Are you following the US election? Meanwhile, the situation with votes and results is only gaining momentum – we want to tell you about the most controversial and scandalous elections in America, which took place in 2000.

The Constitutional Court has caused a political crisis in Ukraine. But the courts influence politics not only in Ukraine. How are the decisions of the US Supreme Court and the US presidential election related?

On November 3, the election period in the United States ended. The results of this election will affect American citizens and political and economic processes in other countries. Therefore, the course of the campaign and the counting of votes will be monitored around the world.

Any election held in 2020 is special because of the challenges of the pandemic. However, in the United States, the electoral process has changed beyond recognition. A record number of voters voted long before election day by sending ballots by mail.

Because each state has its own laws, the counting process is different – several states allow ballots to be counted even after election day, provided they are sent in time. Some states have started counting votes in advance and will have results soon. Among the latter are several so-called swing states, states where candidates from the two main parties have an equal chance of being elected. In these elections, such states are, for example, Pennsylvania and North Carolina, where, by the time polls closed, about 80 percent of the ballots had already been counted.

In 2000, the gap between George W. Bush (Republican) and Albert Gore (Democratic) was less than 1 percent, and the election was decided in Florida, where the count showed that Bush would win Florida by such a small margin (537 votes in total), that the law required recalculation.

Recalculation was also required due to uncertainty about most of the ballots in the form of punch-cards in which automatic voting machines incorrectly punched (so-called “hanging, dimpled, or pregnant chads”) – there were disputes regarding the enrollment of such ballots or the degree of perforation that can be enrolled. Even after the election, experts estimated that if the count had taken place across Florida, most of the ballots with problematic perforations would have been counted, Al Gore would have won the election.

However, in the case of Bush v. Gore, the US Supreme Court has made a scandalous decision to cancel the recount, voicing a very political motivation to avoid an “unnecessary and unjustified cloud” over Bush’s legitimacy. Thus, under state law, all Florida votes (even those cast for Gore) passed to Bush, which determined his victory.

This decision is still considered controversial and has seriously damaged both the Supreme Court’s reputation and the legitimacy of the president-elect.

The scenario of 2000, when the fate of the US election was decided by small holes in the ballots and 9 judges, is unlikely, as the “fight” is unlikely to be reduced to one state. However, the results of this election are unlikely to be less scandalous, given the conditions of the election, as well as a large number of lawsuits. Electronic ones have since replaced voting machines, but the highly complex US election process is likely to require more serious change and reform in the future.

Exactly 20 years ago, on October 31, 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325, better known as “Women, Peace and Security”, was adopted. We want to talk about its main provisions and importance for our country.

Although the resolution was adopted 20 years ago, the world community, namely the UN Security Council, is actively improving it. In support of the implementation of this resolution in 2008-2019, 9 more UN Security Council resolutions were adopted under the following numbers: 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122, 2242, 2467, 2493.

Ukraine, as a member of the UN, must also implement the provisions of the resolution. In particular, in February 2016, Ukraine adopted a National Action Plan to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1325 “Women, Peace and Security” for the period up to 2020. Before the 20th anniversary, Ukraine adopted the second National Plan.

• The special importance of taking into account the needs of women and girls in conflict situations and women’s special vulnerability to the negative consequences of conflicts are noted.
• The Security Council calls on UN member states to actively involve women in decision-making at all levels through national, regional, and international institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution.
• UN member states call for the inclusion of a gender component in field operations, particularly the greater involvement of women in the military and police forces.

Subsequent UN Security Council resolutions, in support of Resolution 1325, were aimed at combating sexual violence during conflicts, increasing women’s involvement in the conflict and post-conflict situations, and more.

The resolution became the institutional framework for the integration of women into the security sector. More than 60 countries (including Ukraine) have already adopted national action plans to implement Resolution 1325. NATO and the EU have also adopted action plans. Involving women in decision-making and increasing the representation of women in the military and police significantly increases the effectiveness of combating gender-based violence and improves the consideration of women’s needs in conflict situations.

Ukraine already has the first achievements from the implementation of Resolution 1325. Positions of gender advisers are created in educational institutions of security and defense, a law on equal rights and opportunities for women and men during military service in the Armed Forces is adopted, the list of military specialties that women can occupy is expanded, and more than 27 thousand women serve in the Armed Forces.

However, the Ukrainian implementation of the resolution is also criticized: women mostly hold feminized positions in logistics, logistics, and medical services. Despite the formal expansion of the list of military specialties, there is informal resistance to the increase in women’s number in the security and defense sectors. There are almost no women in the leadership (especially at the rank of “colonel” and above).

Resolution 1325 and other resolutions in support of it (the last of which was adopted in 2019), action plans, demonstrate efforts to integrate women into peacekeeping and security processes, but they are also a signal of the inadequacy of such efforts. The problems addressed by resolution 1325 have not yet been resolved. Therefore, 20 years after adopting the resolution “Women, Peace and Security”, it is necessary to increase efforts to implement it.

The question of the ultimate truth in law is quite controversial. In the modern Ukrainian legal system, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has the right to establish the ultimate truth.

However, the fact that the CCU made a decision does not make this decision entirely correct. In the case of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Law on Prevention of Corruption, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, the CCU could have made a different decision while having a sufficiently strong legal basis. Such a justification is available in the Dissenting Opinion of CCU Judge Serhiy Holovaty and the Dissenting Opinion of CCU Judge Vasyl Lemak. The argumentation of the decision of the CCU itself is criticized by many experts. In particular, the President’s Representative in the Constitutional Court, Fedir Venislavsky, considers the Constitutional Court’s decision to be legally weakly motivated. Additional grounds for doubting the fairness of the decision are given by a possible conflict of interest of some judges of the Constitutional Court regarding whom the National Agency on Corruption Prevention has drawn up administrative reports or carried out inspections. The story about the undeclared house in the Crimea of ​​the Chairman of the CCU caused a special resonance. In the text of the CCU decision, they found plagiarism from the collection of articles and essay “Federalist” by O. Hamilton.

The Constitutional Court should be the last bastion of the Constitution’s protection, but quite the opposite cases are common. The Constitutional Court acts as an instrument for the destruction of the constitutional order of the state. The Constitutional Court has often allowed the President of a country to be elected for a third, fourth, or fifth term, thus destroying the constitutional foundations of a democratic regime in the state. Thus, the Constitutional Courts allowed the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Senegal, and Burundi to be elected for a third term, the President of Bolivia for a fourth term, and the President of Russia for a fifth term. In fact, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine also distinguished itself in this list, allowing Leonid Kuchma to be re-elected for a third term. Another example of a destructive decision is the decision in 2010 to repeal the 2004 amendments to the Constitution. All these decisions led to the destruction of the constitutional order and negative consequences for the state, and the constitutional courts played a major role in them.

