The current law On the Protection of Consumer Rights was adopted back in 1991.

It is poorly geared to modern realities — online stores became a reality not so long ago, and high-tech products were not so widely used before.

So even now, things that have long been commonplace for us are sort of in the ‘grey zone’ of legislation. Warranty obligations, online trade, manipulation in advertising and lots of other things — they either do not exist for the current law or are prescribed too primitively for the protection of consumer rights.

At the same time, the commitments made by Ukraine to the EU include reforming this area.

Therefore, in order to address these specific tasks and modernise the legislation, draft Law No. 6134, On the Protection of Consumer Rights, was registered two years ago. What does it actually offer to consumers?

One aspect of the current law’s being out of date is that it does not extend to the Internet, where increasingly more people order goods and services. In this regard, among other things, the concepts of marketplace (e-commerce platform) and price aggregator (electronic product comparison service) are introduced.

The goal is to expand consumers’ rights to online stores as well.

Extension of consumer rights to product information. Even in the past, manufacturers had to indicate the company’s location and contact details on the goods, as well as details about the product itself — and the new draft law proposes to extend this rule to online commerce as well.

That is, detailed information about the manufacturer needs to be indicated on the marketplaces. A legal entity’s or private entrepreneur’s place of registration and name must be published in order for the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection to handle complaints in an effective way. Penalties for non-compliance are severe.

The State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection gets the right to “request an Internet service provider to restrict access to the website”, in other words, to block the pages of entrepreneurs lacking integrity.

The draft law does not give an unequivocal answer as to whether social media can be marketplaces. It is on those platforms that large volumes of products and services are distributed. Taking into account all of the above, the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection should significantly beef up its staff and funding in order to control all online stores. After all, controlling such large data sets is not a piece of cake.

One of the most significant changes is the introduction of mandatory warranty periods for goods. Mandatory are: two years for new goods, including digital ones, one year for used goods and 10 years for real estate.

Conditions of warranty have also changed: now, upon presentation of a receipt, the product must either be repaired within 14 days or a similar one must be provided.

At that, the warranty also starts to apply to the new spare part, and also for two years. So, after a similar breakdown, the part may be replaced again, it will be necessary to just adhere to the period of two years from the previous repair.

These terms are the minimum, but the seller may provide an additional commercial guarantee, which must also be observed under law. And an interesting detail is that if the advertisement offers more favourable warranty terms than the contract, the warranty must be fulfilled in line with the very conditions specified in the advertisement.

The consumer is deprived of the right to terminate the contract of sale in case the identified shortcoming “is minor” and “can be easily eliminated”.

The devil is in the details: there are no separate standards for a “minor” shortcoming, which makes the law too subjective in its essence. Yes, the minor nature of the shortcoming is allegedly supposed to be proven by the seller…

But what does that mean? Even the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) stated in its opinion on the draft law: “The application of judgemental concepts in conjunction with a non-identified proof mechanism (…) deprives the consumer of the right to demand termination of the contract and creates additional corruption risks.”

Manipulations with the terms “discount” and “sale” is now illegal.

In order to use these terms and those similar in their essence, certain conditions need to be met, such as: the discount can only last for a limited amount of time (the item cannot be “discounted” permanently), and the price must be less than the lowest price in the last 30 days.

Similar rules apply to “sales”, with the only difference being that the sale itself must take place — by selling all products or their separate group.

So, Black Friday will no longer be an opportunity for sellers to stick a “discount” sticker on all items with no real price change, and “sales” that last forever will die out.

Currently, every seller has to maintain an “exchange pool” of goods. Not at will — during a warranty repair, the seller is obliged by law to provide a similar product at the buyer’s request.

This rule is not very robust because maintaining that pool and the premises for it is burdensome for the entrepreneur, and a large portion of the buyers are not aware of this norm — so the money for the pool is wasted. Currently, the norm on the exchange pool is in effect, so at the next warranty repair, do request a similar product.

In contrast, the new draft law provides for the abolition of the mandatory exchange pool by cancelling the non-robust norm.

The consumers’ right is enshrined to freely choose a payment method, including a bank card. So now, at the request of the buyer, entrepreneurs must accept a bank card for goods and services payments with no right to demand an increased fee for the use of this form of payment.

All these changes were proposed before the first reading and are still relevant now. However, further down the road, the story with the draft law becomes more complicated.

Prior to the second reading, the parliamentary committee adopted a large number of amendments, which received a lot of criticism from all sides: from the business community, public organisations, partners and government bodies.

The NAPC, the European Business Association, the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine and other organisations categorically opposed the new version of the document. Moreover, it was the new amendments that caused such sharp criticism.

There were several main changes: the introduction of the Union of Public Associations and the Committee for Out-of-Court Dispute Resolution, the appointment of a person responsible for the protection of consumer rights in every office and commercial building, and the implementation of the state register “E-buyer”. As of writing this article, the story is evolving — on 2 May, a new version of the document was submitted for the second reading, and almost all of the above-mentioned amendments were cancelled in it. Yet the next day, the draft law was completely dropped from the parliament’s agenda.

Civil society’s pressure and constructive criticism forced lawmakers to revise the draft law and improve it. But there is one “but”. One of the high-profile amendments was still kept in the current wording, namely the amendment on the state register “E-buyer”. If the draft law is adopted, this novelty will primarily affect entrepreneurs.

“E-buyer” must contain information on sellers that sell goods and services via the Internet. Within 10 days after the start of their activity, entrepreneurs are obliged to feed the register with extensive information about it (location of a legal entity or residence of a private entrepreneur, contact phone number, web address, e-mail, etc.).

Upon registration, the entrepreneur will receive the status of “verified seller”, which is indicated in the online store. The register “E-buyer” will contain companies’ rankings and also become a place to submit and handle complaints on violations of consumer rights.

In general, draft law No. 6134 proposes introducing a register of all companies providing goods and services via the Internet. Where the entrepreneur fails to feed the data, the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection can block both sellers’ pages and entire marketplaces hosting them.

According to the amendment on the register “E-buyer”, the marketplaces must control sellers’ registration in “E-buyer”. What’s more: the very marketplaces must monitor the reliability of the information provided, and it is they that must block sellers who use the “verified seller” lacking integrity.

And if social media are also to be considered marketplaces — well, the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection will get far more responsibilities and opportunities to control a large part of the Internet.

However, we note that any amendments can still be cancelled and changed after a dialogue between society and the authorities, so the current version of the draft law should not be considered final.

The new law offers many novelties: Internet trade is removed from the ‘grey zone’, mandatory warranty obligations are introduced, manipulations in advertising will become less common and, in general, consumer rights are significantly expanded compared to the current outdated law.

Here, controversial amendments have been repealed, and the dialogue between society and lawmakers will hopefully continue and will create the best version of the law.

Draft law No. 6134 is an important step towards approximating Ukrainian laws to EU legislation, so it must be approached responsibly by both society and MPs.

The text was prepared within the framework of the project “Civil Society for Ukraine’s Post-war Recovery and EU-Readiness”, which is implemented with the financial support of the European Union.

Does Ukraine monitor compliance with competition policy? And does it promote fair competition?

The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) operates in this field, but its work is often criticized, and thus approaches need to be changed.

Among the AMCU’s major challenges indicated by international experts are insufficient powers, a lack of ample funding, and political dependence — and all of those are in place despite the extraordinary importance of this body for the entire Ukrainian economy.

The Antimonopoly Committee was urged to be reformed since Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, but it is now that this case has prospects to come to a conclusion. Today, this reform is gaining special relevance, as it is one of the key demands of the IMF to the Ukrainian authorities.

And at the same time, the reform is also necessary for the process of approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU law.

For years, statements about the importance of in-depth reforms have seemingly been heard everywhere.

Among other things, this issue was highlighted by the EU Association Agreement and, subsequently, the European Union candidacy agenda. In 2008 and 2016, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published reports with recommendations on the development of antimonopoly law in Ukraine, and until recently, there had been no significant changes in the offing. The current phase of the reform began in 2020 after an IMF Memorandum had been made. To comply with the obligations thereunder, draft law No. 2730 was registered. It was never voted on but paved the way for future changes.

A year later, at the subsequent update of the IMF Memorandum, Ukraine once again undertook to reform the Antimonopoly Committee. For this purpose, an updated draft law No. 5431 was developed, and we propose it for review.

