on the duration of the war. That is, the longer the war lasts, the longer the recovery will take. Others believe that a generational change is needed for Ukraine to rebuild properly.

> **Woman, 37, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ Canada:** "Depending on how long this conflict lasts. Right now, things are going well, people are holding on, and the economy is doing well. I can't say that everything is as good as it was. I don't know if it will last forever."

> **Woman, 33, Chernihiv ➡ Germany**: "I think the generation has to change, so it's not a quick process."

When assessing the processes in Ukraine from abroad as prerequisites for future recovery, Ukrainians believe that positive changes have already taken place at home. This includes changes in politics and changes in people's personalities. The reforms in Ukraine are also among the positive things.

> **Man, 37, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "There are changes for the better, but they are against the backdrop of terrible traumas that have been inflicted on society and on each individual. That is why there is a complex impact."

> **Man, 33, Zalishchyky (Ternopil oblast) ➡ USA:** "I think the changes have already begun, because there are Ukrainian news and the Internet here. We watch all the news in the morning, in the evening. I see that taxation is different, judicial reforms, everything is different, and changes are coming. I understand that they cannot change like that in one day. There was a lot of corruption that had been developing for 30 years, and it is impossible to destroy it all in such a short period of time. But I think that it will change anyway and it will be better then, it is already changing, it is going to get better."

At the same time, respondents also mentioned negative aspects, such as dishonest volunteering, entrenched corruption and nepotism, bureaucracy, and increased aggression among Ukrainians. However, these things, in the respondents' opinion, are not a priority during the war. Therefore, society simply "turns a blind eye" to them.

> **Man, 33, Kyiv ➡ Germany:** "We all live in bubbles. I can only speak for my environment, I don't know the mood of the majority of Ukrainians. It seems to me that we have had a lot of bureaucracy, corruption, nepotism, and it remains so. But now the perception of values has probably shifted more from all the things I mentioned to the advancement of Ukraine in the war, and people are simply turning a blind eye to this. I really want to

see many guilty people punished and many guilty people imprisoned. To put it briefly, it seems to me that everything has only gotten worse."

Some respondents indicated that as part of their work in Ukraine, they are already involved in the reconstruction of their country; some plan to use their experience abroad; and some hope for international support.

> **Woman, 32, Odesa ➡ Luxembourg**: "The experience I have here can be used in Ukraine. I can use it to work for the private sector, but I can also use it to work in the public sector, in the regulatory field. Because our legislation in this area is developing, it's anti-money laundering and countering the sponsorship of terrorism. And this area is and will continue to develop. This is why Europe is adopting a lot of new directives and acts. Accordingly, Ukraine will be following in the wake. And what has already been implemented and realised here, Ukraine will only implement in the future. This is a promising area for the future."

> **Woman, 42, Melitopol ➡ Germany:** "We hope for economic recovery through the injection of funds, the recovery strategy that is being developed there, through joining the EU, which will ensure *changes in legislation*."

What forced migrants from Ukraine talk about with fear

Despite the fact that most Ukrainians abroad believe that Ukraine will win a full-scale war, they understand the difficulties that the state and its people will have to face in order to restore it. In particular, interviewees voiced the following concerns:

Security. Ukrainians noted that even access to the 1991 borders does not guarantee the absence of a threat to Ukraine from Russia. Moreover, for 37.1% of respondents, the risk that even after the war is over, Russia may attack Ukraine again over time reduces their desire to return from abroad. Ukrainians also fear a frozen conflict, given the experience of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO).

> **Man, 49, Kyiv ➡ Poland:** "That is, unfortunately, even going to the borders of '91 does not guarantee anything. That is, we will reach the borders, and the shelling will continue. This is my view that the problem is in Russia itself. That's why I don't see a point of victory. That is, it is possible when there is a sharp change of power in Russia – so sharp that it will actually be some other state entity."

> **Man, 65, Sloviansk ➡ United Kingdom**: "It [the victory] can only end on our terms, we simply have no other choice. That is, there can be no freezing, no negotiations, no ORDLO, because it is temporary, and it will be very dangerous."

Economic. In this aspect, respondents talked about the likely low wages in Ukraine after the war, the lack of offers on the labour market, risks for businesses, destroyed cities and the problem of housing for those who lost theirs because of the war.

> **Man, 24, Mariupol ➡ Switzerland**: "Even if they give me some kind of accommodation, it's not forever. The most they can give me now is a loan to start a business. But it's a big

risk – you take a loan, the business doesn't work out, and you're left with a loan and temporary accommodation. But I'll see what happens on the economic side in Ukraine."

Woman, 39, Irpin (Kyiv oblast) ➡ France: "Well, to be honest, I just think it will be very difficult to live in Ukraine. Even if the war ends, it will be difficult economically. We are already adults, but what will the future look like for children? There is the danger from Russia, the problem with work, and the fact that they are destroying everything, a lot of things need to be rebuilt."

Social. On the one hand, we are talking about the problem of reintegrating the military into society, and on the other hand, the situation of the families of those killed in the war.

Woman, 31, Chernivtsi ➡ Canada: "Because Ukraine was not stable before the war, and after the war it will be even worse. Sooner or later the war will end, but I think that after the war the situation will be even worse, because there are a lot of people who are injured. People who will come back from the front, people who will return from abroad, families who have lost their fathers, mothers, parents, children, and they will start taking revenge, they will be angry. It seems to me that after the war, the situation in Ukraine will not be very good. Plus, someone who fought in the war is a different kind of person, because if someone was in the frontline areas. If they had any injuries, or what they saw, it has a great impact on the psyche, and I think that this will play on our families for years and decades to come. And somehow, I don't know, it seems to me that it will take a lot of time to recover."

Chapter 6

Concept of state policy on the return of forced migrants to Ukraine

A study of the prospects for the return of forced migrants to Ukraine has shown the need to develop a set of measures to bring several million Ukrainian citizens home. This Concept contains a description of the problems and possible ways to solve them, in particular in terms of formulating a new policy, preventing mass departure and special measures for the return of forced migrants. This Concept can be used in the development of policies on the return of forced migrants.

