Following the start of Russia’s invasion, parliamentary diplomacy has become one of the key channels of Ukraine’s foreign policy advocacy. Whereas inter-parliamentary cooperation had previously been unsystematic and unstructured and was perceived as parliamentary tourism rather than an instrument for advancing national interests, since 2022, the voice of the Verkhovna Rada has carried significantly greater weight. MPs have substantially broadened the range of platforms on which they appear and the geography of their presence, and have improved coordination — both internally and with other foreign policy actors.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives is publishing the first comprehensive account of how the inter-parliamentary relations groups of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have operated under conditions of full-scale war and amid the growing role of parliamentary diplomacy.

The study draws on 17 semi-structured interviews with the heads and active members of these groups, Ukraine’s Ambassador to an EU member state, and representatives of the parliaments of partner countries.

The study will be of value to MPs as a basis for reflection on parliamentary diplomacy and its potential; to future convocations as a guide to developing and institutionalising this form of cooperation; and to all those researching parliamentarism, foreign policy and Ukraine’s path to the EU.

Documenting and analysing this experience is a way to preserve institutional memory and to place parliamentary diplomacy on a more sustainable footing for future convocations.

This study was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.

Who should appoint and dismiss the Prosecutor General, and how? Today, that decision rests almost entirely with those in power: the President appoints the head of the prosecution service with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada, while removal can be secured through a parliamentary vote of no confidence — a majority of MPs’ votes.

The consequence is chronic institutional instability: in all the years of Ukraine’s independence, no Prosecutor General has served a full term of office, and the average tenure falls short of even two years.

The dismissal procedure was criticised as far back as 2014 by the Venice Commission, yet the 2016 constitutional amendments on justice left the office of the Prosecutor General untouched. Ukraine has therefore already committed to depoliticising the procedure as part of its accession to the European Union. The agenda now features a draft law that would introduce an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General with the involvement of international experts — a proposal that has stirred public debate.

In a new policy paper, the experts of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives examine the substance of Ukraine’s European integration commitments, the relevant European standards and the models adopted by EU member states; weigh the arguments for and against an open competition for the post of Prosecutor General through the lens of constitutionality; and set out concrete scenarios — from the most far-reaching to the most modest — for both appointment and dismissal.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives sets out its own vision: which option is best in the long term, and what can realistically be done right now — under martial law, when amendments to the Constitution are not possible.

Read the policy paper to understand how the office of the Prosecutor General can be depoliticised — and why this is one of the key preconditions for the rule of law in Ukraine.

The Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation provide for unifying the legal framework for organising the system of law enforcement agencies, by establishing criteria for distinguishing the areas of activity of law enforcement agencies and other state bodies based on their exclusive functional focus. A similar measure is also set out in the Rule of Law Roadmap.

This concerns the development and adoption of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’, which should define:

1. the system of law enforcement agencies;
2. the unified foundations for their organisation and functioning, the main criteria for delimiting their competence and areas of activity;
3. the entrenchment of the principles of integrity, gender equality and non-discrimination in their activities;
4. the development of their analytical capacities, including criminal analysis and the ILP model;
5. the consolidation of their institutional independence, an adequate level of financial, logistical and technical support and guarantees of social and legal protection for employees of law enforcement agencies;
6. forms of inter-agency cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies and the prosecution service, including information exchange, as well as interaction with other public authorities and local self-government bodies.

In addition, state policy documents on the reform of all law enforcement agencies provide for improving internal control and anti-corruption mechanisms, applying uniform integrity criteria and standards to vet employees of all law enforcement agencies and monitor them on an ongoing basis, as well as introducing common ethical principles for employees of law enforcement agencies.

These measures are aimed at addressing problems related to duplication of functions, more clearly delimiting the powers of law enforcement agencies, strengthening their independence, increasing their effectiveness and improving mechanisms for interaction as well as legal and social guarantees for their employees.

• 2.1. Key Definitions

For several decades, legal scholarshipFor example: A. V. Lapkin. Prosecutor in Criminal Proceedings: Theoretical, Legal, Organisational and Methodological Problems: monograph. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2020, pp. 98, 122–123, 287; O.S. Tarasenko. On the Concept of Law Enforcement Bodies of Ukraine. Scientific Bulletin of Public and Private Law. Issue 3, 2025, pp. 246–260; A.V. Stolitnii. Legislative Collisions in Defining ‘Law Enforcement Bodies’ and ‘Law Enforcement Agencies’ in the Context of Prosecutorial Supervision: Ways to Unify Terminology. Current Problems of Innovative Economy and Law. 2026. No. 1, pp. 27–31 etc. has debated the meaning and relationship between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agenciesIn Ukrainian «правоохоронні органи» and «органи правопорядку» properly — first is the ‘law defending/securing bodies’ and second is ‘law and order bodies’ (this semantic difference is not obvious in English, but reflects some conceptual aspects of the Ukrainian legislation development during past years)., a debate that intensified after the 2016 amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine.

At that time, the concept of law enforcement agencies appeared in the text of the Basic Law as an object of prosecutorial supervision: in accordance with the new functions of the prosecutor’s office, it supervises covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies (Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

In view of this, it may be concluded that, according to the constitutional functions of the prosecutor’s office, law enforcement agencies are vested with powers to carry out covert and other investigative and search actions. Therefore, from the perspective of constitutional regulation, law enforcement agencies primarily include bodies authorised to conduct pre-trial investigations of criminal offences and covert investigative (search) actions, as defined respectively by the CPC of Ukraine (Articles 41 and 216) and the Law of Ukraine ‘On Operational-Search Activities’ (Article 5).

At the same time, Section I of the Constitution of Ukraine uses the concept of law enforcement bodies: ‘ensuring state security and protecting the state border of Ukraine shall be entrusted to the relevant military formations and law enforcement bodies of the state, the organisation and procedure for whose activities shall be determined by law’ (Article 17 of the Constitution). However, this wording is more likely an artefact of outdated terminology, as indicated by two circumstances: (1) law enforcement bodies are mentioned in the general section of the Constitution in the context of national security, rather than in special provisions concerning the activities of executive authorities and justice; (2) amendments to Section I of the Constitution are extremely difficult, unprecedented and, in practice, almost impossibleA draft law amending Section I ‘General Principles’, Section III ‘Elections. Referendum’ and Section XIII ‘Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’ is submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the President of Ukraine or by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and, provided it is adopted by at least two thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is approved by an all-Ukrainian referendum called by the President of Ukraine (Article 156 of the Constitution of Ukraine). There are no known cases of amendments to Section I in the history of the current Constitution of Ukraine., because this section defines the general principles of the state system, while constitutional amendments introduced after 2014 were primarily aimed at reforming the justice system and defining the state’s European integration and Euro-Atlantic course.

Practising lawyers often refer to the Law of Ukraine ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, which allegedly defines the list of law enforcement bodies. However, this Law expressly states that the list contained in it may be used only for the purposes of regulation by this Law. Under it, ‘law enforcement bodies’ are the prosecution authorities, the National Police, the security service, the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, state border protection bodies, the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine, penitentiary bodies and institutions, pre-trial detention centres, state financial control bodies, fish protection bodies, state forest protection bodies and other bodies exercising law-applying or law enforcement functions (Part 1 Article 2 of the Law).

The problem is, first, that this concept applies precisely for the purposes of that Law, as expressly stated in its text; second, that there is no clear criterion by which those particular bodies are included in the list; and third, that the list is not exhaustive, while defining law enforcement bodies through law application and law enforcement functions expands it to a state of complete uncertainty because the features and the subject of the definition repeat each other. Law enforcement bodies cannot be defined as bodies that perform law enforcement functions, since this definition adds nothing to the content of the concept and does not make it possible to understand what such functions consist of.

The law enforcement function is an extremely broad concept. In theory, it includes not only any activity of public authorities involving the application of legal norms but, in some views, even the activity of any person who obeys legal norms and therefore applies them. In other words, reliance on the definition contained in the Law ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’ is impossible under any circumstances except where practical issues of applying its provisions are being resolved. Moreover, the legal uncertainty of the list of law enforcement bodies is disorientingWhite Paper on the Depoliticisation of Law Enforcement Agencies and the Prosecutor’s Office: Appointment/Dismissal of Leadership, Y.O. Krapyvin. Centre for Policy and Legal Reform. Kyiv: O.D. Buria, PE. 2023, p. 46..