Analyzing the decision of the Constitutional Court in the case of anti-corruption bodies, as well as in attempts to comprehend and somehow articulate the situation, the authors of this comment agreed on a conclusion no less absurd than the situation itself: a democratic institution makes an undemocratic decision in a democratic way. The paradox of this situation is that it is possible (because it has already happened) and impossible (due to the catastrophic consequences for state institutions) at the same time. The first intuitive way to take a critical stance on this catastrophe would, of course, be to find the culprits. After all, if the procedure was violated or there was a criminal conspiracy, it is not the system that is to blame, but specific people, specific judges. This way of criticism refers us to the modern version of obscurantism: instead of admitting that something is wrong with structure, we can look for particular culprits (this is how modern Ukrainian information space and political discourse mostly work). But for now, let’s assume that the Constitutional Court judges are sincerely convinced of the legality and legitimacy of their decision.

The Constitutional Court could have made another decision in this case. In addition to common sense, this is evidenced by the presence of two separate opinions and the unanimity of opinions of independent experts and representatives of very different political camps. That is, the Constitutional Court considered the relevant submission and understood that there were other ways to resolve the case. How did it happen that in a young and undoubtedly democratic state, where the fight against corruption is declared at all levels, the Constitutional Court makes such a contradictory decision?

Surprises and indignations have become a part of our daily lives lately. Unclear personnel policy, curtailment (or even outright repeal) of many reforms, confusing public statements with radically opposite actions and consequences – this is the political reality in which the judges of the Constitutional Court and we live. At the same time, the most horrifying thing is not even the decision itself, as a fait accompli. The most frightening thing about this decision is the level of (un)justification, as well as the fact that respected judges of the Constitutional Court generally consider it possible and acceptable to decide with such a level of justification. But in a country where the level of justification for any change is weak, and the most popular reason for the change (and very radical) is the results of the unknown in nature, level of legitimacy and possible political and legal consequences of answering the “President’s question”, can we expect judges that they will offer high standards of justification?

Another problem directly related to the level of justification is the (un)predictability of court decisions, especially of the Constitutional Court. It is the exhaustiveness of the justification that allows court decisions to be predictable. The unpredictability of the Constitutional Court decisions is a verdict on the reforms, as they are somehow aimed at changing the status quo. Here we can, of course, talk about cases of political involvement of judges, when under different conditions the Constitutional Court made completely opposite decisions/interpretations on the same issue (for example, decisions № 16-rp / 2008 and № 11-rp / 2010 on the principle of forming a parliamentary coalition), or when the decision not only contradicted the already established legal relations but also resulted in the destruction of the constitutional order and usurpation of power (decision № 20-rp / 2010 on the abolition of the Constitutional reform of 2004). With such a role of the Constitutional Court and with such an approach of judges to their decisions, there is no guarantee that in time some reforms, any new policies will not be canceled, no matter how much money international partners have spent on them or how many tens and hundreds of lives were lost in the requirements of their implementation.

On the other hand, we can talk about the abuse of MPs’ right to constitutional petitions. After all, these appeals should also be aimed primarily at protecting the Constitution rather than achieving political goals. The workload of the Constitutional Court with such decisions gives judges a certain idea of ​​the political reality of today. Given the unpredictability of the Constitutional Court’s actions, such submissions pose a real threat to Ukraine’s democratic institutions, the rule of law, and national security.

You can disagree with the court decision, but the decision’s logic must be clear and unquestionable. The validity of the CCU’s decisions is one of the most important principles of its activity. However, it is difficult to understand how the judges came to the conclusions in this particular case.

Thus, according to the CCU, the judiciary’s independence entails recognizing unconstitutional norms that apply not only to judges but also to all subjects of declaration in general. The Constitutional Court also had alternatives to declare the norm unconstitutional, requiring the Verkhovna Rada to make appropriate changes, as, for example, the Court did in the case of the constitutionality of the provisions of part two of Article 392 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. In this case, the Court declared the provision unconstitutional and ordered the Verkhovna Rada to bring the regulations in line with the Constitution and this decision. In particular, this method helps to avoid a situation of “legislative pause”, as Judge Lemak put it, in his dissenting opinion. Why hasn’t the Court done the same now? Annoying mistake? Deliberate sabotage of reform? Demonstration of the “strength” in a situation of real threat to the usual way of life and judges’ status?

On the issue of criminal liability, the Court considered that the establishment of criminal liability for declaring knowingly inaccurate information was excessive and that the negative consequences suffered by a person were disproportionate to the damage. However, the problem is that the Court did not put forward any additional considerations that allowed it to reach such a conclusion. Although even in its decision, the Court cites the Opinion of the Advisory Council of European Judges of November 9, 2018, which states that corruption among judges is one of the main threats to society and a democratic state’s functioning. According to Mr. Holovaty’s Dissenting Opinion, citing international treaties signed by Ukraine, corruption is one of the most dangerous threats to law and order, democracy, and human rights, destroying good governance, honesty, and social justice. Another problem lies in the theoretical space: can the Constitutional Court determine the expediency of punishment at all instead of analyzing the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for restriction of liberties, as is usually the case in constitutional proceedings.

Summarizing this part, the Constitutional Court could have made a less destructive decision for the anti-corruption system: both in terms of scope and providing adequate mechanisms for implementing this decision. However, the Court did not do that.

The CCU decision can have very serious consequences, so significant that the national security of Ukraine may be threatened. The NAPC has already stated that it has lost access to the registers. Accordingly, the NAPC cannot conduct special inspections of candidates for positions without which the heads of public authorities cannot be appointed, as “Decisions on appointment (election) or refusal to appoint (election) to a position related to the performance of state or local functions self-government, is accepted after a special inspection”

This calls into question the results of local elections and the state apparatus’s functioning as a whole. The EU considers that the CCU’s decision is a sufficient basis for the temporary suspension of the visa-free regime.

Anti-corruption reform is one of the main components of Ukraine’s agreements with Western partners: the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union. The ambassadors of the G7 countries also expressed their dissatisfaction with the undermining of anti-corruption reform. Financial support in the form of loans or direct financial assistance is now also in question. And there is no better time to refuse financial support – the pandemic and economic crisis coincided very well with the CCU’s anti-corruption decision. We should not forget directly about the fight against corruption. The CCU’s decision will further weaken the rather weak fight against corruption: the public loses control over the lifestyle of officials, one of the main anti-corruption articles of the Criminal Code is removed, and the main anti-corruption body loses most of its powers. The CCU’s decision thus removes integral parts of the anti-corruption system. Even if a new law is passed, existing criminal cases under (already) unconstitutional articles will be terminated. For that spring, when the landings for corruption will begin, we will have to wait a very long time. Probably even longer than the release of J. Martin’s new book “A Dream of Spring”.

The Constitutional Court has created a stalemate for all anti-corruption reform, as well as for many state institutions. The Constitutional Court may try to use the provision of Part 2 of Article 95 of the Law on the Constitutional Court and, at the request of a participant in the constitutional proceedings involved in the case, explain the procedure of execution of the decision, explaining that the decision applies only to judicial staff. This wouldn’t be a very good explanation. On the other hand, the Verkhovna Rada is likely to have to try to adopt new provisions concerning the activities of the NAPC and in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. As the rationale is very vague, in theory, any new laws on the NAPC can also be declared unconstitutional.

However, Volodymyr Zelensky decided to follow an even more illegal path than conducting a nationwide poll. The bill “On Restoration of Public Confidence in the Constitutional Judiciary” contradicts both the Constitution and the very essence of laws (which are not acts of individual action). A rhetorical question arises: what is worse – the decision of the CCU or this bill?

