Research context. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion, the total value of direct damage to residential and non-residential real estate, infrastructure, vehicles, and inventories has surpassed $157 billion. Another concern is the shortage of qualified personnel, particularly medical professionals, teachers, and social workers, caused by migration. The relocation of businesses from the de-occupied frontier territories has caused a decline in community income and an increase in regional inequality. As of April 2024, nearly 19,000 companies had relocated from Ukraine since February 2022.

The reconstruction of de-occupied communities requires not only technical restoration, but also a comprehensive approach to creating an environment in which people want and are able to live. In this sense, it is necessary to analyse the socio-economic profile of de-occupied communities to identify their needs, capabilities and constraints — data that are crucial for developing a systematic and multi-level reconstruction algorithm.

The study covers demographic trends, the state of public services, infrastructure damage and losses, financial capacity, economic development, and the scale of community cooperation. 

The study timeline was from January to April 2025.

The three-stage study included:

• The first stage involved collecting datasets in the de-occupied communities of Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv regions according to six groups of indicators: socio-demographic, infrastructure, financial, migration, cooperation, and public service delivery.
• In the second stage, the financial capacity of the de-occupied territorial communities was estimated based on the results of the corresponding financial indicators for 2021–2024.
• The third stage of the study involved conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews with the heads of territorial communities and military administrations in settlements.

1. A complex demographic profile and increasing migration rates. At the time of de-occupation, the population in the territorial communities was 44% lower than it had been at the beginning of 2022. The population structure of the communities is dominated by people over 60 years of age, which affects the labour potential and places an additional burden on the social welfare system.
2. Problems with the accessibility of public services. Most communities were able to resume the delivery of public services after de-occupation, particularly by ensuring the launch of mobile administrative service centres, social service centres, and outpatient clinics. Nevertheless, de-occupied communities still experience problems with the accessibility of social services.
3. Unstable security climate. Significant areas of mined territories and contamination with explosive objects. The most dangerous situation is in communities in the Kharkiv region, where at least 332 high-risk and mined areas have been confirmed.
4. Damage and loss of infrastructure due to destruction. At the end of 2024, 41% of infrastructure assets were recorded as destroyed in the de-occupied communities of the Kharkiv region, 15.3% in the Mykolaiv region, and 10.6% in the Kyiv region. The most challenging situation is in the frontline communities of the Kharkiv region, where more than two-thirds of infrastructure facilities have been ruined, and the population is being evacuated.
5. Disparity in access to financial resources between communities. In 2024, 27 communities are classified as having critical or low capacity, of which 15 are located in the Kharkiv region, five in the Kyiv region, and seven in the Mykolaiv region. The Kyiv region has the largest share of de-occupied communities with high and medium capacity. This reflects inequalities between communities.
6. Decline in economic growth. A significant amount of production capacity was destroyed or seriously damaged. One of the problems remains the lack of labour resources. In 2024, compared to 2021, the number of employees in companies in the de-occupied communities of the Kyiv region increased by 12.6%. In contrast, in the de-occupied communities of the Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions, the decrease was 12.7% and 26.8% respectively.

In response to the identified problems and needs, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has designed recommendations, the implementation of which is expected to contribute to the recovery and sustainable growth of the de-occupied communities. For more details on the situation of the de-occupied communities in the Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv regions, see the new study by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The study was conducted within the framework of the project “Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine” (PASS Ukraine), which the Agency implements together with the Parliamentary Centre, in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with the support of Canada’s Foreign Policy — Global Affairs Canada as part of the Peacebuilding Program and stability(PSOPs).

The study offers a comprehensive overview of socio-economic conditions across the deoccupied territories, spanning 15 communities in the Kyiv region, 10 in the Mykolaiv region, and 28 in the Kharkiv region. One of the major challenges in conducting such a complex analysis was the complete absence of baseline data. To address this, ALI initiated data collection from scratch and developed a custom data matrix to provide decision-makers with the necessary information.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director of ALI, explained the team’s decision to scale the study to three additional regions after piloting the methodology in the Kherson region.