Description of policy issues

The idea that the mass migration of Ukrainian citizens abroad and their permanent residence there is a problem for Ukraine is directly **related to the threat to Ukraine's existence as a state.** The war with Russia requires significant financial and human resources. Even if hostilities end in the short term, the Russian threat will persist in the medium and long term. At the same time, the post-war economy will require significant intellectual and labour resources to recover. A weak wartime or post-war economy is likely to reduce Ukraine's ability to repel a new Russian attack and its ability to return the temporarily occupied territories. In addition, the weaker Ukraine's economy, the greater its dependence on foreign aid. Therefore, it is important for Ukraine to return millions of its citizens home. To these rather instrumental considerations, we can add other considerations, such as value or emotional ones, or considerations about the nature of the relationship between a nation-state and its citizens and members of its nation, etc. In any case, the return of its citizens is an important task for Ukraine, important in many dimensions. Therefore, **the problem of policy in this context is that Ukrainians have gone abroad and are not returning to Ukraine.** This is a general problem, which can be broken down into more specific problems. In other words, Ukrainian forced migrants have made a decision to leave Ukraine and not to return due to a large number of reasons of various kinds. These reasons can be considered problems that the state should address as part of its policy on the return of forced migrants.

The first group of policy issues is the **decision to leave.** Forced migrants decided to go abroad rather than stay in Ukraine. The study showed that 38% of forced migrants considered staying in Ukraine in safer regions. The UN estimates that the number of forced migrants from Ukraine is 6 million, meaning that at least 2.3 million Ukrainians could have simply not gone abroad, reducing the demographic losses. In-depth interviews showed that people who left, especially in the first days following the invasion, were afraid of an unknown future. While the quantitative sociological survey fleshed out these fears, showing that the decision to leave was influenced mainly by security and socio-economic reasons.

The **security reasons** for leaving included the following[40]:

1. periodic increase in the level of danger;
2. misunderstanding of the scale of hostilities and further developments at the frontline;
3. fear for life due to hostilities close to settlements (to the line of contact);

40 This and other lists in the Concept of the State Policy on the Return of Forced Migrants are based on the results of the study. The data could be obtained both from a quantitative survey and from in-depth interviews. If a certain factor is based solely on in-depth interviews, without direct confirmation (although confirmation may be indirect, through a broader question), we will mark this factor with an asterisk *. This may be due to the lack of a relevant question or answer option – the quantitative survey questionnaire has a limit on the number of questions and answer options, and it is impossible to ask absolutely everything in one survey. In addition, some of the questions and answer options are such that it makes no sense to check them through a quantitative survey, but instead they should be obtained through in-depth interviews.

4. the threat of occupation;
5. experience of living under occupation;
6. fear of rocket attacks;
7. fear that the front line will move and new territories of ukraine will be occupied;
8. fear of a man-made disaster;
9. fear of a frozen conflict*;
10. fear that russia will always pose a threat to ukraine;
11. lack of a clear plan for leaving the high-risk area, leaving "where there was an opportunity and where it was safer"*.

Economic reasons for leaving included the following:

1. loss of income, running out of financial savings/accumulations;
2. inability to fulfil financial obligations (to pay off loans, mortgages, rent housing, support relatives);
3. rising prices and decreased purchasing power*;
4. disadvantages of doing business in ukraine due to imperfect and unadapted legislation*;
5. instability and excessive risks for starting or restoring a business*;
6. war-related risks in attracting loans and investments*;
7. the need to train staff frequently due to dismissals and relocations*;
8. unfavourable prospects for business development in ukraine after the war*;
9. job loss, unemployment;
10. lack of job security even in the short term*;
11. lower wages than abroad.

As for the specific reasons why **Ukrainians chose to go abroad rather than to relatively safe regions** of Ukraine, they were as follows:

1. lack of relatives, friends, acquaintances in safe regions;
2. the perception of lower chances of finding a well-paid job or other part-time work in ukraine than abroad*;
3. perception that social benefits in ukraine are lower than abroad*;
4. difficulties in finding rental housing due to high demand and, consequently, higher rental costs in relatively safe regions of ukraine*;
5. perceptions of harassment of russian-speaking people in western ukraine and perceptions of poor treatment of internally displaced persons from eastern regions who are predominantly russian-speaking*.

Under the influence of these factors, Ukrainians have decided to move abroad, and this has already become a problem. However, millions of people have already made this decision, and it will

not be possible to rewind time and convince them not to leave at all. Now these people need to be persuaded to return. The study showed that once abroad, forced migrants decide whether to return home or stay abroad by comparing various aspects of life in Ukraine and the host country. Accordingly, **the problem for Ukraine begins when it loses the comparison with the host country.** Obviously, Ukraine is losing in the security situation, as there is no full-scale war and no constant shelling in the host country. Unfortunately, Ukraine is also losing in some aspects of life, such as the economy, healthcare, education, public safety, transport, environment, etc.

Economic benefits abroad:

1. more opportunities for employment abroad;
2. more loyal working conditions abroad for highly qualified employees;
3. more transparent and fair employment system*;
4. higher salaries;
5. advantages when doing business abroad.

Advantages of the healthcare system abroad:

1. free medical insurance*;
2. promptness of ambulance service*;
3. medical facilities are equipped with modern equipment and highly qualified staff*;
4. preventive medicine policy*;
5. access to medical care or critical medicines, which was not the case in ukraine during the war.

Advantages of education abroad:

1. “healthy” interpersonal interaction between children and teachers, based on respect for the student, taking into account the characteristics of each child, i.e. on the approach “every child should be seen as a person”;
2. career guidance work with children, which begins in the 6th and 7th grades abroad,
3. availability of assistants for teachers;
4. free material support for schools (including meals for students);
5. the ability to choose study subjects.