Draft law No. 5431 received mixed comments from the expert community.

Among others, the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NACP) stated that “the draft law contains corruption-inducing factors and needs to be refined, accommodating the recommendations provided”. However, as early as three months after its registration, in July 2021, draft law No. 5431 was passed in principle by the votes of the parliamentary factions of Servant of the People, Trust and For the Future.

In November of the same year, a tranche was received from the IMF, and this law draft was temporarily forgotten. As of February 2022, the draft law received 1,621 amendments, but on 24 February 2022, the agenda changed dramatically.

The next time the draft law was back in the spotlight was in November 2022. Due to the large number of amendments, it had to be considered with many hours of discussion of these amendments, or by consensus (when the majority of parliamentary factions and groups agree to the adoption of the draft law), or through a special procedure (when the consideration of amendments is significantly reduced).

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine tries to avoid a long discussion of amendments under martial law, especially in the midst of missile terror. Yet, despite this, there was no unanimity among MPs. The opposition argued that the Antimonopoly Committee would be given new powers and would be “abusing companies and harassing businesses”.

Therefore, the Parliament can expect heated debates to address the AMCU and its future.

Yet the members of the parliamentary minority were not the only ones to dislike the draft law.

The Ukrainian Bar Association noted that “the draft law needs substantial refinement and cannot be adopted in this version.”

On 24 March 2023, the President and the Prime Minister signed and sent the Letter of Intent and the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies to the IMF, in which they again promised to reform the AMCU. This time, the obligations were already more specific, with deadlines having been established for reforms.

In September of the running year, the Ukrainian party undertook to adopt changes and strengthen the AMCU’s legal framework so that it could effectively unleash its capabilities. And it was promised that as early as the end of December, the Parliament would have received a new draft law which should ensure the AMCU’s institutional independence and improve the procedures for appointing key officials.

Given the fact that Ukraine critically needs funds, including those of the IMF (which is an informal benchmark for other Western donors to the Ukrainian budget), the AMCU reform process has a real chance to take off. Draft law No. 5431 may (or may not) play an important role in that.

So, the question comes: how will law draft No. 5431 help the AMCU “effectively implement its capabilities to promote market competition and combat monopolistic practices”?

The draft law introduces new tools for joint and subsidiary liability.

At present, it is impossible to collect a fine when the company has been brought to bankruptcy or in case of insufficient assets. That is, a group of companies, which includes the offender, may avoid the fine by bankrupting that company.

Under the new draft law, however, if the offending company is part of a group of companies, the shortfall will be charged to the group.

Another novelty is that if several companies have committed the offence from the same group, or if they can benefit from therefrom, then the fine becomes joint and several and all the aforementioned companies must pay it.

The procedure for release from liability, or the so-called Leniency, gets improved.

Its essence is that a participant in anti-competitive concerted actions can voluntarily approach the AMCU and cooperate with the body, providing it with important evidence and information in the case. In return, the participant receives a complete exemption from liability, although s/he must compensate the victims for the damage caused.

According to the current legislation, only the first applicant receives an exemption. As a result, there is a very high risk for others in applying to the body — they do not gain anything by applying, and enough disadvantages are rising therefrom.

Law draft No. 5431 proposes to extend the procedure to subsequent applicants, with a gradual reduction of the fine for each subsequent one of them.

The authors of the draft law deem this novelty to be among the most important ones. It is thanks to this tool that positive results can be achieved, such as a reduction in the burden on the AMCU and its greater efficiency in investigating cases. The tool of exemption from liability is widespread across many countries, including the USA and EU member states. Therefore, if the AMCU law is approved, the investigation won’t require a long and challenging time to gather evidence, as it is highly probable that the body itself will get everything it needs.

Also, the procedure for settlement in cases, or Settlement, is introduced.

The essence is quite simple: a 15% reduction in the fine in exchange for a guilty plea. The accused person must submit a relevant statement before announcing preliminary findings in the case.

The right may not be exercised when the person has already been held liable for the same offence within the last five years.

The accused and the AMCU enter into an agreement, which must incorporate several terms and conditions (admission of guilt, provision of evidence, cessation of violations and reduction of the fine), but the parties can also agree on additional T&Cs. If no agreement has been reached during negotiations, the explanations already provided by the accused party may not be considered an admission of guilt and be evidence of the commission of an offence.

Therefore, it always makes sense for the accused to try and make avail of such a right. This novelty and the possibility of exemption from liability would reduce the burden on the AMCU and enable more detailed and efficient operations in other areas.

One of the critical aspects of strengthening AMCU’s independence is the improvement of working arrangements.

Thanks to the changes, the AMCU could attract the best anti-trust specialists, and increasing the official salary would eliminate a large part of the corruption risks.

These very changes have been carried out in recent years: from 2020 to 2022, the average salary of an AMCU employee increased by more than 50% (from 15,000 to 23,000 hryvnias). Indeed, the situation would be changed by draft law No. 5431, according to which the salary of a specialist would advance up to 64,416 hryvnias.

In general, recent years have seen a very positive evolution for the entire AMCU. The contrast is especially clear compared to previous years: as noted in the OECD report of 2016, “AMCU is one of the most poorly funded public institutions in Ukraine. On average, employees earn less than $200 a month. The number of staff is insufficient to fulfil the AMCU’s tasks, the volume of which is constantly increasing.”

Notably, the Ministry of Finance did not endorse the draft law in the first reading, as it was submitted in violation of the requirements for the calculated impact of a draft law on the state budget.

Moreover, by the second reading, the draft law had changed, albeit unexpectedly: official salaries doubled for almost all positions, and for the chairman and state commissioners, as a matter of fact, they tripled. The source of such expenses was not provided, so it is unclear how they can be covered.

Therefore, implementing all these provisions will be possible no earlier than next year when the new budget is drawn up.

One of the OECD’s recommendations was to enhance the powers of the Antimonopoly Committee.

Draft law No. 5431 offers exactly this — AMCU gets more opportunities in the area of conducting inspections and obtaining confidential information.

The authors of the draft law consider this a positive thing because it gives more opportunities to combat offences, but minority MPs criticize these very provisions as excessive.

The NAPC, together with the Main Legal Department at the Parliament, also draw attention to the impropriety of such powers: a court decision is necessary to violate the right to the inviolability of one’s home or the right to privacy of correspondence and telephone conversations, but the want is to grant this right to the AMCU and ignore that.

Further, the new draft law allows the AMCU to independently choose cases for proceedings and set priorities for its own activities. International partners repeatedly recommended such a change.

At the same time, the NAPC believes that the arrangements proposed by the draft law do not hold clear and transparent rules, which can be a source of corruption risks.

According to the current law On the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, there is a norm for compensating double damages caused to victims.

That is, the perpetrator must return twice the amount earned using dishonest means. This system is a global norm, and some countries (for example, the USA) practice triple damages.

Law draft No. 5431 introduces single damages, and this change may indirectly have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the entire legislation.

The injured party, even if winning in court, will only get back its losses, and taking into account the costs of representation and court proceedings, filing a lawsuit would make hardly any sense.

It looks like monopolists and criminals are being given a free hand because the victims would have increasingly less reason to fight for justice. Yes, single damages are practised in the EU, but its system is more complex, allowing for damages to the victim for the costs of legal representation and a failure penalty.

The AMCU’s independence remains in question.

Currently, the fate of the AMCU is almost entirely in the hands of the President, and draft law No. 5431 does not change this situation at all.

At that, the OECD and the IMF drew attention to the need to ensure institutional independence. According to the Memorandum, Ukraine commits to introduce the second part of the reform to the Verkhovna Rada by the end of the year, which should ensure the AMCU’s independence. However, this law draft may still fail or get stuck in the Parliament’s chambers for years.

Another challenge is that the current procedure for the appointment of the AMCU chairperson does not comply with the Constitution. Under the Basic Law, the AMCU’s chairperson is appointed by the Parliament at the request of the Prime Minister. However, according to the current law On the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, the chairperson is appointed and dismissed by the President, and this law is followed in practice.

This issue is the basis of the true independence of the Antimonopoly Committee.

Draft law No. 5431 proposes only strengthening the dependent body, which may lead to the selective application of norms (rewarding friends and punishing enemies). These are the challenges outlined by expert bodies and what minority MPs feared.