In 2023, the Supreme Court resolved an exceptional legal problem consisting in the absence, at the legislative level and in case law, of clear criteria for defining the concepts of ‘law enforcement body’ and ‘employee of a law enforcement body’. This had led to inconsistent application of substantive and procedural law and had an extremely negative impact on the implementation of the principle of legal certainty. The subject of divergent case law was the determination of the victim who enjoys enhanced protection by the state (an employee of a law enforcement body) in the relevant elements of criminal offencesA law enforcement officer is designated as a victim of such criminal offences as resistance (Article 342 of the CC of Ukraine), interference with activities (Article 343 of the CC of Ukraine), threat or violence (Article 345 of the CC of Ukraine), intentional destruction or damage to property (Article 347 of the CC of Ukraine), attempt on life (Article 348 of the CC of Ukraine), taking hostage (Article 349 of the CC of Ukraine) and failure to take security measures (Article 380 of the CC of Ukraine)..

According to the legal position of the Supreme Court in case No. 633/195/17 (proceedings No. 13-39ks23), law enforcement bodies should include: (1) public authorities defined in the laws of Ukraine as law enforcement bodies or (2) those exercising a law enforcement function assigned to them at the legislative level. When resolving whether a person is an employee of a law enforcement body, it is necessary to proceed from a systemic analysis of: the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences and normative legal acts regulating the legal status of the relevant public authority with which the person is in an employment or service relationship; the employee’s powers under their job description, which provide for the exercise of a law enforcement function, including the application of preventive measures and coercive measures defined by law, as well as measures provided for by criminal procedure legislation and legislation on administrative offences; and legislation on pension provision for the relevant category of employees.

Attention should also be paid to work by auxiliary bodies of Parliament. In 2024, the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine published a document entitled ‘Scientific Concept of Legislative Support for the Activities of Law Enforcement Agencies of Ukraine’. It rightly notes that the existing conceptual and legislative uncertainty regarding the concept, fundamental principles, status, tasks and functions of law enforcement agencies as a separate autonomous system, as well as their delimitation from other state bodies performing related functions, has a negative impact on combating crime and on the effectiveness of the relevant state policy in this field. As a result, this legal uncertainty leads to inconsistency and imbalance in the work of the relevant state institutions, ineffective performance of their functional powers and, consequently, failure to ensure guarantees for protecting citizens from criminal and other unlawful encroachments, failure to observe the rule of law and failure by state bodies to perform their main task of protecting the constitutional rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen.

In general, imperfect legal regulation has a negative impact on determining the status of a particular state body and its place in the system of public authorities, and leads to inconsistent law enforcement practice, including in criminal proceedings concerning offences against the authority of public authorities.

In our view, the most productive approach to distinguishing between the concepts of law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies is a functional approach, based on the main tasks and functions of the relevant bodies. This approach is fully consistent with the Constitution of Ukraine and corresponds to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

This approach makes it possible to define:

1. the relationship between these concepts. It appears most appropriate to distinguish between law enforcement bodies and law enforcement agencies as a broader and a narrower category: every law enforcement agency is a law enforcement body, but not every law enforcement body may be classified as a law enforcement agency;
2. the criteria for classifying a particular state body as law enforcement, including functions and corresponding powers, namely: 1) functions: protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments; protection of public order; ensuring public and national security; 2) powers: prevention, detection, solving and investigation of criminal offences; conducting operational-search measures and covert investigative (search) actions; application of direct coercive measures on behalf of the state, including the use of firearms.

• 2.2. The Concept of a ‘Law Enforcement Agency’ and Its Features

Legal order is a term widely used both in legal scholarship and in national and international law. Thus, Part 1 Article 19 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that the legal order in Ukraine is based on principles according to which no one may be compelled to do what is not provided for by legislation.

Therefore, legal orderTheory of State and Law: textbook for students of higher legal education institutions / O.V. Petryshyn, S.P. Pohrebniak, V.S. Smorodynskyi et al.; edited by O.V. Petryshyn. Kharkiv: Pravo, 2014, p. 337. is the actual state of ordering of social relations through legal means. The latter formulation effectively emphasises three components of this concept: (a) law; (b) coercion; and (c) order. In all cases, therefore, it concerns, in one way or another, the coercive application of the law to protect legal order by the bodies responsible for its protection.

In view of this, the following definition is proposed:

Law enforcement agencies are central executive bodies and structural units of state bodies and military formations whose main functions under the law are to protect the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protect public order and ensure public and national security.

This definition takes into account situations where these functions are not the main functions of a state body or military formation, but its structure includes units that perform such functions, for example the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The main features of law enforcement agencies may be considered to include:

1. performance of functions related to protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments, protecting public order and ensuring public and national security;
2. the organisation and procedure for the activities of such agencies and their administrative and legal status are defined by law;
3. belonging to the security and defence sector;
4. powers to prevent, detect, suppress, solve and investigate criminal offences;
5. powers to conduct operational-search activities and/or covert investigative (search) actions;
6. the right to apply direct coercion on the grounds and in cases defined by law, including the right to use firearms;
7. prosecutorial supervision over the activities of such agencies in countering offences and carrying out covert and other investigative and search actions of law enforcement agencies.

• 2.3. Subject Matter of the Law

The following state bodies and military formations that could be classified as law enforcement agencies, or whose units could fall within the scope of the relevant law, were analysed* for compliance with the features listed above: the National Police of Ukraine (NPU); the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI); the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU); the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU); the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU); the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS); the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU); the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine (UDO); penitentiary bodies and institutions and pre-trial detention centres of the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine (SCES); the intelligence body of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine); the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MLES AFU); units of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU); the State Customs Service of Ukraine (SCS); and the Court Security Service (CSS).

The list of bodies and military formations was formed on the basis of Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Laws of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’ and ‘On State Protection of Court Employees and Law Enforcement Officers’, the Overarching Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Reform as Part of the Security and Defence Sector of Ukraine for 2023–2027 and the Government Action Plan for its implementation.

Compliance with the above features is established on the basis of the provisions of the laws of Ukraine regulating the activities of these bodies.

In addition, the analysis identified certain shortcomings in legislation that will need to be addressed.

• 2.3.1. Status of state bodies

The NPU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS have the status of central executive bodies, while the NABU is a central executive body with special status. Under Ukrainian legislation, these bodies belong to the executive branch.

The SBI is a law enforcement body, while the UDO and the SBGS are special-purpose law enforcement bodies. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On Intelligence’, the SBGS is also classified as an intelligence body.

The SSU has the status of a special-purpose state body with law enforcement functions.

The Court Security Service is a state body within the justice system.

The FISU is defined as an intelligence body with the status of a separate state body that is not an executive authority.

The NGU is a military formation with law enforcement functions, while the MLES AFU is a special law enforcement formation within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The status of a central executive body means that such bodies are established in accordance with the Law of Ukraine ‘On Central Executive Bodies’ and that this Law applies to their activities insofar as it does not contradict special laws. Under Article 16, central executive bodies are established to perform specific functions related to implementing state policy. Their activities are directed and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine through the relevant ministry. Special status of a central executive body provides for a special procedure for forming the composition of such a body, if it is collegial, or a special procedure for appointing its head, as well as a special form of interaction with the Government.

The concept of a ‘state body’ has a broad and generalising meaning. The Law of Ukraine ‘On Prevention of Corruption’ defines this concept as follows: a public authority, including a collegial state body, or another public-law entity, regardless of whether it has the status of a legal entity, which is vested by legislation with powers to exercise authoritative managerial functions on behalf of the state and whose jurisdiction extends to the entire territory of Ukraine or to a separate administrative-territorial unit. Accordingly, this concept covers legislative, executive and judicial bodies.

• 2.3.2. Functions and tasks

The laws regulating the activities of the state bodies and military formations included in the list show different approaches to defining the functions and tasks of these bodies, as well as to the content of the concepts of ‘task’ and ‘function’. However, the prevailing approach is that a body’s function is its main purpose, while its tasks are specific areas of activity.

Protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, society and the state from unlawful encroachments is, in essence, a function of all the bodies on the list. Such protection means ensuring the right to life, liberty, inviolability, personal security and private property, preventing crime, combating terrorism and organised crime and protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state and the inviolability of its borders.

Ensuring public and national security is also among the functions of all state bodies on the list.

National security is the protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the democratic constitutional order and other national interests of Ukraine from actual and potential threats.

Public security and order means the protection of interests vital to society and individuals, as well as the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen, the safeguarding of which is a priority task of the security forces, other state bodies, local self-government bodies, their officials and the public, which implement coordinated measures to realise and protect national interests from the impact of threats.