Advantages of public safety abroad:

1. illuminated streets at night*;
2. installed video surveillance cameras*;
3. constant patrolling of streets or other public gathering places (schools, parks, sports complexes, etc.)*.

Advantages of transport abroad:

1. high-quality and comfortable vehicles*;
2. high-quality road surface;
3. clear schedule of public transport (intensity, adherence to the schedule)*;
4. digitalisation of transport infrastructure*.

Advantages of environmental policy abroad:

1. availability of more waste sorting bins*,
2. noticeably clean streets and parks*,
3. absence of open ground, and therefore dust*,
4. clean water*,
5. mandatory return of plastic bottles for recycling*.

Three more, deeper and more important problems in Ukraine are worth highlighting:

1. Corruption – Ukrainians abroad have gained experience of living without corruption, when there are uniform, fair rules of life for everyone, and the state and everything related to it can exist without additional incentives not provided for by law.
2. Infrastructural destruction – systemic damage to energy, utilities, and housing infrastructure for a long time reduces the attractiveness of Ukraine as a comfortable enough country to live in.
3. The problem of reintegrating the military into society – some respondents fear the "long-term" consequences of the war, including PTSD. This, in turn, leads to a deeper problem: prolonged stay abroad deepens the ideological and psycho-emotional distance between those abroad and those who were in Ukraine.

Of course, not everything abroad is perfect, there are many shortcomings and aspects that are better in Ukraine (more on this later), but this is not a policy issue in this context. On the contrary, the difficulties and disadvantages of living abroad encourage Ukrainians to return home. The **policy problem is the gradual adaptation of Ukrainians to life abroad**, overcoming the difficulties and discomfort of living in the host country, gradual socialisation, employment, and settling down, including the creation of new families in the host country.

Another problem for the return of Ukrainians from abroad is the lack of a policy in this area (at least in the public sphere, there is nothing known about this policy or the intention to create it). That is, there are no coordinated and targeted actions by the state. The above-mentioned problems are not being solved and no solutions are being developed. Moreover, individual actions and statements by government officials reduce the level of readiness of Ukrainians to return rather than stimulate it. For example, the prosecution of men who have gone abroad. However, we should not forget that the issue of returning forced migrants is only one of many on the agenda. The main task for the state is to preserve its statehood. Perhaps for this purpose, such statements are really necessary. In other words, the return of forced migrants is an important tool, but not an end in itself.

Possible ways to solve the problems

Policy making

Before considering policy options, it is worth considering the zero policy alternative – no policy is formed, and the **state takes no action to return** forced migrants to Ukraine. In a sense, this option is the cheapest – it does not require additional funding. At the same time, the costs of implementing this policy would have to be offset by the benefits of returning forced migrants. Therefore, the key question is whether the state can influence the decision of a forced migrant to return to Ukraine. At present, it is difficult to answer this question unequivocally. It is difficult for any social science to make accurate predictions due to the complexity and multidimensionality of society as a whole and each individual person in particular. The study of forced migrants has shown that at least some of the factors that lead to the return of forced migrants are those that the state can (positively or negatively) influence. Therefore, this null alternative can neither be definitively rejected nor accepted as sufficiently justified. Further research, in particular on the behaviour of forced migrants under the influence of various factors, may allow for a more in-depth analysis of the strength and cost of different policy alternatives and an understanding of the attractiveness of the zero and other alternatives.

In order to implement the policy, **at least a framework for its implementation and an institution responsible for it are needed.** The policy on return of forced migrants should be based on a **programme document** (e.g. Strategy or State Target Programme), which will specify the objectives, content (measures), policies, performance indicators, timeframe, amount and sources of funding, and responsible authorities. An important part of such a programme document should also include a plan for legislative changes. This programme document and its components should be developed with the involvement of various stakeholders, based on the results of public discussion.

The strategy of returning forced migrants can help solve another important task, namely, to play an important **role in the reconstruction** of Ukraine. The fact is that many communities, especially in the east and south of Ukraine, have experienced a decline in their population, both due to physical destruction by the Russian army and mass migration abroad. And the study showed that only half of the residents of the east plan to return home even after the war ends. In other words, in addition to the general demographic crisis, some settlements have felt this crisis particularly acutely. It can be somewhat mitigated by the planned return of forced migrants to Ukraine, their more planned distribution across regions, with the possibility of incentives to return to priority communities.

Another important focus of the Strategy should be on young people – children and the younger generation. Research has shown that the younger a forced migrant is, the less likely they are to return to Ukraine.

We do not suggest an exhaustive list of specific measures for such a Strategy, as we neither held separate consultations with stakeholders nor set out to develop a final version of this document. Therefore, it is not appropriate to propose a complete draft of such a document at this time. However, it is possible to consider some potential directions of measures for the return of forced migrants, as well as to outline who may be responsible for its development and implementation.

Currently, there are three potential candidates for the role of the **institution responsible for the development, coordination and implementation of the policy** on the return of forced migrants. These are the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ministry of Reintegration or a new specially created body. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages.

The Ministry of Social Policy was established a long time ago and therefore has a strong institutional capacity. In addition, the Ministry of Social Policy can provide social services to forced migrants, facilitating the process of adaptation upon their return. It is the competence of the Ministry of Social Policy to deal with issues of "*demographic development, regulation of migration flows*"[41] and these are directly related to the return of forced migrants. Such competences also mean the availability of knowledge that can help develop a policy on the return of forced migrants. One of the disadvantages of the Ministry of Social Policy as an institution responsible for the return of forced migrants is its prominent role in many existing policy areas. This means that the return of forced migrants may not be a priority for the already busy Ministry. As a result, the efficiency and quality of this policy may be low. If this Ministry is designated as responsible for the policy of returning forced migrants, it would be logical to make the **Verkhovna Rada Committee on Social Policy** responsible for this policy as well. Currently, this Committee does not deal with migration issues.