Vitalii Bezghin, Head of the Subcommittee on Administrative and Territorial Structure and Local Self-Government of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Local Governance, Regional and Urban Development, noted that ALI’s research on Kherson region had offered a comprehensive picture of the current situation — which sparked demand for similar analysis in other formerly occupied, now liberated regions. Such findings, he said, should form the foundation for the next steps by both Parliament and the relevant ministry, and the study’s detailed data would be of interest to both the public and key stakeholders.

How Can ALI’s Data Be Interpreted and Understood?

The study was conducted in three stages. In the first stage, the Legislative Initiatives (ALI) collected statistical data across six groups of indicators: socio-demographic, infrastructure, financial, migration trends, cooperation, and access to public services. The second stage involved assessing the financial capacity of communities using a composite index made up of 11 indicators, including revenues, expenditures, and the level of budget dependence. In the third stage, ALI interviewed local officials, including heads of communities and military administrations. The research period spanned January to April 2025.

Volodymyr Skrypets, the Analytics Lead at ALI, presented the study’s key findings:

Tamila Tasheva, Member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Local Governance, Regional and Urban Development, emphasised that in regional development planning, the unique challenges of deoccupied communities are often insufficiently taken into account — and that studies like this one offer a foundation for a more systemic understanding of those challenges.

She also stressed the importance of communicating such findings to Ukraine’s international partners — who need to see the real picture on the ground and the progress made despite all odds.

Context. Back in 2023, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives (ALI), in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Building, Local Governance, Regional and Urban Development, conducted a study on the state of public services in deoccupied communities of the Kherson region. During the research, it became clear that information was neededbeyond the scope of public services. ALI, therefore, launched an additional study to enable a more comprehensive analysis and to uncover interrelated challenges across sectors. Following the completion of work on the Kherson region, demand emerged for similar research on deoccupied communities in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv regions.

The complete study “Analysis of the Socio-Economic Situation in Deoccupied Communities: Kherson Region” is available here. The study on Kyiv, Mykolaiv and Kharkiv regions is currently being finalised and will be published soon.

The presentation took place as part of the project “Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine” (PASS Ukraine), implemented by ALI in partnership with the Parliamentary Centre (Canada), in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with support from Global Affairs Canada under the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs).

In recent months, discussions around peace negotiations have intensified significantly. This is particularly linked to the return to power of Donald Trump in the United States, who during his election campaign emphasised his desire to end the war and go down in history as a peacemaker. So far, however, we have only seen pressure on Ukraine and concessions to the Kremlin’s wishes.

Nonetheless, talk of a potential end to the war has not subsided, and the key question now is not whether negotiations are possible, but under what conditions they would take place. The most pressing and controversial issue at present is: what security guarantees can Ukraine receive?

While Ukraine continues to insist on NATO membership as a security guarantee, the more likely scenario at this point appears to be the deployment of peacekeeping units from the armed forces of other countries on Ukrainian territory. Such statements have already been made by political leaders in  Denmark, Еstonia and the United Kingdom.

However, throughout the negotiation preparation process, the absence of Parliament is noticeable. Regardless of the scenario, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine — as the country’s sole legislative body — will be one of the key actors in adopting decisions on behalf of Ukraine. 

It is important to note that we are not advocating for or expressing support for this particular scenario of ending the war. Rather, we aim to broadly outline how such a scenario could be implemented and what role the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine would play. This analysis is crucial in the context of potential political destabilisation and challenges to legitimacy that Ukraine may face in 2025.

In general, the establishment of a buffer zone is not new to Ukraine. In 2014, following the so-called Minsk Agreements, a “line of contact” was formed — essentially a buffer zone with opposing forces positioned on either side. Moreover, Ukraine has extensive experience in hosting foreign military forces, particularly those of NATO member states (albeit under the pretext of joint exercises). The key law enabling the presence of foreign armed forces on Ukrainian territory was adopted by Parliament back in 2000. However, this does not mean that the Verkhovna Rada’s involvement would be limited.