The Constitutional Court is one of the most independent bodies in the Ukrainian legal system. Such independence is guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Thus, the Constitutional Court’s validity of decisions and the issue of the presence of judges of the Constitutional Court in the office cannot be subject to regulation by law. According to legal doctrine, a legislative act that annuls a Constitutional Court decision or dismisses judges of the Constitutional Court cannot have any legal consequences. Even such a proposal causes natural indignation and is immeasurable for anyone with an education in law. However, we will try to model the situation that the bill was adopted and somehow legitimized.

Here is a rather unexpected scenario. Laws are, in fact, constitutional until the Constitutional Court rules that they are unconstitutional. If the law on the termination of the CCU powers is not declared unconstitutional, it will also be constitutional. However, as the CCU powers are terminated, the decision on unconstitutionality cannot be made by this composition of the CCU. There is a collision. After the termination of the powers of this composition of the CCU, a new composition of the CCU will be formed. Then a decision may be made on the unconstitutionality of this law. Here again, there is a conflict – will the recognition of the law on the termination of the powers of the CCU unconstitutional mean that the powers of the previous CCU will be renewed? However, CCU’s new composition is supposed to be formed according to the legal and constitutional procedures. The issue of the constitutionality of the Law “On Prevention of Corruption”, the Criminal Code of Ukraine, remains open because, in case of recognition of the President’s law (which is currently at the stage of the bill), these renewed laws will also be unconstitutional. The new composition of the CCU in its decision can resolve these conflicts by explaining the procedure for implementing its decision, but it is obvious that there are too many conflicts and the unknown. Even if the process of recognizing the unconstitutionality of the Law on Restoration of Public Confidence in Constitutional Proceedings (if it becomes law) is not launched immediately, the foundation of legality in the Law on Prevention of Corruption, certain provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine will be very shaky.

A much more legitimate way out of the situation would be to adopt a new version of the law, taking into account the CCU’s comments, as far as possible, given the rather abstract and vague nature of the justification of the decision.

We could outline some no less absurd options (for example, deprivation of judges of citizenship, recognition of their absence – and why not? After that, these judges do not “exist” for society), but no option will solve this situation. Moreover, such absurd choices undermine the constitutional order in our country even more. This situation must be accepted and the problem recognized in the system itself. This does not mean that nothing needs to be done. Protests, the adoption of a new law on the NAPC, media coverage of every step of the Constitutional Court, (possibly) reforming the Constitutional Court’s staff, and even law enforcement inspections to rule out “malicious intent” in judges’ actions (especially given the conflict of interest of some judges) – it is calm, democratic and confident.

In general, this whole situation has happened because of the destructive processes of politicization of the judiciary that characterize young democracies and authoritarian regimes. Is it possible to recognize the actions of the CCU judges as treason and send them to Rostov, as activists suggest, or “just take and restore confidence in the CCU” by restarting it?

As part of a broader process, judges point us to the political problems that prevail in our state. The legitimacy of this decision is in doubt. Still, at the same time, the activity of the entire Constitutional Court is also in doubt, the decision or position of which in various cases provokes positive responses of some and resentment of others.

Modern politicians must be aware of the Constitution’s sacredness, as a document, as a social contract. Consequently, the appointment of CCU judges cannot be a contest for political influence or the result of political bargaining. Here, of course, we can mention appointing judges to the US Supreme Court, which is an important part of the political game. Moreover, in the United States, the appointment process is an important event in the information space, and each appointment is publicly debated. Ideally, the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court should compete for which of them will appoint the most worthy and trustworthy person. After all, the Constitutional Court is the institution that has the power to dynamically interpret the Constitution, breathing life into it following modern reality.

Unfortunately, neither the political culture in modern Ukraine, nor the judicial reform that has been going on for more than a year, nor the system of training lawyers (and, accordingly, judges) still allow us to approach such a high constitutional ideal. And what is worse, the reaction of other branches of government, particularly the President with his new political force – is not something that can somehow change the situation. On the contrary, it drags us into a whirlpool of constitutional chaos and launching a snowball of unconstitutional coma, where each subsequent action seems even more unconstitutional and, as a result, undermining the legitimacy of state institutions.

On October 25, 2020, local elections will be held in Ukraine. Many experts consider this election to be one of the most difficult in Ukraine’s history:

• a new electoral system.
• many multi-member constituencies.
• optional voting for candidates on the list.
• funding problems.
• Russian pressure to cancel the election.
• a coronavirus pandemic with weekly record updates.

In addition, it is proposed to conduct a nationwide poll on election day.

Despite one of the basic principles of public policy – predictability, the details of this survey were unknown from the beginning. The questions that citizens are asked to answer were voiced by the President in video appeals, and still (a week before the election and the announced poll) have no formalization.

Although there were statements that the poll would be private (i.e., funded by an “unknown oligarch”), it was announced by the President of Ukraine. Moreover, in September, one of the leaders of the parliamentary majority – Oleksandr Korniienko – registered a bill on public opinion polls (Draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Central Election Commission” on Public Opinion Polls Number, registration date: 4043 dated 03.09.2020). The bill proposes to give the CEC the authority to conduct (according to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers) public opinion polls on the day of voting in local elections. The bill was never passed before the local elections, and Volodymyr Zelensky announced a “nationwide poll” without any legal grounds.

As the constitution of a democratic state, Ukraine’s Constitution establishes that “the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine is the people“. The question arises as to the significance of the opinion of the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power. If the bearer of sovereignty and the sole source of power supports or does not support a certain issue, it is logical to conclude that the people’s representatives – public authorities – must act following the people’s will, namely – to support or not support a decision. Only the expression of the will of the people to support or not support a certain issue is called not a “public opinion poll” but a “referendum”. And the legitimacy of the results of such expression of the will of the people through a referendum is ensured by predictable, transparent, and understandable for all procedures.

Sociological agencies conduct public opinion polls. The public opinion poll results do not have the status of expressing the will of the people. They do not have to be fulfilled. Public opinion polls do not establish the opinion of every citizen of Ukraine: about 2-3 thousand respondents express the opinion. There is a methodology for conducting opinion polls, which determines and declares a certain level of error as to how correctly a sample of 2-3 thousand respondents conveys all Ukrainians’ opinion. No one has a monopoly on conducting surveys – if you want and have the resources, you can create your sociological agency and conduct surveys on any topic. The poll does not claim to establish the will of the people and has no legal consequences. Unlike a poll, a referendum (which obliges the authorities to respond to the results in one way or another) can only be organized and conducted by the state. It is funded transparently through special funds or budget funds. It aims to reflect the opinion of as many citizens as possible (as a rule, there should also be a certain required level of voter turnout). It involves not a few thousand but millions of citizens.

The “public opinion poll”, as proposed by the bill, will be conducted by the state monopoly. If it is planned to be held on election day, millions of citizens will be asked instead of 3,000. And all this is presented not as a referendum, but as a poll!

Besides, the President assured the citizens that the will of the people expressed during the poll will be fulfilled.