Issues such as "*r*efugees" and "*cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organisation for Migration*"[42] are within the competence of the **Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights,** De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations. Such subjects of jurisdiction are quite well-established (they were in many convocations of the Verkhovna Rada, long before 2022) and relate primarily to foreign refugees who came to Ukraine, in particular to the observance of their rights. Therefore, this Committee should have a certain level of expertise in dealing with refugees (although we mainly use the term "forced migrants" in this study, Ukrainian legislation uses the term "refugees" in this case). However, this is rather a tangential area related to the return of Ukrainian forced migrants from abroad, rather than a ready-made unambiguous basis for the development of a policy making centre for the return of forced migrants within this Committee. Nevertheless, there is another argument for making this Committee responsible for such a policy – it is already responsible for a category similar to forced migrants, internally displaced persons. Its terms of reference include *"the excersice of the rights and freedoms of internally displaced persons and the creation of conditions for the voluntary return of such persons to their abandoned place of residence"*. That is, the Human Rights Committee should have expert knowledge in this area, and this knowledge, in turn, is relevant to the issue of return of forced migrants.

There are similar arguments for designating the **Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories** as the responsible body for the formation, coordination and implementation of the policy on the return of forced migrants. It currently deals with a category similar to forced migrants – internally displaced persons – and the competence of this Ministry includes "*ensuring the formation and implementation of state policy on issues of: ...internally displaced persons and citizens of Ukraine who have left their place of residence in the temporarily occupied territory as a result of or in order to avoid the negative consequences of the armed conflict and/or temporary occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine and have* ***moved abroad (hereinafter referred to as persons who have moved abroad****), promoting the exercise of their rights and freedoms and creating conditions for the voluntary return of such persons to their abandoned place of residence or integration at a new place of residence*". That is, at the level

41 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/423-2015-%D0%BF#Text

42 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/19-20#Text

of the Regulation[43], this Ministry is already authorised to formulate and implement a policy on persons who have gone abroad because of the armed conflict and to create conditions for their voluntary return home. In addition, in June 2022, the Commissioner for Internally Displaced Persons[44] was also appointed at the regulatory level, who, among other things, would have to deal with persons who have moved abroad. However, the Ministry does not have (at least according to the information on the Ministry's website) structural units that are supposed to deal with persons who have moved abroad due to the armed conflict. The website also does not contain information on any activities of the Ministry or the Commissioner in the area of return of forced migrants. Amendments to the Regulation of the Ministry of Reintegration, which extended its competence to persons who have left abroad, were adopted in 2020, when the focus was on persons who left the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The share of residents of these territories who moved abroad was insignificant. This approach continued in 2022, when, despite the millions of forced migrants abroad, the main focus of the Ministry and the Commissioner is still on internally displaced persons (and their number has also increased significantly since 24.02.2022), and there is no information on activities related to forced migrants abroad. This can also be seen at the level of policy documents – while there are several iterations of policy documents on internally displaced persons[45, 46], there is no Strategy on forced migrants.

Thus, the Ministry of Reintegration has the regulatory basis for developing and implementing a policy on the return of forced migrants, and it also has experience and knowledge of working with internally displaced persons. These are arguments in favour of this Ministry actually being responsible for the policy of return of forced migrants. The arguments against this decision lie precisely in the Ministry's focus on internally displaced persons and institutional inertia, which causes difficulties with the formation of new rules of work in a policy area that is not new to this Ministry.

The third option is to **create a new body** that will formulate, coordinate and implement the policy of return of forced migrants. This could be a State Agency under the coordination of another ministry or an independent executive body. The undoubted advantage of such an agency is the ability to focus exclusively on the issue of return of forced migrants. At the same time, such an agency may face organisational challenges in its work – the need to create a regulatory, personnel, and logistical framework for its work from scratch.

There are four other institutions that may be important for the policy of forced migrant return. Perhaps they even deserve the role of a focal point for such a policy, or at least should be involved in the implementation and coordination of activities. These include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Community, Territories and Infrastructure Development (Ministry of R ecovery) and local self-government bodies, and the Ministry of Culture.

The **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** and embassies should play a key role in the return of forced migrants. Among the special measures for the return of forced migrants, coordination with host countries and communication with forced migrants are very important. The experience and capacity of the MFA to work abroad make it the most appropriate ministry to perform these two functions within the overall Return Strategy. It is debatable whether this ministry should be the

43 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/376-2016-%D0%BF/ed20200516

44 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/740-2022-%D0%BF#n56

45 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1364-2021-%D1%80#Text

46 https://minre.gov.ua/2023/04/07/uryad-shvalyv-strategiyu-derzhavnoyi-polityky-shhodo-vnutrishnogo-peremishhennya-na-period-do-2025-roku/

primary authority responsible for return of forced migrants. The MFA, for all its advantages, has a slightly different focus – foreign policy, while the return of migrants is a matter of domestic policy that requires the use of foreign policy tools (incidentally, a somewhat similar situation exists with the supply of arms). However, the need for significant involvement of the MFA in such policy and its coordination is undeniable.

The **Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development** within the executive branch of government is supposed to be responsible for Ukraine's recovery from the consequences of Russian aggression. That is why it is semi-officially called the Ministry of Recovery. The return of forced migrants is an important component of Ukraine's recovery, especially the demographic recovery. It is this ministry that is most likely to be the executive body responsible for formulating and implementing Ukraine's recovery policy. The strategy for the return of forced migrants should be part of a broader Recovery Plan. Therefore, it is advisable to designate the Ministry of Recovery as the body that should be involved in the development and implementation of the Strategy for the Return of Forced Migrants, at least at the level of coordination between the Recovery Plan of Ukraine and the Strategy for the Return of Forced Migrants. Moreover, the Ministry of Recovery can coordinate the policy of return of forced migrants at the local level, as it is the ministry that is supposed to formulate and implement the *"state regional policy"*[47]. However, the designation of this particular Ministry as the main one in the system of policy making on the return of forced migrants may be somewhat problematic for several reasons. First, the Ministry of Recovery was created by merging the Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministry of Infrastructure, which is already a rather large structure with a large number of tasks, and thus forced migrants are unlikely to be a central priority for this Ministry. Secondly, this Ministry has no focus on foreign communication or work with migrants, which means it is less competent (compared to some other ministries) to formulate policies aimed at forced migrants.