Let us consider scenarios in which a foreign military contingent might be present in Ukraine as a security guarantee. This could involve a UN contingent (1), a European Union force (2), or troops from individual countries (3). Each of these scenarios has its own specifics, but all require the conclusion of a peace agreement.

Such an agreement would provide a solid basis for Ukraine to appeal to the UN Security Council or the Council of the European Union to deploy peacekeeping forces on its territory. In the case of an agreement with individual countries, third parties would need to be involved, and zones, capabilities, and conditions for the deployment of foreign military units would have to be defined. These arrangements must be formalised through a multilateral international treaty. At the same time, the multilateral treaty must comply with the requirements established by Ukrainian law — that is, it must contain information on the composition, structure, and other characteristics of the foreign forces; the location and boundaries of deployment areas; and restrictions on the movement of their military and civilian personnel, among other provisions.

The next step is the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of a law recognising the binding nature of such a multilateral treaty for Ukraine, in line with the requirements of the Law on International Treaties.

In this context, it is important to recall that it is Parliament that will ratify the treaty. According to subparagraphs 23 and 32 of Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, it is the Verkhovna Rada that, by adopting a law, ratifies Ukraine’s international treaties and directly approves decisions both on sending units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine abroad and on admitting foreign armed forces to the territory of Ukraine.

Next, in the case of the first and second scenarios, the Verkhovna Rada must prepare an appeal to the United Nations Security Council or the Council of the European Union.

It is important to note that a resolution to deploy peacekeeping missions to a specific country must be supported by at least nine of the 15 members of the Security Council. Moreover, it must receive affirmative votes from all five permanent members — including the Russian Federation. Therefore, this scenario appears to be the least realistic.

The final step is the formation and deployment of military units from third countries on the territory of Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping mission.

It is essential that this entire process proceeds in a coordinated manner and in compliance with Ukrainian legislation. Therefore, Parliament must begin developing and adopting the necessary legislative acts in parallel with the start of negotiations. Particularly, this concerns the previously mentioned Law “On the Procedure for Admitting and the Conditions for the Presence of Units of the Armed Forces of Other States on the Territory of Ukraine”.

• Provide for the possibility of deploying troops from third countries for peacekeeping purposes. Currently, the law does not allow individual countries to deploy their forces to Ukraine for peacekeeping without a decision from the UN or the EU, although foreign armed forces may be admitted to fight alongside Ukraine against the aggressor.
• Regulate issues related to additional requirements for an international treaty, should the need arise; the use of real estate, Ukraine’s airspace, navigational, hydrographic, and informational support by the peacekeeping military contingent; the provision of utilities, household and other services; and the procedures for border and customs control for peacekeeping personnel.

Once agreements on peace (a truce) have been reached and there is clarity regarding which peacekeeping forces will be deployed on the territory of Ukraine, Parliament will need to adopt legislative acts to regulate the following issues:

1. The definition and status of a buffer (demilitarised or sanitary) zone, including the delineation of its territorial boundaries.
2. Rules for interaction between the peacekeeping contingent and Ukrainian state authorities and the civilian population residing (or present) in this zone.
3. Conditions for the residence or presence of civilians in the zone.
4. Rules governing the activities of Ukrainian state authorities and the provision of public, medical, and banking services to the population in this special zone.
5. Business operations.
6. The payment of taxes, duties, and other mandatory contributions in this territory.

All the aforementioned amendments to existing legislation — and the need for new laws — address only one issue: the deployment of peacekeepers. However, the challenges we will face after a ceasefire are far broader. The pace at which our negotiating positions are changing and the uncertainty surrounding the preparation process for these negotiations suggest that the work on legislative changes must begin now — as there may not be enough time later. The process is already under way, which is why the active involvement of Parliament is essential.