Five bodies on the list have powers to conduct pre-trial investigations: the NPU, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU and the SSU. In addition to these five bodies, operational-search activities may also be conducted by the SBGS, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine. In view of Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine, all these bodies are subject to prosecutorial control. However, the FISU and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine cannot be classified as law enforcement agencies, since their main function is intelligence rather than law enforcement activity.

All bodies on the list have the right to use physical force, special means and firearms on the grounds and in cases defined by law. At the same time, the provisions of the laws regulating the activities of the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the FISU, the UDO, the SCES, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, the NGU and the Court Security Service are blanket provisions and refer to the relevant provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Police’.

• 2.3.3. Belonging to the security and defence sector

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the SBI, the NABU, the ESBU, the SCES and the SCS are not included in the security and defence sector.

Three of the listed bodies have almost identical legal status: the NABU, the ESBU and the SBI. In our view, however, their exclusion from the security and defence sector is erroneous.

Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On National Security of Ukraine’, the security and defence sector is a system of public authorities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other military formations established in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, special-purpose state bodies with law enforcement functions, civil protection forces, the defence-industrial complex of Ukraine, whose activities are subject to democratic civilian control and, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, are functionally aimed at protecting Ukraine’s national interests from threats, as well as citizens and civil society associations that voluntarily participate in ensuring Ukraine’s national security.

Thus, an important criterion for classifying a particular state body as part of the security sector is its functional focus on protecting the national interests of the state from threats.

Ukraine’s national interests are the vital interests of the individual, society and the state, the realisation of which ensures Ukraine’s state sovereignty, its progressive democratic development and safe living conditions and welfare for its citizens.

Accordingly, threats to Ukraine’s national security are phenomena, trends and factors that make impossible or complicate, or may make impossible or complicate, the realisation of Ukraine’s national interests and the preservation of its national values. Crime is among such threats.

The SBI, the NABU and the ESBU were established to counter specific categories of criminal offences. Moreover, the Law ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’ states that this body counters corruption and other criminal offences committed by senior officials authorised to perform state or local self-government functions and constituting a threat to national security. Under the Law ‘On the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine’, this body is tasked with countering threats to Ukraine’s economic security, which is a component of national security. Therefore, the SBI, the NABU and the ESBU should be classified as part of the security and defence sector as security forces.

2.3.4. Law enforcement agencies and the list of issues to be regulated by the law

a) the following public authorities, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply in full:

• the National Police of Ukraine;
• the State Bureau of Investigation;
• the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine;
• the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine.

b) structural units of the following state bodies and military formations, to which the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ would apply partially:

• the Security Service of Ukraine;
• the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine;
• the Department of the State Protection of Ukraine;
• the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine;
• the National Guard of Ukraine;
• the State Customs Service;
• the Military Law Enforcement Service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
• the Court Security Service.

In the future, the State Bureau of Military Justice and customs may be added to the list of law enforcement agencies to which the provisions of the Law would apply in full.

It is proposed that the subject matter of the Law ‘On Law Enforcement Agencies’ include the following issues:

1. the concept of a law enforcement agency and other definitions related to the activities of such agencies;
2. the organisational and legal status of law enforcement agencies and the features of special status within the executive branch;
3. an exhaustive list of law enforcement agencies;
4. the foundations for the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles of activity, functions, powers, tasks, guarantees of independence, organisational foundations, model structure and the overall authorised staffing level of each agency;
5. the foundations for analytical activity, including the use of the ILP model, consideration of criminal policy in the activities of law enforcement agencies, application of the SOCTA and IOCTA systems, regular assessment of the crime situation through crime surveys and victimisation surveys, as well as public trust in these agencies, including the sense of security as a key component of trust;
6. the foundations of service in law enforcement agencies, including the principles and procedure for appointing heads, candidate requirements, terms of office of heads, grounds and procedure for early termination of their powers, a list of typical positions such as detective and analyst, the procedure for appointing and dismissing employees, requirements for candidates for positions, general principles for wearing uniforms, general principles for awarding special ranks, social protection and guarantees of material support;
7. the grounds and procedure for using physical force, special means and firearms;
8. the foundations for international and inter-agency cooperation and coordination of the activities of law enforcement agencies, including principles, coordination and cooperation arrangements, the role of the MIA, the procedure and forms of cooperation and specific features of interaction between law enforcement agencies during martial law;
9. the foundations of integrity and professional ethics for employees of law enforcement agencies, including ethical principles for interaction with participants in criminal proceedings;
10. the audit and internal control system and the foundations for whistle-blower protection;
11. the general procedure and grounds for holding employees disciplinarily liable;
12. external control over the activities of law enforcement agencies, including parliamentary and public oversight.

Unifying the key foundations for the activities of the above-mentioned bodies would make it possible to eliminate gaps in legislation, clarify the place of these bodies in the overall system of public authorities and their status, strengthen guarantees of their independence and improve the system of interaction between them so that they can perform their main functions more effectively.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy (ACS) defines the principles and priorities of state anti-corruption policy for the next five years. It is developed by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU). The Strategy should be based on a systemic analysis of the corruption situation and the results of implementing the previous strategy.

Subsequently, to implement the ACS, the Government develops and approves a clear action plan for its implementation — the State Anti-Corruption Programme (SAP).

This is Ukraine’s third strategic anti-corruption policy document. The first strategy was approved on 14 October 2014 for the period until the end of 2017. The next strategy covered 2021–2025, but the relevant Law was adopted by Parliament only in June 2022. As a result, only three years in practice remained to achieve the expected results.

At present, three draft laws on the principles of state anti-corruption policy for 2026–2030 have been registered in the Verkhovna Rada, which is an unprecedented situation. Previously, Parliament adopted a government draft law, with certain amendments, while alternative drafts were not even submitted.

This time, the initiators are Anastasiia Radina, Head of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy (Draft Law No. 15230), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Draft Law No. 15230-1) and a group of MPs who are members of the European Solidarity faction (Draft Law No. 15230-2).

Given the volume of the documents and the relatively short timeframe for their consideration and adoption, since, according to the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Strategy must be adopted no later than the second quarter of 2026, it is advisable to draw attention to both the positive provisions and the shortcomings of all three versions. This is particularly important in the most significant areas: countering corruption and corruption-related offences, the judiciary and the status of judges, the prosecution service, the Bar and law enforcement agencies.

In this area, the identified problems concern disciplinary, administrative, criminal and civil-law liability for corruption and corruption-related offences. The annexes to all three draft laws contain identical provisions, which may indicate consensus among the subjects of legislative initiative as to these problems and the expected results of resolving them.

In particular, it is proposed to clarify the grounds for holding persons authorised to perform state or local self-government functions disciplinarily liable:

• for violating the requirements of anti-corruption legislation or rules of ethical conduct;
• where a court decision imposing an administrative penalty on a person for a corruption-related offence has entered into force;
• where a person has been released from administrative liability due to minor significance or the case has been closed because the time limit for imposing an administrative penalty expired.

These provisions have essentially been carried over from the ACS for 2021–2025. Since the defined results were not achieved, the necessary amendments were not introduced into legislation.

At the same time, the issue of holding public servants disciplinarily liable where an administrative offence case is closed because the time limit has expired should be approached carefully. As studies of case law show, when courts apply this ground for closing a case, they rarely establish the fact that the offence was committed and the guilt of the person concerned. Accordingly, imposing disciplinary liability on the basis of a court decision that has not found the person guilty will lead to such decisions being challenged. This leads to an obvious conclusion: the quality of court decisions needs to be improved.

In parallel, the draft ACS for 2026–2030 provides for increasing the time limits for imposing administrative penalties for corruption-related offences, which should reduce the number of cases closed by courts on this ground.

The provision of the draft ACS concerning the consolidation of Supreme Court (SC) case law in cases on corruption-related administrative offences appears somewhat questionable.

Under the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences (CUAO), the Supreme Court considers this category of cases where the ECtHR finds a violation of Convention rights during the consideration of the relevant case by a national court and, as a court of appeal, cases concerning offences under Article 185-3 of the Code (contempt of court). The CUAO does not provide for cassation review of cases, and the ruling of the appellate court is final and not subject to appeal (Article 294 of the CUAO).

Since it began operating in December 2017, the Supreme Court has considered eight cassation appeals against appellate court decisions in administrative offence cases. In all cases, the Court refused to open proceedings, referring to Article 294 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences. Therefore, achieving this strategic result is impossible, at least until legislation on a prejudicial request mechanism is adopted, which would enable the SC to express positions in cases not subject to cassation appeal and ensure consistency of case law in such cases.