Communities are also important for coordinating the return of forced migrants. Some communities critically need the return of forced migrants for their existence and recovery. Moreover, communities may be interested in competing for forced migrants who want to return to Ukraine but are unsure of where to go. Separate structural units could even be created for this purpose. Local recovery plans for the medium and long term should take into account the factor of return or non-return of forced migrants, as this will determine their income and needs (expenditures), what they should or should not build. At the same time, it should be understood that the capacity of communities to conduct a full-fledged return policy is extremely limited – they do not have adequate access to foreign governments, the ability to collect data on forced migrants, or to communicate directly with a large audience of forced migrants. In other words, it is doubtful that communities will be able to significantly influence whether forced migrants will return, but they can influence where forced migrants will return to.

An important part of the return of forced migrants is also the intangible component – the perception of society in Ukraine about forced migrants and the perception of forced migrants about society in Ukraine. This is partly a matter of a communication campaign. However, such a campaign will inevitably rely on broader perceptions, stereotypes, and images. Therefore, the **Ministry of Culture** can play an important role here, in particular through state support (among other important topics) for those cultural products (exhibitions, films, performances, concerts, etc.) that will address the issue of forced migrants and the moral dilemmas associated with it.

47 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/460-2015-%D0%BF#n491

The **President** could also complement the interaction at the level of the Cabinet of Ministers and parliamentary committees by creating, for example, the position of the **Commissioner or the Coordination Council on the Return of Forced Migrants.** It is unlikely that these structures will have any formal powers, but given the current system of power distribution, systematic involvement of the President in the formulation and coordination of the policy on return of forced migrants can play an important role in ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of such a policy.

To conclude the description of the alternatives for identifying the body responsible for the development and implementation of the policy of return of forced migrants, it should be noted that this issue is open and almost unresolved. This means that the selection of such a body can be guided primarily by the logic of the distribution of power and responsibility in the Ukrainian government. There are no significant obstacles from the perspective of legislative regulation, or institutional continuity, or institutional capacity to identify a particular institution responsible for such a policy.

Preventing mass exodus

The problem of increasing the number of Ukrainians travelling abroad due to the consequences of the war is still relevant. **New waves of migration** can also occur during this phase of the conflict, for example, due to new Russian offensives (last winter, forecasts of an offensive from Belarus were actively circulating), or man-made disasters (as happened with the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant and there are fears about the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant), or a new wave of large-scale shelling of energy infrastructure. A new massive wave of forced migrants may also occur in the future if Russia attacks Ukraine after this phase of the conflict is over. Therefore, it is important to **limit these future possible waves of forced migrants.** It is unlikely that this policy will be able to limit the immediate causes of the decision to leave their homes (prevention of disasters or new attacks). Instead, the solution may be to make it more attractive to move to other regions of Ukraine rather than abroad. Taking into account the fears and concerns expressed by forced migrants, this goal can be achieved through two areas of action: **information and a centralised contingency plan.** However, these areas and specific measures are rather tentative, as they were developed without additional consultations with stakeholders and additional analysis of international experience, cost and capacity to take such actions.

Among the fears of forced migrants, they often mentioned the unknown, fear of an uncertain future, panic, and a special mental state. **Ukraine could eliminate this fear of the unknown** by simply informing them. This could be informing about the advantages of safe regions of Ukraine over those abroad, or an algorithm of actions in emergency situations. It may also include overcoming myths and stereotypes, such as those that have led some residents of eastern and southern Ukraine to be prejudiced against residents of western regions (including fear for their safety) and to travel abroad. An important element may be the provision of psychological assistance to help some people overcome their shock and make rational decisions.

Another area is to ensure that the **departure from the place of residence is organised.** This can also help eliminate uncertainty. And if the decision-making process is rational, it can serve as an argument for staying in Ukraine. Measures in this area may include organising relocation, providing at least temporary food and accommodation, and opportunities for psychological assistance. In this context, it is important to improve the situation of internally displaced persons, in particular, the issue of adaptation of internally displaced persons in new settlements, their employment, social security, and accommodation (for example, increasing the number of modular towns). These are issues that fall within the competence of the Ministry of Reintegration. It is worth noting that

we have not conducted a separate study on the situation of internally displaced persons and cannot assess whether it is better than the situation of persons who have moved abroad.

Limiting hasty actions and shock (one of the two most popular reasons for leaving is a severe difficult psychological state) of potential forced migrants can ensure the creation of conditions for a **cooling off period**. Such a cooling-off period (lasting, for example, 1–2 days) can be ensured by having a potential forced migrant stay for a certain period of time in an evacuation centre, where the person is provided with basic necessities, psychological assistance, and is introduced to accommodation and employment opportunities in safe regions of Ukraine, social assistance for internally displaced persons, etc. Evacuation centres can be located both near the border and in cities that are intermediate points along the evacuation route.

Improvement of living conditions in Ukraine

Among the conditions for their return, Ukrainian forced migrants mentioned not only issues related to the end of the war, but also non-military issues that directly affect Ukraine. In particular, these are the issues of finding a high-paying job (32% indicated this condition for return), fighting corruption (20% indicated this condition for return), raising incomes and living standards (11% indicated this condition for return), developing entrepreneurship, and investing (7% indicated this condition for return). In addition, 60.3% of respondents indicated that they were **deterred from returning to Ukraine by the expectation of a poor quality of life in Ukraine after the war.** Respondents also mentioned the need to improve education, healthcare, environmental protection and other areas of life.