Studying the needs and problems of veterans and, more generally, veterans’ policy has been going on in Ukraine for the past 11 years. However, it became more pronounced when the war went beyond the ATO/JFO and affected almost every Ukrainian family. Many relevant actors, experts, and observers are still of the opinion that the veterans’ policy is not really formed and that the set of tools for its development is still almost entirely borrowed from the state practices of the Ukrainian SSR.

But if the changed context is a window of opportunity for systemic change, how long can this window be open? Will the changed context allow for the creation of a veterans’ policy capable of addressing veterans’ concerns?

In order to answer these questions, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives has analysed the experience of the development of veterans’ policy in the 2014-2022 period, with a clear focus on the question “Why did it happen this way?” at all stages of the policy cycle.

The ALI considers veterans’ policy as a case study and an important precedent. Answering the question, “Why did we fail to develop a qualitatively new veterans’ policy in 2014-2022?” the report also provides a detailed look at the work of the Ukrainian system of decision-making and implementation.

We use several approaches and methods to answer these questions, primarily institutionalism and public policy analysis.

• Institutionalism: The object of research is viewed through the prism of formal and informal rules, institutions, and policymaking mechanisms. This model allows policy to be divided into stages of a single system — the policy cycle. The political cycle model is used in this study as a kind of “optic” that allows us to better see what is happening in the decision-making system.
• Analysis of state policy: We have included an analysis of the actions of the Verkhovna Rada, the President and the Government to provide a more comprehensive view of the whole policy cycle.

The study focuses on veterans’ policy and identifies systemic problems that have arisen at each stage of its development. The study also contains tasks and recommendations for optimising and improving the design of veterans’ policy.

Read more about the issues of veterans’ policy 2014-2022 — in the new ALI study.

For more than a decade, Russia has systematically violated the rights of Ukrainians in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in the temporarily occupied areas of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Its international obligations to protect the rights of civilians in occupied territories remain unfulfilled. The restoration of citizens’ rights is only possible if the root causes of the conflict are identified and the crimes committed are fully investigated. This is precisely the role of a well-developed concept of transitional justice.

Transitional justice must take into account the post-war condition of the state and society and should involve comprehensive legislative reform to regulate all processes aimed at restoring justice and protecting human rights. The urgency of enshrining this concept in legislation stems from the risk of an overwhelming backlog of cases, which could severely overload the justice system and lead to unreasonably lengthy procedures for the restoration of victims’ rights. To avoid such an outcome and to respond effectively to the challenges of the post-war period, a holistic approach is essential. This includes both reforming the legal framework governing law enforcement and judicial institutions in line with the principles of transitional justice and initiating the review of cases concerning the restoration of rights and freedoms, already at this stage, to prevent the justice system from being overloaded in the future.

Transitional justice refers to the processes and mechanisms designed to address the consequences of large-scale conflicts, repression, and human rights violations — with the goal of ensuring accountability, delivering justice, and achieving both fairness and historical truth. Its overarching aim is to guide a society’s transition from a state of conflict — in which national justice and law enforcement systems are dysfunctional and human rights are systematically violated — to a state of peace and stability, where citizens’ rights are restored, and institutions are reformed to prevent future conflicts.

Transitional justice can be implemented through both judicial and non-judicial means. These may include accountability initiatives, reparations, truth-seeking effortsThe concept of ‘truth-seeking’ means ensuring people’s right to know 1) why the conflict started, 2) who committed what crimes during the conflict, 3) how their loved ones died, 4) how, by whom and what decisions were made during the conflict, and 5) what was the nature of the conflict and what needs to be done to avoid its recurrence., institutional reform, and measures to prevent future violations.