A general analysis of all three draft ACSs shows that the problems of liability for corruption and corruption-related offences were largely not resolved during 2023–2025 and require further measures. At the same time, it is also important to analyse the reasons why similar expected results of the ACS for 2021–2025 were not achieved.

In the judicial sphere, the draft ACSs focus on discretion in the formation of judicial governance bodies: the High Council of Justice (HCJ) and the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (HQCJ), as well as on ensuring their continuous operation. The latter is a significant step forward in the state’s understanding of one of the basic principles of good governance: the work of a body cannot be suspended without transferring its powers to other bodies. The history of judicial reform over the past 12 years shows that Parliament has twice suspended the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ, which led to a significant shortage of judges in courts and, consequently, worsened public access to justice. The differences in wording between the three draft laws are not substantial, so they should be supported by Parliament in any version.

The difference between Draft Laws No. 15230, No. 15230-1 and No. 15230-2 on the formation of judicial governance bodies lies in their approaches to granting a decisive vote to independent experts delegated by international partners within competition commissions selecting members of the HCJ and the HQCJ. The first two draft laws preserve this right for them for the next period, while the initiators of Draft Law No. 15230-2 believe that such experts should have voting rights equal to those of Ukrainian members of the competition commissions.

Although the idea of equal weight for the votes of international and national experts in Ukrainian competitions is correct, at this stage Ukraine is not yet fully ready to abandon the decisive vote of experts delegated by international partners. This is primarily because Ukrainian appointing entities require further reform and currently do not enjoy public trust, which is what led to the need to apply the formula involving international experts with a decisive vote.

The initiators also differ somewhat in their views on the specifics of electing the Council of Judges of Ukraine (CJU). The ACS in the versions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 proposes introducing electronic voting by all judges for the new composition of the CJU, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 provides for voting by all judges but does not specify the method of voting. Given that Ukraine is facing a full-scale war unleashed by the Russian Federation and that Ukraine’s movement towards the EU envisages full digitalisation of the judiciary as one element of an effective court free from corruption, electing new compositions of the CJU through electronic voting appears more appropriate.

At the same time, the provisions of Draft Law No. 15230-2 aimed at minimising corruption risks in the activities of the National School of Judges of Ukraine (NSJU) and expanding additional mechanisms to ensure trust in judicial career procedures, primarily through rotation in administrative positions in courts, deserve support. These provisions are much more detailed than those in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. Implementing the relevant provisions is extremely important for fulfilling European integration commitments, particularly in view of the critical TAIEX report on the functioning of the NSJU and the Prosecutors’ Training Centre, which was recently provided to Ukraine.

The need for rotation of judges in administrative positions has long been discussed, but there is no consensus. At the same time, hundreds of court presidents and their deputies continue to hold their positions beyond the six-year term provided by law, successfully manipulating gaps in legislation.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 adds an expected strategic result concerning the role of the Public Integrity Council (PIC), which is absent from the other versions of the ACS for 2026–2030. It provides that: ‘the Public Integrity Council, in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law), should be legally embedded in the system of mutual balance between civil society and the state in judicial selection, where civil society strengthens transparency but does not replace the institutional decision of the judiciary’. This addition also deserves the support of MPs during consideration of the draft laws.

The problems of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) in the draft ACSs are included in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’ and do not contain fundamental differences.

The problems identified in the prosecution service, and the expected strategic results for addressing them, concern procedures for selecting prosecutors, material support, internal management processes within prosecution bodies, issues of procedural guidance by groups of prosecutors, criteria for determining the optimal staffing level of prosecution bodies and other matters.

All three draft ACSs differ to some extent in this part.

Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not contain the problem of risks of informal or political influence on the procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, nor the corresponding expected strategic results. Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 contain such provisions, although with different levels of detail.

While the main draft has a clear focus on selecting candidates for the position of Prosecutor General with the involvement of a competition commission, the second alternative draft uses the general and evaluative concept of ‘best European practices’ and refers to the Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka. This wording makes the expected strategic result less measurable and less achievable.

In different European countries, the status of the Prosecutor General, their role in the system of state bodies and their level of political weight vary depending on the institutional model of the prosecution service. Accordingly, it is rather difficult to determine which practices are the best.

As regards improving the procedure for expressing a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, Draft Law No. 15230 proposes defining the grounds for this, as well as the body that would have the authority to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position through disciplinary proceedings. Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains no reference to the relevant bodies, which is a significant shortcoming given the existing practice of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors (QDCP).

By its decision No. 97dp-18 of 28 February 2018, following consideration of disciplinary proceedings concerning Prosecutor General Y. Lutsenko, the QDCP established that there was no legislative mechanism for implementing a disciplinary sanction against the Prosecutor General. This made it impossible to hold him liable for a disciplinary offence. The absence of clear mechanisms and procedures effectively nullifies the institution of disciplinary liability of the Prosecutor General and lowers the level of control over performance in this position.

Therefore, on issues concerning the improvement of procedures for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, the ACS in the version of Draft Law No. 15230 best corresponds to the principles of strategic planning.

The other provisions of Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1 do not differ on these issues. Draft Law No. 15230-2, however, contains a clarification regarding the consequences of the new system for assessing the quality of prosecutors’ work: it proposes that, based on such an assessment, not only staffing and management decisions, as well as decisions on bonuses, but also decisions on disciplinary sanctions, may be taken. This approach is flawed and creates additional corruption risks. Issues of disciplinary liability and assessment cannot be mixed within one procedure.

Assessing the quality of a prosecutor’s work concerns the effectiveness of their performance, which should be taken into account in promotion, informing the prosecutor’s professional profile, influencing bonuses and similar incentives. However, it cannot in any way be used as an instrument of punishment for poor work results, since this would essentially amount to a return to the quota-driven ‘stick system’ of assessment, where the dynamics of statistical indicators automatically leads to punishment if they are negative. This system has de facto existed since Soviet times, and its harmful effects have been minimised only in isolated cases.

The subject of disciplinary liability is a specific disciplinary offence, namely culpable non-performance or improper performance by a prosecutor of their duties. The list of disciplinary offences and the grounds and procedure for holding prosecutors disciplinarily liable are defined by law and provide for such liability for a specific case.

Assessment of the quality of work is a procedure that helps determine how effectively a prosecutor performs the official duties assigned to them over a certain period. Under the current assessment procedure, this period is one year. It is therefore more of an incentive-based tool and serves as motivation for professional development. It helps the manager form a more objective understanding of the team’s potential, form a staff reserve and make decisions on bonuses or other incentives more transparent.

Accordingly, if the results of assessing the quality of work can be used to impose disciplinary liability, this may turn into an instrument of administrative influence over prosecutors and undermine their procedural independence.

Improving the activities of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office is addressed in all three draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’. However, it would be advisable to consider it as one of the specialised prosecutors’ offices within the unified system of prosecution bodies.

Both alternative draft laws exclude the provisions of the ACS for 2026–2030 that would grant the Head of SAPO the right independently to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations (URPTI) on the possible commission of a criminal offence by an MP of Ukraine and to approve motions considered by an investigating judge.

At present, this is the exclusive power of the Prosecutor General. It is the result of a political compromise reached in 2019, when parliamentary immunity, meaning immunity from criminal prosecution without the consent of the VRU, was replaced by a special procedure for bringing MPs to criminal liability under the exceptional procedural control of the Prosecutor General. For the Government and MPs, the existence of this political compromise, reached by parliamentarians of the same IX convocation that must consider the ACS for 2026–2030, is a key argument against changing it.

It should be noted that, under the new procedure for bringing MPs to liability, more than 40 MPs have been notified of suspicion, and the number of criminal proceedings may be higher. The Head of SAPO has not stated that there is a direct conflict with the Prosecutor General over problems with entering information into the URPTI and approving motions, from which it may be concluded that the practical problem is rather potential in nature.

If there are political obstacles to MPs supporting the ACS for 2026–2030, this provision may be removed from the draft at this stage, provided that it is revisited later: either when there is a real set of cases in which the Prosecutor General ignores substantiated materials from the NABU and SAPO or if a new convocation of the VRU does not consider itself ‘burdened’ by the political compromise previously reached.