The reform of the Antimonopoly Committee is long overdue. The first recommendations were made 15 years ago, and only now do they have a chance to be translated into reality.

The imperfection of crime-fighting tools, insufficient powers and insufficient funding — all of this is rectified by No. 5431.

The draft law provides the AMCU with new tools for more effective opposition to monopolies: joint liability, Leniency, and Settlement should help impose fair penalties and spend fewer resources. Higher salaries should increase AMCU’s institutional capacity.

On the other hand, not everything is so simple with enhanced powers — they can be used both to fight monopolies and for less-worthy purposes. Single damages also have two perspectives they are looked at.

But perhaps the most important thing is what is missing in the draft law — ensuring the political independence of the AMCU. And without it, even the best tools may be used in a sub-optimal way.

Currently, it was the IMF that raised the need to adopt draft law No. 5431.

Yet the reform of antimonopoly legislation is important not only in conjunction with receiving a new tranche — the Ukrainian economy needs an effective fight against monopolies to create a healthy market environment and economic growth.

The text was prepared with the financial support of Sweden.

The text was prepared for “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” (Mirror of the Week newspaper)

The end of 2022 was remembered, among other things, for adopting the scandalous draft law No. 5655, which its critics were easy to call “urban rape reform”. Mass media wrote that it expanded developers’ capabilities, removing almost all responsibility from them while opening up new opportunities for corruption. The prospect of adoption made the public flare up: criticism was heard seemingly from everywhere: the Ministry of Culture, the Association of Ukrainian Cities, the National Union of Architects and many other public organizations, and even the NAPC came out categorically against the weakening of transparency in the field of construction.

Law draft No. 5655 gathered only 228 votes in its favour, with just three MPs providing the majority. A day before the vote, registered was a petition demanding to veto the draft law, which accumulated the required number of signatures in a few days. But time elapsed, and neither the veto nor the signature appeared on the document. All deadlines have passed, and No. 5655 still hangs in “legislative purgatory” as if the scandalous draft law had never existed. Yet thanks to that, another problem popped out, and it had been eroding the Ukrainian constitutional norms for years. What is happening, and how can it be addressed? We suggest you figure that out.

Article 94 of the Constitution of Ukraine defines —“The President of Ukraine, within fifteen days after receiving the law, shall sign it, taking for pursuance, and officially promulgate it or shall return the law with his/her motivated and formulated proposals to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for reconsideration”.

And what if the President won’t do this? The same article states — “If the President of Ukraine does not return the law for reconsideration within the prescribed period, the law is considered to have been approved by the President of Ukraine and must be signed and officially promulgated”. In theory, we have a fairly complete picture of the adoption of draft laws. Regretfully, only in theory.

In practice, everything is a little more complicated. The thing is that the said norm does not provide a clear understanding of who must sign such a draft law if the “15 days of the President” have expired. On the one hand, this can be construed as meaning that the President him/herself must sign and promulgate the law (albeit in violation of the 15-day deadline). On the other hand, the very next paragraph prescribes a rule if the President vetoes the approved draft law and the Parliament overrides the veto with a constitutional majority of 300 votes or more: “If the President of Ukraine has not signed such a law, it shall be officially promulgated by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine immediately and shall be published with his/her signature”. Article 94 is contained in the very section of the Constitution dealing with the Verkhovna Rada.

All this gives reasons to believe that the draft law, which has not been signed by the president, must be signed by the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. One way or another, in the second case — when the veto is overcome (paragraph 4 of Article 94) —the directly approved entity is in place to take the last step for publishing the document. Whereas in the first case — when the draft law simply lies unsigned (paragraph 3 of Article 94) — there is no clear understanding of who exactly must sign the draft law that the President has not signed. This is what creates the most problems.

As history shows, it’s very simple: firstly, some Presidents allowed themselves to disregard the 15-day limit, and the fact of violation of the deadline has become a common phenomenon since Kuchma’s era. Subsequently, his successors used this increasingly more often: as of 26 June 2018, three dozen draft laws had been pending then-President Petro Poroshenko’s signature for more than a month. Gradually, lateness turned into nearly a habit — in the first two years of his term, Poroshenko, on average, vetoed the draft laws on the 19th day, thus violating the provisions of the Constitution.

Another very interesting thing happened during Petro Poroshenko’s tenure, the likes of which had not been recorded since the adoption of the Constitution — for the first time ever, a draft law was not signed as a matter of principle (the tenures for both the eighth convocation of the Verkhovna Rada and the fifth President have already expired). The draft law is still on the shelf at the Presidential Office. This refers to the infamous draft law No. 5553, which became a precedent for the abuse of the imprecision in the Constitution. It was aimed at reassuring the depositors of the newly nationalized Privatbank. At the same time, this document contradicted obligations to the IMF, possibly because the President did not turn to the draft law.

But the most crucial thing in this story is something else: never before had Article 94 been tested for strength so directly. It looks like this can be used in the future. This is exactly what is happening now: as of 10 April 2023, 25 unsigned draft laws sit and collect dust at the Presidential Office, with some of them waiting for their fate to be decided for years. For example, the draft Law On Amendments to the Budget Code of Ukraine No. 2661 of 20 December 2019 was submitted to the President for signature on 21 January 2020, i.e., more than three years have passed.

Specific trends in “very nearly laws” appear to be rather vague. However, even the existing picture, drawn with broad strokes, seems fanciful. Of the total number of “forgotten” documents, two were submitted as drafts by President Zelenskyi himself and three more — by Prime Minister Shmyhal. The case becomes even stranger considering that the initiators of another 18 draft laws included members of the pro-presidential parliamentary faction, Servant of the People. That is, out of the 25 ignored draft laws, 23 — the absolute majority, 92% (!) — were submitted by members of the ruling coalition or by “Zelenskyi’s people” (including himself, no matter how ironic this sounds).

Other data reveal a greater depth of the overall picture: 13 out of the 25 analysed draft laws were adopted by more than 300 votes — that is, the complete consolidation of the Parliament can be mentioned in their case. And when the President does not sign such draft laws, what we have is a “silent veto”, as it is called, which can’t be overcome. 52% of the draft laws already have a constitutional majority, so the subsequent evolution of the case can be imagined as follows: the President vetoes, and the Verkhovna Rada would have to overrule (of course, if he were to have the political will and once again collect 300 votes for such initiatives). Instead, the “silent veto” — ignoring a draft law submitted for signature — cannot be overcome at the moment.

So, three trends are distinguished here:

The head of state, time and time again, takes advantage of the shortcomings of the Constitution to reject even those draft laws that were adopted by the constitutional majority (as of 10 April — 52% of such cases).

Most of the unsigned law drafts come from the pro-presidential faction, which indicates weak communication between the President and his party and calls into question the very existence of the single-party majority.

The reasons behind the decisions not to sign are unclear: government officials initiate most draft laws, and only the President himself can say why he did not sign them.

A non-solid attitude towards statutory prescriptions that regulate the course of law-making is characteristic of the work not only of the President but also of the Parliament. In the Verkhovna Rada, violations during the adoption of draft laws have already become a common practice. Increasingly, legislators perceive the Rules of Procedures not as a set of rules but as a list of completely optional recommendations. After the full-scale invasion, two out of three laws passed have some sort of procedural flaw, and in 2021, Ruslan Stefanchuk noted that “in this Verkhovna Rada… not a single law of Ukraine was adopted in full accordance with the Rules of Procedures of the Verkhovna Rada”. In light of this, the library of unsigned draft laws at the Presidential Office no longer seems to be something incredible.

What is the President’s motivation for ignoring certain bills? Several hypotheses can be put forward:

1. Some part of the draft laws, especially those adopted by the Verkhovna Rada at the beginning of martial law, has simply lost their relevance. An example is draft law No. 7153. Like some other law drafts, it was voted on at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, when circumstances constantly changed. After the liberation of a large part of the north of Ukraine, many problems that the draft law was supposed to solve have lost their relevance. Therefore, the draft law’s obsolescence may be one reason for not signing it.
2. The case of draft law No. 5655 On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Reforming the Field of Urban Development is illustrative. It received a lot of criticism, including from the Union of Architects and civil society. Even more: the European Parliament directly stated that adopting this draft law is an obstacle to the EU. Yet it was supported by the majority of votes in the Verkhovna Rada, so the President should have signed or vetoed the law. Still, vociferous fallout seems to have done its job, so the guarantor of the Ukrainian Constitution is not ready to sign it. Then why not use the right to veto? Here comes the time for speculation: conflict of interest? Reluctance to push back lobbyists? In each case, vetoing or signing is a loud message to the concerned groups. It is less provocative to leave the document until better times.