In 1997, L. JoinetLouis Joinet was a member of the Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a mandate he held for 17 years. In addition, he participated in the creation of the Working Group against Arbitrary Detention at the former Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council). In 1988, he drafted the first declaration to the UN Convention against Enforced Disappearances in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. presented a report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, in which he outlined a list of 42 principles for preventing impunity for those who had violated human rights. These principles were divided into four categories: (1) the right to truth; (2) the right to justice; (3) the right to reparations; and (4) guarantees of non-repetition.

To ensure the protection of human rights, the following are necessary: 1) access to justice for all citizens, especially those belonging to particularly vulnerable groups; 2) reform of the existing system (the judiciary, the police, etc.) and the establishment of new independent bodies to investigate crimes and violations, with maximum involvement of victims and civil society (in particular, truth commissions); 3) adoption of a strategy aimed at the comprehensive implementation of transitional justice at all levels of the state, and amendments to legislative acts; 4) reparations in the context of human rights violations (both material and non-material).

Transitional justice became an important topic in the context of human rights violations against Ukrainian citizens starting in 2014. However, a substantive discussion initiated by civil society organisations only began in 2016, and in 2017, the development of a draft law “On the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Overcoming the Consequences of the Armed Conflict” was announced.

In 2019, by a Decree of the President of Ukraine, a Commission on Legal Reform was established, which developed a Concept of Transitional Justice. However, the Concept was never approved.

The next step was the development of a draft law on the transitional period under the auspices of the Ministry for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories. In 2021, the draft law “On the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Transitional Period” was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. It was criticised by both the civil society and the Venice Commission. The key argument was that a single legislative act is seen as an ineffective tool for addressing the broad range of issues encompassed by transitional justice. The non-governmental sector, in its analysis, advocated for the development of a strategy that would provide for amendments to specific legislative acts. The Venice Commission pointed to the issue of the list of occupied territories of Ukraine and recommended clarifications and revisions. The draft law was withdrawn by the Government in early 2022 and was not reintroduced to Parliament.

By the Decree of the President of Ukraine of 24 March 2021, the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol was approved. A few months later, by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 29 September 2021, an action plan for the implementation of this Strategy was adopted.

Russia’s unlawful war against Ukraine has continued for over ten years. Despite previous attempts to address transitional justice, there is still no unified approach, resulting in fragmented legislative initiatives aimed at implementing individual elements of transitional justice.

These fragmented and uncoordinated initiatives include the following acts:

A draft law on restricting participation in state governance for individuals associated with political parties whose activities have been banned.

The action plan for the implementationThe Action Plan was approved by Order No. 1171-r, as amended by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 4 April 2023. of the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol includes 127 updated measures. The revised plan for the reintegration and de-occupation of the ARC was developed to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens and legal entities whose legitimate interests were violated due to armed aggression. However, it focuses exclusively on the ARC and does not provide for a systematic approach covering all citizens of Ukraine.

The addition of Article 111¹ “Collaboration Activities” to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, proposed by the Ministry for National Unity of Ukraine, is intended to regulate issues related to the activities of state authorities, local self-government bodies, and business entities in the de facto occupied territories of Ukraine. Citizens, local authorities, and municipal institutions must have a clear understanding of the limits of their actions to ensure that their activities do not fall under the relevant provisions of criminal law.

A draft of the new Strategy for the period until 2026 and an operational action plan for its implementation have also been developed and presented in April this year. The draft aims to synchronise the actions of state authorities, local self-government bodies and the restoration of human and civil rights and freedoms in the de-occupied territories.

Despite efforts to develop an effective concept, they have so far yielded no tangible results. In the case of pre-war initiatives, the main problem was the lack of a comprehensive approach to transitional justice, which led to unsystematic amendments to legislative acts. Consequently, the provisions of different laws contradicted or duplicated one another. In addition, transitional justice was often considered solely within the context of judicial reform, without parallel reform of law enforcement agencies or the necessary amendments to criminal, civil, and administrative legislation. During the full-scale invasion, the primary issue remains fragmentation.