The inclusion of the Bar in the ACS for 2026–2030 is due to the relevance of this issue in the context of European integration: development of the Bar is covered by the Rule of Law Roadmap. Although the Bar is an independent self-governing institution, the advocate’s profession is subject to state regulation. Given the corruption risks that exist within the Bar, such as obtaining an advocate’s certificate and non-transparent budgets, as well as systemic problems including the continued tenure of Bar self-governance bodies (BSG bodies) since 2022, the failure to delegate two members to the HCJ and one member to the QDCP and other issues, the Bar has become part of state policy in the field of European integration. At present, it is also a matter of anti-corruption policy and justice policy.

Corruption risks in the justice sector are systemic and are not limited to courts and the prosecution service. No matter how much courts and the prosecution service are reformed, ignoring the Bar in state anti-corruption policy means reproducing corrupt practices at the level of the entire system. Even from a formal perspective, under Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Bar is part of the justice system alongside courts and the prosecution service, which means that including the Bar in the ACS is a logical and necessary step.

For the first time, the Bar appears in the Anti-Corruption Strategy as a separate substantive subsection alongside courts and the prosecution service. This makes it possible to align anti-corruption policy with the Constitution, the logic of justice system reform and Ukraine’s commitments to the EU.

The problems of the Bar identified by the NACP and the corresponding expected results are included unchanged in Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-1. At the same time, Draft Law No. 15230-2 contains certain changes that do not affect the substance of the proposed state policy measures. They concern clarification of the wording of certain problems, detailing their consequences and similar refinements.

For example, the problem concerning the formation of BSG bodies is supplemented, in addition to the issues already listed above, by ‘the absence of real electoral competition, effective appeal mechanisms, representation of alternative professional groups, the formation of informal stable centres of influence and a lack of leadership rotation’, as well as the corresponding consequence: complicating access to the profession and limiting the ability to ensure disciplinary control and high professional standards.

Certain details that do not affect the substance are also clarified. For example, the wording is not simply ‘online voting’ but ‘secure online voting’, although, in substance, any online voting should have an appropriate level of protection against interference and guarantee data security. Another example is the addition of the word ‘periodic’ to ‘electoral cycle’, although a cycle, by definition, implies periodicity.

Therefore, all three documents contain the initial concept of the drafters of the ACS for 2026–2030, while Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes certain stylistic amendments and clarified wording that may be discussed as amendments at the stage when the ACS is finalised in the lead Committee.

All draft ACSs for 2026–2030 identify problems in the activities of the National Police of Ukraine (NPU), the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).

The version of the ACS appended to Draft Law No. 15230-1 does not address the problem of legal regulation of selection procedures for the heads of the NPU and the SBI, as well as the corresponding expected strategic results, although the need to introduce transparent merit-based competitions for these positions has been repeatedly noted by national experts and international partners.

Given that the subjects submitting Draft Laws No. 15230 and No. 15230-2 are MPs, it can be hoped that these provisions will be preserved in full during parliamentary discussions.

Draft Law No. 15230-2 additionally contains problems relating to the institutional independence of the SBI and the absence of clear criteria for determining the investigative jurisdiction of this body. It states that resolving these problems would allow the following strategic results to be achieved:

• introduction of a mechanism for a comprehensive staffing and institutional reset of the SBI, including an open competition for the position of Director with the involvement of independent experts with a decisive vote, as well as mandatory periodic attestation of Bureau employees;
• ensuring a clear focus for the SBI on its original mission: combating torture, unlawful detention and other criminal offences committed in office in the justice sector, as well as introducing a system of periodic external independent audits of the Bureau’s activities, where a negative conclusion would constitute grounds for early dismissal of its leadership;
• developing the analytical capacity of the SBI to shift towards strategic prioritisation of its activities based on verified data, using European tools such as SOCTA, which would help avoid selective application of the law and pressure on other state bodies.

These proposals reflect urgent problems in the activities of the SBI that have been highlighted by experts and international partners. During 2025–2026, the SBI was repeatedly used as an instrument of political pressure and inter-agency confrontation, diverting the Bureau’s resources away from its core tasks and undermining trust in it. Developing the analytical capacities of the SBI corresponds to European integration changes under which national law enforcement agencies must be integrated into the European system for countering crime.

In addition, the text of Draft Law No. 15230-2 proposes that, within 30 days after the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030’ enters into force, the Verkhovna Rada should hear the report of the Director of the SBI on the Bureau’s performance in 2025 and, if its work is found unsatisfactory, the President should dismiss the Director of the Bureau. This proposal is fully consistent with the provisions of the Law of Ukraine ‘On the State Bureau of Investigation’.

Although, in general, we agree that these issues are relevant, it should be noted that the problems in the activities of the SBI are more complex and require a balanced and well-considered solution.

At present, in accordance with the Rule of Law Roadmap, a comprehensive study is being conducted that should determine the need and feasibility of further reforming the SBI in line with best European practices and should lead to the preparation, adoption and implementation of a law taking into account the necessary recommendations.

The Joint Statement by Commissioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka notes that a draft law on SBI reform will be presented by December 2026 based on the results of the study. In preparing such a law, broad discussions involving experts and civil society must also be held.

As in the current ACS for 2021–2025, the drafts do not examine problems in the activities of the Economic Security Bureau of Ukraine (ESBU) that have a corruption-related nature. While the current ACS has a different structure, the draft ACSs for 2026–2030 should pay attention to the institutional independence and capacity of the Bureau as one of the law enforcement agencies.

In particular, the work of the ESBU internal control units needs to be strengthened, since the integrity and transparency of the Bureau depend to a certain extent on their effectiveness. Attention has also repeatedly been drawn to the uncompetitive level of remuneration of ESBU employees, which prevents the Bureau from attracting the best specialists and creates corruption risks in its activities.

Issues related to the functioning of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine are included in the draft ACSs in section ‘1.10. Independence, Institutional Resilience and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions’.

The versions of all three draft ACSs largely share a common view of the problem of the institutional resilience and independence of the NABU, except for certain targeted changes proposed in Draft Law No. 15230-2. It states that one way to ensure the Bureau’s resilience and independence is to build a highly professional, integrity-driven team through open, transparent competitions, and to communicate the NABU’s activities effectively through the Public Oversight Council.

Both proposals appear questionable. Under the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine’, the Public Oversight Council at the NABU is an instrument for ensuring transparency and civilian oversight of the Bureau’s activities. As stated in the Report on the Results of the External Independent Evaluation (Audit) of the Effectiveness of the NABU’s Activities, conducted from March 2023 to November 2024, the members of the Public Oversight Council themselves noted a fairly high level of interaction between the Bureau and the Council. Such interaction takes the form of involving Council members in competition and disciplinary procedures, providing information and semi-annual reports on NABU activities, assessing the amount of public information disclosed by the Bureau and other measures. This indicates a considerable level of transparency of the body.

The openness of competitions for NABU positions is ensured both by involving representatives of civil society in competition commissions, namely persons selected by the Public Oversight Council, and by regularly publishing announcements on the NABU website, which allows any candidate who meets the requirements to take part in the competition.

All three draft ACSs for 2026–2030 contain sound proposals but also leave important issues unaddressed. Compared with previous anti-corruption strategies, before voting in the plenary composition of the Verkhovna Rada, these draft laws must be considered by all parliamentary committees, whereas previous ACS drafts were examined by only five committees.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy is not only a requirement of anti-corruption legislation and a prerequisite for stable and progressive anti-corruption policy. It is also Ukraine’s commitment to international partners, reflected in the Ukraine Facility Plan and the Rule of Law Roadmap. The Joint Statement by Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Taras Kachka of 11 December 2025 states that the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy and the State Anti-Corruption Programme for its implementation is one of the priorities for 2026 that should demonstrate Ukraine’s determination to strengthen its institutions, achieve substantial progress in reforms under the ‘Fundamentals’ cluster of the EU accession process and continue moving forward on its European path.

The involvement of international (foreign) experts in the work of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the CCU emerged in response to a number of systemic problems:

• the inability of the judicial governance bodies (primarily the High Council of Justice (HCJ)) and the CCU to take decisions under political pressure;
• attempts by some judges to interfere in judicial decision-making;
• the persistently low level of public trust in the courts (according to sociological surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and others).

Together, these factors ultimately resulted in an inability to respond effectively to the crises that regularly arose in the judiciary and the CCU. The requirement to involve international (foreign) experts was also enshrined in Ukraine’s commitments to international organisations and partners. In particular, such involvement was regarded as a safeguard that provided additional oversight of compliance with the principles of judicial independence and professional integrity, as well as the prevention of corruption risks.

The active involvement of international (foreign) experts in the composition of competition commissions within the judicial authorities and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine began in 2018. On the one hand, the introduction of these experts into the work of the competition commissions was a response to the low level of public trust in the judiciary and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. On the other, it was driven by Ukraine’s international commitments (the Ukraine Facility Plan and European Commission reports), as well as by the Rule of Law Roadmap.