What are the ways to change the current situation? Solving this problem is a complex issue. The thing is that the said imprecision in the Constitution becomes obvious to the public only after the news about another unsigned draft law. This happened both with draft law No. 2689 On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine regarding the Implementation of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law in 2021 and, more recently, with the scandalous draft law No. 5655. Every now and then, a small piece of the Constitution gives rise to scandals, rallies and heated discussions, and each time only the President is accused of not wanting to do something with a given draft law. With time and further regular law violations, the systematic problem of the disproportionate power of the head of state may come to the fore. Yet, at present, it is possible to observe a reaction to just piecemeal symptoms but not to the source of the disease.

The lack of a diagnosis as such is the worst part of the whole situation. Should he wish to do so, the President may stop the work of the entire state machinery by simply not letting anything whatsoever reach Holos Ukrayiny (Voice of Ukraine, an official herald). In retrospect, it can be seen how the head of state abuses this imprecision of the Constitution increasingly more, turning a blind eye to an inconvenient draft law at the right moment. No one can control this, as there is no system of checks and balances in this regard. This is the most alarming red flag of all those noted earlier.

But in addition to the public, there is another group of people for whom the status quo is not beneficial. These are MPs themselves. Ultimately, it is they that suffer most from such arbitrariness of the President. The entire outcome of their work can be crossed out by being ignored — and what if the most important draft law of the opposition party or even the coalition itself is sent to purgatory in the Presidential Office?

Maybe the Constitutional Court has a solution? It repeatedly issued interpretations of Article 94 of the Constitution — in 1997, 1998, and 2008. But there is no answer to the question of what to do when the President does not sign laws. Instead, its decisions concernув the method of calculating days (15 calendar or working days), the peculiarities of submitting proposals and imposing vetoes, signing laws adopted in referendums and the entry into force of the Constitution. Naturally, even under martial law, a group of MPs can turn to the Constitutional Court and ask it to explain the provisions of the Basic Law. However, the court may refuse to address this issue. For example, in 2008, concerning another problem, the court noted that “the procedure for signing and promulgating laws adopted by an all-Ukrainian referendum is not regulated in the Constitution of Ukraine. This issue is exclusively for the legislative body and does not belong to the competence of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine”.

It is quite doubtful that the court will construe Article 94 so that it is the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada who must sign draft laws not signed by the President. After all, such norms are not written directly and clearly. Should the court interpret insufficient regulation so that the President him/herself must sign draft laws that have not been signed before, the verdict will not change the situation: the President is acting this way now. The systemic problem remains the ability of the President to completely block the process of adopting laws that s/he does not like and the inability of the Verkhovna Rada to resolve this situation even if more than 300 MPs wish to do so.

Thus, the most realistic way to solve the problem is to amend the Constitution. This is important, at least for MPs themselves, because their own gains will then be guaranteed. And taking into account the fact that the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada have not been considered as something mandatory for a long time, a comprehensive reform suggests itself. But this should really be the position of the majority — after all, an amendment to the Constitution needs the votes of more than 300 lawmakers.

Still, it must be noted that the Constitution’s changes should be expected after the war, as the Basic Law may not be amended under martial law. This, of course, does not mean that the mentioned reform is not overdue, and public discussions are extremely needed. Although currently, no one from MPs’ chambers articulates the need for specific reforms, there is hope for change, not least thanks to the infamous law draft No. 5655.

For a long time, the agenda of firearms legalisation in Ukraine could not move off dead centre. A pile of discussions and zero actual actions — this is how the situation that existed in the Parliament for 20+ years can be characterised.

Another wave of heated discussions broke out in 2021 before the looming threat of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. The draft law on the right to civilian firearms was adopted in principle on 23 February 2022. But the matter is still not moving forward.

Ukraine is still almost the only country in Europe that does not have a dedicated arms law. How the right to own firearms is regulated in other countries — we wrote in our piece.

What is happening in the Ukrainian legislative framework now, and to what extent are the Ukrainian authorities ready to establish a clear legal regulation for the civilian firearms agenda? We will tell you further.

Before the full-scale invasion, most Ukrainians did not support free gun ownership. This is evidenced by polls conducted at different points in time. For example, according to a survey by the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, in 2015, about 70% of citizens did not support the liberalisation of arms circulation, and only 11% did. This trend has been practically unchanged for a long time: as a 2021 survey by the Research & Branding Group also proved, 73% of Ukrainians did not believe that arms would help improve their personal security.

However, the full-scale invasion changed Ukrainians’ attitude to arms. In May 2022, the Sociological Group “Rating” published survey findings showing that during the war, the number of citizens who support giving civilians the right to own firearms doubled. The initiative to legalise arms is supported by 58% of survey participants, 39% do not support it. Thus, for the first time in the history of research on this agenda, the number of supporters of the idea exceeded that of opponents (in 2018-2021, about a quarter supported this idea, and more than 70% did not).

The survey conducted in the Diia mobile app in May 2022 regarding the version of gun ownership considered by Ukrainians most appropriate is not representative. Yet, for now, it may become the main incentive for the Ministry of Internal Affairs in communicating and advocating for a future regulatory settlement. The survey findings proved that more than half of the respondents (58.75%) chose the chance of owning and carrying arms for personal protection, and 22% spoke against holding them.

At the same time, it should be emphasised that the polls conducted during the war may have a number of limitations, and after the end of its active phase, it can be cautiously forecasted that a part of the respondents will return to the opinion recorded years earlier.

Although there is no clear legal regulation of arms in Ukraine, Ukrainians do possess them.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ data indicates that the total number of registered arms in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion of Russia in 2022 was 1.2 million units. At the same time, according to the most modest estimates, there are more than a million units of unregistered arms.

The authors of the study on illegal arms flow in Ukraine, tailored for the Small Arms Survey in 2017, came up with the figure of 2-3 million units of illegal arms. In 2018, the report referred to a total of 4.4 million units of arms, 3.6 million of which are unregistered.

Ukraine holds top positions among European countries in the ratio of illegal arms to legally registered ones. Small Arms Survey analysts indicate a figure of 9.9 civilian firearms per 100 people for 2018. The scale of the problem has grown significantly, should the evolution be considered: in 2007, this indicator stood at 6.6 arms per 100 people.

In addition, given the beginning of a full-scale war with Russia, the number of arms in the hands of Ukrainians only increased. Several factors contributed to that:

1. Shortly before the war and in the first days of the Russian invasion, the demand for the purchase of firearms increased significantly;
2. Only the publicly reported issue of arms by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence for Territorial Defence amounted to 25 thousand units;
3. Under such conditions, controlling the flow of arms has become more complex, and therefore the entry of arms into the black markets should not be ruled out.

Although such a significant number of firearms are in civilian circulation, no law still regulates this field in Ukraine. And this directly contradicts the requirements set forth by the Constitution. In particular, Article 92 of the Basic Law clearly establishes that the legal regime of ownership must be regulated exclusively by the laws of Ukraine. Non-compliance with this norm can be justified only in a transitional period when the Parliament is working on developing a dedicated law. However, the process took a long time for Ukraine because, in fact, this provision of the Constitution has not been enforced for more than 25 years. Thus, adopting the core law should become one of the priority areas for reforming the arms legislation.

Currently, the right to own arms in Ukraine is regulated only at the level of by-laws. Order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine No. 622 of 21 August 1998 remains the main act determining conditions for the acquisition, storage, registration, protection, carrying, transportation and use of arms.

At the same time, the need to improve legal regulation and make the legislation aligned with modern challenges has been in place since the first years of independence, when this dealt with effective control over the significant amount of arms that remained following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Importantly, key stakeholders agree that the existing legislation is piecemeal, contains inaccuracies and does not correspond to European best practices.

The inability to reach a compromise was the main obstacle explaining the absence of a dedicated law. So, only in the period from 1998 to 2020 20 draft laws on arms were submitted to the Parliament. Different approaches and differences in interpretation trigger the debate that has been actively ongoing in Ukraine over recent years.