According to the plan for the reintegration and de-occupation of the ARC, transitional justice is to be applied only to individuals who lived or continue to live in the territory of the ARC, which makes this concept rather limited in terms of the population it covers. Consequently, there is currently no unified and systemic vision for the implementation of transitional justice that would ensure the reform of all key sectors and the inclusion of all citizens of Ukraine.

Therefore, there are no simple answers to the challenges associated with the transitional justice system — they require new systemic approaches and, above all, the development of a current transitional justice strategy that genuinely considers all previous recommendations and remarks, both from civil society and the Venice Commission.

During the discussion, Svitlana Matviienko, Executive Director of the ALI, shared her vision of civil society’s role in cooperation with governmental authorities, where the partnership should be strengthened, and how to make it more effective.

Given the experience of the Coalition of NGOs led by ALI, which prepared the Shadow Report to Title 23 Justice and Fundamental Rights of the European Commission’s 2023 Report on Ukraine, it should also be borne in mind that the issue of thorough joint work on roadmaps is both about human capital and the ability to implement them. And civil society needs to find opportunities to support institutions working on European integration processes, as this is a huge amount of work.

All issues, especially in times of war, can be resolved jointly and constructively, both with partners and civil society. Therefore, an important task for the public sector is to form such Coalitions and maintain constructive relations, while the government institutions need to build an adequate framework for cooperation.

Ukraine’s Accession to the EU: Shaping the Transformation Agenda Forum was held on 7 February 2025. This forum brought together representatives of governmental authorities, the European Union, and the expert community. 

During the event, participants discussed Ukraine’s transformation plan in the areas of the rule of law and public administration, namely roadmaps that will become key benchmarks for the coming years for Ukraine to achieve the EU membership criteria and a roadmap for the functioning of democratic institutions. These developments will form the basis for negotiations with the EU. Therefore, it is important to jointly identify the strategic priorities of such roadmaps, further steps for their implementation, and all the tasks and challenges along the way.

On 14 April 2022, Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland Tomasz Grodzki, for the first time as a representative of the international community, stated:

This statement was the first time a foreign official used the term “crime of genocide” to describe the nature of Russia’s crimes against Ukraine. Tomasz Grodzki’s words not only marked the beginning of a trend of states recognising the genocidal nature of the Russian invasion but also highlighted the politicisation of the crime of genocide as a special phenomenon in world politics.

According to international lawArticle 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Courtу, four categories of international crimes are currently enshrined: 

• The crime of genocide that is construed as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.”
• Crimes against humanity, meaning “any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”
• War crimes, which are violations of international humanitarian law, i.e., violations of the rules and laws of war. As of May 2024, more than 133,000 war crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine have been documented in Ukraine, and this figure is constantly growing.
• The crime of aggression, which is defined as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a person […] of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations […].”

In its assessments, the international community tends to refer to two categories of crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine: 1) war crimes; 2) crimes against humanity.

The peculiarity of all four categories is that they are independent, autonomous and, most importantly, equal. International crimes (four categories mentioned above) do not have an internal hierarchy that would make a particular category more important than another. From a legal standpoint, all categories are equal as they relate to different types of crimes and acts. In the context of the Ukrainian case, it is important to consider all of these categories with equal vigilance, with particular attention being paid to the qualification of Russia’s crimes as genocide.

First, it concerns the competence of the global judicial architecture. Who has the right to consider and address issues related to massive violations of international law?

The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over all four categories of crimes. In the context of Ukraine’s case, the Court can consider three categories: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. However, there are two caveats:

• The crime of aggression does not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC (in the case of Ukraine, due to the history of the ratification of the Rome Statute), so this issue is being dealt with by an expert group that is initiating the creation of a special international tribunal to consider the crime of aggression.
• Out of 32 cases pending before the ICC, only one has been charged with the crime of genocide. However, this case is at the pre-trial stage (Sudan), which is why there is a risk that the ICC’s examination will not provide the desired results for Ukraine.