But we emphasize: first, there are no legal grounds for conducting the survey; secondly, the President, by the Constitution, has no authority to announce any “poll”.

At this point, it is worth pausing and congratulating all readers who have read this paragraph. After all, the number of words from the beginning of this article to this paragraph already exceeds the number of words in the draft law introduced by Oleksandr Korniienko.

The procedure for conducting a poll, which by all indications is a referendum, is almost not regulated at the legislative level. The level of turnout, the issue of mandatory participation in the “survey”, its legal consequences, the procedure for counting the results of the “survey”, protection against falsification of results, protection against manipulative issues, the procedure of campaigning, etc. The bill does not regulate all this.

The CEC should establish the procedure for conducting such a “poll” and its organization (according to the draft law). However, public opinion polls are not within the competence of the CEC. Logically, the CEC organizes the referendum, but the procedure for holding a referendum (according to the Constitution) is established exclusively by laws, not by CEC resolutions. The draft Law on Democracy through an all-Ukrainian referendum adopted in the first reading, although it has shortcomings, will still comprehensively regulate the issue of holding a referendum.

Both public opinion polls and referendums can be forms of consultation with citizens. However, the form of this consultation must be coherent. Public opinion polls should be representative: consider the distribution of citizens by gender, age, place of residence, etc. If proper distribution (representativeness) is not ensured, the results of such consultation will be skewed. The referendum must be held according to prescribed procedures; otherwise, its results will also be distorted.

Citizens of Ukraine are already familiar with the distorted referendums, which were not conducted according to the proper procedure (or rather the procedure did not exist at all, because as of 2014, the Law “On All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums” was no longer in force) and were not representative. “Referendums” in Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk are good examples of neglect of procedures. And this is a danger to the democratic system. In addition to the pseudo-referendums mentioned above, there are many examples of usurpation of power through a referendum. In such cases, the referendum created an additional channel of legitimacy, allowing a strong figure, usually the president, to bypass parliament or other constitutional bodies and usurp power.

The draft law on public opinion polls proposes polls, which in essence and features are a referendum. Still, it brings the order of its organization into the sphere of bylaws – CEC resolutions. Polls that will claim the will of the people, to which Ukraine’s leaders will refer to making the most important decisions, will not be regulated by law. This opens up a huge space for distorting the will. The Electoral Code of Ukraine has 289 articles to protect the electoral process from distortions and manipulations. The draft Law “On Democracy through an All-Ukrainian Referendum” has 131 articles and occupies 157 pages to protect the referendum process from distortions and manipulations. The rhetorical question is why the draft law on public opinion polls is two pages long and has less than 400 words? Maybe not from, but for manipulation?

At least the questions announced by Volodymyr Zelensky seem manipulative.

Legislation in some countries explicitly prohibits the referendum on issues related to justice. However, we have the question №1:

“Do you support the idea of ​​life imprisonment for corruption on a particularly large scale?“

This question is formulated as if non-support of this type of punishment means supporting corruption on a particularly large scale, leading to an affirmative answer.

This is even though the system of anti-corruption bodies is still not working properly. So far, the accusations supported by the court and, accordingly, the sentences for top corrupt officials have yet to be sought. If the existing system of anti-corruption bodies, which has been built for a long time, cannot ensure the implementation of the current legislation, it is difficult to imagine that increasing the level of punishment will somehow correct this situation.

The peculiarities of the free economic zone’s legal status, which is proposed to be created on Donbas’ territory in question №2, are unclear.

Citizens can only guess whether this economic zone will be “a cat in a bag” or “a wolf in sheep’s clothing”, because the phrase “free economic zone” does not have any specific meaning. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of free economic zones in the world. It is not clear which of them citizens are invited to choose.

The Verkhovna Rada has previously approved the bill on reducing the number of MPs to 300. It is unclear why the President wanted to consult with citizens right now by asking question №3, and not before initiating consideration of this bill.

Although there is a nuance: the Constitutional Court of Ukraine issued an opinion with reservations on this bill. This means that, following the Rules of Procedure, the Verkhovna Rada had to finalize the draft amendments to the Constitution and re-initiate its consideration in the CCU. However, the parliamentary majority did not do so, deciding to ignore the reservations of the CCU, which were purely technical and legal, aimed at preventing inconsistencies between the various articles of the Constitution. In this context, bringing this issue up for a “referendum” looks like an attempt by the President (and his majority in parliament) to legitimize his actions on the bill (again, contrary to the position of the CCU and the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada). Such a populist flirtation with the “people’s expression of will” on, in fact, not a very simple issue, which puts law and procedure on one scale and the will of citizens on another, is alarming in its resemblance to authoritarian regimes.

Questions №4 and №5 are double.

The fourth question can be asked as follows – “Do you support the legalization of cannabis for medical purposes?” and “Do you support pain relief in critically ill patients?” The manipulation is that by supporting pain reduction, we automatically endorse the legalization of cannabis.

The fifth question can also be divided into two: “Do you support Ukraine’s right to use the security guarantees set out in the Budapest Memorandum?” and “Do you support the restoration of Ukraine’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity?” And a person who does not support the memorandum, at the same time, does not support our territorial integrity. The memorandum’s legal force, which has not been ratified by the signatory countries and did not contain any levers of influence or mechanisms to force the signatory countries to adhere to the memorandum, also raises questions.

The level of manipulation of questions in the informal public poll raises significant concerns about the manipulation of public opinion in the case of the adoption of Bill 4043 of 03.09.2020 or in the case of attempts to conduct such a poll without any legal grounds.

In general, the motives for initiating such a poll can be twofold: 1) to somehow revive the ratings of the “Sluga narodu” party and mobilize the turnout of its electorate in local elections, and 2) to legitimize dangerous steps for Ukrainian sovereignty in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

The trend for “new faces” is decreasing! And this, on the one hand, is good news!

The results of the survey of the Sociological Group Rating showed that the majority of respondents (60-70%) believe that it is more important for parties at the local level to have a strong local leader than well-known national, experienced politicians than “new faces”, a good team than a strong leader. One way or another, political players are changing, and the authorities are being “renewed”. In particular, Agency for Legislative Initiatives counted that 80.4% of “new faces” entered the Verkhovna Rada after the last parliamentary elections in 2019. These are people who have never received a mandate as a member of parliament before.

Experience shows that the coming to power of “new faces” is not the same as radical positive changes in the country, the eradication of corruption, and economic growth. Of course, new people need to appear in the political process. But we insist that politics must be a professional activity. To become an effective manager, you need to gain years of experience, earn credibility in society, work first for your community, and then reach the national level.

In Ukraine, it is necessary to build a system for the education of political leaders and the formation of strong political parties so that this smooth growth of politicians takes place in a professional environment. That is how we finally could have the opportunity to choose professionals in their field – politics, and not just “new faces” who were previously engaged in a completely different area.

We are working to make society aware of this. On the other hand, experienced leaders in Ukraine are also often not professionals. And that needs to be changed too.

Svitlana Matviienko, Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives and Director of the Ukrainian School of Political Studies, spoke on Ukrainian Radio about why politics should be a professional activity and why we shouldn’t believe only in “new faces”.