In other words, **socio-economic and other reforms** that will improve the quality of life and create many well-paid jobs, combined with the fight against corruption, **will have a significant positive impact on the return of forced migrants home.** However, this is a goal, an end product of certain reforms. It is likely that more than one reform will be needed to achieve these goals, dozens of policy changes and a rather long-lasting change in attitudes, values and culture. These goals are not new or unusual for Ukrainian politics. Perhaps **all generations of Ukrainian politicians since 1991 have tried to achieve, or at least declared, such goals.** That is why the need for return of forced migrants is unlikely to have a significant impact on the prospects of these reforms. Accordingly, such general reforms do not seem to be worth considering in the specific context of the policy of return of forced migrants. Moreover, it is difficult and dangerous (for the reforms themselves) to make specific recommendations in various areas of life (living standards, education, healthcare, etc.) based solely on the perceptions of forced migrants.

Special measures for the return of forced migrants

Econometric modelling has shown that it is the **standard of living abroad in the host country that is the most important factor** determining the decision to return or not to return forced migrants. Therefore, a significant part of the work on the return of forced migrants should be carried out not so much in Ukraine as abroad. **Communication with host countries and coordination of activities with them seem to be critically important for the return policy.** This is not only a question of communication with the governmental structures of the host country, but also cooperation with non-governmental organisations – international and national organisations working with forced migrants, organisations of forced migrants abroad. At the same time, more specific coordinated measures should be an integral part of the overall Strategy for the Return of Forced Migrants.

The statements of Polish officials about the suspension of payments to Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland[48] prove both the relevance of communication and coordination with foreign governmental and non-governmental bodies and the relevance of the Strategy for the Return of Forced Migrants. This Strategy can ensure an organised and efficient return process. Forced migrants in Poland will face a strong incentive (loss of benefits, which for most constitute their only source of income or a significant part of it) to change their current situation. Ukrainians in Poland are likely to be forced to either urgently look for work, move to another country, or return to Ukraine.

However, these are only predictions; if Poland actually stops making payments, it will be important to study the impact of such a measure on forced migrants from Ukraine. This knowledge will allow us to more accurately predict the behaviour and future dynamics of forced migrants. It can also be assumed that organised interaction with forced migrants, in particular through governmental and non-governmental structures, could increase the share of those who choose to return to Ukraine.

The next area of action is to **ensure adaptation conditions for forced migrants** in Ukraine. This may include financial, legal, psychological, logistical or other types of assistance to facilitate the process of returning home. However, the study did not show that the provision of such assistance would be decisive for the decision of forced migrants to return home. More significant assistance may be the **restoration of housing.** This raises the question of prioritising the order of housing restoration, as not only forced migrants but also internally displaced persons will need it, and each group includes people with different income levels, number of children, and disabilities. A non-transparent and unclear mechanism for allocating the priority of housing restoration will have negative consequences for public trust and will definitely not contribute to the return of forced migrants. This priority should be an integral part of the overall Recovery Plan and possibly the Return Strategy, in order to allow forced migrants to plan their future actions. Another area worth highlighting is education. The issue of integration and adaptation of children of forced migrants to the **Ukrainian educational system** upon return must be resolved. For older children and students, the issue of re-entry or resumption of studies in Ukrainian higher education institutions after their stay abroad will be relevant. Educational issues relate not only to substantive adaptation, but also to the formal recognition and crediting of educational achievements abroad in Ukrainian educational institutions.

An important area of work is the **collection and analysis of data on forced migrants.** Ukraine, including the institution responsible for the policy of returning forced migrants, needs to understand how many forced migrants are in each country, who these people are, their socio-demographic characteristics, and better understand their intentions and plans for the near future. This is necessary for a more effective and informed process of their return to Ukraine, in particular for policy planning in Ukraine. In addition, the process of establishing agreements on this data will allow establishing the necessary contacts with governmental and non-governmental structures in the countries of residence of forced migrants, which in turn can be the basis for further cooperation on the return of these people to Ukraine. Establishing contacts and collecting data is a fairly cheap process and can (and should) take place before the end of the war, even if the process of returning forced migrants takes place later. the next step after collecting data should of course be its analysis, along with existing studies of forced migrants. This analysis should form the basis for data-driven policy making.

48 https://www.unian.ua/world/u-polshchi-zayavili-pro-pripinennya-dopomogi-ukrajinskim-bizhencyam-nastupnogo-roku-12398229.html

Another area is communication activities. Communication measures can take the form of social advertising, mobile applications, mail, TV channels broadcasting abroad, and organisations of forced migrants. This specific form will depend on the budget and capacity of the body responsible for the policy of returning forced migrants to Ukraine, as well as the relevant Strategy. There are several types of communication activities that can take place within the framework of a forced migrant return policy, some of which should take place in Ukraine and some abroad. The activities in Ukraine should relate to communication with the "magnets" of forced migrants in Ukraine. For example, communication with employers to encourage the return of forced migrants who work remotely. Or communication with the relatives of forced migrants – only 5.2% of respondents indicated that they had no relatives in Ukraine, and for others, these relatives, as well as close friends, would be an incentive to return.

As for communication activities abroad that should be aimed at forced migrants, there are four fairly clear areas:

Communication campaign matrix	Pull factors	Push factors
Ukraine	Emphasising, highlighting	Debunking myths, reformulating, downplaying
Host countries	Debunking myths, reformulating, downplaying	Emphasising, highlighting

A striking example of such communication activities is the issue of financial opportunities. In both the in-depth interviews and the quantitative survey, a clear contrast can be drawn – in Ukraine, forced migrants had fairly prestigious jobs, but [at least in absolute terms] low incomes, while abroad, earnings may be higher, but the work is usually low-skilled, non-prestigious, and often involves working longer hours and [physically] in more difficult conditions. The following two tables of responses to the quantitative survey illustrate this contrast well. Almost half of the respondents have either definitely (28.1% gave a score of "7") or almost definitely (13.4% gave a score of "6") faced the situation of not being able to get a highly skilled job abroad. However, almost two thirds, as shown in the second table, believe that the monetary amount of remuneration is exactly the same or rather better abroad. And the following two quotes from in-depth interviews show a holistic picture of higher salaries in non-prestigious jobs.