The relevance of this study lies in the fact that examining the results of the work of competition commissions with the participation of international (foreign) experts enables not only to assess their effectiveness in the context of judicial reform, but also to formulate well-grounded proposals for improving their work.

For the purposes of this study, the work of the competition commissions was assessed over the period from January 2022 to November 2025 inclusive. As regards the conduct of competition procedures, updated data as of April 2026 were used.

The study focuses on analysing the work (including the legal framework) of the following competition commissions: the Ethics Council; the Competition Commission for the Selection of Candidates for the Positions of Members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine (the HQCJ Competition Commission); the Competition Commission for Conducting the Competition for the Positions of Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors and Disciplinary Inspector (the SDI Competition Commission); the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE); the Public Council of International Experts (PCIE); the Expert Council (legal framework only); and the Public Integrity Council (PIC) — the last of these to the extent relevant for comparison with the work of those commissions which, under the law, are to be replaced by the Public Integrity Council once the current compositions complete their terms. The relevant Supreme Court case law was also analysed.

As part of the study, the interviews held were analysed — the special joint meetings of the HQCJ and the PCIE with candidates for the positions of judge of the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) and the CCU; Head of the Service of Disciplinary Inspectors, Deputy Head and disciplinary inspectors; and members of the HQCJ and the HCJ. In total, 143 candidate interviews were reviewed and analysed, together with the decisions of the competition commissions concerning those candidates. Interviews were also conducted with members of several competition commissions.

The study centres on analysing the consistency of the criteria for selecting candidates and the consistency of the approaches taken by the competition commissions in determining whether candidates meet the criteria assessed. The work of the competition commissions was assessed in terms of the mechanism for forming their composition, the number of international (foreign) representatives within them, the qualification requirements, the scope of their powers, the assessment criteria, and so on.

Where relevant, the work of the competition commissions was also compared with that of the Public Integrity Council (PIC).

The conclusions drawn from the study rest, in particular, on statistical data from these competition commissions reflecting the outcomes of their work.

A separate part of the report sets out specific recommendations for addressing the problems identified in the course of the study — recommendations that can serve as reference points for the further development of public policy in this area.

This document has been prepared with the support of Sweden. The contents of the document are the sole responsibility of the CSO ‘Agency for Legislative Initiatives’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of Sweden.

The suspension of competitive selection in early 2022 was a necessary emergency measure for the civil service system in the first months of the full-scale invasion. At the same time, several questions remain open regarding:

1. whether the use of this practice throughout the entire period of the legal regime of martial law is justified;
2. the mechanisms to be introduced to remedy the situation;
3. whether the proposed approaches meet the interests of the target audience — civil servants themselves.

This report seeks to answer these questions.

Throughout martial law, the restoration of competitive procedures for civil service positions has repeatedly prompted active debate. International institutions have emphasised the need for Ukraine to return to merit-based, competitive selection. Lawmakers have focused on meeting these requirements, while the target audience — civil servants themselves — do not always share this view.

This study focuses on civil servants’ internal perspective of the current state of play and prospects for staffing the civil service during the legal regime of martial law, as well as their attitudes, needs and expectations.

The internal assessments and attitudes of the civil service were identified through an anonymous questionnaire survey.

Overall, the survey results indicate that civil servants have adapted to the current staffing model and appear to have limited awareness of the potential advantages of competitive selection. A majority of respondents (57.2%) are comfortable with the absence of competitive procedures and, in some cases, openly opposed their restoration, not only during martial law but more broadly.

At the same time, some respondents clearly recognise the need to restore competitive procedures for civil service positions and expect this step to be taken. They associate such procedures with fair selection, reduced subjective discretion and lower corruption risks in staffing decisions. However, this group accounts for only 26.3% of respondents.

Although the prospect of restoring competitive procedures did not receive broad support, a majority of respondents (51.7%) expressed trust in their results. At the same time, almost one in five respondents does not trust the results of competitive selection. As civil servants themselves explain, this mistrust is based on their own negative experience of taking part in competitive procedures.

This experience has created demand among respondents for improving the quality and transparency of competitions. In this context, civil servants identified areas that could strengthen the effectiveness of the Commission on Senior Civil Service and competition commissions, including:

1. granting commissions the power to select one winner of the competition and the next-ranked candidate, who may take up the position if the winner declines or if the position becomes vacant within one year after the competition — 29.5%;
2. reducing political influence on commission members — 29%;
3. specifying liability for interference in the work of commissions — 22.9%;
4. training commission members in tools for assessing candidates’ professional competence — 22.5%.

Civil servants appointed without competition during martial law are concerned about their future status once competitive selection is restored. Most respondents (42.8%) believe that such persons should be able to continue in civil service without a competition based on the results of performance appraisal, 26.7% — based on the actual length of service and 22.5% — based on a competition under the general procedure. In addition, respondents suggested combining appraisal results with the time actually worked, as well as simplifying competitive procedures for persons who already have some length of service in civil service positions.

38.6% of survey participants stated that continuation of civil service based on a decision of the appointing authority would improve the quality of public administration, as it creates opportunities to retain valuable and experienced staff.

On the one hand, these results may reflect concerns about competitive selection or an unwillingness to spend personal resources, in particular time and effort, on additional preparation for it. On the other hand, the inclination towards this practice may indicate that the civil servants do not perceive the appointing authority’s discretion as a significant risk and, in some cases, even regard it as a potential advantage and an acceptable alternative to competitive selection.

At the same time, the staffing model is not the main factor shaping the professionalism, prestige and stability of the civil service workforce. Working conditions play an equally important role and are currently neither conducive to attracting highly qualified specialists to the civil service nor to retaining current civil servants.

Only 8% of respondents consider civil service employment to be prestigious. Respondents most often mention: (1) excessive workload, which leads to burnout and resignations; (2) low remuneration; (3) frequent changes in the organisational structure of state bodies (changes in structure, staffing tables and staff reductions); (4) instability of the system of central executive bodies (redistribution of powers, reorganisations and changes in subordination or functions of bodies); (5) ineffective decisions and weak management by the political leadership. These factors encourage civil servants to change jobs.

The adoption of Draft Law No. 13478-1 on restoring competitive procedures will contribute to meeting one of the requirements of the Ukraine Facility Plan for 2024–2027 and to resolving a number of problems related to forming the workforce, serving in and terminating civil service.

At the same time, civil servants are cautious about the draft law’s ability to improve the situation. Only 4.2% of respondents believe that it will do so, while the largest share (29.2%) assumes that the draft law will help resolve the problems only partially. Every sixth respondent (17.8%) is not familiar with the provisions of Draft Law No. 13478-1 at all. This points to insufficient awareness among civil servants of their prospects for continuing in the civil service and the need to strengthen communication activities to prepare them to work under the renewed conditions.

Despite the sceptical attitude of most respondents towards the restoration of competitive procedures, competitive selection remains a tool with clear advantages over the current procedure for forming the civil service workforce.

A meritocratic approach to staffing increases the value of selection both for the civil servant, who invests personal effort in entering the civil service, and for the state body, which has an interest in retaining a professional selected through competition.

Selecting candidates for civil service positions on a competitive basis can potentially contribute to a more balanced distribution of workload among staff, reducing the risk of situations where some specialists have to compensate for the lack of experience or professional training of newly appointed employees. Therefore, restoring competitions is likely to help reduce staff turnover.

The restoration of competitive selection and clarification of certain conditions for entry into, service in and termination of civil service should not be expected, in themselves, to automatically ensure the recruitment of highly qualified specialists or significantly increase the prestige of the civil service. This requires comprehensive solutions aimed at creating working conditions that would be both attractive and acceptable for potential and current civil servants. This concerns ensuring fair remuneration (respondents mention disgracefully low pay), stability in the system of public authorities and improving the quality of managerial competences and decisions of the political leadership, whose effectiveness is assessed critically by some civil servants.

Restoring competitive procedures is a necessary step, but parallel efforts must continue to develop and implement measures that increase the prestige of the civil service and strengthen the state’s image as a reliable and competitive employer.

During the 14th session, 7 ‘Government Question Hours’ were held — in total, MPs and ministers spent more than 8 hours asking questions and providing answers.

The largest number of questions raised by MPs concerned the implementation of state social policy under martial law and the fulfilment of Ukraine’s European integration commitments.

Members of Parliament terminated the activities of 8 temporary commissions and established 5 temporary investigative commissions.