As early as 5 April 2022, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union criticised the current criminal legislation of Ukraine, noting that “war crimes are so poorly formulated that it is almost impossible to apply this qualification in practice.” Sometimes the lack of professional practices and sometimes irrelevant legislative formulations inherited from the traditions of Soviet law perception hinder not only the initial qualification of crimes but, most importantly, their further investigation and the nature of the sentence.

This creates significant challenges, as Russia’s crimes may remain outside the scope of judicial proceedings.

The third explanation is the challenges associated with the use of the term “genocide” itself. In the socio-political discourse, there is a belief that the concept of genocide is a serious violation of international law and applies only to the Holocaust, as all modern cases of the crime do not reach the same scale and, accordingly, the number of victims. However, what is the quantitative indicator – does the number of victims have to reach one million for the international community to define this crime as genocide? The question is rather rhetorical.

An equally important challenge is the politicisation of the problem. Leading states in the international arena do not dare to publicly discuss the genocidal nature of the Russian attack because they have their own interests and often close economic and political ties with Russia. This kind of fear limits their political will and the unity of the international community, which, following the domino principle, demonstrates a certain passivity due to the lack of clear steps by influential states.

From the very beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine immediately reacted to the events and adopted a statement on the crime of genocide committed by Russia against Ukraine. Thus, the main legislative body, on behalf of the Ukrainian people, recognised Russia’s actions as genocidal.

The crime of genocide is the only category of international crimes that indicates the aggressor state’s special intent to destroy a group in whole or in part. In Ukraine’s testimony, this is a key point, as the qualification of Russia’s crimes against the Ukrainian people as a crime of genocide will illustrate that the aggressor state’s violations of international law are due to its main goal, which is to destroy Ukrainians.

A number of legal instruments can be used to understand how the crime of genocide is interpreted and qualified in practice. In this context, we appeal to the experience of the ICTR and the ICTY.

The practice of the ICTR and the ICTY shows how the subjective category of “intent” can be interpreted to prove that the actions of the Russian Federation are genocidal in nature. For example, the ICTY’s evidentiary practice offers a list of circumstantial grounds that simplify the proof of the criminal’s special intent. One of these grounds can be considered the fact of the intentional and systematic destruction of persons because they are part of a particular group, while the destruction of members of other groups is excluded. In this context, there is evidence that Russian soldiers and armed groups have killed and tortured civilians precisely because they belong to the Ukrainian national group, for their bold self-identification and for using the Ukrainian language.

However, the problem is not the lack of evidence but rather the absence of effective tools that would have a real ability to monitor, classify and recognise the actions of the Russian Federation as genocidal already today.

So what are the alternatives? Should we convene a special tribunal for Russia’s crimes, following the example of the ICTR and the ICTY? How can we ensure real guarantees that the crime of genocide does not go unpunished?

The study encompasses the main trends in various spheres of de-occupied communities of Kherson Oblast based on the results of the analysis of data on the socio-economic situation in 17 communities, i.e., the entire de-occupied part of the oblast. The data set was collected based on five indicators: socio-demographic, infrastructure, financial, migration trends and cooperation.

Context. Back in 2023, the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada Committee on the Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning, studied the state of public services in the de-occupied communities of Kherson Oblast. During this study, the need to collect information beyond the issue of public services appeared, so ALI conducted an additional study to analyse the situation fully and identify interdependencies between the problems.

Oleksandr Zaslavskyi, Deputy Executive Director of the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, presented the study prepared at the request of the relevant Committee and stressed that such data was very much needed by stakeholders – both MPs responsible for legislation and government representatives developing public policies – to refer to substantiated data in their work.