Only draft law No. 5708, On the Right to Civilian Firearms, dated 25 June 2021, was adopted in principle on the eve of a full-scale invasion. According to the explanatory note’s text, the draft law’s objective is to “strengthen compliance with the regime of legality in determining the legal regime of gun ownership”. So, this draft seeks to regulate the following:

• determination of conditions and procedures for obtaining documents on ownership of civilian firearms;
• classification of civilian firearms;
• development of a procedure for creating and maintaining the Unified State Register of Civilian Firearms;
• regulation of the procedure for obtaining the right to civilian firearms and ammunition, taking into account statutory limitations;
• definition of the rights and obligations of owners of civilian firearms;
• prohibition of the civilian population to use certain types of firearms, etc.

The draft law stipulates that the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which already maintains those records, will be designated as the Unified State Register of Civilian Arms holder. Although the alternative version (draft law No. 5708-1) suggested that this register should be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, this body refused to be its holder and proposed to leave the register under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. However, this provision of the draft law and the stance of the Ministry of Justice contribute to the “monopolisation” of influence tools in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So, to avoid risks, it is worth dividing the powers in regulating arms circulation between different state bodies.

Although draft law No. 5708 currently has the best chance of being adopted as a whole, there are other shortcomings therein. For instance, the Main Scientific and Expert Department at the Parliament and the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement expressed several comments regarding individual provisions of the draft:

• The Main Scientific and Expert Department notes that the draft law does not fully align with the prescriptions of international law, namely, with the provisions of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which supplements the United Nations Convention of 31 May 2001, accessed by Ukraine in 2013. Therefore, the terminology of the draft law and the regulations on the procedure for marking firearms and international cooperation need to be refined.
• The Parliamentary Committee also proposes to harmonise the draft law provisions on the principles of civilian firearms use with those of Directive (EU) 2021/555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons.
• The Main Scientific and Expert Department and the Parliamentary Committee jointly emphasise that the draft law provisions on the classification of arms and permits to arms, establishing requirements for civilian firearms owners, as well as substantiating reasons for the ban on civilian circulation of smooth-bore short-barrelled firearms, require coordination.

However, in general, the adoption of draft law No. 5708 is supported by stakeholders given the urgent need to settle the special legal regime of civilian firearms and ammunition circulation “to guarantee the safety of society, the rights and freedoms of citizens”.

Further, with the armed aggression being already underway, the Ministry of Internal Affairs developed and approved the Procedure for Issuing Arms to Civilians who Participate in Repelling the Russian Aggression. This procedure applies exclusively to the temporary issue of arms (for the period of martial law) and their use with a clearly defined purpose, which is resistance to the aggressor.

Thus, after long public discussions, the adoption of the law on the circulation of firearms in Ukraine is an urgent requirement of today. The Ukrainian legal framework is still not ready for the full implementation of this provision, as most norms of the current legislation are outdated. Therefore, the adoption of the arms law, on the one hand, will ensure the liberalisation of the circulation of civilian firearms in Ukraine, and on the other, it will strengthen public safety by establishing responsibility for their illegal use. At the same time, further arms regulation in Ukraine should be a meticulously planned process where clear policy goals are in place, specific instruments are chosen, and activities are coordinated with other security programs.

The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation has greatly invigorated the debate about granting civilians the right to own firearms freely. Such trends are quite understandable given the need for self-defence, which became especially acute during the war. At the same time, the issue of arms legalisation is an “eternal” topic for Ukrainian society and has been discussed since the Declaration of Independence. However, until now, the problem remains unsolved. Despite the chosen pro-European vector of development, currently, Ukraine remains almost the only country in Europe that still does not have a dedicated arms law. At the same time, avoiding legal regulation creates potential threats of a higher number of illegal arms in the population. How firearms are regulated in other countries and whether there is only one right approach – let’s find it out.

World practice shows that regulating the circulation and ownership of firearms among the civilian population in different states depends on historical conditions, cultural traditions and the legal system. So, countries policies on arms are sometimes drastically different.

In general, two key trends in establishing control over the use of weapons by the civilian population coexist in international practice.

The first of them gravitate towards enhanced legislative regulation of arms possession and use conditions. This national policy is a continuation of the UN position expressed at the Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001 when member states of the organisation signed a binding plan to combat small arms. The position of the UN is as follows: the illegal manufacturing and circulation of arms, their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled distribution undermines human security and development. Therefore, the UN has called on states to effectively regulate “civilian” ownership and use of firearms, as this will help curb their illegal trafficking.

At the national level, this trend is associated with the following factors:

• Many governments see a link between gun violence and the uncontrolled or poorly controlled trade in and possession of small arms;
• Firearms in the possession of civilians are often subject to illegal trade and misuse through theft, careless storage or illegal sale.

Within this approach, responsibility for all violations committed by private individuals using firearms rests with the state since it is the national government that is believed to have failed to establish reasonable regulation of private ownership of civilian firearms and also to be unable to protect the population from domestic violence and organised crime.

The second trend is manifested in the attempt to find a reasonable balance between introducing restrictions on the possession of arms and the right to their legal use by civilians. The main goal of governments is to prevent the misuse of arms and improve public safety. However, within this approach, there are also differing positions regarding what restrictions should be applied. For instance, some countries tend to impose strict controls on firearms use, while others use more liberal legislation. Yet no state in the world allows unlimited possession and use of weapons by civilians.

So, to find out the specifics of approaches to regulating the use and circulation of firearms in the civilian population, let’s turn to the practice of individual countries.

Proponents of gun legalisation often appeal to the legal tradition of the United States of America, where as early as in 1791, the Second Amendment to the Constitution was adopted and legalised citizens’ right to keep and bear firearms freely. Still, at the time of the introduction of these constitutional changes, a certain culture of handling small arms already existed in the country. Additionally, the nationwide right of Americans to keep arms at home for self-defence purposes was enshrined in the US Supreme Court rulings of 2008 and 2010. The last high-profile decision of the Supreme Court, handed down in the summer of 2022, also extended the right to carry arms outside one’s home.

However, the right to arms is not absolute in the US — the law prohibits some populations from carrying them (examples are the mentally ill, persons guilty of domestic violence using weapons, etc.). In addition, the country has introduced a number of restrictions on the types of small arms that can be used by the public, as well as bans on carrying guns in certain places, such as government buildings or schools.

However, gun ownership in the United States is still controversial, as the US leads both in the number of suicides and that of gun crimes. Further, this trend has a direct correlation with easy access to firearms for many Americans.

Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, the state faced a significant problem with firearms smuggling due to military conflicts in the region. However, since 2013, when Croatia became a full member of the European Union, the national policy has been regeared to reduce the circulation of illegal arms significantly. Particularly, in 2007, the Croatian government permanently confiscated arms. The trend was also carried on with the 2018 Law on Arms.

The country has successfully implemented an “amnesty program” aimed at combating the high rates of illegal possession of firearms in the civilian population. The primary purpose of this program is to persuade citizens to drop off any illegally held firearms, and reporting them to the police. The experience of implementing similar programs is also possessed by Estonia and Finland.

For a long time, a large number of illegal arms, which remained from the time of the Second World War, could be found within the country. However, according to the latest estimates, the total number of illegal firearms in Estonia is small. Among other things, this is due to the adoption of arms laws in 1991 and 2001. Estonia’s legislation was almost the first in the post-Soviet space to allow civilians to have short-barrelled firearms for self-defence purposes. Unlike most European countries, Estonians can also own semi-automatic arms. But fully automatic ones are reserved exclusively for Kaitseliit, the Estonian Defence League, which is in fact the equivalent of the Ukrainian Territorial Defence.

Nevertheless, the state provides for preventive measures that guarantee the safety of the civilian population when handling arms — requirements for their storage were established, strict skills tests were introduced, and a mandatory weapons register is in place.

At the same time, after joining the European Union in 2004, Estonia enhanced some of the rules for the handling of arms, following EU directives. In particular, this concerns the provisions of the Firearms Directive, which has also been revised several times by the European Commission in order to beef up the fight against the illegal circulation of firearms. This policy was based on the need to apply a more coordinated and coherent approach after the terrorist attacks of 2015. In general, Estonian legislation can be characterised as quite liberal regarding the rules of private gun ownership. This approach contrasts with most other post-Soviet countries, which remain quite restrictive in arms regulation.