During the 14th session, MPs submitted 218 parliamentary questions — almost half as many as during the 13th session, and on a par with the 10th session. All inquiries addressed to the President concerned the conferment of titles.

‘Government Question Hour’ is an instrument of parliamentary oversight through which Members of Parliament may ask questions to members of the Cabinet of Ministers on a defined topic and receive answers. During the ‘Government Question Hour’, only issues related to the designated topic may be raised. As a rule, responses are delivered from the rostrum by the minister responsible for the relevant area, although questions may also be addressed to the Prime Minister and other ministers. 

During the 14th sessionMPs may often yield the floor to another MP during the Government Question Hour to ask a question. Therefore, remarks by MPs lasting less than 10 seconds were removed from the data, as these were most likely such transfers of the floor., 7 ‘Government Question Hours’ were held — in total, MPs and ministers spent more than eight hours asking questions and receiving answers.

MPs may ask several questions during a single intervention, while ministers may respond to several questions, or several ministers may respond to a single question. Considering these features of the ‘Government Question Hours’, the data obtained illustrate MPs’ interest in particular topics or even specific ministers. 

Compared to the 13th session, the data on the ‘Government Question Hours’ demonstrate a decrease in MPs’ activity, which is generally consistent with the overall trends of this session. 

*It should be noted that the ‘Government Question Hour’ is divided into two parts: 1) questions from parliamentary factions (parliamentary groups) to members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and responses thereto; 2) questions from Members of Parliament to members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and responses thereto — up to 30 minutes. 

As in previous sessions, the largest number of questions (interventions) came from the Servant of the People faction — its representatives accounted for almost one third of all questions.

During the 14th session, questions from Members of Parliament were most frequently answered by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Yuliia Svyrydenko, and the Minister of Education and Science, Oksen Lisovyi. This distribution is expected, given the role of the Prime Minister in coordinating the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers and the fact that the Minister of Education served as the main speaker during the ‘Government Question Hours’. 

The Verkhovna Rada may establish temporary bodies: temporary special commissions and temporary investigative commissions, which are formed for a period not exceeding one year. During the 14th session, the Parliament voted to establish five temporary investigative commissions and terminated the activities of eight temporary commissions (of which five were special commissions). Their list is provided in Annex 7.

Members of Parliament have the right to submit parliamentary inquiries and MPs’ appealsSince MPs’ appeals do not require announcement at a plenary sitting and there is no information about their registration, which complicates data collection, they are not the subject of this monitoring.. The former constitute a requirement by an MP to provide an official response on matters within the competence of a body or institution, while the latter constitute a request to provide an official clarification or present a position on matters within the competence of a body or institution.

During the 14th session, MPs submitted 218 parliamentary inquiries — almost twice fewer than during the 13th session and at the level of the 9th session. All parliamentary inquiries addressed to the President concernedThe conferral of titles and awards falls within the powers of the President; therefore, a parliamentary inquiry addressed to the President regarding the awarding of service members and other individuals (most often with the title of Hero of Ukraine) has become one of the instruments for recognising the contribution of service members, alongside citizens’ appeals and electronic petitions. the conferment of titles.

The decrease in the number of submitted parliamentary inquiries, as well as the number of ‘Government Question Hours’ held and MPs’ activity during them, confirms the conclusion that the 14th session is one of the slowest and least active sessions since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

During the 14th session, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure in the adoption of laws amounted to 38%, which is 30% lower than during the previous session.

The share of violations at the second reading of draft laws decreased by half compared to the 13th session.

The overall share of violations of the constitutional time limit (15 days) for the signing of laws by the President during the 14th session again amounted to 44%. The time limit for signing (or submitting proposals) was violated for 20 laws, while another 8 laws were neither signed nor vetoed.

The volume of violations of the legislative procedure during the 14th session decreased significantly and almost reached the level observed before the full-scale invasion. The overall share of draft laws adopted with violations is lower than during all other sessions under martial law, due to the significant decrease in violations at the second reading.

This section provides information on violations of the Rules of Procedure during the 14th session.

The 14th session demonstrated a decrease in the share of violations across all categories. During the 14th session, approximately 38% (more than one third) of laws were adopted with violations of consideration procedures, compared to 68% during the 13th session.

During the 14th session, the dynamics of the frequency of violations of the Rules of Procedure are similar for both the first and second readings. For the first reading, the share of violations decreased compared to the 13th session. Overall, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure at the first reading has continued to decline since the 11th session.

Since the 9th session, the share of violations at the second reading had been increasing. During the 14th session, however, the share of violations of the Rules of Procedure at the second reading decreased almost twofold across all three types of violations monitored for the second reading.

These are among the lowest indicators for the entire IX convocation. The volume of violations at both the first and second readings continues to gradually approach the levels observed before the full-scale invasion.

In the charts and table, data on the share of draft laws adopted with specific types of violations of the Rules of Procedure are presented by session.

*The Rules of Procedure of the VRU do not contain a direct and clear requirement regarding the mandatory nature of opinions of the MSED. Alongside Article 103(4), which provides that in the absence of opinions within 14 days there are deemed to be no comments, there are also provisions requiring MSED opinions:

1. Article 112 establishes that accompanying documents to a draft law shall be provided to MPs no later than seven days before the day of consideration of the draft law at a plenary sitting of the Verkhovna Rada.
2. Article 99(2)(3) provides that expert opinions on a draft law form part of the accompanying documents.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Rules of Procedure of the VRU are imperfect and contain contradictory provisions. For example, the MSED may provide an opinion after the 14-day deadline (due to workload), and in such a case it is unclear what the main committee should do — treat the absence of timely opinions as meaning there are no comments or consider the comments submitted after the deadline. 

**The opinion of the MLD was absent for the draft state budget, but this was not considered a violation due to the established practice of the absence of MLD opinions on budgets in different years.

In addition to standard violations of the Rules of Procedure, monitoring was carried out of violations of the Constitution related to breaches of the 15-day time limit for the signing of adopted laws by the President (Article 94 of the Constitution). The monitoring covered 63 laws adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during the 14th session. The time limit for signing (or submitting proposals) was violated for 20 laws, i.e. in 32% of cases (compared to 43% during the 13th session). In addition, a further 8 laws were neither signed by the President, nor vetoed, nor accompanied by proposals (although the deadline for their signing had already expired). If all violations are combined, this amounts to 44% of all laws adopted during the 14th session, which is lower than the results of the 13th session (47%). Thus, almost half of all laws adopted during the 14th session involved violations of the time limits established by the Constitution of Ukraine.

Of course, the extent of the delay — whether 2 days or 102 days — does not change the fact that both constitute a violation. If one considers the most extreme cases, the longest recorded time for signing was 83 days.

Violations of the constitutional procedure began to increase with the introduction of martial law. The 11th and 13th sessions recorded the highest number of such violations, while the 12th and 14th sessions showed only a slight decrease. However, it is premature to conclude that the trend has changed. Despite significant improvements in the process of adopting laws, the timeframes for signing remain a major issue. These violations also cannot be explained byAccording to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President has 15 days to sign a law and officially promulgate it, or to return it with his reasoned and formulated proposals to Parliament. At the decision of the President, the Government organises an expert review of the law submitted for signature. According to the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Government has a maximum of seven days to submit its proposals regarding the signing of the law by the President or reasoned and substantiated proposals on the expediency of the President exercising the right of veto. The time spent on preparing generalised comments and proposals depends both on the scope and complexity of the law and on other factors — the day of the week and time when the copy of the law was received, the number of ministries involved in the review, differences in their positions regarding the adopted law, internal bureaucratic procedures in the ministries, technical reasons, etc. Any combination of these factors may delay the Government’s submission of proposals on the law and, accordingly, the President’s decision to sign the law or return it to Parliament. deficiencies in the regulatory or procedural framework, as the relevant provisions have not changed.

During the 14th session, the President, within the established 15-day time limit (i.e. without violation), vetoed one draft law and submitted his proposals. The draft law had been initiated by representatives of the Servant of the People faction, which suggests that, in this case, the positions of the initiators and the President were not aligned or that the draft law was technically flawed. The Verkhovna Rada has not yet considered this draft law.

• The most heavily burdened committees are the Committee on Economic Development (34 opinions), the Committee on Finance (25 opinions), the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Social Policy (24 opinions each).
• In terms of the number of draft laws per MP, two committees had the highest workload during the 14th session — the Committee on Economic Development and the Committee on Social Policy. Both committees account for more than 2 assigned draft laws and provided opinions per MP. In nine committees, the workload (number of provided opinions) does not exceed 0.5 per MP.