In your opinion, how likely is it that in the near future you will face the inability to get a highly skilled job in your host country without knowing the language in that country?

This question had 1 answer option

1 – this will definitely not happen to me in the near future	18.47%
2	7.73%
3	8.84%
4	12.73%
5	10.69%
6	13.38%
7 – this will definitely happen in the near future or has already happened to me here	28.14%

This question had 1 answer option

	Career opportunities	Cash salary after tax
Definitely better in Ukraine	22.48%	8.64%
Rather better in Ukraine	19.00%	4.19%
Slightly better in Ukraine	4.98%	5.06%
The same	22.02%	7.98%
Slightly better in the host country	7.61%	9.74%
Rather better in the country of residence	11.60%	18.41%
Definitely better in the host country	12.31%	45.99%

> **Woman, 41, Kherson ➡ Poland:** "No, I am constantly looking for a job. I took my diploma and all my talents – no one needs it here, because Ukrainians generally only work in factories, plants, warehouses for 10–12 hours a day, can you imagine? How is this possible? Although there, for example, a woman can earn $800–1000. But to be honest, it's a death sentence."

> **Woman, 39, Zhovkva (Lviv Oblast) ➡ Poland:** "But this attitude towards Ukrainians is a little bit of mindset: so you have arrived, now you will take all our jobs, so better get a cleaning job. I don't refuse, I can clean, I can do anything, but when you realise that there is a shortage of these nurses and you apply, I apply for a job in a hospital, just not to clean toilets. And that really threw me off."

However, such confrontations exist not only in the area of skilled work in Ukraine versus high-paying jobs abroad. Such areas as healthcare or education also have different pros and cons in Ukraine and abroad. Building the right communication strategy, in particular as part of a broader Return of Forced Migrants Strategy, can be a relatively inexpensive way to influence intentions to return to Ukraine. A detailed description of the various areas targeted by forced migrants is available in the study and in this Concept. However, it is also worth mentioning those factors of life abroad that discourage Ukrainians from staying there.

Economic factors that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. gradual reduction of the level of assistance to Ukrainians abroad*;
2. high cost of utilities abroad*;
3. difficult conditions for starting a business abroad, including the need to have significant start-up capital due to the higher cost of commercial real estate lease, high wage rates for employees, high tax rates, high cost of utilities, etc.

Employment-related factors that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. inability to find a job due to insufficient foreign language skills, unconfirmed diploma; the need for additional training;
2. long and exhausting process of obtaining a well-paid job abroad; instability and seasonality (the need to change jobs frequently)*;

3. labour discrimination: on the basis of age or nationality*;
4. stereotypes about the suitability of Ukrainians for low-skilled labour only*;
5. difficulties in combining work and childcare*;
6. difficulties with remote work in Ukraine*.

Factors related to medical services that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. problems with access to healthcare,
2. high cost of private healthcare*;
3. bureaucracy in the medical sector*,
4. "passivity" of medical care in case of insufficiently severe symptoms*.

Factors related to educational services that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. financial inaccessibility of kindergartens*,
2. long waiting lists for kindergartens abroad*,
3. lower level of knowledge provided by foreign schools compared to ukrainian schools*.

Factors related to the transport sector that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. congestion during rush hour abroad*,
2. poor junctions outside megacities*,
3. travelling abroad is much more expensive than in Ukraine*.

Factors related to the service sector that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. significant restrictions on the amount of cash that can be withdrawn per day*;
2. bureaucracy – lengthy procedures, the need to provide a large number of documents, mostly paper-based workflow, etc.*;
3. slow operation of internet banking and a minimal set of options available*;
4. the need to make an appointment to visit a bank*;
5. time-consuming production of a bank card and its receipt through a physical postal address*;
6. inability to conduct financial transactions in a bank if you do not have an account there*;
7. worse quality of catering services than in ukraine*;
8. low-quality but expensive beauty services abroad*.

Factors related to the search for housing that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. overcrowding of large cities abroad with forced migrants from ukraine*;
2. high cost of rental housing*;

3. challenging conditions for obtaining rental housing (requirements to pay in advance for a long period (six months to a year), bureaucracy)*;
4. long search time due to high demand for rental housing abroad*;
5. refusal to rent to Ukrainians with pets*;
6. difficulties in searching, including due to discrimination against Ukrainians on the basis of nationality, etc.*;
7. the need to have guarantors/sponsors, good credit history, official status of staying abroad, sometimes – official employment in the country of destination*.

Factors related to general adaptation that discourage Ukrainians from staying abroad:

1. lack of contacts in the host country;
2. disorientation due to lack of understanding of how things work abroad*;
3. bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining residence status*;
4. apathy and psychological stress of staying abroad*;
5. low level of foreign language skills, which complicates the process of adaptation abroad, labour and educational socialisation;
6. gradual decline in the level of support for Ukrainians abroad due to negative economic consequences for host countries, sometimes passivity of Ukrainians abroad, and their high demands*;
7. cases of discrimination against Ukrainians abroad: in the labour market – in terms of giving preference to residents of the country for employment, lower wages than those of indigenous people with the same job positions and workload;
8. manifestations of xenophobia towards Ukrainians abroad*;
9. difference in mentality between Ukrainians and foreigners, which psychologically burdens and complicates the adaptation and assimilation of forced migrants abroad.

Annexes

Annex 1.



Methodology for building an econometric model of the impact of factors on the probability of return of forced migrants to Ukraine before and after the war

General logic of the approach

At the stage of developing the questionnaire, the future model of the factors influencing the likelihood of forced migrants returning to Ukraine before and after the end of the war was laid down in the theoretical basis of the questionnaire.