The right to own weapons in this state was restored after the collapse of the USSR. In addition, in the summer of 2021, the Czech Parliament adopted a revolutionary decision, thereby approving an amendment to the Constitution allowing self-defence using weapons. This constitutional provision supplemented the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic with the provision that “the right to defend one’s life or the life of another person, even with the help of a weapon, is guaranteed under the conditions established by law.”

The current arms legislation of the Czech Republic is quite liberal. In particular, this country allows buying arms for self-defence purposes, and a loaded weapon may be carried concealed. To that end, it is necessary to obtain a special permit, which is granted after passing an appropriate inspection. This permit is only valid for ten years, and the owner of the weapon is required to undergo a health check every five years to confirm the legality of the reasons for ownership. In addition, unlike many European countries, it is legally allowable to keep a loaded weapon at home if the owner has the appropriate licence.

At the same time, the very fact of the right to have a weapon for self-defence purposes is not identical to the unlimited possibility of its use. A number of restrictions are in effect in the state, so the use of weapons is allowed only in case of extreme necessity.

Swiss legislation has allowed citizens to carry weapons as early as 1997. This country is considered one of the most armed states in Europe and globally. At the same time, Switzerland has a fairly high level of gun culture, as the ownership and use of firearms are closely related to the traditions of state-building and the protection of democracy. Hence any person may openly carry a weapon if there is an appropriate permit for this. The permit is valid for five years. Still, if the Swiss wish to obtain a permit for concealed carry, they should additionally undergo a background check and an arms inspection by the police and also substantiate the reasons for that need.

In response to the European Union’s adoption of firearms directives, the Swiss authorities had to enhance national legislation slightly. The state’s population also endorsed this initiative to introduce stricter arms bans in the 2019 referendum. However, in general, the Swiss arms policy remains fairly liberal.

Thus, international experience proves that there is no uniform approach to the development of arms policy worldwide. At the same time, the trends irrevocably point to one thing — proper legal regulation is a must-have for the effective implementation of a state firearms legalisation strategy. So, the adoption of the relevant law in Ukraine would provide for a significantly lower number of cases of illegal handling of arms and a higher overall level of public safety. Yet the development of a dedicated law must be approached in a balanced manner to ensure the maximum quality of legal regulation and avoid potential risks.

The decentralisation reform and the transfer of resources and powers to the local level therewith increased the number of participation tools for residents of communities. The communities have more opportunities for the changes that the residents of the community themselves can initiate – participation budgets, electronic petitions, consultations in the development of draft decisions, public control, and other options to ensure transparency of local processes. These tools have been legislated. But how can the community get involved in addressing local problems? And do war conditions allow doing so?

Russia’s full-scale invasion into Ukraine and the introduction of martial law create some restrictions for citizens – in the context of both forms of public participation and access to public information. This is primarily due to security issues, as the enemy tries to use all possible information (including public one) as weapons against us.

Among other things, during martial law, local self-government bodies or their ‘substitutes’ (i.e., military-civil and military administrations) may refrain from publishing draft decisions. The work of local MPs’ committees and local councils is not announced in advance and can take place behind closed doors. Public electronic registers (especially those for land plots, planning documentation) may be closed to citizens. In addition, some communities have temporarily ceased to hold calls for public budget proposals or delayed participation budget projects (this is regulated by a Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’s Resolution, which legitimises free disposal/transfer of local funds for the purpose of counteracting Russian aggression. In fact, budgetary funds that were appropriated for the implementation of local initiatives are reallocated to address military needs). This is due to the peculiarities of the budget process under martial law and limited financial resources.

All of this changes the relations of local self-government bodies and the community, established by the decentralisation reform, and, accordingly, narrows the ability of citizens to influence local authorities. Yet it should be remembered that all the above restrictions are temporary, and citizens are not deprived of the rights to participate in the life of their community. Today, there is no legislative act forbidding that completely.

The Ukrainian legal framework does not have a single law regulating the procedures of all forms of public participation. The main forms of local participation of citizens are defined in charters, provisions on communities and the following laws:

• Law of Ukraine on Local Self-Government in Ukraine;
• Law of Ukraine on the Bodies of Self-Organisation of the Population;
• Law of Ukraine on Citizens’ Appeals;
• Law of Ukraine on the Status of Members of Local Councils.

So, the participation of citizens is not limited only by the elections of the head of the community and their deputies, which, by the way, may not be run during martial law (at least as yet). Citizens are also guaranteed the rights to access freely information about local authorities, attend local government meetings, submit electronic petitions, hold public hearings, etc. Which may be used under martial law, and which ones are to be put off – we tell you further.

Local referendum (Article 7) is a form of direct expression of will of community residents. Any issues may be addressed at a local referendum, except for those prohibited by the Constitution (taxes, budget and amnesty) and those belonging to the powers of state, rather than local authorities. For example, a local referendum in the community may address the issue of liquidation or reorganisation of communal educational institutions, approval of the charter of the community or changes thereto, a community development programme, early termination of powers of the head of the community, etc.

Local referendum decisions are binding. But organising and holding it is not easy. This requires an initiative group of citizens, collecting signatures among voters, financial resources for its organisation.

However, nowadays, a referendum may not take place for two reasons. First, there is martial law in Ukraine, which prohibits elections including referendums. Second, the vehicle of local referendum has been mentioned in the national legislation in a piece-meal way across several legislative acts, since in 2012 the fundamental Law on All-Ukrainian and Local Referendums lost its effect. As a result, a legal vacuum developed with regard to the procedural aspects of this form of participation. The Law of Ukraine on Local Self-Government mentions that the procedure for setting and holding a local referendum and the list of issues that may be addressed at it are to be determined by a law on referendums. However, this law is not in place today. Draft law No. 5512 On Local Referendum has been with the Verkhovna Rada since its registration back in 2021 but is yet to be approved.

General meeting of citizens (Article 8) provides for the direct participation of citizens in addressing local issues. For example, this may be a meeting of the inhabitants of the section in a block of flats, street or neighbourhood to discuss the problems of their area, file proposals to local self-government bodies, discuss the council’s draft decisions. At the meeting, citizens may require reports from local self-government bodies and actions to address pressing issues (such as the state of the environment, social services provision to various populations of the community, urban development, etc.). The procedure for holding a general meeting of citizens is determined by the charter of a specific territorial community. Any community resident may initiate a general meeting where there is a need to address an issue or set up house committees (e.g., homeowners associations). If a community resident initiates that meeting, then the notice along with the agenda is sent to the local council, published on the official website and shared in the media.

During martial law, this instrument of participation formally works. The only thing is that there can be difficulties in organising meetings, especially in communities where lots of residents have left for safer regions. The decisions of the general meeting of citizens shall be considered by local self-government bodies. If local authorities decide not to accommodate the decision of the general meeting, they should provide a reasoned response together with a refusal to make the requested decision.

Local initiatives (Article 9) are the right of members of a territorial community to initiate the council’s consideration of any issue related to local self-government. These can be issues on land relations, social, administrative, educational, healthcare services, etc. For example, initiatives on establishing a municipal centre for rehabilitation of veterans, preventing the build-up of the city, planting trees along the street, developing transport infrastructure, repairing an educational institution, etc. Local initiatives may also relate to the council’s committees – for example, proposals can be made to change the members of a committee or exclude a certain local MP where residents of the community do not trust them. In fact, through local initiatives, community residents can draft decisions – just the way MPs do that – and they must be considered at the council’s session.

During martial law, this participation tool is accessible to community residents, even in a situation where a council meeting is held behind closed doors. The issue of the initiative group is included into the agenda of the meeting in advance, the day of the meeting is then communicated, and it must be discussed by all members of the council with the participation of that group.

Public hearings (Article 13) are the right of a territorial community to hold meetings with the members of the council or officials. This is a kind of public meeting to exchange opinions where citizens can have their say on pressing issues, and representatives of LSGBs can hear the needs of community residents.

For example, before decision-making on building a waste processing plant, the LSGB may organise public hearings to get feedback from the residents. Thus, public hearings are not just a tool to inform the community residents about relevant issues, but it is also meant to involve citizens into solving local problems.