The abolition of parliamentary immunity was put forward by the representatives of the “Sluga narodu” and the President himself, almost the main achievement of the last year. But the recent story of a bribe to Oleksandr Yurchenko, an MP of “Sluga narodu”, raises doubts about the reality of the abolition of immunity, as it took two days of public pressure to open criminal proceedings, which is a threat to the political party’s ratings ahead of the local elections. When the scandal could not be quietly silenced, the MP was expelled from the faction and promised without investigation and trial that he would “definitely go to prison”.

What’s wrong with revoked parliamentary immunity? We answer by analyzing the changes to the legislation that were adopted at the end of 2019.

How was it before? The old pre-trial procedure of bringing an MP to criminal responsibility provided for the following stages:

1. The opening of proceedings against the MP took place in the general order – any prosecutor could do it.
2. Investigative actions in the form of search, detention, an inspection of items, violation of the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, application of other measures, including covert investigative actions that restrict the rights and freedoms of a member of parliament by law, could be carried out only if the Verkhovna Rada agreed to bring the MP to justice.
3. Detention, arrest, or criminal prosecution of the MP could be carried out only with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada. For this:

• The Prosecutor General filed motions for detention, arrest, and criminal prosecution;
• The nominated MP provided explanations to the Standing Committee;
• The Standing Committee considered the motivation for the submission and prepared an opinion:
  • In the absence of sufficient evidence to substantiate the submission, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada could return the submission to the prosecutor’s office together with the opinion of the committee;

• The Verkhovna Rada then had to consider the committee’s opinion under a special procedure. If a majority of MPs voted for the decision, agree to start the MP’s prosecution process.

Current procedure. Amendments to the legislation, including the Constitution, excluded the Verkhovna Rada from the process of making such decisions, concentrating procedural powers in the hands of the Prosecutor General. Now (pre-trial) procedure of bringing the MP to criminal responsibility provides:

1. Only the Prosecutor General can initiate proceedings concerning a member of parliament.
2. Detention or house arrest, search, covert investigative (search) actions can be carried out only with the Prosecutor General’s consent. And at the consideration of the corresponding petitions (except for search and secret investigative actions), the MP has to be present.

The Prosecutor General’s monopoly on initiating proceedings and approving an important part of investigative actions significantly limits independent anti-corruption bodies’ capabilities – the National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). In fact, in investigations of MPs, these independent bodies depend on the Prosecutor General. The logic of creating a special vertical of anti-corruption bodies – NABU, SAPO, Anti-Corruption Court, is that these bodies are minimally dependent on other state bodies (including the Prosecutor General’s Office), as anti-corruption bodies are engaged in combating corruption in other state bodies. In the scandal with a bribe for the MP Yurchenko, NABU had to persuade Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova to start proceedings publicly. Before that, the Prosecutor General did not see sufficient grounds for handing over the suspicion.

Is the immunity, which was so happily announced by the representatives of the “Sluga narodu” party, abolished? There has always been the possibility of prosecuting MPs. Yes, earlier, this required the consent of the Verkhovna Rada. In fact, out of 22 attempts to abolish the parliamentary immunity in the existing constitutional and legal framework for the VII and VIII convocations, 12 were successful – the MPs lost their parliamentary immunity. In some cases, voting in the session hall failed (6 cases). In three cases, the submission was returned to the Prosecutor General’s Office, and in another case, the Prosecutor General withdrew his submission.

The prosecutor’s office has problems with the preparation of submissions, which have been repeatedly “rejected” by the Standing Committee of the Verkhovna Rada (cases against Oleksandr Vilkul, Dmytro Kolesnikov, Serhiy Dunayev, and Oleksandr Ponomaryov). At the same time, it is difficult to say whether the problems were in the un/professionalism or non-/involvement of the Regulatory Committee or the prosecutor’s office and the courts.

Currently, the number of entities that decide on the possibility of bringing an MP to justice has decreased. Now the Verkhovna Rada’s consent is not required, and the powers are concentrated in the hands of the Prosecutor General. But the Prosecutor General is not independent. The President appoints him/her in agreement with the Verkhovna Rada. In Ukrainian practice, the Prosecutor General has always been a person of the President. In conditions when the President has a majority in the Verkhovna Rada, the Prosecutor General is even more dependent on the President. And it seems that the above-described powers of the Prosecutor General, as well as many of his other powers, under the current system of prosecuting MPs, will continue to be used as a tool to support friends and punish enemies.

After the first quarter of the Verkhovna Rada, the figures showed that the “turbo mode of the parliament” is a myth! And the results of our two monitorings for 1-2 and 3 sessions of the parliament only confirmed this. The tsunami of “legislative spam” is declining, the number of laws passed in the first year of the ninth convocation did not differ significantly from predecessors – members of parliament of the VIII convocation.

In particular, for the period of 1-2 sessions of the IX convocation (from 08/29/2019 to 01/17/2020) a total of 155 laws were adopted. During the same calendar period of the VIII convocation (from 11/27/2014 to 04/24/2015), MPs managed to pass not much less – 140 laws even though the Verkhovna Rada of the VIII convocation spent the first month of work on forming a coalition.

The third session of the new parliament seemed completely different, and therefore the annual “results” of the Verkhovna Rada are even lower than their predecessors in quantitative terms. But we emphasize that the annual calendar period of the two convocations in this matter is methodologically incorrect to compare – quarantine and pandemic are a significant error for analysis.

In general, the effectiveness of the work of the Verkhovna Rada cannot be measured by the number of bills, adopted laws, and hours spent in the session hall. It is difficult to distinguish between quantitative indicators and the quality of parliamentary work. Moreover, there can hardly be a system of clear KPIs in parliament to measure its performance.

The coordinated functioning of the state mechanism, which is fundamental for the country’s development, depends not on the fact that a certain law has been adopted but on all decision-making bodies’ coordinated interaction.

The state is a system. And a democratic state means procedures and their observance to keep the system balanced.

“Legislative turbo mode” and democracy – these concepts are incompatible, in principle. The procedure for adopting the law is described in the Rules of Procedure. And it involves a rather long process of discussion, refinement, weighing all the pros and cons. Any attempt to speed up this procedure, to fulfill the “five-year plan” for the number of laws in one parliamentary session will lead to a violation of the Rules of Procedure and, consequently, of the declared democratic principles. This is not even about the quality of bills produced by the subjects of the legislative initiative.

The eighth and ninth convocations operated at the marginal capacity of the law-making process. This is not a feature of the new parliament, but only a marketing move, which was coined by the apt name “turbo mode”. The “turbo regime” of the parliament did not happen – and it’s for the best.

On Thursday, July 30, Svitlana Matviienko, Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, took part in presenting the results of the expert survey “Political Quarter: Summer 2020” conducted by the Ilko Kucheriv “Democratic Initiatives” Foundation.

During the event, the speakers discussed the main trends of the political process in Ukraine. Svitlana Matviienko spoke about the observation of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives regarding the work of the parliament and the president. We publish in full the speech of the Chairwoman of the Board of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

“There are some positive trends. However, not without a “BUT”. In the first half of the year, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of registered draft laws. That is, the amount of what Pete Cox’s Roadmap calls legislative spam or “legislative tsunami” has decreased. A total of 1,178 draft laws were registered during the 1-2 sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of the IX convocation. Accordingly, the number of registered draft laws decreased by almost a third compared to the same calendar period of the VIII convocation.