During the 14th session, committees of the Verkhovna Rada continued to operate in conditions of a slight decrease in the number of registered draft laws compared to the 12th session. The total number of provided opinions decreased to 260, which is 32 fewer than during the corresponding 12th session. The uneven distribution of workload among committee members, which in some cases differs by as much as 17 times, raises the issue of redistributing responsibilities or revising the composition of MPs and secretariat staff within committees.

Information on the timeframes for the provision of committee opinions is presented in the section on the speed of passage of draft laws.

During the 14th session, 38 opinions of main committees recommending the rejection of draft laws were prepared. Opinions recommending rejection may indicate both the political alignment of committees and the level (at least minimal) of the quality of draft law preparation. At the same time, as during the 11th session, two-thirds of the rejected draft laws are alternative draft laws. Presidential draft laws appear to meet both criteria, as none received opinions recommending rejection (it should be noted, however, that the number of presidential draft laws was limited and they are often ratifications and decrees). Government draft laws also appear largely unproblematic: during the 14th session, they did not receive any opinions recommending rejection. Most rejection opinions were issued for draft laws initiated by MPs from the Servant of the People faction, which is logical given the number of MPs and their legislative activity. 

When assessing committee workload, it should be borne in mind that this monitoring primarily calculates workload based on the number of opinions by main committees. This method is used due to data availability (open data format). Information on the opinions of main committees is consistently available on the website of the Verkhovna Rada, is regularly updated and covers all such opinions. At the same time, committees perform many other functions and tasks beyond providing opinions as main committees. Three committeesBudget Committee, Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, Committee on European Integration. are required to provide mandatory opinions on all draft laws; committees may also be tasked with preparing opinions as supporting committees; they consider and adopt decisions within the framework of the oversight function; review letters and appeals; and organise conferences, round tables and other events. These limitations should be considered when reviewing the information presented below, which is based on the opinions of main committees. 

The presented chart includes two indicators. First, it shows the number of opinionsThe number of opinions does not correspond to the number of draft laws considered. A committee may provide several opinions on a single draft law, for example: an opinion on inclusion in the agenda, opinions for the first and second readings, for repeated readings, or on revised versions of the draft law, etc. provided by the main committees. The second indicator reflects the number of draft laws assigned to each committee as the main committee in accordance with its remit. Together, these indicators illustrate the distribution of legislative work related to the preliminary consideration of draft laws.

The highest workload in terms of the number of opinions (34) falls on the Committee on Economic Development. Three other committees also demonstrate a relatively high workload (compared to other committees): the Committee on Finance (25 opinions), the Committee on National Security and the Committee on Social Policy (24 opinions each). While the Committee on Economic Development was not among the leaders in terms of the number of provided opinions in recent sessions, for the other committees, this distribution is relatively typical for the last seven sessions under martial law (7th–13th sessions).

The total number of opinions decreased to 260, which is 32 fewer than the number provided by committees during the corresponding 12th session.

The largest decreases (compared to the corresponding 12th session) in the number of opinions provided during the 14th session were recorded by the Committee on Legal Policy (−32 opinions) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−29 opinions).

At the same time, for some committees, the number of opinions increased compared to the 12th session. In particular, the largest increase was recorded by the Committee on Economic Development (+18 opinions).

The number of draft laws assigned to committees, as compared to the 12th session, changed within a range from −28 to +15 assigned draft laws.

The potential workload (i.e. the number of assigned draft laws) of committees during the 14th session decreased most significantly (as compared to the 12th session) for the same committees that also experienced a decrease in actual workload: the Committee on Legal Policy (−28 assigned draft laws) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−27 assigned draft laws).

At the same time, the potential workload increased most significantly for the Budget Committee (+15 assigned draft laws) and the Committee on Social Policy (+10 assigned draft laws).

Another dimension of committee workload is illustrated by the chart above, which shows how many opinions or registered draft laws fall per MPNumber of MPs at the end of the 14th session; during the 14th session the number of MPs in committees changed. who is a member of a committee. A high workload (where the number of assigned draft laws and provided opinions exceeds 2 per MP) during the 14th session is observed only in one committee — the Committee on Social Policy (5.1 draft laws per MP and 2.4 opinions per MP). Two other committees (the Committee on Economic Development and the Committee on EU Integration) have a workload exceeding 1.5 opinions and draft laws per MP.

In nine committees, the number of provided opinions per MP does not reach 0.5 (during the 12th session, this indicator also did not reach 0.5 for nine committees). The lowest number of provided opinions per MP is recorded for the Budget Committee (0.14 opinions per MP) and the Committee on Agrarian Policy (0.23 opinions per MP). Three other committees, despite having assigned draft laws, did not provide any opinions.

When comparing the 14th session with the corresponding 12th session, a noticeable difference in workload can be observed, as the difference in the number of provided opinions per MP ranges from −1.78 to +1.43. The number of assigned draft laws also varies significantly — within the range from −1.56 to +1.

The actual workload (i.e. the number of provided opinions per MP) decreased the most for the Committee on Legal Policy (−1.89 opinions per MP) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−1.32 opinions per MP). The largest increase in actual workload was recorded for the Committee on Economic Development (+1.43 opinions per MP).

The potential workload decreased the most (compared to the 12th session) for the Committee on Legal Policy (−1.56 assigned draft laws per MP) and the Committee on Law Enforcement (−1.23 draft laws per MP). At the same time, the largest increase in potential workload was recorded for the Committee on EU Integration (+0.88 assigned draft laws per MP) and the Committee on Social Policy (+1 assigned draft law per MP).

Overall, the trends in actual and potential workload per committee member correspond to the general data on committee workload.

When comparing the least and most heavily burdened committees, their workload differs by a factor of 17. This situation observed during the 14th session, as well as persistent trends in committee workload across sessions, raises the issue of redistributing either MPs or the areas of competence among committees.

During the 14th session, a total of 48 hours was spent on the consideration of draft laws in the session hall, which is the lowest figure for the 9th–14th sessions of the IX convocation.

7.4% of plenary time during the 14th session was spent on the consideration of draft laws initiated by actors outside the governing majority.

Draft laws for which both readings took place during the 14th session demonstrate the highest average and median consideration time indicators for the entire period of the IX convocation.

Overall, draft laws were discussed significantly longer than during other sessions; however, the record-low amount of plenary time is explained by the relatively small number of adopted draft laws.

For the calculation of plenary time indicators, only the time spent on the consideration of draft laws was used. Time for registration, announcements of inquiries, the ‘Government Question Hour’, resolutions and other matters was not considered.

During the 14th session, Members of Parliament spent almost 48 hours of plenary time on the consideration of draft laws. This constitutes a new negative record for the Verkhovna Rada, as it is the lowest amount of time spent on the discussion of draft laws for the period of the 9th–14th sessions. It may also indicate a possible end to the trend of increasing plenary time expenditure, which began during the 9th session.

During the 14th session, 92.6% of plenary time was devoted to the consideration of draft laws initiated by the governing actors — the Servant of the People faction, the Government and the President. This is a fairly typical situation for recent sessions, as this figure usually exceeds 90%.

The 14th session of the Verkhovna Rada demonstrates a further increase in both the average and median time spent on the discussion of draft laws compared to previous sessions. The average and median consideration time represent the second-highest indicators for the IX convocation and the highest for the period of the full-scale invasion. This indicates a continuation of the trend towards longer consideration of draft laws. For 70% of draft laws adopted at the first reading and in their entirety, the amount of plenary time spent increased, although the average time remains slightly lower than the peak value of the 6th session (701 seconds). These data demonstrate a return to the pre-war format of draft law consideration. 

Draft laws considered only in the second reading during the 14th session were discussed in the session hall twice as long as during the previous three sessions and even exceeded the indicators of some pre-war sessions. For 80% of draft laws adopted at the second reading and in their entirety (where the first reading took place before the 14th session), plenary time increased. 

Draft laws for which both readings took place during the 14th session were considered, on average, for the longest time across the entire IX convocation. The average consideration time amounted to approximately 123 minutes, while the median was 40 minutes. This indicates a significant increase in time, partly driven by the lengthy consideration of the State Budget for 2026, which in total amounted to almost 12 hours. Thus, in terms of the format of draft law consideration in the session hall, the 14th session significantly exceeded the indicators of pre-war sessions. For 100% of draft laws, plenary time for both readings increased compared to the 13th session.

The five draft laws with the longest consideration time in the plenary hall are presented in Annex 6.