The theoretical basis was grounded in the fact that the decision to return to Ukraine is made by forced migrants based on a number of factors that can be divided into the following groups:

1. *How well a person has settled abroad, how long they have been there, whether their relatives or significant others have moved with them (we assume that the better a person has settled and the more of their loved ones are abroad together with them, the less likely they are to return to Ukraine). The group of factors is represented by the following survey questions:*

- When did you arrive in the country you are currently in?
- Which of your family members/relatives are also currently staying in...
- Please rate your level of knowledge of the language of the country you are in.
- How would you assess your financial situation abroad?
- How would you rate your living conditions abroad?
- What is your current employment status? (Answer options "I have a job in this country" and "I am studying in educational institutions of the host country".

2. *Whether the person has important objective reasons or motives for returning to Ukraine, such as relatives or friends who remain in Ukraine, having a business, suitable housing, other property in Ukraine, etc., or whether the person has a relatively positive assessment of the level of security in Ukraine now (we assume that the more such "magnets" a person has in Ukraine, the more likely they are to return to Ukraine). The group of factors is represented by the following survey questions:*

- Which of your family members/close friends are in Ukraine (permanent residence, did not leave with you or have already returned)?
- What of the following do you (your family) own in Ukraine? Please indicate the usable property
- What is your current employment status? (answer option "I continue to work remotely at the job I had before the war")
- How would you assess the overall security situation in Ukraine today?

3. *How much a forced migrant likes the current host country compared to Ukraine. This group refers to satisfaction with a wide range of issues of life in the host country, ranging from purely practical (e.g., opening hours of shops, public transport, etc.) to more general ones (e.g., the closeness of the mentality of the host country's population). A detailed list of factors is contained in the corresponding question of the questionnaire*

(we assume that the more a person likes the current host country in terms of these criteria compared to Ukraine, the less likely they are to return to Ukraine). The group of factors is represented by the following survey questions:

- Now, please rate various aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in [host country] for you personally. Please use a scale where 1 is definitely better in Ukraine and 7 is definitely better in the host country (the list contained 37 indicators).

4. *Expectations of certain problems in the host country or fears about the host country. Again, this group refers to a number of criteria, such as an assessment of the likelihood of losing a job, losing financial support, experiencing discrimination on ethnic grounds, etc. (we assume that the higher the risks or fears about the host country, the more inclined a person will be to return to Ukraine). The group of factors is represented by the following survey questions:*

- In your opinion, how likely is it that you will encounter the following phenomena/events in the country of residence in the near future? Use a 7-point scale to answer, where 1 — this will definitely not happen to me, 7 — this will definitely happen or has already happened to me here (the list contains 10 indicators)

5. *Expectations regarding the timing and scenarios of the end of the war in Ukraine, as well as scenarios of the post-war situation and reconstruction in Ukraine (we assume that the more optimistic a person is about these criteria, the more likely he or she is to return to Ukraine). The group of factors is represented by the following survey questions:*

- How do you think a full-scale war in Ukraine will end?
- When do you think a full-scale war in Ukraine is likely to end?
- What scenario do you think is most likely for Ukraine after a full-scale war?

Statistical analysis and modelling

A combination of methods was used to build the impact model, including factor analysis in conjunction with regression analysis. A number of less important technical procedures were also used in the preliminary preparation of the data.

The preliminary factor analysis was applied separately to respondents' answers to the following questions:

- Now, please rate different aspects/conditions of life in Ukraine before the full-scale war and in [country of residence] for you personally. Please use a scale where 1 is definitely better in Ukraine and 7 is definitely better in [host country]" — The question contained 37 criteria.
- In your opinion, how likely is it that you will experience the following phenomena/events in the near future in [host country]? Use a 7-point scale to answer, where 1 — this will definitely not happen to me, 7 — this will definitely happen or has already happened to me here.

The purpose of using factor analysis for these questions was to reduce the dimensionality of the data and to reduce/remove the problem of multicollinearity for further analysis. Factor analysis was performed using the principal components method with Equamax rotation.

The factors obtained from these two questions separately, as well as the other variables described above, were used as independent variables in a linear regression model, the dependent variable

in which at the first stage was the short-term probability of returning to Ukraine (answer to the question "D1. How likely is it that you will return to live in Ukraine before the end of the war? To answer, move the slider between the options – the left, the lower the probability, the right, the higher the probability"), and in the second stage – the long-term probability (answer to the question "D2. How likely is it that you will return to live in Ukraine after the war is completely over? To answer, move the slider between the options – the left, the lower the probability, the right, the higher the probability").

Calculating the importance of the factors of probability of returning to Ukraine

The calculation of the importance of different factors is based on the coefficients of influence of all these factors on the probability of return in the final regression model (standardised regression coefficients were used). The calculation was done separately for the model of return to Ukraine before the end of the war and after the end of the war. This makes it possible to compare the relative impact of different factors on the short-term and long-term intentions of forced migrants to return to Ukraine.

The regression coefficients reflect the impact of each factor on the probability of return when the corresponding factor changes. For ease of understanding, the aggregate impact (in the sense described above) was taken as 100%, and for each factor, the relative impact was calculated, which for the aggregate of factors adds up to 100%. Further, the relative influence of the factors belonging to each of the 5 content groups (see the General Logic of the Approach section) was grouped (summed) to obtain an estimate of the overall influence (importance) of each of the 5 content groups of factors as defined above. The names of the groups of factors were formulated based on the content of the factors that we assigned to a particular group according to the logic of the theoretical approach.

A detailed description of the direction and strength of influence of various factors, as well as substantive groups of factors, on the short- and long-term intentions of forced migrants to return to Ukraine is provided at the end of Section 5.1. "How and where do forced migrants from Ukraine see their future". The presented results reflect the average impact of the factors considered for the entire population of surveyed forced migrants (without reflecting the likely specifics of individual subgroups of the sample).