During the third session, 13% fewer draft laws were registered than during the first two sessions. Given that during the first two sessions of the IX convocation, almost a third fewer draft laws were registered than during the same period of the VIII convocation. It is tempting to talk about some dynamics of reducing the flow of draft laws. However, it is noteworthy that, along with the decrease in the number of parliamentary draft laws over the past six months, the number of registered government and presidential draft laws has also decreased. And such a synchronous decrease can rather be explained by a long socio-political lockdown during the strict quarantine.

Another positive trend. The share of draft laws adopted in the second reading has increased. In the first and second sessions, this share reached 74% compared to 38% for the same period in the VIII convocation. However, the trend was unstable, and in the third session, their share fell to 49%. We hope that this is due to the peculiarities of the work of the Verkhovna Rada during quarantine restrictions.

Along with this, consideration of draft laws started to take longer. Why is this good? Because the laws passed in the first reading and in general – almost guaranteed – will be of lower quality in terms of legal technique or will not consider all stakeholders’ positions. As a result, it will affect their implementation and effectiveness. Passing almost 75% of the approved draft laws through 2 readings (we don’t mention the third one) is at least a precaution against making people laugh (or rather resent) in a hurry.

As for the turbo mode, which is still popular to mention among the majority. Six months ago, it was already obvious to us and all those who monitor the parliament’s work that this mode is not so “turbo”. As they say: everything is known by comparison. During the first two sessions (read six months) in the ninth convocation, 155 laws, or 13% of registered resent were adopted. In the VIII convocation for the same calendar period, 140 laws, or 9% of the registered ones, were adopted. At the same time, we must remember that the majority began to pass laws (including on amendments to the Constitution) on the first day, immediately after the opening ceremony, and taking the oath. While the MPs of the VIII convocation spent at least the first month on negotiations, working out a coalition agreement and forming the government. So, forget about the turbo.

We did not compare the 3rd session of the ninth convocation with the same period of the VIII session, because this would be irrelevant given the extraordinary circumstances in the form of strict quarantine. The parliament lost two working months.

During the first two sessions, it was noticed that the percentage of adopted laws, the subject of the legislative initiative of which is the government (17% vs. 35% in the VIII convocation) decreased. This trend may indicate a weakening of the role of government in shaping public policies. It also harms the principle of unity of decision-making.

During the 3rd session, the share of the accepted governmental projects is insignificant. Only 7 government draft laws were passed. Is this because the government has a weak position in policy-making, completely subordinate to the President’s Office? Or is it because the government does not see a need to be an independent player, instructing MPs to register the necessary draft laws? Both possible explanations are disappointing. There is a clear distortion of the constitutionally established system of checks and balances against the concentration of powers in one power entity in Ukraine. However, the tendency to weaken the government in the decision-making system is contrary to global trends.

Volodymyr Zelensky, of the last four presidents, registered the largest number of draft laws in his first year – 76 (or 4% of all registered this year). His predecessors exercised the right of legislative initiative, respectively: 48 times – Poroshenko, 39 – Yanukovych, 50 – Yushchenko. The relative share of legislative initiatives of other presidents was not more than 2%. At the same time, the rate of adopted presidential draft laws during Zelensky’s first year of a presidency is twice lower – 38% – compared to previous presidents, where the share of adopted laws ranged from 76% to 82%. This situation is rather strange because the president had his “mono-majority” in parliament for the most calendar year, which became a unique situation in Ukrainian history. Given the frequent personnel changes during the year, as well as the results of a study by the Sociological Group “Rating”, this situation may indicate the active use of the model “good President – bad MPs / officials”, which in turn, leads to a positive image only of the president. Although it no longer helps. Another explanation may be that the “Sluga narodu” party was formed virtually and from people who were not connected with politics in any way before the election. After a while, this affected the weak factional discipline and led to multiple divisions.

According to Article 94 of Ukraine’s Constitution, the president must within 15 days sign the law adopted by the Verkhovna Rada or return it with his proposals. The average rate (median) of signing bills by Zelensky was 9 days, which is the fastest rate among Ukrainian presidents. For the rest of the presidents, this figure was 15 days. However, some of the laws were signed in violation of the 15-day deadline. Thus, Zelensky signed 13% of all adopted laws in violation of the deadline (for other presidents, the figure ranged from 8% to 17%). And while for many, such a violation may seem insignificant, it is still a direct violation of the Constitution, which may be grounds for declaring laws unconstitutional. It is also worth mentioning the situation with three draft laws that Volodymyr Zelensky “inherited” from Petro Poroshenko: №0975, №0976, №0977. These draft laws were neither signed nor vetoed by the new president for much more than 15 days, which directly violated the Constitution. Zelensky dragged on time until the new parliament was elected to prevent these laws from being passed”.

You can read more about the work of the parliament and the president of Ukraine in the other articles of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The effective functioning of any public authority is impossible without establishing an effective system of control over the implementation of its decisions because the very “effectiveness of any decision depends on control”. For example, the parliament is responsible for the supervision of the activities of the executive branch. And soon the Verkhovna Rada may get more tools for this. In May, MPs registered the draft law №3499, which provides the introduction of the newest form of parliamentary control for Ukraine – interpellation.

This is another form of parliamentary control, which is used to discuss the executive branch’s activities. In general, it can be described as follows: members of parliament have the right to invite government representatives to parliament so that government officials or one particular official can explain their policies, specific documents, or actions. Members of parliament can ask questions to government officials or debate the results of a speech by a member of the government. Sometimes, as a result of such debates, parliament can express a vote of no confidence.

An interpellation is a new form of parliamentary control for Ukraine, which was previously exercised only through parliamentary inquiries and an hour of questions to the government. The procedure of the current Rules of Procedure closest to the interpellation is the procedure of considering the answer to the MP’s request, which is established by Art. 226, but still, the interpellation procedure provides a more specific impact of the parliament on the government’s activities.

In particular, Art. 226 also stipulates that the executive branch members may be summoned to parliament (to discuss a response to an MP’s request). But we will consider the differences:

The procedure of discussing an MP’s request requires twice as many MPs to initiate it, the decision of at least 226 MPs to appoint it, lasts 4 times less and has no clear legal consequences. However, it can apply to any official, not just members of the government.

Considering the interpellation in the Verkhovna Rada’s plenary hall can take about two hours. It includes speeches by the MPs who initiated the interpellation and the “respondent” minister. After that, the discussion takes place in the format of questions and answers. The Prime Minister can also speak.

Based on the discussion results, the Verkhovna Rada may request some additional documents – then, a new date for consideration of the interpellation is set. If there are no additional issues, after discussions, the parliament votes to declare the work of a member of the Cabinet unsatisfactory. If less than 226 MPs voted in favor, then the work of this member of the government is considered satisfactory – and he/she receives “immunity” from interpellation for three months.