Public hearings are held at least once a year, although in practice, this legislative requirement is not always complied with. All proposals made as a result of public hearings must be considered by local self-government bodies.

During martial law, it can be challenging to organise and hold public hearings. First and foremost, this is because today LSGBs’ representatives address urgent issues related to military needs, IDPs and humanitarian aid. Otherwise, public hearings are held informally or online. Communities use online platforms, such as e-Dem, Google Forms, Diia chatbot. For example, these participation formats were used for renaming the streets in Kalush and Chervonohrad communities.

Consultative surveys of citizens (Article 43) are a form of participation that is used to identify the opinion of residents on the needs and problems of a community. At their plenary sessions, district and regional councils make decisions following the proposal of territorial communities to conduct such a survey. The findings of this survey are taken into account in making respective decisions. For the most part, such a survey involves unambiguous answers – “yes” or “no” – and refers to some specific problems. A consultative survey of citizens is flexible, as it can be conducted for a given house, residential quarter, street – everything depends on the decision of local authorities. This survey takes little time, and its participants have to answer the questions once. There are no restrictions as to the systematic nature of such surveys – they can occur depending on the emergence of requests, e.g., when there are discussions on a particular draft decision of the council on urban development, landscaping, local infrastructure, environmental safety, etc.

Population self-organisation bodies (Article 14) are established to address certain issues of local importance. These bodies can be endowed with their own finances, property, powers, and they are established at the initiative of residents of a building, residential quarter, street, neighbourhood.

Notionally, residents of an inhabited locality can directly influence the decisions of the council and monitor their implementation. It is, in fact, a tool of direct democracy. There are many examples of issues that can be resolved through self-organisation of the population. For instance, a residential complex is planned to be built, but its construction was not agreed with local residents who live in the area. In this case, residents can self-organise and establish committees that would prevent illegal construction. Another example is a broken and bumpy road in the area, and a member of the local council does not respond to the problem. Here, too, the establishment of street-based committees facilitates raising the profile of the issue in the media and to the level of LSGBs.

There are other cases where self-organisation bodies can be established. For example, when there is an active part of inhabitants in a neglected residential quarter of the community, they can unite to systematically promote their ideas.

Uniting into population self-organisation bodies has a double advantage – its activity can enhance the work of members of a district council, and it can be resistance where a local MP abuses their powers and spends budget resources on their own needs. The district to which the member of the local council is assigned usually goes beyond a street, house or residential quarter. Therefore, oftentimes the MP may lack resources or time to lobby for a decision in favour of the community or even explore the problem in greater detail. Accordingly, in this case, residential quarter or street-based committees will be effective, and they, in fact, play the role of local MPs by offering solutions to problems. The only thing, of course, is that initiators from population self-organisation bodies may not vote on these decisions in the council.

Creating a population self-organisation body can be particularly effective in the process of recovery of territories, as their activities relate to different areas. Considering that the population self-organisation body, together with local MPs, represents residents of a street, building, residential quarter, etc., their initiative can minimise the risks of abuse and corruption. Another advantage of the functioning of such a body in the process of recovery of territories is the ability to raise funding since the population self-organisation body is funded not only by local budgets but also by voluntary contributions of individuals and other revenues that are not prohibited by law.

Appeals of citizens – proposals, statements, and complaints, presented in writing or verbally, and electronic petitions. Appeals may relate to any issue that is of concern for the residents of the community or needs to be immediately resolved. During martial law, this form of participation is widespread as the number of individuals in need of advice on social services, housing recovery, etc. has increased significantly. In some regions, special advisory assistance centres have been established (for example, the City Support Centre for Internally Displaced People is operating in Lviv). Another form of public participation – voters’ instructions to their member of the local council – is specified in the Law on the Status of Members of Local Councils. Voters can make submissions to their local council members at a meeting, in the course of their reports or meetings with them. These instructions can relate to any issues and needs of a constituency or community as a whole (for example, repair of a road, rehabilitation of an educational institution, etc.). Such an instruction must be endorsed by a majority of those present at a meeting (by voting). The local MP must convey the content of the instruction to the local council, and a decision on its implementation is made in line with available resources. This tool allows combining the efforts of the entire community to fulfil the instruction, since participation in the implementation can be taken by both constituency voters and the LSGB.

National legislation, martial law and restrictions associated with it do not ban full participation of citizens in local self-government. Moreover, as of today, the Verkhovna Rada has adopted in the first reading the draft Law on Amendments to the Law on Local Self-Government in Ukraine and Other Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government, which improves the procedure for organising the forms of participation. Therefore, even in today’s environment, it is important for local self-government bodies not to reject using community involvement tools that are formally approved in their charters or provisions. Depending on the level of security in, and capabilities of, each region, flexible forms of participation can be used – electronic public consultations, remote conferences, surveys of residents and more. Such participation mechanisms are not only accessible but will also improve the quality of decisions and align them with the needs of different social categories, because the number of IDPs has increased across the regions, as businesses have relocated, the need has arisen to redistribute budgets, attract additional resources, etc. This requires enhanced interaction with the community.

This material was prepared with the financial support of Sweden.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives has been promoting the implementation and monitoring the parliamentary reform for many years. According to our latest monitoring data for 2021, the reform of the Ukrainian Parliament has been completed by 45.7%. In recent years, the rate of implementation of the reform has decreased, but the political leadership of the Verkhovna Rada recognizes the need to fulfil the commitments made regarding the implementation of the parliamentary reform. In addition, judging by the public statements of the political leadership of the Parliament, the authorities are fully aware of the actual state of implementation of the reform and the problems in its implementation. And the very fact of a realistic assessment of the situation gives hope for the solution of these problems and the successful completion of the reform.

Today, the Agency is included in the working subgroup on parliamentary reforms in Ukraine and has the opportunity to actively and constructively cooperate directly with representatives of the Verkhovna Rada in this direction.

What are the current priorities in the implementation of the reform of the Parliament? What should be emphasized to change the situation for the better? Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Director of the Analytical Direction of the Agency, during the forum “Democratic reforms for the integration of Ukraine into the EU: a dialogue with leading reformers”, voiced for our European partners and Ukrainian colleagues from civil society and the Parliament 3 priorities of parliamentary reform in Ukraine.

A well-known problem that complicates the work of the Verkhovna Rada is the production of a large number of legislative initiatives. And this affects the quality of legislative initiatives, as well as the workload of MPs and structural divisions of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada. At the IX convocation of the VRU, there is a steady decrease in the number of, first of all, legislative initiatives by MPs, which is certainly a positive trend. However, it is possible to reduce the amount of “legislative spam” in other ways. In particular, by increasing the requirements for expert-analytical support, generally by increasing the quantity and quality of accompanying analytics in the legislative process. There are global examples when such a step, in particular, increasing the requirements for the preparation of impact assessments of draft acts, reduced the number of these same drafts by many times. This indicates an increase in their quality, as the share of draft laws that change existing laws is radically decreasing.

This also includes strengthening European integration expertise at the parliament level. In particular, by strengthening the capacity of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union. The Verkhovna Rada has three committees whose conclusions are binding on all draft laws: budget, anti-corruption, and European integration. During the convocation, thousands of draft laws pass through these committees. Accordingly, increasing the requirements for accompanying documents, particularly for draft laws related to European integration, and increasing the ability of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union to develop a large number of draft laws will improve the entire European integration direction of legislation. And this, as we understand it, is currently becoming extremely important and relevant.

The war actualized the issue of democratic control in the sphere of security and defence. Changes to the legislation in this direction have already been adopted in Ukraine, which will come into force next year. In particular, a special control committee unique to the Verkhovna Rada will be created, which will carry out control in the field of security and defence.

In terms of parliamentary control, it is worth giving an example of how the Verkhovna Rada adapted to the conditions of war. Since February 24, we have not had the time of questions to the Government, but a special format was introduced when individual ministers met with the heads of parliamentary factions or with representatives of the majority in the Parliament. Some ministers managed to go through this format several times. As for specific actions to strengthen parliamentary control, we must talk about strengthening the system and the regularity of its implementation. Including at the level of committees.