Vitalii Bezgin, Chair of the Subcommittee on Administrative and Territorial Structure and Local Self-Government of the Committee on the Organisation of State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning, stressed the critical importance of such research and the need for continued cooperation to scale it up:

Oleksiy Riabykin, Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine, noted that it was necessary to continue the study, and the Ministry was ready to help:

Tetiana Lukeria, an engaged analyst at the Agency for Legislative Initiatives, discussed the study’s key findings and recommendations. She also reminded that this was the second study covering Kherson Oblast – in July, ALI presented a study on public services, in which it measured the extent to which communities can provide residents with various types of services:

Alina Zahoruiko, Deputy Chair of the Committee, Chair of the Subcommittee on Elections, Referendums and Other Forms of Direct Democracy of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning, noted the complexity and need for research on the socio-economic situation in the de-occupied communities:

Dmytro Mykysha, member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on State Power, Local Self-Government, Regional Development and Urban Planning, shared the findings of the study, which could potentially be developed further:

The study “Analysis of the socio-economic situation in de-occupied communities: Kherson Oblast” is available here.

The event is held within the Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine (PASS Ukraine) project, which the Agency for Legislative Initiatives is implementing jointly with the Parliamentary Centre (Canada), in cooperation with the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with support from  Global Affairs Canada within the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs).

Research concept. The materials highlight the general trends in the development of de-occupied communities in the Kherson Oblast. Five indicators are of particular importance:

1. Socio-demographic indicators — since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of inhabitants in the de-occupied communities of the Kherson oblast has decreased significantly. Due to the rapid and partly chaotic migration processes, it has become more difficult to organise the process of service provision;
2. Indicators of infrastructural accessibility — due to the fact that the infrastructure in each community has been damaged and destroyed after the de-occupation and due to the constant shelling;
3. Financial indicators — as one of the biggest challenges faced by communities during the war is their financial capacity;
4. Indicators of migration processes — almost no community records data on the residence of its residents in other communities, regions or countries, making it difficult to calculate migration trends;
5. Indicators of cooperation — international cooperation, cooperation between municipalities and with NGOs can be an additional resource for de-occupied municipalities to optimise services. However, only a small number of de-occupied communities in Kherson oblast make use of this opportunity.

ALI has conducted a study that provides a number of recommendations for the balanced revitalisation of de-occupied communities in Kherson Oblast, taking into account the current indicators and the problems associated with them.

You can read more about the socio-economic situation in the de-occupied communities of the Kherson oblast in the new research by the Agency for Legislative Initiatives.

The research was conducted within the framework of the project “Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector in Ukraine” (PASS Ukraine), which the Agency implements together with the Parliamentary Centre, in cooperation with The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and with the support of Canada’s Foreign Policy—Global Affairs Canada as part of the Peacebuilding Program and stability (PSOPs).

According to international law Art. 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court., there are four independent categories of international crimes today: 

1. the crime of genocide;
2. crimes against humanity;
3. war crimes;
4. the crime of aggression. 

Ukraine should consider all four categories, but it is critical to focus on recognising russia’s crimes against Ukraine as genocide. It is worth noting that while international crimes are subject to classification, there is no hierarchy of “atrocity” under any circumstances.

The importance of this issue is that the crime of genocide is the only category of international crimes that indicates the deliberate intention of the aggressor state to destroy a specific group in whole or in part. It means that the proof of the crime of genocide illustrates that all these categories of international crimes were committed because of russia’s primary goal of exterminating Ukrainians.

However, the process of recognising russia’s actions as an act of genocide faces significant challenges. First of all, this concerns the absence in historical retrospect of an effective mechanism that would have jurisdiction and a real opportunity to investigate and qualify the crime of genocide in the context of Ukraine. Another problem is the political aspect of the issue. Former colonising powers have a particular fear of publicly discussing crimes of genocide. However, the political component is perhaps the most crucial aspect of the qualification of crimes, as the “domino principle” is quite effective in the international arena, i.e., when influential players make decisions, other states follow.

That is why ALI’s new PARLIAMENT journal raises the following questions: “Do the norms of national legislation comply with the norms and principles of international law in terms of international crimes: war crimes and genocide?” and “How to legally justify the qualification of russia’s crimes against Ukraine as the crime of genocide?”.