Suppose the work of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers is considered unsatisfactory. In that case, the Prime Minister must submit a motion to dismiss such a member of the Cabinet of Ministers within 15 days, or the Verkhovna Rada itself considers the issue of his dismissal.

We emphasize that the interpellation alone cannot lead to the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet. His/her work can only be considered unsatisfactory, and then a new consideration of dismissal of a member of the Cabinet and a new vote on this issue. Accordingly, it is necessary to collect at least 226 votes for the minister’s dismissal once again, after the interpellation vote.

The idea of ​​introducing a law on interpellation is valuable. However, it is alarming that the MPs are trying to introduce an interpellation by a separate law, not through changes to the Rules of Procedure. Thus, there may be a problem of compatibility of this law with the Rules of Procedure.

And here are the likely political consequences of the adoption of this draft law:

• First, the adoption of the draft law could lead to increased parliamentary control over the executive branch. MPs’ inquiries are mostly non-public, and the hour of questions to the government is very vague, as MPs ask different questions on different topics to different ministers, while ministers mostly answer something like “did not know about this situation, we will get to it soon” or say general facts. The interpellation should focus the discussion on a specific list of issues, and this will be the subject of public attention. Finally, the interpellation consideration may result in the dismissal of a member of the Cabinet of Ministers.
• Secondly, the factions will receive a new instrument of politics implementation, part of the criticism of the government will be carried out in the form of interpellations.
• Third, there will be a strengthening of the ruling majority, which appoints the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, as it is the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, who receives the authority to moderate the interpellation process and may refuse to consider it.
• Fourth, suppose the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada strictly adheres to the Rules of Procedure and the Law on Interpellation and accepts the interpellation initiated by the opposition. In that case, a large part of the plenary time will probably be devoted to the consideration of interpellations.

From the very beginning of the election campaign, Volodymyr Zelensky positioned himself as a “non-systemic” candidate, and while already in office, at least in the media discourse, he tried to maintain such an image. However, the president is not only a media actor but also a subject of legislative initiative and a critical element of the system of power, the system of checks and balances. The president has his powers, clearly defined by the Constitution. He exercises these powers to a large extent, not independently, but in cooperation with the Government and the Parliament. Did the president manage to become “different from the old politicians” in terms of interaction with other subjects of the legislative initiative in the first year? The answer to this question can be given by the analysis of the legislative activity of Volodymyr Zelensky in comparison with his predecessors.

It is necessary to right away make a remark about the correctness of the analysis of the calendar year of the president’s work, as the head of state exercises his powers in cooperation with the parliament. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelensky received “his” Parliament and Government not immediately, but only at the end of August 2019. It should be reminded here that Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic. The key role in Ukraine, according to the Constitution, is played by the parliament. It “determines the principles of domestic and foreign policy” (paragraph 5 of Article 85) and forms the government, which, in turn, ensures “the implementation of the domestic and foreign policy of the state, the implementation of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine” (paragraph 1 of Article 116). That is, the President of Ukraine, as a “guarantor of state sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, observance of the Constitution of Ukraine, human and civil rights and freedoms,” exercises his powers regardless of the presence or absence of “his” Parliament and Government. Besides, previous presidents have started their first year from diverse positions. Therefore, in our opinion, it is quite relevant to analyze the results of the work of the president’s calendar year, as well as to compare them with the “predecessors”.

The relationship between the president and the parliament can be discussed in different areas. The most interesting dimension, of course, is the degree of the president’s influence on parliament, but often such considerations are based on facts that are difficult to verify. Instead, we tried to analyze the president’s participation in the legislative process, based on formal indicators, and compare the indicators with previous presidents: with Petro Poroshenko, Viktor Yanukovych, and Viktor Yushchenko.

Zelensky, of the last four presidents, registered the largest number of bills in his first year – 76 (or 4% of all registered this year). His predecessors exercised the right of legislative initiative, respectively: 48 times – Poroshenko, 39 – Yanukovych, 50 – Yushchenko. The relative share of legislative initiatives of other presidents was not more than 2%. At the same time, the rate of adopted presidential bills of Zelensky is twice lower – 38% – compared to the previous presidents, where the share of adopted ranged from 76% to 82%. This situation looks rather strange because the president had his “mono-majority” in parliament for most of the calendar year, which became a unique situation in Ukrainian history. Given the frequent personnel changes during the year, as well as the results of the survey of the Sociological Group “Rating”, this situation may indicate the active use of the model “good President – bad MPs/officials”, which leads to a positive image of the president. Another explanation may be that the party “Servant of the People” was formed virtually and from people who were not connected in any way before the election. This, after a while, affected the weak factional discipline and led to multiple divisions.

Zelensky used his veto only 12 times in the first year. And this is the lowest number among the four presidents. It is logical given the presence of support in the parliament, which previous presidents could not boast of in the first year of their work. It may also indicate a significant influence of the president on the legislative branch and the lack of polarization of views on legislative activity in the party (at least during the first months of work). Given the possible split in the “majority”, it is likely that in the coming years, the president will use his veto more actively. For comparison, during the first year of his presidency, Poroshenko used his veto power 16 times, Yanukovych 30 times, and Yushchenko 58 times (!). Interestingly, the tactics of vetoing by presidents are quite different. Thus, Yushchenko and Poroshenko periodically vetoed bills two or more times.

According to Article 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the president must sign the bill adopted by the Verkhovna Rada within 15 days or return it with his proposals. The average rate (median) of signing bills by Zelensky was 9 days, which is the fastest rate among presidents. For the rest of the presidents, this number is 15 days. However, some of the bills were signed in violation of the 15-day deadline. Thus, Zelensky signed 13% of all adopted laws in violation of the deadline (for other presidents, the figure ranged from 8% to 17%). And while for many such a violation may seem insignificant, it is still a direct violation of the Constitution, which may be grounds for declaring laws unconstitutional. It is also worth mentioning about the situation with three bills that Volodymyr Zelensky inherited from Petro Poroshenko: №0975, №0976, №0977. These bills were neither signed nor vetoed by the new president for much more than 15 days. Zelensky dragged on time until the new parliament was elected to prevent these laws from being passed.

Another illustrative aspect of the president’s work is how often and under which conditions the government changed. Apart from the prime ministers appointed before the presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky, as of the first year, has the same figures as Viktor Yushchenko (2 newly appointed prime ministers). Zelensky resembles not only Yushchenko but also Kravchuk and Kuchma in the pace of change of heads of government. They all replaced the current prime minister with a new one on 9-11 months of their presidencies.

Analyzing the activities of Ukrainian presidents, we cannot ignore the fact that every president of the independent Ukraine tried to change the Constitution. Volodymyr Zelensky is no exception.

The first President of Ukraine is Leonid Kravchuk. For Kravchuk, the change of the Constitution of the USSR to the Constitution of Ukraine seemed logical and natural: a new state – a new Constitution. Leonid Kravchuk started working on the new Constitution before his presidency when he was the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The Constitutional Commission was established. The Concept of the new Constitution was developed. However, the turbulent events of the early 1990s prevented the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the 12th convocation, which was later renamed the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 1st convocation, from adopting the Basic Law.