This is also a crucial aspect of the reform. Since the Apparatus is, in fact, a parliamentary service. Although we currently do not have a separate parliamentary public service, the Apparatus of the VRU is the structure that ensures the stability and institutional memory of the Verkhovna Rada. These are people who ensure the work of the parliament even during the war. Among the Apparatus employees, a significant number of those have been working there for more than 15 years. These are high-class specialists. Their experience should be preserved and multiplied, and the status of a parliamentary employee should be strengthened. For this purpose, the draft law on parliamentary service was developed and adopted in the first reading. It would be excellent to adopt it as a whole. The strategy for building the staff potential of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada was also adopted and is already at the final stage of implementation. It should be updated with an emphasis on maintaining the Apparatus employees’ high level of professionalism and preserving institutional memory.

The Agency for Legislative Initiatives will, as far as it can, support these and other areas of parliamentary reform. And we once again emphasize the importance of the stable functioning of such an institution as the Parliament for the implementation of all other reforms and for Ukraine’s progress on the European integration path.

This publication was prepared with the financial support of Sweden.

Every time MP gets into the scandal, it reduces public trust not only to a particular MP but to Parliament in general. Unfortunately, such scandals occur every month, sometimes every week.

It is not surprising that recent polls show public distrust of Parliament in more than 75%.

Last week, August 23, MP from the “Servant of the People,” deputy chairman of the Budget Committee, Olexander Truhin, got in an accident at Boryspil highway. As a result of the accident, six people were injured. Trukhin, according to media reports, was in a state of intoxication.

However, the most interesting part started after the accident.

Mentions of Trukhin’s involvement in this accident began to disappear from the media sites that wrote about it. However, none of these media refuted the information or additions – the news simply disappeared. Some media outlets reported that they got a request from some alleged PR agency to remove articles.

The “Servant of the People” still not commented on the incident.

As a result, we have a situation where the MP of Ukraine tries to avoid responsibility and disseminate information about the accident with his participation, and the party, in turn, conceals it as it is impossible to call it otherwise in such a situation.

Last month, on July 8, an accident involving a member of parliament took place in the center of Lviv. This time the “main actor” was a non-party MP Oleksandr Yurchenko. After the accident, he tried to flee the scene, inflict damage on the injured driver, and that`s all under the influence of drugs, which was confirmed by the test.

The worst thing in this situation is that the Parliament does not have a mechanism for punishing members of parliament in such cases. Therefore, the Verkhovna Rada Regulatory Committee stated that it could not punish Yurchenko. This again indicates the need to introduce a code of conduct for MPs.

Of course, the problem is not only the lack of the Code of Conduct for parliamentarians but also the problem of a broken justice system. Members of parliament sometimes seem to be outside the legal field, ignoring any rules and regulations and not being responsible for it. After all, there is no clear mechanism for influencing deputies who violate the law.

The law is the same for everyone, but MPs have a special procedure for bringing justice. Only NABU or the central office of the State Bureau of Investigation can conduct investigations of members of parliament, and only the Prosecutor General can carry out amendments to the Unified register of pre-trial investigations. Only after investigations, the trial, and, indeed, the judgment, authorities of the MP could be terminated.

Public attention to the problems of reforming law enforcement and prevent MPs privilege in matters of justice – its first steps.

However, the introduction of the Code of Conduct may also provide mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of problems when MP`s uses their power for selfish purposes, their behavior does not meet professional requirements, and so on. It is important to note that the Code should be the set of rules that members of parliament will use in their daily activities. That is, it should regulate relations in both legislative and parliamentary activities, as well as non-parliamentary activities related to the performance of the functions of the MP.

The scandals in which parliamentarians get involved are most often relate to their extra-parliamentary activities. For the Code to be effective, every parliamentarian must feel responsible for activities that run counter to his or her professional requirements and understand the legitimacy of the Code.

The development of professional and ethical standards for deputies has many advantages:

First, accountability is improved, and trust is strengthened. Society will understand the system of regulating ethics, and it will be easier for it to trust parliamentarians because it will know that any violations will be detected, and violators will be punished. In turn, parliamentarians will feel responsible, as the Code will provide for sanctions, possibly even in the form of termination of office.

Second, the Code can be a means of combating corruption. The established standards will help prevent abuse of office and other forms of corruption, as they establish clear rules of conduct for parliamentarians, mechanisms for monitoring their work, and provide for penalties for violations. These standards will help MPs better understand what society expects of them, especially after certain scandals that may potentially arise.

Third, the Code can be a tool for policy professionalization. Often the behavior of members of the Parliament of Ukraine in the workplace does not meet ethical and moral norms (for example, verbally insulting another MP, fights, sexist behavior, etc.). Unethical behavior in the Parliament undermines the professionalism in the public’s eyes, not only of an individual member but of the Parliament as a whole. Once in parliament, MPs must follow the same rules of conduct in the workplace. Unified standards will also help unite members of parliament themselves and resolve certain political differences constructively.

Thus, developing a Code of Conduct for MPs remains open and it is especially relevant in scandalous situations when members of parliament abuse their professional position. Ukrainian legislation contains many norms concerning MPs ethics, sanctions in case of committing offenses, however, on the one hand, they are unregulated, and on the other hand – there are no principles of conduct of MPs outside the parliament. Therefore, the Code of Conduct could become the basis that would form the internal social responsibility of members of parliament, unify ethical standards and guidelines for all parliamentarians, and as a result – strengthen citizens’ trust in the parliamentary corps.

The other day Volodymyr Zelensky announced the Green Country project. Under this project, forest areas will be increased by 1 million hectares over the next 10 years. To do this, it is planned to plant 1 billion trees in the first 3 years.

But how realistic is this plan? We asked experts.

Vice President of the Forestry Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Professor of Ecological Economics, National Forestry University of Ukraine Ihor Soloviy told us about the current state of afforestation and reforestation in Ukraine. According to him, now the pace of planting and reforestation is far from what is needed to implement the ambitious plan of Zelensky.

The State Agency of Forest Resources of Ukraine, in its response, told us that it supports Zelensky’s idea.

The agency’s position also states that for the optimal level of forest cover in Ukraine (20%), it is necessary to create more than 2 million hectares of new forests. That is twice as much as the Green Country project offers.

Zelensky’s new initiative really has a noble goal. However, it is too early to talk about positive changes, as there are too many questions. Is there land for planting? How to encourage landowners to plant? How well thought out is this initiative, and is there a strategy for its implementation?

We could not stay away from when we heard about Volodymyr Zelensky’s new initiative – to build a “Presidential University”, which “should become a modern innovative educational and research center.”

The university is planned to teach specialists in the following fields: information technology, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, aerospace, energy technology, biotechnology, and health sciences, globalization, and international communications.

According to the Minister of Education and Science, the construction of the new higher education institution will cost 7.2 billion UAH. The university itself should be located on the territory of the “Expocenter of Ukraine”.

The President’s initiative has yet to be approved separately by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Still, we draw attention to the need to address other issues that accompany higher education as a matter of priority.

The education system is a critical area for the country’s development, so changes should be carried out comprehensively, using research rather than the desire to raise the rating. The creation of a new university, no matter how good it will be, does not solve systemic problems, of which there are many in Ukraine. This includes low salaries of research and teaching staff, corruption on some levels of higher education, and an epidemic of plagiarism, and, most importantly, in this case, a large number of already established educational institutions that do not provide consistently high-quality education for all students.

In 2016, the experts of the Agency prepared a Shadow Report, analyzing the reform of the education system, and unfortunately, many of the problems mentioned in it are still relevant today. In this report, we noted the need to provide priority funding for “strong” Ukrainian education institutions that have the potential to join the leading universities in Eastern Europe by gradually reducing state support for lower-level higher education institutions.

We should also not forget that universities are created not only for students. First of all, they are research centers. The money planned to be allocated to the new university could be used to fund research programs in the areas mentioned above.

Universities that have existed in Ukraine for decades already have the necessary base and reputable capital, so they will need much less financial investment than creating a new institution. As a result, the probability of spending 7 billion UAH on the construction of the “Presidential University” seems to be an inefficient use of available funding and certainly not a priority step to improve the quality of education in Ukraine.

Another problem with Zelensky’s new project is that it is planned to be implemented in Kyiv. The capital already has a significant number of universities, including the most prestigious and best in the country. Implementing a project of this scale outside Kyiv could accelerate economic development and increase investment attractiveness for the regions.

The creation of a new university can be seen as a purely populist step, as it completely ignores the institutional problems of Ukrainian education, turning its attention to one striking point example that creates the visibility of changes.