Leonid Kuchma continued the constitutional process, and finally, in 1996, the Constitution was adopted. However, Leonid Kuchma did not limit himself to adopting the Constitution alone. At the end of his first term, he began talking about the need to revise the Constitution, and in 2000 held an all-Ukrainian referendum on reducing the number of MPs to 300 and introducing a bicameral parliament (remember how much this initiative was used in the last election race?). However, the results of the referendum were not embodied in the amendments to the Constitution. And in 2002, against the background of a possible election loss, Leonid Kuchma initiated another reform aimed at strengthening the Verkhovna Rada by reducing the powers of the president and moving to a parliamentary-presidential model. A temporary special commission was set up, and at the end of Leonid Kuchma’s term in 2004, the relevant amendments to the Constitution were adopted.

Viktor Yushchenko took office just after the 2004 constitutional reform (which gradually came into force during 2005-2006), so, unlike his two predecessors, he did not initiate constitutional changes in the first year of his presidency. However, without constitutional changes, Viktor Yushchenko could not hold out. In 2007, the National Constitutional Council was established, headed by the president himself. Maryna Stavniychuk became its secretary. However, Yushchenko did not have enough support in the Verkhovna Rada, so he wanted to amend the Constitution through a referendum, but failed to do so. In 2009, a draft amendment to the Constitution was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. This project, among other things, provided for a bicameral parliament and an increase in the powers of the president. In the end, without the support of the Verkhovna Rada, Viktor Yushchenko could not make any changes to the Constitution.

Viktor Yanukovych has decided not to waste his first year of presidency within the constitutional powers in force at the time, which he inherited from his predecessors. Therefore, at the hands of his fellow party members in parliament, he appealed to the Constitutional Court regarding the illegality of the constitutional changes of 2004. In the fall of 2010, the CCU (the Constitutional Court of Ukraine) declared these changes unconstitutional. At the end of the first year of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovych made his first changes to the Constitution, again using the help of the Party of Regions faction in parliament. Among the significant changes, in particular, the president managed to increase the term of office of the Verkhovna Rada and local councils from 4 to 5 years.

After that, on February 21, 2011, Viktor Yanukovych formed the Constitutional Assembly. The Head of the Assembly was Leonid Kravchuk, and the secretary was Marina Stavniychuk. The Constitutional Assembly was to work out amendments to the Constitution regarding the powers of government and local self-government. The next amendments to the Constitution were the expansion of the powers of the Accounting Chamber, which was allowed to control revenues to the state budget.

The events of late 2013 – early 2014 led to the termination of the Constitutional Assembly. That is, the Constitutional Assembly had no results in the form of comprehensive amendments to the Basic Law.

After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity on February 21, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada restored the 2004 version of the Constitution.

Petro Poroshenko also did not hesitate to amend the Constitution. Already in June 2014, he submitted a draft law amending the Constitution (on the powers of public authorities and local self-government), but he withdrew it. And in March 2015 (in the 10th month of the presidency), he set up a Constitutional Commission. This commission was to work out amendments to the Constitution in three areas:

1. Decentralization.
2. Justice.
3. Rights and freedoms of man and citizen.

The first results of the work of the Constitutional Commission appeared in the summer of 2015. At that time, amendments were proposed to the Constitution regarding the decentralization of power (draft law № 2217a). There were intentions to change the entire vertical of power at the local level and introduce a new administrative-territorial system. However, the bill was withdrawn after the presidency passed from Poroshenko to Zelensky.

The changes proposed by Petro Poroshenko in the field of justice proved to be more productive. As a result, the following was approved:

• The High Council of Justice elects judges.
• Instead of a 5-year term, judges are elected indefinitely.
• Neither the President nor the Verkhovna Rada can dismiss judges.
• A constitutional complaint mechanism has been introduced.
• Only lawyers can defend citizens in court.

At the end of his presidential term, Petro Poroshenko initiated two more amendments to the Constitution – consolidating the course of Ukraine’s integration with NATO and the EU.

The second draft of amendments to the Constitution (draft law № 9310 on renaming the Dnipropetrovsk region, actually initiated by a group of MPs) did not receive the necessary support in the hall and was withdrawn from consideration.

Volodymyr Zelensky has not yet set up commissions or assemblies. Still, in the first year of his presidency, he has already initiated eight draft amendments to the Constitution and made changes to the Constitution initiated by his predecessor.

Petro Poroshenko introduced the bill on the abolition of parliamentary immunity, but it was considered and adopted under Volodymyr Zelensky.

Zelensky’s legislative initiatives have not yet been implemented. Some are now under consideration, and some have already been rejected. Namely – it is:

1. Amendments to the abolition of the lawyer’s monopoly (draft law № 1013), according to which citizens can represent themselves in courts, except for representation in criminal cases. The bill is pending.
2. Changes in regulatory bodies (draft law № 1014), under which the president will be able to form new regulatory bodies, appoint and dismiss the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the State Bureau of Investigations chairpersons. The bill was rejected.
3. Amendments to the legislative initiative of the people (draft law № 1015), according to which the people are given the right of legislative initiative. The bill is pending.
4. Amendments to the Commissioners of the Verkhovna Rada (draft law № 1016), which introduce the position of the Commissioners of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine and regulations in certain areas. The bill received a negative opinion of the Constitutional Court. It is pending.
5. Amendments to reduce the number of MPs and implement the proportional electoral system (draft law № 1017), which reduces the number of MPs to 300, and the Constitution establishes a proportional electoral system. The bill is awaiting consideration, although it has received an opinion from the Constitutional Court with reservations.
6. Changes to expand the grounds for deprivation of an MP’s mandate (draft law № 1027), according to which it is proposed to take away an MP’s mandate in case of impersonal voting or absence of an MP for more than a third of sittings. The bill received a negative opinion of the Constitutional Court, pending.
7. Amendments to additional bodies of the Verkhovna Rada (draft law № 1028), according to which the Verkhovna Rada receives the right to establish advisory and consultative bodies. The bill received a positive opinion of the Constitutional Court, pending.
8. Changes in the decentralization of power (draft law № 2598), which introduces a new structure of local government and a new administrative-territorial system. The bill was withdrawn.

Thus, in the first year of his presidency, Volodymyr Zelensky submitted the most bills on amendments to the Constitution among all Presidents of Ukraine. But it is important to note that the draft amendments submitted by Volodymyr Zelensky are particular, although some of them have repeatedly been positioned, for example, as a “parliamentary” reform.

Also, unlike his predecessors, Zelensky, at least so far, has not created bodies or open and inclusive platforms for drafting amendments to the Constitution. Legislative initiatives of the sixth President of Ukraine can be summarized as follows:

• Among all the draft laws, only the draft law that was being developed during the time of Petro Poroshenko’s presidency was adopted.
• three draft amendments to the Constitution have already received the conclusions of the CCU. They have been preliminarily approved (although the draft amendments № 1017 received the opinion of the CCU with reservations).
• one draft amendment received the conclusions of the Constitutional Court with reservations and has not yet been considered.
• three draft amendments received negative conclusions of the Constitutional Court and, therefore, cannot be adopted.
• one draft amendment was withdrawn without being considered.